Annie Cole Truitt v. Susan Cole Byars and William C. Cole ( 2013 )


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  •                                    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    ________________________
    No. 07-11-00348-CV
    ________________________
    ANNIE COLE TRUITT, APPELLANT
    V.
    SUSAN COLE BYARS AND WILLIAM C. COLE, APPELLEES
    On Appeal from the 46TH District Court
    Wilbarger County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 25,629, Honorable Dan Mike Bird, Presiding
    May 30, 2013
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
    Appellant, Annie Cole Truitt, appeals from the trial court’s judgment admitting the
    Last Will and Testament of Mary Faye Cole (“Cole”) dated November 20, 2009 (“2009
    will”) to probate. Appellees, Susan Faye Cole Byars and William C. Cole were the
    applicants for probate of the 2009 will. Truitt asserts the trial court erred by admitting
    the 2009 will to probate rather than Cole’s Last Will and Testament dated September
    20, 2010 (“2010 will”) because the evidence was (1) legally and (2) factually insufficient
    to establish Cole lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 2010 will; and (3) legally
    and (4) factually insufficient to establish Cole was unduly influenced to execute the 2010
    will. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    This is a will contest wherein allegations of lack of testamentary capacity and
    undue influence typically stand or fall depending on the sufficiency of the facts
    underlying the trial court’s judgment. See Rothermel v. Duncan, 
    369 S.W.2d 917
    , 921
    (Tex. 1963). In that regard, no two cases are alike. 
    Id. Given the
    polarity in the parties’
    factual contentions, it is necessary to undertake a detailed summation of the evidence
    presented during the two day bench trial. 1
    Cole was seventy-eight years old when she passed on October 13, 2010. She
    was survived by five children (Susan Faye Cole Byars, William C. Cole, Annie Lee Cole
    Truitt, Roy Cole and Thomas Ed Cole), eight grandchildren, and four great-
    grandchildren.
    GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS
    In September 2009, Truitt filed an application for permanent guardianship of Cole
    and her estate. In her application, Truitt attested Cole was suffering from Alzheimer’s
    disease and was unable to manage her property or financial affairs without a legal
    guardian. The application proposed that Truitt be appointed Cole’s permanent legal
    1
    In addition to the trial testimony of Susan Faye Byars, Kristi Hyatt, Jay Cantrell, Truitt, Dr. Francis
    Anwasi, Ruth Timberlake, Diana Negrete, Crystal Negrete, Marshall Capps, and Stephanie Hord, the
    parties stipulated to admission of the deposition transcripts of Terry Donk and Mary King as well as
    certain investigative records from Adult Protective Services, a subdivision of the Texas Department of
    Family and Protective Services.
    2
    guardian with the power to deal with her mother’s finances to the same extent as her
    mother could if she were able.              Truitt’s application sought permanent guardianship
    because Cole “lack[ed] the capacity to manage her business and financial affairs.” In
    that proceeding, the trial court appointed an attorney, Marshall Capps, to represent Cole
    as her attorney ad litem.
    Capps visited Cole three to four times after his appointment as attorney ad litem.
    According to his testimony, Cole had expressed a desire to get to a point where she
    could live free from family strife. In addition to the pending guardianship action, Cole’s
    children were previously involved in litigation concerning a family trust established by
    Cole’s late husband, William Horace (Buster) Cole. 2 Ultimately, the proceeding did not
    result in the appointment of a permanent guardian.
    2009 WILL
    In the fall of 2009, Susan Byars contacted Kristi Hyatt, an attorney who had
    known Cole for “about” four years, 3 to set up an appointment for the purpose of drafting
    a will. Other than arranging that appointment, Cole’s family did not participate in the
    drafting process or otherwise give Hyatt any instructions. Following a private meeting
    with Cole, Hyatt prepared the will and sent it to her for approval. On November 20,
    2009, Cole executed that will at Hyatt’s office. Hyatt testified that she had no concerns
    about Cole’s competence or soundness of mind at the time she executed the 2009 will.
    2
    In the litigation involving the family trust, Truitt sought to remove the trustees, Susan and William, and
    recover her attorney’s fees. According to Truitt, this litigation was originally filed by her brothers, Roy and
    Thomas Ed, concerning a dispute over some property belonging to the trust.
    3
    Hyatt testified that she had earlier assisted attorneys representing the trustees in litigation where Cole
    had been named as a defendant.
    3
    The 2009 will appointed Susan Faye Byars and William C. Cole as independent
    co-executors and co-trustees of all trusts created by the will. The will provided that all
    principal and income from the family trust established by her late husband would pass
    to Susan and William in equal amounts. If either Susan or William predeceased her, the
    trust distribution would be made to Cole’s grandchildren, subject to the establishment of
    contingent trusts for those grandchildren who were less than twenty-one years of age or
    incapacitated. After providing for her debts, the residue of her estate passed to Susan
    and William in equal amounts, subject to similar contingent trust provisions.
    NEW POWER OF ATTORNEY
    In June 2010, Cole was living at Wynwood Assited Living in Vernon, Texas.
    Stephanie Hord, LVN and Health/Woman’s Director at Wynwood, provided oversight for
    Cole’s medication program. In that capacity, she saw Cole on a daily basis. Cole was
    on medications for anxiety, upset stomach, heartburn, Parkinson’s disease, pain, and
    dementia. Although Cole was generally oriented as to person, there were times when
    she was not oriented as to place or time.        On certain days, Cole was difficult to
    understand. On other days, she was unable to take her medication due to swallowing
    problems.   She had a history of congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, and
    plaque build-up in her veins.
    Truitt moved from Galveston to Vernon in June of 2009 to be with her mother.
    Prior to her arrival, she had not visited Cole for approximately one year. Truitt testified
    she came to visit her mother because Cole had been hospitalized for dehydration and
    depression. The second day after her arrival Truitt had a conversation with Cole about
    4
    why she had sued her mother concerning the family trust. 4 Truitt explained that she
    didn’t initiate the litigation but was drawn into it and, as a result, she had accrued
    considerable legal fees. She told her mother that, during mediation, the trustees (Susan
    and William) and her twin brothers (Roy and Thomas Ed) agreed to pay each other’s
    legal fees, or a portion thereof, but they would not agree to pay hers.
    Truitt testified Cole was experiencing hallucinations in the evenings, typically
    lasting until after dark.      She indicated her mother had “some mild dementia” and
    occasional memory problems although she did not believe her mother had Alzheimer’s
    disease.    Truitt also took her mother to see an alternative medicine doctor who made
    changes to Cole’s heart medications. Dr. Lindsey Streit, Cole’s primary physician, did
    not approve of the medication changes.
    On June 25, Hord discussed the changes sought by the alternative medicine
    doctor with Truitt. Hord’s concern was that the new doctor had prescribed several
    changes to Cole’s heart medications and fluid pills that were not in her best interest.
    Hord testified “that’s generally not just something that we completely go in and stop on
    someone that has a history of cardiac problems.” Hord also indicated to Truitt that,
    before the changes could be implemented, she was required to obtain approval from
    Susan, who had Cole’s power of attorney.
    In July, Truitt hired Jay Cantrell, an attorney she found on the internet, to prepare
    a new power of attorney for Cole. Truitt called Cantrell “at her mother’s request,” and
    instructed him to prepare a new power of attorney empowering Truitt to “do and perform
    4
    At the time, Truitt’s guardianship proceeding was pending.
    5
    each and every act and thing that I may or can do (either personally or through my
    person), . . . so long as [Truitt] shall deem, in his (sic) discretion, the act to be proper,
    expedient or advisable.” There was no evidence Cole ever spoke with Cantrell or had
    any participation in drafting the new power of attorney. On July 10, Cole purportedly
    executed the document drafted by Cantrell.
    After Truitt was given power of attorney authority, Cole’s medical condition
    substantially declined. Although Cole had been very active and walked throughout
    Wynwood, she now had trouble walking and stayed in her room. Hord also testified
    Truitt had Cole’s pet cat put to sleep, when others at Wynwood believed Cole would
    never have consented to it. Truitt also had access to Cole’s bank account containing
    approximately $200,000.
    2010 WILL
    A. PRE-EXECUTION
    In mid-July, Adult Protective Services received a complaint that Truitt had
    medically neglected Cole by taking her off her blood pressure and heart medications.
    On July 14, representatives of Adult Protective Services interviewed Cole and Truitt.
    Cole was unaware Truitt now had access to her bank account and could not explain
    why she had replaced Susan with Truitt as the person with her power of attorney. Truitt
    indicated Cole was in very poor health and feared she would not live long. Truitt also
    indicated Cole was unaware that the 2009 will had cut Truitt completely out of any
    inheritance.
    6
    On July 16 and 17, Cole called Hyatt, and/or her legal assistants, requesting that
    they fax her estate papers to Truitt’s attorney, Cantrell. In the background, they could
    hear a voice coaching and prompting Cole. On July 20, Hyatt’s assistant received a
    similar call from Cole and also heard a female voice coaching Cole. The assistant
    indicated Cole appeared to be answering questions by repeating what someone was
    saying to her. Later, that same day, Cole called again requesting that estate documents
    be faxed to Cantrell. Again, the assistant heard a female voice in the background
    prompting Cole. On July 21, Hyatt received a call directly from Truitt, who, acting as
    Cole’s power of attorney, requested her mother’s estate documents. Hyatt testified he
    was uncomfortable providing the documents because he believed Cole was being
    coached. Ultimately, however, he complied with the request.
    Truitt testified that, after she received the documents from Hyatt, she showed
    them to her mother, who then indicated she wanted a new will. Truitt testified that, at
    first, her mother was leaning towards leaving the bulk of her estate to her. Truitt was
    uncomfortable with that idea because she didn’t want her staying with Cole to be seen
    as something done for personal gain. She testified that, after she expressed these
    concerns, Cole changed her position and “wanted to leave everything to her
    grandchildren and her great-grandchildren.” Truitt indicated Cole wanted to eliminate
    any family-fighting and believed her children had “gotten enough” already.         Cole’s
    attorney ad litem from the guardianship proceeding testified that, throughout this period,
    Cole never expressed any desire to him that she wanted to change her 2009 will.
    From July to August, Cole began to lose more weight. She was having difficulty
    expressing herself on occasions and gradually progressed to the point she could not
    7
    take food or medications because she could not swallow. Hord testified Cole’s medical
    condition declined dramatically in August. That same month, Truitt called Cantrell, to
    schedule an appointment to talk about writing a new will for Cole. Cantrell testified that
    at their meeting Cole “seemed” to grasp the natural objects of her bounty and “in
    general what her estate was.” During their meeting, no one disclosed to Cantrell that
    Truitt had sought permanent guardianship over Cole—a fact he testified would have
    been significant to him. When Cole mentioned experiencing memory problems, Cantrell
    advised that she have a medical examination.                  After speaking with Cantrell, Truitt
    scheduled an appointment for Cole to see Dr. Francis Anwasi. Ultimately, Cantrell
    decided not to write Cole’s will because of the size of her estate.
    In September, Cole was no longer able to walk without assistance and needed a
    wheelchair. She also continued to have hallucinations. Truitt replaced Cole’s primary
    physician with Dr. Anwasi. In addition, Cole began seeing a new doctor, Dr. Jerry
    Tennet, for her decline in physical condition.
    On September 1, Terry Donk, an attorney who had written a will for Cole in 2001,
    received a call from Truitt indicating Cole was in a rest home and wanted a new will.
    Truitt testified that over the next day or two she sat down with her mother and went over
    the 2009 will in detail. According to Truitt, she wrote down what her mother wanted to
    change about the 2009 will and then faxed her notes to Donk in the form of a letter
    signed by her mother. Truitt testified the letter was in her handwriting and signed by her
    as well because Cole had a “very difficult” time writing.” 5                She included a medical
    5
    The letter contained detailed legal instructions regarding the contents of the new will. The letter also
    contained a note stating: “I don’t know if this is relevant, but I have two sons, three other grandchildren
    8
    competency statement signed by Dr. Answai. 6 Donk drafted a will and faxed it to Truitt
    on September 13.           Truitt faxed back additional changes in her handwriting.                     On
    September 15, Truitt made further corrections and gave Donk instructions for instant
    faxing so she could receive a clean copy suitable for immediate execution. Truitt’s
    instructions regarding the family trust and the clause leaving Cole’s entire residuary
    estate to Truitt were very detailed and framed in legal language. On September 16,
    Donk prepared the final draft incorporating Truitt’s latest changes and sent the will to
    Truitt by overnight mail. Donk testified in deposition that he didn’t know if Truitt had
    exerted undue influence over Cole because he had no contact with Cole. Instead, he
    relied entirely on Dr. Anwasi’s statement.
    Also, on September 16, Dr. Frank Del Rio examined Cole at the request of Adult
    Protective Services. He concluded Cole had capacity but that “it [was] very close”
    based on her ability to answer basic questions regarding her safety, basic care, and
    how to obtain help in an emergency. He also believed her capacity should be revisited
    in the future and that the outcome could be different at that time. He believed it was
    strange that Cole’s regular sitters, Diana and Crystal Negrete, did not seem to want to
    leave during his interview. He also felt like there could be some undue influence being
    exerted on Cole. Further, after he left Cole’s room, Truitt approached him and asked
    ______________________________
    and one great grandchild, to whom I do not wish to leave any of my money or possessions. They are my
    Son Thomas Ed Cole, his son Joshuah John Paul Cole and Joshuah’s son who’s (sic) name I don’t know;
    and my son Roy Franklin Cole and his children Christopher Cole and Christine Cole.” Cole’s signature
    was barely legible.
    6
    On September 9, Dr. Anwasi signed a statement indicating Cole was mentally competent. He filled out
    the statement after having spent at least thirty minutes with her in his office on three separate occasions.
    He testified Cole was able to answer questions about her health and sickness and, despite her medical
    circumstances related to her mental abilities and memory, was always oriented. He also indicated her
    memory issues were consistent with early dementia.
    9
    whether the allegations against her had been “dropped” and if Cole had capacity. Dr.
    Del Rio responded that he was presently unable to share any information.
    On September 17, Capps reported to Adult Protective Services that he was
    worried Truitt was exerting an undue influence over Cole. When he first started talking
    with Cole, she wanted to have an independent guardian appointed without any
    connection to her family. After Truitt arrived, he indicated that things changed. He
    reported that, when he speaks with Cole, she just “parrots” everything that Truitt states.
    He also told Adult Protective Services that he was at a standstill because the
    guardianship case was awaiting the appointment of a new judge. Truitt also contacted
    Adult Protective Services to inform them that Cole was unhappy with Capps and that
    she was going to see if the judge in the guardianship proceedings would appoint a new
    attorney ad litem.
    B. EXECUTION OF THE 2010 WILL
    Hord testified that by September 20, Cole’s mental health had definitely
    deteriorated. She was difficult to understand, her speech was slurred, her recall was
    slow, and her affect was flat. She testified that Cole did not have an appetite, was
    continuing to lose weight and was basically chair/bed fast without assistance. Although
    Cole was oriented as to person, at times she was not oriented to place or time. Hord
    also testified Cole would become weaker as the day progressed, experienced periods
    where she would speak randomly, and was often confused.
    Robin Koch, Cole’s primary caseworker at Adult Protective Services, visited Cole
    on the 20th at 2:40 p.m. and described her as very tired and not feeling well. Cole
    10
    wanted to speak with her but asked if she could return at another time. When Koch
    revisited Cole at 3:15 p.m., she was unaware Koch had visited earlier even though Koch
    had earlier introduced herself as being from Adult Protective Services and had visited
    Cole several times before. Before Koch left, Cole asked her to stay for a minute. Koch
    heard Cole speaking with a woman and afterwards Cole said “I just want to tell you that
    [Truitt] has not mistreated me in any way. She has not abused or neglected me or
    taken any of my money.”
    At 5:30 p.m., Mary King (a notary), Ruth Timberlake (a Wynwood resident), Cole,
    Truitt, Crystal, 7 and two witnesses, were present for the signing of the 2010 will. King
    did not recall Cole ever speaking. She did recall Truitt putting the will in front of Cole
    and saying, “mother, you know this is what we discussed and Mary is here to notarize
    your—will and she just said yes.” She testified Truitt had to “kind of help her hold the
    pen up to sign it.” She indicated that “[Cole] would kind of doze off and wake up. She
    seemed fine but she didn’t—she kept just falling asleep.” “When everybody else was
    visiting and talking, I’d happen to look over there and she would be asleep but then she
    would come to, you know, every once in a while.” That is, “[s]he would wake up, she’d
    open her eyes and look around.” King indicated that it took approximately an hour to
    complete the signing process because Cole “kept falling asleep and there towards the
    end, I do remember it did take her a long time to fill the rest out because she kept falling
    asleep.” She further indicated Truitt stood holding the documents and asked Cole to
    sign, two to three times. Describing the execution process, she testified “[Truitt] just
    7
    Crystal was hired by Truitt to sit with Cole on weekdays from 1:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. and weekends
    from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
    11
    kind of helped her hold the pen up but she did sign”—“[i]t was kind of like [Cole] would
    try to hold her pen and she couldn’t hold it real well, and [Truitt] helped her put it in her
    hand, and then kind of signed it there a little bit. She assisted her.”
    Truitt testified that executing the will took “close to an hour”--handwriting for her
    mother was difficult so she “assist[ed] by holding the pen up.” She showed her mother
    where to sign but did not recall her mother asking for any help. She testified Cole
    discussed the will with others in her presence and understood who the children were
    and what her assets were. She also testified Cole recognized the residuary clause
    leaving Truitt the entirety of her residuary estate.
    Crystal testified that, on the day the will was signed, she was standing behind
    Cole the entire time. She testified Cole was “very cognitive;” “[h]er memory was all
    there;” no one helped Cole to grip the pen; she never dozed off and never closed her
    eyes. Crystal estimated the execution took approximately thirty minutes. She testified
    that, in their conversations prior to its execution, Cole wanted “everything to go to her
    grandkids and great-grandkids.”
    Timberlake, a long-time Wynwood resident, testified Cole did not speak about
    property she owned except to say she had a lot of land and stuff.                      She also told
    Timberlake that she wanted a new will because she didn’t want William or Susan to
    inherit saying “they already got enough.” Cole’s other sitter, Diana, 8 testified Cole was
    pretty alert but did not talk about her property except to say that she had a big farm.
    8
    Diana was hired by Truitt to sit with Cole from 7:00 p.m. until 10-11:00 p.m. weekdays and 3:00 p.m. to
    11:00 p.m. weekends.
    12
    Diana testified Cole told her “she wanted to leave everything to her grandkids and great-
    grandkids” after the 2010 will was signed.
    C. Post-execution
    On September 21, Cole was admitted to hospice. She was not oriented and had
    begun hallucinating.    On September 22, Adult Protective Services visited Cole and
    asked her about the 2009 will that cut Truitt out of her estate.       Cole replied she
    remembered doing it and wanted to do it because what Truitt was doing at the time was
    not right. On September 28, while Truitt was out of town, Adult Protective Services
    spoke with her, informing her that Cole’s deteriorating condition necessitated that she
    be sent to a hospital. Truitt would not agree to admit Cole.
    On September 29, Cole’s other children were visiting her when they were told by
    an attendant that Cole needed to go to a hospital. Truitt was again contacted and again
    she declined to admit her mother. An Emergency Medical Technician subsequently
    decided to take Cole to the hospital because she was requesting to go. At the hospital,
    Cole was diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and pneumonia. Cole later told Adult
    Protective Services that she was glad to be hospitalized and wanted medical treatment.
    Cole’s medical condition improved while she was hospitalized but when she was
    transferred by ambulance to an assisted living facility in Midland, she passed away en
    route.
    Adult Protective Services subsequently summarized its findings at the conclusion
    of their investigation. Its investigators found William, Susan, Hord, and Capps credible.
    They found Cole not credible because she gave conflicting statements and appeared to
    13
    be coached. Truitt was also found to be not credible because (1) she had her mother
    sign the 2010 will when, on the day of execution, Adult Protective Services had
    observed Cole in a confused state of mind, (2) Cole made calls to Adult Protective
    Services wherein a female voice was overheard coaching Cole as to what to say, (3)
    Truitt appeared more concerned about Cole’s finances than her health and (4) there
    was evidence Truitt isolated Cole from contact with her other children. Based on their
    investigation, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence indicated
    William and Susan did not exploit 9 their mother. At the same time, Adult Protective
    Services was unable to determine whether Truitt did exploit Cole.
    Proceedings Below
    On October 18, Susan and William filed an Application for Probate and for
    Issuance of Letters Testamentary seeking to admit the 2009 will to probate.                          On
    October 29, Truitt filed her opposition to that application and included her own
    Application for Probate and for Issuance of Letters Testamentary seeking to admit the
    2010 will to probate. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court issued its Final
    Judgment granting probate of the 2009 will and denying admission of the 2010 will
    because it was procured when Cole lacked testamentary capacity and was executed as
    a result of undue influence exerted by Truitt.            On June 30, the trial court entered an
    order admitting the 2009 will to probate and appointing Susan and William as co-
    9
    Adult Protective Service investigators used the following definition of “exploitation”: the illegal or
    improper act or process of a caretaker, family member, or other individual who has an ongoing
    relationship with the elderly or disabled person using the resources of an elderly or disabled person for
    monetary or personal benefit, or gain without the informed consent of the elderly or disabled person.
    14
    independent executors. This appeal followed. Because we find Truitt’s third and fourth
    issues dispositive, we address them first.
    DISCUSSION
    STANDARD OF REVIEW 10
    We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record discloses
    a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or
    of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the
    evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the
    evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. See King Ranch, Inc. v.
    Chapman, 
    118 S.W.3d 742
    , 751 (Tex. 2003). In determining whether there is legally
    sufficient evidence to support the finding under review, this Court must credit evidence
    favorable to the verdict if reasonable jurors would have done so, disregard contrary
    evidence unless reasonable jurors could not have done so, and reverse the jury’s
    determination only if the evidence presented at trial would not enable reasonable and
    fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 827 (Tex. 2005).
    In reviewing an appellant’s factual sufficiency challenge to an adverse finding on
    which the other party had the burden of proof, we consider all of the evidence in the
    record, both in support of and contrary to the finding.           See Dow Chemical Co. v.
    Francis, 
    46 S.W.3d 237
    , 242 (Tex. 2001). We will set aside the district court’s finding
    10
    The standard of review in jury trials is the same standard that applies in bench trials. See MBM
    Financial Corp. v. The Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 
    92 S.W.3d 660
    , 663 n.3 (Tex. 2009).
    15
    only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly
    wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 
    709 S.W.2d 175
    , 176 (Tex. 1986).
    Finally, the trial court acts as fact finder in a bench trial. HTS Servs., Inc. v.
    Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 
    190 S.W.3d 108
    , 111 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2005, no pet.). Where there are disputed issues of fact, the trial court judge is the sole
    judge of the credibility of the witnesses; Thornton v. Dobbs, 
    355 S.W.3d 312
    , 316
    (Tex.App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.), and, as such, determines the weight to be given their
    testimony, and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony. Petrie v. Widby,
    
    194 S.W.3d 168
    , 174 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Southwest Bell Media, Inc. v.
    Lyles, 
    825 S.W.2d 488
    , 493 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). The trial
    court may take into consideration all the facts and surrounding circumstances in
    connection with the testimony of each witness and accept or reject all or any part of that
    testimony.   Granger v. Granger, 
    236 S.W.3d 852
    , 859 (Tex.App.—Tyler 2007, pet.
    denied).
    UNDUE INFLUENCE
    Lack of mental capacity and undue influence are two separate and distinct
    grounds for avoiding an instrument or contract. See Long v. Long, 
    133 Tex. 96
    , 
    125 S.W.2d 1034
    , 1036 (Tex. 1939).       “[I]ncapacity implies the lack of intelligent mental
    power; while undue influence implies within itself the existence of a mind of sufficient
    mental capacity to make a will if not hindered by the dominant or overriding influence of
    another in such a way as to make the instrument speak the will of the person exercising
    the undue influence and not that of the [testatrix].” 
    Id. See Rothermel,
    369 S.W.2d at
    16
    922 (“Undue influence implies the existence of a testamentary capacity subjected to and
    controlled by a dominant influence or power.”) That said, “weakness of mind and body,
    whether produced by infirmities of age or by disease or otherwise, may be considered
    as a material circumstance in determining whether or not a person was in the condition
    to be susceptible to undue influence.” In re Estate of Lynch, 
    350 S.W.3d 130
    , 135
    (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (quoting 
    Long, 125 S.W.2d at 1036
    ). See
    Lowery v. Saunders, 
    666 S.W.2d 226
    , 233 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref’d)
    (“evidence of impaired mentality not amounting to testamentary incapacity may afford
    an opportunity for the exercise of undue influence . . . .”)
    To prevail on an undue influence claim, the contestant has the burden to prove
    (1) the existence and exertion of an influence, (2) that subverted or overpowered the
    testatrix’s mind at the time she executed the instrument, (3) so that the testatrix
    executed an instrument she would not otherwise have executed but for such influence.
    In re Estate of Johnson, 
    340 S.W.3d 769
    , 776 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2011, pet.
    dism’d) (citing 
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    ). See Estate of Davis v. Cook, 
    9 S.W.3d 288
    , 292-93 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). There must be some tangible and
    satisfactory proof of the existence of each of the three elements. 
    Johnson, 340 S.W.3d at 776
    (citing 
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    ).
    Importantly, not every influence exerted by one person on the will of another is
    undue; 
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    , and its exertion “cannot be inferred by
    opportunity alone.”    See Cotton v. Cotton, 
    169 S.W.3d 824
    , 827 (Tex.App.—Dallas
    2005, pet. denied). An influence is not “undue” unless the free agency of the testatrix is
    destroyed and a testament is produced that expresses the will of the one exerting the
    17
    influence rather than the one executing the will. See 
    Long, 125 S.W.2d at 1035-36
    .
    Thus, a will contestant must not only provide evidence that an undue influence existed,
    they must also offer evidence of the testatrix’s state of mind at the time the will was
    executed that would tend to show her free agency was overcome by such influence.
    See 
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    .
    The exertion of undue influence is usually a subtle thing, and by its very nature
    typically involves an extended course of dealings and circumstances. 
    Johnson, 340 S.W.3d at 769
    . Thus, its elements may be proven by circumstantial or direct evidence.
    
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    .         Accordingly, “all of the circumstances shown or
    established by the evidence should be considered; and even though none of the
    circumstances standing alone would be sufficient to show the elements of undue
    influence, if when considered together they produce a reasonable belief that an
    influence was exerted that subverted or overpowered the mind of the testatrix and
    resulted in the execution of the testament in controversy, the evidence is sufficient to
    sustain such conclusion.” 
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    .
    Factors which have been considered in determining the existence of undue
    influence include: (1) the nature and type of relationship between the testatrix, the
    contestants, and the party accused of exerting the undue influence; (2) the opportunities
    existing for the exertion of the type of influence or deception possessed or employed;
    (3) the circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of the testament; (4) the
    existence of a fraudulent motive; (5) whether there has been an habitual subjection of
    the testatrix to the control of another; (6) the state of the testatrix’s mind at the time of
    the execution of the testament; (7) the testatrix’s mental or physical incapacity to resist
    18
    or the susceptibility of the testatrix’s mind to the type and extent of the influence
    exerted; (8) words and acts of the testatrix; (9) weakness of mind and body of the
    testatrix, whether produced by infirmities of age or by disease or otherwise; and (10)
    whether the testament executed is unnatural in its terms or disposition of property. In re
    Estate of Graham, 
    69 S.W.3d 598
    , 609-10 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)
    (citing 
    Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922
    ).        Additionally, whether the person allegedly
    exercising undue influence took part in the preparation or execution of the will has been
    considered as a factor; Guthrie v. Suiter, 
    934 S.W.2d 820
    , 831 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1996, no writ), and “[p]roof of the planning and preparation of the will, . . . is the
    heart of an undue influence case.” Boyer v. Pool, 
    154 Tex. 586
    , 
    280 S.W.2d 564
    , 566
    (1955). See Mackie v. McKenzie, 
    900 S.W.2d 445
    , 449 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995,
    writ denied) (motive, character, and conduct of person benefitting from will is relevant).
    We discuss each of the elements of an undue influence action below. Because
    of the similarity between the elements, some overlap is unavoidable.
    A. EXISTENCE AND EXERTION OF AN INFLUENCE
    The record indicates that, during the period of Truitt’s interaction with Cole, Cole
    was taking a myriad of medications for a variety of medical issues including anxiety,
    pain, depression, and dementia. She also had a history of high blood pressure and
    congestive heart failure. Although Cole was generally oriented as to person, at times
    she was not oriented as to place or time. Her mental and physical health was markedly
    declining and she suffered from hallucinations, memory problems, and chronic weight
    loss.
    19
    Despite Cole’s declining medical condition, upon her arrival, Truitt immediately
    sought to change Cole’s medical care from traditional to alternative. After learning that
    the changes prescribed by an alternative medicine doctor had to be approved by Susan,
    as Cole’s power of attorney, Truitt hired an attorney to draft a new power of attorney.
    The new power of attorney, drafted without any involvement from other family members
    or her attorney ad litem, displaced Susan and appointed Truitt. Neither is there any
    evidence the attorney who drafted the new power of attorney ever met with, or spoke to,
    Cole, or was involved in any way other than signing the document.             Moreover, in
    obtaining the new power of attorney, Truitt successfully achieved what she had sought
    through the guardianship proceeding, i.e., complete control of Cole’s medical treatment
    and financial affairs. Afterwards, Truitt ousted Cole’s existing doctors in favor of new
    doctors who had no prior involvement with her mother’s medical care. She also had
    Cole’s pet cat put to sleep when others at Wynwood thought Cole would never have
    consented to it.
    Truitt also hired an attorney to draft a new will with no input from Cole’s family or
    her attorney ad litem. The 2010 will’s provisions represented a complete departure from
    the terms of the 2009 will. Only Truitt communicated with the attorney. Cole’s attorney
    ad litem, Capp, was unaware a new will was being drafted or that Cole even wished to
    change her beneficiaries. Cole had been talking to him about the appointment of a
    guardian independent of any family influence. However, after her arrival, Truitt quickly
    became Cole’s new power of attorney, orchestrating the drafting of a new will
    completely at odds with the terms of the 2009 will — a will that was less than a year old
    20
    and drafted after face-to-face meetings with Cole’s attorney, and without any family
    influence. Capp also observed that Cole seemed to “parrot” whatever Truitt stated.
    After examining Cole at Wynwood, Dr. Del Rio believed Cole was minimally
    competent and that Truitt could be exerting undue influence over her. Although Dr.
    Anwasi opined Cole was competent, he had been her doctor for only a few weeks, had
    only visited with her two to three times for a period of approximately thirty minutes, and
    his interaction focused on her health and sickness. As the ultimate trier of fact, Dr.
    Anwasi’s opinion testimony regarding Cole’s competency was not binding on the trial
    court. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 
    977 S.W.2d 328
    , 338 (Tex. 1998);
    McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 
    722 S.W.2d 694
    , 697 (Tex. 1986). Further, as regards any
    inconsistencies or conflicts of opinion between witnesses, the trial court could accept or
    reject any or all of that evidence. See 
    Thornton, 355 S.W.3d at 316
    ; 
    Granger, 236 S.W.3d at 859
    .
    Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude there is legally and factually
    sufficient evidence to support a finding that undue influence existed and was exerted.
    B. OVERPOWERING THE TESTATRIX’S MIND
    After Truitt’s arrival, Cole was isolated from her family and her primary medical
    providers. During that time, Truitt accomplished a complete turn-about in Cole’s power
    of attorney, her medical care, and her estate plans. Other than Cole’s signature on the
    new power of attorney, there is no evidence that she had any input in initiating the
    process or drafting the document. Shortly thereafter, Cole indicated to Adult Protective
    21
    Services that she was not aware Truitt would have power over her bank accounts and
    was uncertain why she displaced Susan and chose Truitt.
    After the new power of attorney was executed, Cole was coached as to what to
    say to members of the law firm who assisted her in drafting an earlier will in order to
    obtain her estate documents for Truitt. After Cole’s medical condition worsened further
    still, Truitt hired a new attorney to draft a new will for Cole, thereby dispossessing Susan
    and William in favor of certain grandchildren, great-grandchildren and Truitt. The 2010
    will contained no provisions, as did the 2009 will, for the establishment of contingent
    trusts for grandchildren less than twenty-one years of age or disabled.          And, after
    execution of the 2010 will, Cole told Adult Protective Services that she had executed the
    2009 will intending to dispossess Truitt because she did not believe Truitt was doing
    right. Further, there is no evidence Cole had any input in the selection of the attorneys
    hired by Truitt.
    Further, Truitt, Crystal, and Diana testified that, when the 2010 will was executed,
    Cole wanted everything to go to her grandchildren and great-grandchildren. However,
    the 2010 will did not leave everything to Cole’s grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
    Rather, some grandchildren and great-grandchildren were disinherited while Truitt
    inherited all of Cole’s residual estate, a disposition contrary to Cole’s statements that
    her children “had enough already.”       Importantly, several family members that were
    disinherited in the 2010 will, Roy and Thomas Ed, had opposed Truitt in the Trust
    litigation and, according to Truitt, treated her unfairly by not agreeing to pay her
    attorney’s fees.   The 2010 will also similarly disinherited grandchildren and great-
    grandchildren from their line of the family.
    22
    Throughout this period, Cole indicated to her attorney ad litem that, in order to
    avoid family conflict, she wanted an independent guardian—wishes reflected neither in
    the new power of attorney nor the 2010 will. Moreover, Cole did not express to Capp
    that she wanted a new will or to dispossess William and Susan. Having reviewed the
    record, we find that, given Cole’s poor physical and mental health coupled with the
    terms and events surrounding the execution of the new power of attorney and the 2010
    will, there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a finding that Truitt
    overpowered Cole’s mind and the 2010 will expressed Truitt’s will rather than Cole’s
    desires.
    C. NO EXECUTION “BUT FOR” INFLUENCE
    In drafting the 2010 will, only Truitt communicated with the attorney. Donk never
    had any direct communication or face-to-face meeting with Cole. All drafts and edits
    were circulated through Truitt. Although Cole’s health was failing and she could barely
    pen a legible signature, Truitt’s communications to Donk were very detailed and
    couched in legal language sufficient for direct insertion into a will. Moreover, the 2010
    will was drafted by Truitt in isolation with Cole and there was no corroborating evidence
    establishing that Cole suggested any of its terms. Moreover, even if the trial court gave
    weight to the testimony of Truitt, Crystal and Diana that Cole wanted to leave everything
    to her grandchildren and great-grandchildren because her children had already received
    enough, her 2010 will does not reflect such an intent.
    The 2010 will also represented a complete departure from the 2009 will, with only
    Truitt inheriting as between her siblings – siblings with whom she had a conflict because
    23
    of the earlier litigation concerning the family trust. Remarkably, the 2010 will required
    that any memorandum disposing of Cole’s personal effects be in Cole’s handwriting
    when Cole could barely sign her name in a legible manner with Truitt’s assistance. In
    addition, there was no involvement by Cole’s other family members or her attorney ad
    litem in the formation or execution of the 2010 will. Afterwards, in a conversation with
    Adult Protective Services, Cole recalled that the 2009 will dispossessed Truitt because
    she wanted it that way and remembered Truitt was not acting right.
    Finally, the day the 2010 will was executed, Cole had no appetite, was suffering
    from chronic weight loss, was chair/bed fast, weakened as the day progressed, had
    memory issues and, in the afternoon, appeared very tired and not feeling well. She was
    unaware from one hour to the next whether Adult Protective Services had visited her
    and, while there, she was being coached to make statements vindicating Truitt of
    exploitation complaints being made against her. When it came time for the will to be
    executed, Cole did not speak while drifting in and out of awakened consciousness.
    Truitt put the will in front of Cole, told Cole it was what they discussed, indicated where
    Cole should sign and helped Cole hold the pen while she signed. All told, the “signing”
    took approximately an hour. 11
    Having considered the entire record, we cannot say the trial court’s finding was
    so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
    unjust. See 
    Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176
    . Accordingly, we find there was legally and
    11
    Regarding execution of the 2010 will, the trial court apparently gave little or no weight to the conflicting
    and, at times, inconsistent testimony of Truitt, Timberlake and Crystal. See 
    Thornton, 355 S.W.3d at 316
    ;
    
    Granger, 236 S.W.3d at 859
    .
    24
    factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the 2010 will would
    not have been executed but for undue influence exerted by Truitt.
    Truitt’s third and fourth issues are overruled and her remaining issues are
    pretermitted. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
    Conclusion
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Patrick A. Pirtle
    Justice
    25