Marjorie Putnam v. Major Edward Barbee ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                          COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-12-00487-CV
    MARJORIE PUTNAM                                                     APPELLANT
    V.
    MAJOR EDWARD BARBEE                                                  APPELLEE
    ----------
    FROM THE 415TH DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    Appellant Marjorie Putnam sued Appellee Major Edward Barbee to recover
    $6,000 in earnest money that Putnam allegedly paid to Barbee as part of a real
    estate transaction that ultimately never happened.      Barbee generally denied
    Putnam’s allegations, and after a final trial at which each side appeared pro se,
    the trial court ordered that Putnam take nothing on her claim.
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    Putnam argues in her first issue that the trial court denied her equal
    protection of the law because it “discriminated against her because of her gender
    and unrepresented status.” Equal protection is violated when a statute makes
    invidious or unreasonable classifications. Lucas v. United States, 
    757 S.W.2d 687
    , 702 (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).       The trial court admonished
    Putnam about the dangers of self-representation before affording both her and
    Barbee an opportunity to present evidence, conduct cross-examination, and
    make argument. Putnam’s first issue challenges no statute and contains nothing
    more than unsupported allegations levied at the trial court. We overrule her first
    issue.
    In her second issue, Putnam argues that the trial court denied her due
    process by assessing costs against her that were “not awarded at Trial.” “The
    successful party to a suit shall recover of his adversary all costs incurred therein,
    except where otherwise provided.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 131. The allocation of costs is
    a matter for the trial court’s discretion.      Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 
    686 S.W.2d 599
    , 601 (Tex. 1985).          Here, the trial court taxed costs against the
    unsuccessful party, and Putnam directs us to no authority requiring the trial court
    to simultaneously assess costs when it orally renders judgment. We overrule
    Putnam’s second issue.
    Putnam argues in her third issue that the trial court abused its discretion by
    “believing everything [Barbee] said and nothing [Putnam] said.             The Judge
    ignored everything in and attached to [Putnam’s] Complaint . . . .” Documents
    2
    attached to pleadings are not evidence unless they are introduced at trial, and
    Putnam never sought to introduce any of the documents that she attached to her
    petition. See Am. Fire & Indem. Co. v. Jones, 
    828 S.W.2d 767
    , 769 (Tex. App.—
    Texarkana 1992, writ denied). Further, as the factfinder, the trial court could
    have believed Barbee’s testimony and disbelieved Putnam’s testimony, what little
    there was. See Gonzalez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    143 S.W.3d 118
    , 122 (Tex.
    App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). We overrule Putnam’s third issue and affirm
    the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/ Bill Meier
    BILL MEIER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
    DELIVERED: April 30, 2014
    3