State v. Clint Saenz ( 2012 )

NUMBER 13-11-00328-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
CLINT SAENZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the 28th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Vela
Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rose Vela
The State appeals from a trial court order suppressing the oral statements of the
defendant, Clint Saenz, after he was indicted for third-offense driving while intoxicated. I
would reverse and remand to the trial court.
I would hold that the record conclusively established both that Officer Bintliff had
reasonable suspicion to detain Saenz at the time he originally stopped Saenz and that
Saenz had not been arrested or placed in custody before he made the oral statements to
Officer Sanders.
A. Reasonable Suspicion
An officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a person if he has specific articulable
facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to
conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be, engaged in criminal
activity. Derichweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In
determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether
there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest." See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (internal
quotes omitted); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("A
person is in custody only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe
that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal
arrest."). An "officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs
concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among
many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but
only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under
interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would
perceive his or her freedom to leave." See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325.
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The record shows that Officer Bintliff was dispatched to the Whataburger just after
2:00 a.m. because of a fight. The tip the officer received regarding the individuals
involved in the fight matched Saenz's and his passenger's descriptions at the scene.
Additionally, it appeared to the officer that Saenz was in the process of operating a
vehicle while intoxicated. Officer Bintliff noted that the back-up lights were on, the
vehicle Saenz was occupying was improperly parked in two spaces, including a
handicapped parking spot, and Saenz had a confused and dazed look. All of these
factors could lead to reasonable suspicion to stop Saenz for one or more offense,
including DWI.
B. Miranda Warnings
When a defendant seeks to suppress a statement on the basis of an alleged
Miranda violation, he bears the burden to show that the statement was the product of
custodial interrogation. See Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007); Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "In determining
whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest." See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at 322 (internal quotes omitted); Dowthitt
v. State, 931 S.W.2d at 254 ("A person is in custody only if, under the circumstances, a[n
objectively] reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was
restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.") (internal quotes omitted).
A person who is stopped only temporarily is not in custody for purposes of
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Miranda. State v Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Appellate
courts review the legal determination of detention, reasonable suspicion, and probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment de novo while granting great deference to a trial
court's factual findings. Id. at 286–87. The United States Supreme Court has long held
that an officer has the right to briefly detain and investigate a person when the officer has
a reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. Id. at 287.
The record shows that Saenz was not free to leave; but he was being temporarily
detained while the officer conducted his investigation. A temporary detention, in which
the person is not free to leave while the police officer investigates whether a crime has
been committed is allowed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d
at 287. But a Fourth Amendment Terry detention is not a custodial arrest. Id. at 289.
Here, the stop began as a temporary detention. While Saenz was placed in the
patrol car, although he was not free to leave, he was not arrested. He was not placed in
handcuffs. Officer Bintliff dispatched the DWI unit shortly after he arrived. The police
report shows only a twelve-minute delay between the time that Officer Bintliff was
dispatched at 2:13 a.m. and Officer Sanders being dispatched at 2:25 a.m. There is
nothing in the record to show that the temporary detention became an arrest prior to
Officer Sanders asking Saenz questions. While Saenz was with Officer Sanders, Bintliff
continued to investigate. The record showed that Officer Bintliff had reasonable
suspicion to detain Saenz and that Saenz had not been arrested or placed into custody
before he made statements to Officer Sanders. Giving deference to the trial court's fact
findings and applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed
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questions that do not depend on credibility determinations, I would hold that the trial court
erred in granting the motion to suppress. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ROSE VELA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 28th
day of December, 2012.
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