Karla Jane Dobbs v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-12-0376-CR
No. 07-12-0377-CR
________________________
Karla Jane Dobbs, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On Appeal from the 31st District Court
Gray County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 9191 & 9192, Honorable Steven Ray Emmert, Presiding
March 20, 2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant Karla Jane Dobbs was convicted, after a bench trial, of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault on a public servant. In seeking to
overturn those convictions, she argues 1) there is insufficient evidence that she
intentionally or knowingly threatened Officer Tobie Bias, and 2) bodily injury from a
vehicle is not imminent when the vehicle is going so slowly that the complainant can
easily avoid it. We affirm the judgments.
The charges arose from an incident in which appellant had parked her vehicle for
several days in a Pampa, Texas, neighborhood and was living out of it. During that
time, she had played her radio loudly and honked the horn on her car repeatedly.
When one of the residents of the neighborhood, Jeremy Doucette, tapped on the
window of the car and asked her to leave, she said to him, “Who the fuck are you?”
When he replied that he lived there, she told him he was “a God damn liar.” Jeremy
then sat down several feet from her car and stared at her. Thereafter, appellant drove
down the street, waited for a little while, returned, drove slowly upon Doucette's yard
towards the owner as he sat, and struck him and the chair on which he sat as he
attempted to move out of the way.
Shortly after appellant struck Doucette with her car, the police arrived. One
officer approached and went to the driver’s side of her car and one to the passenger's
side. Appellant then rolled her car windows up and locked the doors. The officers
ordered her to exit. Instead of complying, she placed an article of clothing over her
head. Officer Bias then broke the window on the passenger side and tried to open the
door. As he did so, appellant accelerated rapidly in reverse onto the street. Bias too
headed for the street and stopped a short distance in front of the car. When appellant
shifted the car into drive, the officer pulled his firearm. This did not dissuade appellant
for she stared at the officer with a “demonic” blank look and accelerated towards him.
The officer fired his weapon as the car approached and then jumped out of its path just
before it could strike him.
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Issue 1 – Sufficiency of the Evidence
First, appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that she had the
requisite mens rea to commit the offense of aggravated assault upon a public servant.
This was purportedly so because she had suffered from mental illness, engaged in odd
behavior, and adopted a “demonic” blank stare. Thus, an expert was needed before
anyone could reasonably infer whether she intentionally or knowingly threatened the
officer with her car. We overrule the issue.
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits an assault by using or
exhibiting a deadly weapon. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). An
assault occurs when a person intentionally or knowingly threatens another with
imminent bodily injury. 1 Id. § 22.01(a)(2). Next, whether one acted intentionally or
knowingly may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d
270, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), such as from the words and conduct of the accused.
Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). There was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support the factfinder's decision here.
Appellant placed her vehicle in reverse and sped from Doucette's yard when the
officers attempted to secure her. Then she placed the car in drive and accelerated at
the officer who stood in her path. No effort was made to swerve. Instead, she looked
in the officer's direction, donned a “demonic” visage, and headed at him. All this
occurred after appellant moments before had driven upon Doucette's yard and struck
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A person acts intentionally when it is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). A person acts knowingly with respect
to the nature of her conduct when she is aware of the nature of her conduct and acts knowingly with
respect to the result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result. Id. § 6.03(b).
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him with her car. Such is some evidence upon which a rational fact finder could infer
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant intended to threaten Officer Bias with her car.
And, the mere presentation of evidence suggesting mental illness does not require
anyone to conclude that appellant lacked the capacity to act with an intentional or
knowing mens rea. Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 575-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Issue 2 – Imminent Bodily Injury
Next, appellant urges that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of
assaulting Doucette. This is allegedly so because he could have avoided the threat's
fruition, that is, he could have escaped from the car's path since it was moving slowly.
We overrule the issue.
In effect, appellant is asking us to conclude that an assault by threat cannot
occur if the victim can avoid the altercation. Yet, we know of no case saying that a car
must be approaching rapidly before it constitues an imminent threat. Nor do we know of
some theory requiring the State to prove that the victim cannot escape harm before a
threat becomes assaultive conduct. Indeed, there are opinions upholding convictions
even though the victim did not accept the accused's invitation to submit to a “butt”
“kick[ing],” see e.g., Adams v. State, 222 S.W.3d 37, 51 (Tex. App.–Austin 2005, pet.
ref’d) or leave property on which the victim lawfully stood when threatened with being
shot. See e.g., Tidwell v. State, 187 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2006, pet.
dism’d).
Addionally, the word “imminent” has been defined to mean “ready to take place,
near at hand, impending, hanging threateningly over one’s head, menacingly near.”
Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), quoting Devine v. State,
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786 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Appellant has cited us to nothing of record
suggesting that Doucette's threat of being struck was something less than menacingly
near or impending if he stood his ground on land he lawfully occupied. And to the
extent that appellant would have the law impose some type of duty upon the victim to
mitigate or avoid the results of the threat before an assault by threat can happen, she is
free to petition higher authority to achieve that end.
Simply put, not only did appellant drive upon Doucette's yard and aim her car at
him, but she also struck him with it. Though she drove slowly, she nonetheless drove.
Though she could have stopped or swerved, she did not attempt such actions. Had
Doucette not moved, the results may have been far more adverse. The factfinder had
more than some evidence upon which to conclude that the assault was imminent on the
part of appellant. See Hill v. State, 844 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Tex. App.–Eastland 1992, no
pet.) (holding that “imminent” means on the verge of happening).
Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
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