State v. Clint Saenz ( 2014 )

NUMBER 13-11-00328-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
CLINT SAENZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the 28th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
ORDER
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Perkes1
Order Per Curiam
This case is on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant, the
State of Texas, appealed the trial court’s granting of a motion to suppress filed by
1The Honorable Rose Vela, former Justice of this Court, did not participate in this decision because
her term of office expired on December 31, 2012. In accordance with the appellate rules, she was replaced
on panel by Justice Gregory T. Perkes. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1(a).
appellee, Clint Saenz, who was indicted on one count of driving while intoxicated. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2011). Saenz moved to suppress certain
oral statements made to police, the trial court granted the motion, and we affirmed. See
State v. Saenz, No. 13-11-00328-CR, 2012 WL 7783406, at *1–5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Dec. 28, 2012) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court of criminal
appeals reversed, holding, among other things, that while our “ultimate legal conclusion”
that Saenz was in custody at the time he made the challenged statements “may
be . . . correct,” we erred “in attempting to reach that legal conclusion in the absence of
adequate fact-findings from the trial court.” State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 498 & n.7
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The court of criminal appeals remanded the cause to this Court
for abatement to the trial court for more complete findings of fact. Id. at 498. We then
abated the appeal on December 17, 2013, and remanded to the trial court for more
complete findings of fact. We specifically ordered the trial court to enter findings as to:
(1) whether Officer Bintliff told Saenz that he was not free to leave; and (2) how long
Saenz was inside the police car before he made the challenged statements to Officer
Sanders.
The trial court made the following supplemental findings of fact:
1. The Court finds that these findings are supported by credible
evidence. The Court makes no general credibility determinations.
2. Neither Officer Bintliff nor Officer Sanders read the statutory
Miranda warnings prior to question[ing] Mr. Saenz.
3. Mr. Saenz was instructed to turn off his vehicle, was placed in the
back of Officer B[]intliff’s police car, and was instructed by Officer
Bintliff not to leave. [Record citations omitted]
4. No officer advised Mr. Saenz that he was free to leave at any time
prior to or during his interrogation.
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5. Officer Bintliff approached Mr. Saenz shortly after 2:13 a.m. Officer
Sanders was dispatched at 2:25 a.m., arriving some time after. The
Court finds that Mr. Saenz was in custody for approximately 20
minutes prior to his interrogation by Officer Sanders.
6. A reasonable person, under these circumstances, would have
believed he had been arrested during the time of his interrogation.
7. Officer Bintliff’s manifestation of his intent to arrest Mr. Saenz was
made when he physically placed Mr. Saenz in his police car and
verbally told him not to leave. Officer Bintliff testified he believed
Mr. Saenz was intoxicated before placing Mr. Saenz in his police
car and called for a DWI enforcement officer.
The State has filed an objection to the supplemental findings, asserting that they
are inadequate because: (1) though the trial court found that Saenz was “in custody for
approximately 20 minutes prior to his interrogation,” it did not make a finding as to how
long Saenz was in the police car prior to his interrogation; (2) there was no finding as to
whether the officers told Saenz to wait while they continued investigating, and (3) the trial
court did not make any “general credibility determinations” regarding the officers’
testimony. We agree in part. The trial court was under no obligation to make “general
credibility determinations” as to each officer’s testimony. See Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d
220, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noting that, at a suppression hearing, “a trial judge is
free to believe or disbelieve any part of the testimony as he sees fit”). However, findings
as to the specific issues identified by the State—i.e., how long Saenz was in the police
car before being questioned and whether the officers told him to wait while they continued
investigating—are necessary to our evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the
case. We find that the supplemental findings of fact entered by the trial court are
inadequate because they failed to address these specific issues.
Accordingly, we hereby REMAND this cause to the trial court for entry of additional
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supplemental findings of fact as to: (1) how long Saenz was in the police car before
Officer Sanders began interrogating him; and (2) whether either officer told Saenz to wait
in the police car while they continued investigating. The trial court shall make its findings,
as ordered herein, within FIFTEEN days from the date of this order. Furthermore, the
trial court shall cause a supplemental clerk’s record to be filed with the Clerk of this Court
within THIRTY days from the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
Delivered and filed the
7th day of February, 2014.
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