Jose De Leon v. Fidel Rodriguez ( 2013 )

NUMBER 13-11-00286-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JOSE DE LEON, Appellant,
v.
FIDEL RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
This appeal arises over a landlord-tenant dispute. By one issue, appellant, Jose
De Leon, appeals, the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellee, Fidel Rodriguez, for
unpaid rent and for forcible detainer. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (West 2000).
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
This forcible detainer action was brought by Fidel against De Leon regarding a
rental property on Bluebird Avenue in McAllen, Texas.2 According to the record, Jesus
Puga Rodriguez (Jesus) is the record titleholder of the Bluebird property.
Prior to trial, De Leon filed a “Motion to Show Authority,” see TEX. R. CIV. P. 12, to
determine whether Fidel’s trial counsel, Alex Moreno Jr., was acting with proper authority
to prosecute the suit on behalf of Jesus’s interests. The trial court concluded that
Fidel’s trial counsel could continue his representation, but De Leon objected on the
grounds that no admissible written evidence existed to show privity of contract between
Fidel’s trial counsel and Jesus.
A bench trial was held in March 2011, and the trial court found in favor of Fidel.
This appeal ensued.
II. MOTION TO SHOW AUTHORITY
By one issue, De Leon asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that Fidel’s trial
counsel had authority to proceed as counsel for Jesus.
A. Applicable Law
1
The record shows that because the reporter’s record in this case is lost and unrecoverable, the
parties and trial court filed a joint “Statement of Evidence” for our review. Furthermore, because this is a
memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as
necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P.
47.4.
2
This cause was originally brought in justice court but later appealed de novo to Hidalgo County
Court at Law No. 4 where De Leon asserted a counterclaim for repairs he made to the rental property.
Those matters are not before us in this appeal.
2
When a rule of procedure is clear, unambiguous, and specific, we construe its
language according to its literal meaning. Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Furthermore, rule interpretation is a pure
question of law over which the judge has no discretion. Id. (citing Mitchell Energy Corp.
v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. 1997)).
Rule 12 of the rules of civil procedure provides the following:
A party in a suit or proceeding pending in a court of this state may, by
sworn written motion stating that he believes the suit or proceeding is being
prosecuted or defended without authority, cause the attorney to be cited to
appear before the court and show his authority to act. . . . At the hearing
on the motion, the burden of proof shall be upon the challenged attorney to
show sufficient authority to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of the
other party. Upon his failure to show such authority, the court shall refuse
to permit the attorney to appear in the cause, and shall strike the pleadings
if no person who is authorized to prosecute or defend appears. The motion
may be heard and determined at any time before the parties have
announced ready for trial, but the trial shall not be unnecessarily continued
or delayed for the hearing.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. The historical background and purpose behind Rule 12 was to
protect defendants from groundless suits. Angelina County v. McFarland, 374 S.W.2d
417, 423 (Tex. 1964). It was thought that a person who was sued was entitled to know
that the named plaintiff had in fact authorized the suit. Id.
B. Discussion
The named plaintiff in this suit is Fidel Rodriguez, not Jesus Puga Rodriguez. It
also appears undisputed from the record that Jesus is the recorded title owner of the
Bluebird property and that Fidel’s trial counsel represents Fidel, not Jesus, in the present
case. By his motion, however, De Leon challenges whether Fidel’s trial counsel has
authority to represent Jesus’s interests, when the named plaintiff is Fidel. A durable
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power of attorney or similar instrument, see TEX. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 482(3) (West
2003), signed by Jesus, which gives Fidel unreserved and unlimited “general power for
lawsuits” and “acts of administration” related to Jesus’s benefit, was admitted into
evidence over De Leon’s objection. Through this instrument, the trial court recognized
Fidel’s right to file suit on the Bluebird property on Jesus’s behalf and that Fidel’s trial
counsel was acting with property authority. Accordingly, Fidel’s trial counsel met his
burden of proof. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in overruling De Leon’s Rule 12 motion. De Leon’s sole issue is
overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
__________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
25th day of July, 2013.
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