State v. Mark Emede Garcia ( 2013 )

NUMBER 13-13-00185-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
MARK EMEDE GARCIA, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant the State of Texas challenges the trial court's granting of appellee Mark
Emede Garcia's motion to suppress. By seven issues, which we consolidate as one, the
State argues that the trial court erred in determining that the arresting officer's seizure of
several weapons, drugs, and drug paraphernalia from Garcia's vehicle violated Garcia's
constitutional and statutory rights. We affirm.
I. Background
On February 6, 2012, Garcia was arrested after Victoria Sheriff's Deputy Jason
Boyd discovered what he believed to be stolen guns in the vehicle Garcia was driving. In
his search of Garcia and the vehicle after the arrest, Deputy Boyd discovered a small
amount of methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia connected with the use of
methamphetamines. Garcia was indicted for state jail felony possession of a controlled
substance. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (West 2010). Garcia
filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Deputy Boyd's search of his person and vehicle
and subsequent seizure of evidence violated Garcia's rights under the United States and
Texas Constitutions and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
At the hearing on Garcia's motion to suppress, Deputy Boyd testified that he
stopped Garcia around 5:00 p.m. for driving eighty-one miles per hour in a seventy
mile-per-hour zone. Deputy Boyd approached the vehicle and asked for Garcia's
driver's license and insurance. Deputy Boyd testified that Garcia handed him his license
but was looking around the vehicle for the insurance information. Deputy Boyd asked
Garcia if he wanted to look in the glove compartment. Garcia then opened the glove
compartment partially and quickly closed it, telling Deputy Boyd that he did not have the
insurance information. Deputy Boyd testified that Garcia seemed nervous and that
Garcia's demeanor made Deputy Boyd suspicious that Garcia was concealing some sort
of contraband in the vehicle.
Deputy Boyd asked Garcia to step out of the vehicle and then asked Garcia if he
had any weapons. Garcia responded that he had just bought a pistol and pointed to a
box on the floorboard of the vehicle. Garcia then told Deputy Boyd that there was
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another gun in the backseat and two more in the center console. Deputy Boyd testified
that he observed a bulge under Garcia's shirt. The bulge was a pistol in a holster, and
Officer Boyd eventually determined that the gun in the holster was the one Garcia had just
bought. Deputy Boyd testified that, for his safety, he secured that pistol from Garcia.
The pistol was unloaded. Garcia then gave Deputy Boyd consent to retrieve the
remaining guns from the vehicle. Another officer, Sergeant Mikulic of the Victoria
Sheriff's Department, arrived on the scene around 5:30 p.m.
While Sergeant Mikulic stood with Garcia, Deputy Boyd took the guns to his patrol
car and radioed dispatch to check the serial numbers of the guns to determine if they were
stolen. Dispatch informed Deputy Boyd that two of the guns were stolen. At this point,
Deputy Boyd placed Garcia under arrest for possession of the stolen guns. In a search
of Garcia's person incident to arrest, Deputy Boyd retrieved a small plastic bag of
methamphetamines from Garcia's pocket. In a further search of Garcia's vehicle,
Deputy Boyd recovered drug paraphernalia associated with the use of
methamphetamines. In his subsequent processing of the case, Deputy Boyd
determined that dispatch had been mistaken about the two guns and that they were, in
fact, not stolen.
After the close of evidence and argument by counsel, the trial court granted
Garcia's motion to suppress. In its order granting the motion, the trial court made the
following findings and conclusions:
[T]he officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle defendant was
driving for exceeding the speed limit;
defendant consented for the officer to search the vehicle for guns; the
officer called in to dispatch the make and model of the weapons with serial
number to check if the weapons were stolen;
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the officer did not have reasonable suspicion that the weapons were stolen
when he called in the weapon information, and the reason for the stop
(vehicle violation and proof of insurance issue) would have otherwise been
concluded;
dispatch reported to the officer that 2 weapons were stolen based on the
serial numbers, but did not relay the make and model even though that
information was available at the time;
dispatch was wrong in advising that the weapons were stolen because the
make and model on the information dispatch had were different than the
make and model called in by the officer;
the defendant was then arrested based on dispatch's erroneous information
that the weapons were stolen and the drugs were recovered in a search
after the arrest.
The Court concludes that the defendant was illegally arrested and therefore
the alleged drugs found after the arrest should be suppressed (assuming
arguendo that the officer could detain a defendant [and] do a serial number
check to see if weapons were stolen as part of the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion that weapons were stolen and when the stop would
otherwise be concluded).
This appeal followed.1
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Whether the trial court properly ruled on a defendant's motion to suppress is
reviewed under a bifurcated standard of review. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720,
725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State,
214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to a trial
court's determination of historic facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon
the credibility of a witness, but apply a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law
1
Appellee has not filed a brief to assist us in our disposition of this appeal.
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and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d
919, 922–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court's ruling. When a trial court makes explicit fact findings, the appellate
court determines whether the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable
to the trial court's ruling) supports these fact findings. The appellate court
then reviews the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless the trial court's
supported-by-the-record explicit fact findings are also dispositive of the
legal ruling.
State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court does
not enter findings of fact, we assume the court made implicit findings of fact supporting its
ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d
853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In the end, we must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is
reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to
the case. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
"It has been an accepted part of state and federal jurisprudence for many years
that law enforcement officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal
activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest."
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting Crockett v. State,
803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)) (other citations omitted). To justify an
investigative detention, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person
detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Derichsweiler v.
State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A reasonable suspicion
requires specific articulable facts based on the officer's experience and personal
knowledge that, when coupled with the logical inferences from those facts, would warrant
the intrusion on the detainee; "[t]hese facts must amount to more than a mere hunch or
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suspicion." Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244 (citing Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989)) (other citations omitted). "An investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
The investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. (citing
Perez v. State, 818 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ))
(other citations omitted). "This limitation means that once the reason for the stop has
been satisfied, the stop may not be used as a 'fishing expedition for unrelated criminal
activity.'" Id. at 243 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring)). "[A] detention that is not temporary and reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference, is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the
Fourth Amendment." Id.
III. Discussion
By one issue, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Garcia's motion
to suppress. Specifically, the State argues that: (1) Deputy Boyd had the legal
authority to temporarily seize Garcia's weapons during the traffic stop; (2) Deputy Boyd
had the legal authority to call in the seized weapon's identifiers to determine if they were
stolen; (3) Deputy Boyd did not unduly prolong the traffic stop; (4) Deputy Boyd acted in
objective good faith in relying on the dispatch's report that the weapons were stolen; and
(5) as such, the evidence obtained was not excludable under the constitutions and statute
as fruits of the poisonous tree.
To begin, we note that there is no dispute that Deputy Boyd was legally justified in
initiating the traffic stop; Garcia's traffic violation provided the reasonable suspicion to
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support the stop. The motion to suppress dealt with Deputy Boyd's actions following the
initial stop and investigation into the traffic violation. The trial court concluded that
Deputy Boyd did not have reasonable suspicion to believe the weapons in Garcia's
vehicle were stolen, and his detention of Garcia beyond concluding the traffic violation
was therefore unjustified. The trial court made no specific fact findings supporting this
conclusion. At the suppression hearing, Officer Boyd testified that based on Garcia's
nervous demeanor, he suspected that Garcia was concealing some sort of contraband in
the vehicle. He then held Garcia for over thirty minutes to run checks on the weapons he
retrieved from Garcia's person and vehicle that Garcia voluntarily disclosed were there.
Based on the trial court's conclusion, we presume the court doubted Officer Boyd's
description of Garcia's demeanor and disagreed that the facts stated by Deputy Boyd
gave rise to more than a mere hunch or suspicion that the guns in Garcia's possession
were stolen. See Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 853; see also Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244. From
the testimony at the hearing, the trial court could have reasonably found that Deputy
Boyd's testimony about Garcia's demeanor was a pretext and the resulting investigation
into the serial numbers of the guns was just the sort of fishing expedition clearly prohibited
by law. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. Because the trial court's decision was based on
its determination of Deputy Boyd's credibility, we must defer to it. See Wiede, 214
S.W.3d 24–25; see also Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 922–23. In short, we cannot conclude
that the trial court erred in concluding that there were no facts articulated by Deputy Boyd
that justified extending Garcia's temporary detention beyond the scope of the initial
purpose of the stop, i.e., the traffic violation. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244. Garcia's
arrest and the resulting search violated his rights, and the evidence seized as a result was
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therefore excludable. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005). In granting the motion to suppress on this
basis, the trial court was correct under the law.
The State argues that Deputy Boyd was within his rights to secure the weapon on
Garcia’s person for purposes of his safety and suggests that this justification extended to
his inquiring with dispatch about whether all of the guns were stolen. The State argues
that the trial court's conclusion that "[Deputy] Boyd had no reasonable suspicion the
weapons were stolen" was therefore "immaterial." It is true that an officer's safety is
paramount and justifies a temporary detention and search, and to that end, we agree with
the State that Deputy Boyd was justified in holding the weapons until the traffic stop was
concluded in order to protect himself. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). But
because the facts did not support a reasonable suspicion that the weapons were stolen,
Deputy Boyd exceeded the scope of his safety-based justification and violated Garcia's
rights when he prolonged the traffic stop to radio dispatch about the ownership of the
weapons. In short, we are not persuaded by the State's argument in this regard.
The State next argues that Deputy Boyd was "legally" justified in calling in "the
weapon's identifiers to determine if they were stolen." In support of this argument, the
State points to holdings by the court of criminal appeals allowing officers to run warrant,
license, and registration checks in the course of a routine traffic stop even if the officer has
no particularized suspicion that the driver might have a warrant or the vehicle might be
stolen. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 n.6; see also Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54,
62–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). These cases involve clearly delineated exceptions to the
usual requirement that a search requires particularized suspicion of criminal conduct, and
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we are not persuaded to create an additional exception to cover the circumstances of this
case. The mere possession of a gun is not, in and of itself, a criminal offense.
Robinson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. II; Gonzalez v. State, No. 13–08–00685–CR, 2011 WL
2652162, at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 7, 2011, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). We decline to create a blanket exception under which a
traffic officer could routinely confiscate and verify the legality of a driver's weapon absent
particularized suspicion that the weapon is stolen. And here, as discussed above, we
defer to the trial court's determination that Deputy Boyd's testimony stated no facts that
would give rise to such a particularized suspicion.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Garcia's motion to
suppress. The State's issue is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 5th
day of September, 2013.
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