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Adenrele Oladapo-Jimoh v. Joshua Nwogo and Linda Nwogo ( 2014 )


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  • Opinion issued December 23, 2014
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-13-00675-CV
    ———————————
    ADENRELE OLADAPO JIMOH, Appellant
    V.
    JOSHUA NWOGO AND LINDA NWOGO, Appellees
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1020002
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Adenrele Oladapo Jimoh, challenges the trial court’s judgment
    entered in favor of appellees, Joshua Nwogo and Linda Nwogo (collectively, the
    “Nwogos”), in their suit against her for breach of contract. In two issues, Jimoh
    contends that the trial court erred in awarding the Nwogos certain damages and
    attorney’s fees.
    We affirm.
    Background
    After Jimoh withdrew from representing them as their attorney in an
    immigration matter, the Nwogos filed a pro se petition, alleging breach of contract
    against Jimoh in a justice court. In their petition, the Nwogos requested $5,000 in
    damages, the amount they paid Jimoh for “all . . . services relating to . . . [an]
    [a]sylum [a]pplication,” and the costs associated with their suit.            Jimoh
    counterclaimed, seeking the “balance of the [parties’] contract” and attorney’s fees.
    The justice court ordered that the Nwogos take nothing on their claim and Jimoh
    take nothing on her counterclaim. The Nwogos then appealed to the county court
    below for a trial de novo.
    At trial in the county court, Joshua testified that on December 4, 2007, he
    moved from Nigeria to Houston and subsequently sought help from Jimoh to
    obtain asylum in the United States. On June 12, 2008, he signed a contract with
    Jimoh for legal representation related to his asylum application. Joshua believed,
    pursuant to their agreement, that he was to pay Jimoh a “flat fee” of $5,000 for
    “representation until [his] asylum case [was] over,” i.e., the $5,000 “flat fee”
    covered “the entire process.” Although the contract does contain a provision that
    2
    “[t]he amount of the Attorney’s fee is understood to be $175,” Joshua explained
    that he and Jimoh never discussed payment in terms of an hourly rate. Rather, she
    told him that the $175 provision “d[id] not concern [him].” Jimoh also “canceled
    the retainer part” of the agreement that provides, the “[c]lient shall deposit a NON-
    REFUNDABLE retainer in the amount of $5,000.00.” Thus, Joshua paid her the
    $5,000 “flat fee.”
    Jimoh then submitted Joshua’s asylum application, which, according to him,
    contained several mistakes. The application was ultimately “deemed not credible”
    and “referred to an immigration judge” for an “evaluat[ion] . . . [of the asylum]
    claim anew.” Following the “deni[al]” of his application, Jimoh told Joshua that
    the $5,000 that he “paid [was] for the administrative hearing” and “if [he] want[ed]
    to retain her as [his] lawyer . . . to represent [him] at immigration court,” he would
    “have to agree . . . [to pay an] additional $3,000.” Jimoh further stated that if he
    could not pay her, she would “not continu[e] with the case” and would “withdraw.”
    Joshua did not pay Jimoh the additional $3,000. And although she withdrew
    her representation, Joshua did not receive notice of Jimoh’s withdrawal until after
    it had been filed in the immigration court because, according to him, it was sent to
    the wrong address. At the time of Jimoh’s withdrawal, Joshua had “less than 30
    days” to submit a new asylum application to the immigration court, and he “ha[d]
    to” retain a new lawyer to represent him, which cost the Nwogos $3,000.
    3
    Jimoh testified that she began representing the Nwogos in June 2008, when
    Joshua approached her about his asylum claim. She and Joshua entered into a
    contract wherein he agreed to pay her a nonrefundable “$5,000 retainer” for her “to
    submit his asylum claim to the administrative office of . . . immigration.” She
    noted that she “never charge[s] [her clients] a flat fee”; instead, she “always
    charge[s] a retainer,” unless she is representing a client in a contingency-fee case.
    Jimoh “explain[ed] to [Joshua] what [her] retainer consisted of” and “what it
    meant.” According to Jimoh, when she “obtain[s] a retainer from a client, [she]
    bills at an hourly rate,” and “[w]hen [she] exhaust[s] those funds, [she] sit[s] down
    with [her] client” and explains that the client may “make a further deposit” or
    “pay[] at an hourly rate instead of putting a[nother] deposit down.” Accordingly,
    she charged Joshua an hourly rate of $175.
    Jimoh explained that she struck through the parts of the contract
    “pertain[ing] to criminal cases or . . . cases that might be taken on appeal” and that
    were not applicable to Joshua’s case.1            She did not strike “the [$5,000]
    nonrefundable retainer” provision; instead, she “kept” it in the contract.
    1
    The stricken provisions of the contract would have provided as follows:
    Client agrees to pay for the pretrial stage of this case, not including
    preparation, filing, and presenting pretrial motions, in the amount $0,
    payable now. If it is necessary to have a trial to the jury on the
    charges, Client agrees to pay an additional fee of $TBD for the
    preparation of the trial and for the actual trial, including pretrial
    motions, pretrial hearings, and all other things necessary for a proper
    4
    In the course of her representation of the Nwogos, Jimoh submitted Joshua’s
    asylum application.     Although the application was returned to her because
    “portions of the application . . . were not filled out,” Jimoh made the necessary
    corrections. Subsequently, Joshua had an asylum hearing with an administrative
    officer. Following the hearing, Joshua’s asylum application was not denied, but
    rather referred to the immigration court for a determination of whether he “ha[d] a
    credible case.”    At this point, Jimoh informed Joshua that she had not yet
    “exhausted” the $5,000 retainer, but would tell him when she did. Jimoh then
    made two appearances in the immigration court on Joshua’s behalf.
    Jimoh had difficulty contacting Joshua and meeting with him regarding the
    upcoming deadlines in his immigration case. By January 2009, the initial $5,000
    retainer was exhausted. When she tried to discuss this matter with Joshua, he told
    her:   “I’m not going to pay you anymore [money].”              Jimoh then decided to
    withdraw from representing him because he was not willing to continue paying her
    and she had experienced difficulty in trying to contact him and obtaining the
    necessary documentation for his immigration case. She sent Joshua a copy of her
    defense. . . . It is expressly agreed and understood that the above fee
    does not include: a. Any appeal which may be taken to a Court of
    Appeals or to the Court of Criminal Appeals, nor does it include a
    petition for discretionary review to the Court of Criminal Appeals or
    any other form of appellate review, whether in state or federal
    court[.]
    5
    withdrawal motion after filing it with the immigration court, and he did not oppose
    the withdrawal in the immigration court.
    Jimoh explained that Joshua failed to pay her any money beyond the
    nonrefundable $5,000 retainer and, under their contract, he still owes her money.
    In total, she spent 28.86 hours on Joshua’s case; however, 4.5 of these hours were
    billed after she had decided to withdraw.
    Laban Opande, the Nwogos’ attorney in the instant case, testified that the
    Nwogos retained him to represent them in the county court below, and he charged
    them a $5,000 “flat fee” for the trial of their case. He explained that the $5,000 fee
    was “reasonable” and “fair and equitable considering the amount of work
    that [he] . . . spent in preparing the case.”
    After hearing the witnesses, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
    Nwogos, awarding them $737 “as damages on the original fee paid to [Jimoh],”
    $3,000 “as damages subsequently incurred by [the Nwogos] in hiring other
    representation” for the immigration case, and $5,000 for attorney’s fees. It further
    ordered that Jimoh take nothing on her counterclaims. Jimoh then filed a motion
    for new trial, which the trial court denied.2
    2
    The appellate record does not contain a reporter’s record from a hearing on
    Jimoh’s motion, nor does it indicate whether the trial court held a hearing on the
    motion.
    6
    Damages
    In her second issue, Jimoh argues that the trial court erred in awarding the
    Nwogos damages of $3,000, the amount that they paid to the attorney handling the
    immigration case after Jimoh’s withdrawal, because
    no authority . . . supports the court’s ruling that [a] withdrawing
    attorney should reimburse her former clients for the fees paid to their
    new attorney for continuing a case, especially when [the] fees were
    not prayed for in the pleading[s] . . . [and] in light of the fact that [the]
    withdrawing counsel fully or substantially performed.
    Jimoh further asserts that “[o]rdering a former attorney to pay for [a] client’s new
    lawyer greatly offends public policy.”
    An appellant’s brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the
    contentions made with appropriate citations to the authorities and to the record.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Failure to cite applicable authority waives an issue on
    appeal. See Huey v. Huey, 
    200 S.W.3d 851
    , 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no
    pet.); Richard v. Cornerstone Constructors, Inc., 
    921 S.W.2d 465
    , 469 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (“[A] point of error unsupported by
    the citation of any authority presents nothing for this Court to review.”); see also
    Saudi v. Brieven, 
    176 S.W.3d 108
    , 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.
    denied) (holding appellant’s failure to cite authority and provide analysis in initial
    brief waived issue on appeal).
    7
    Jimoh cites no authority in her brief to support her argument that the trial
    court erred in awarding the Nwogos damages for the amount that they paid to the
    attorney handling the immigration case after Jimoh had withdrawn her
    representation. Accordingly, we hold that Jimoh has waived her second issue. See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 
    881 S.W.2d 279
    , 284 (Tex. 1994) (noting appellate courts have discretion to deem issues
    waived due to inadequate briefing).
    Attorney’s Fees
    In her first issue, Jimoh argues that the trial court erred in awarding the
    Nwogos $5,000 in attorney’s fees to prosecute the instant case because they failed
    to plead for attorney’s fees in the justice court, only requested $1,500 in attorney’s
    fees in their county court pleadings, “failed to produce evidence that the
    attorney[’s] fees of $5,000.00 was reasonable or . . . ‘usual and customary,’” and
    did not present a demand for attorney’s fees. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
    ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 2008) (“To recover attorney’s fees [for breach of contract]:
    (1) the claimant must be represented by an attorney; (2) the claimant must present
    the claim to the opposing party or to a duly authorized agent of the opposing party;
    and (3) payment for the just amount owed must not have been tendered before the
    expiration of the 30th day after the claim is presented.” (emphasis added)).
    8
    In response, the Nwogos argue that Jimoh did not properly preserve this
    issue for appeal because she “did not object to the submission of attorney’s fees”
    and her motion for new trial was “ambiguous on its face and not specific enough as
    to give notice . . . of what was being complained of.”
    As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record
    must show that “the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request,
    objection, or motion . . . with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of
    the complaint.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). This is true of an alleged trial error
    regarding an attorney’s fees award because such error is not fundamental. See
    Kelly v. Brenham Floral Co., No. 01-12-01000-CV, 
    2014 WL 4219448
    , at *4
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Tex. Dep’t of
    Pub. Safety v. Burrows, 
    976 S.W.2d 304
    , 307 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no
    pet.). However, “[i]n a nonjury case, a complaint regarding” the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support attorney’s fees “may be made for the first time on appeal”;
    thus, no “timely request, objection, or motion” to the trial court is required. See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a), (d); Nelson v. Najm, 
    127 S.W.3d 170
    , 176 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“It is well settled that challenges to the
    sufficiency of the evidence in nonjury cases may be raised for the first time on
    appeal.”).
    9
    Jimoh advances several arguments on appeal regarding the trial court’s
    award of attorney’s fees. To the extent that Jimoh’s complaints relate to the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support the $5,000 award, she may advance the
    complaints, regardless of whether she first presented them to the trial court.3 See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d). However, to the extent that Jimoh raises other complaints
    about the award of attorney’s fees on appeal, namely, that the Nwogos failed to
    plead for attorney’s fees in the justice court, only requested $1,500 in attorney’s
    fees in their county court pleadings, and did not present a demand for attorney’s
    fees in accordance with section 38.002, we must consider whether she preserved
    the complaints “by a timely request, objection, or motion.” See TEX. R. APP. P.
    33.1(a).
    At trial, Jimoh did not object to the testimony of Opande, the Nwogos
    attorney in the instant case, about his fees, including his testimony as to their
    amount and reasonableness. And, although Jimoh filed a motion for new trial, she
    did not specifically complain about the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees or
    make the complaints she now attempts to advance on appeal. See, e.g., Coleman v.
    Coleman, No. 01-09-00615-CV, 
    2010 WL 5187612
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
    3
    On appeal, Jimoh argues that the Nwogos “failed to produce evidence that the
    attorney[’s] fees of $5,000.00 was reasonable or . . . ‘usual and customary.’” See
    Atl. Shippers of Tex., Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty., 
    363 S.W.3d 276
    , 285 (Tex. App.—
    Beaumont 2012, no pet.) (concluding defendant entitled to complain that “court
    awarded an unreasonable attorney ad litem fee” for first time on appeal).
    10
    [1st Dist.] Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Presentment [issue] must be raised
    at the trial court to be preserved on appeal.”); Robertson v. Gregg Cnty., No. 06-
    09-00062-CV, 
    2009 WL 2971763
    , at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 18, 2009,
    no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Although judgment cannot generally be awarded for an
    amount greater than that raised by the pleadings, such a matter may be waived if a
    complaint is not properly preserved.”); 
    Burrows, 976 S.W.2d at 307
    (concluding
    complaint plaintiff did not request attorney’s fees in pleadings waived when not
    raised in motion for rehearing or motion for new trial).
    Because Jimoh, in her motion for new trial, did not specify that she intended
    to challenge the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees on the grounds that the
    Nwogos failed to plead for them in justice court, only requested $1,500 in
    attorney’s fees in their county court pleadings, and did not “present” their
    attorney’s fees demand, we hold that Jimoh has not preserved these complaints for
    appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
    In regard to Jimoh’s remaining sufficiency-of-the-evidence complaint, we
    review the amount of attorney’s fees awarded under a legal-sufficiency standard.
    Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 
    212 S.W.3d 665
    , 671 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).       In conducting our legal-sufficiency review, we
    consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding under review and
    indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson,
    11
    
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 822 (Tex. 2005). If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the
    challenged finding, the legal-sufficiency challenge fails. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
    Canchola, 
    121 S.W.3d 735
    , 739 (Tex. 2003); see also Lundy v. Masson, 
    260 S.W.3d 482
    , 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (when party
    challenges sufficiency of evidence supporting adverse finding on issue on which
    she did not have burden of proof, party must demonstrate no evidence supports
    adverse finding).
    In determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, the following factors
    may be considered: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
    the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
    (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
    other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
    similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the
    time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and
    length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience,
    reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8)
    whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or the uncertainty of
    collection before the legal services have been rendered. Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
    Perry Equip. Corp., 
    945 S.W.2d 812
    , 818 (Tex. 1997). A factfinder is not required
    to consider all of these factors in every case; they simply constitute guidelines to
    12
    be considered, not elements of proof. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 
    144 S.W.3d 554
    , 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.); Acad. Corp. v. Interior
    Buildout & Turnkey Constr., Inc., 
    21 S.W.3d 732
    , 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Thus, it is not necessary that the record include evidence on
    each of the factors. See Burnside Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. T.S. Young
    Corp., 
    113 S.W.3d 889
    , 897–98 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Acad. 
    Corp., 21 S.W.3d at 742
    .
    In addition to the above enumerated factors, judges may consider the entire
    record and draw upon their common knowledge and experience as lawyers and
    judges. See In re M.A.N.M., 
    231 S.W.3d 562
    , 567 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no
    pet.); C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc., 
    135 S.W.3d 768
    , 802 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). And when a claim for attorney’s fees is based
    on chapter 38, it is presumed that the usual and customary fees are reasonable,
    although the presumption may be rebutted. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    § 38.003 (Vernon 2008).
    Opande testified that he has been a licensed attorney in Texas for “the last
    six years.” He practices in Houston in the “areas of civil litigation, criminal
    defense and immigration” and has represented “several hundreds of clients.”
    Generally, Opande charges clients “either [a] retainer fee or [a] flat fee,” depending
    on the case. Here, he negotiated with the Nwogos a “flat fee” of $5,000, if their
    13
    case went to trial. If the Nwogos’ case “had not gone to trial,” he would have
    charged them a “flat fee” of $1,500. Opande and the Nwogos signed a contract
    reflecting the fee arrangement; however, it was not admitted into evidence. At the
    time of trial, the Nwogos had paid Opande “a total of $1,500” and had an
    “outstanding” balance of $3,500 due.4
    Although Opande charges certain clients an “hourly rate,” he explained that
    it “varie[s] . . . depending on the client . . . [and] the complexity of the matter.”
    Here, he did not charge the Nwogos an hourly rate because he “charg[ed] [them] a
    flat fee.” And he did not “count[] the hours” that he spent on the case, keep “time
    slips,” or create a “billing statement” because of the “flat fee” arrangement.
    Opande further testified that a fee of $5,000 was “reasonable” and “fair and
    equitable” for the Nwogos’ case because he “spen[t] several hours [doing]
    consultation, several hours . . . review[ing] documents[,] and . . . several hours [in]
    court represent[ing]” them.
    Jimoh argues that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is not reasonable
    because the Nwogos did not produce a “contract and billing statement for
    $5,000.00,” “[t]he only testimony” was from the Nwogos’ attorney, “[t]he award
    of $5,000.000 does not bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of $737.00 [in
    4
    The trial court admitted into evidence receipts reflecting the Nwogos’ payments to
    Opande.
    14
    damages] found by the court,” and the testimony presented did not
    “articulate . . . the factors required to prove reasonableness.”
    Initially, we note that an attorney is qualified to testify regarding his own
    fees. See, e.g., Harrison v. Gemdrill Int’l., Inc., 
    981 S.W.2d 714
    , 719 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (upholding attorney’s fees award as
    matter of law based on attorney’s testimony regarding his own fees).           And,
    although the Nwogos did not introduce into evidence their contract with Opande,
    any “time slips,” or a “billing statement” containing the hours that Opande worked,
    such “[d]ocumentary evidence . . . is not a prerequisite to an award of attorney[’s]
    fees.” See In re A.B.P., 
    291 S.W.3d 91
    , 99 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)
    (holding evidence sufficient to support attorney’s fees award, although attorney’s
    “fee agreement or billing statements” not submitted); see also Save Our Springs
    Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 
    304 S.W.3d 871
    , 892–93 (Tex. App.—
    Austin 2010, pet. denied) (rejecting suggestion “that only fee bills . . . would be
    sufficient evidence of attorney[’s] fee amounts”); Hays & Martin, L.L.P. v.
    Ubinas–Brache, M.D., 
    192 S.W.3d 631
    , 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.
    denied) (explaining “the nature and extent of the [attorney’s] services
    performed . . . [need not be] expressed by the number of hours and the hourly
    rate”); Cashin v. Jackson, No. 13-00-049-CV, 
    2001 WL 34615336
    , at *3 (Tex.
    App.—Corpus Christi no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“It is proper for an
    15
    attorney to charge a lump sum or flat fee for a case rather than on an hourly
    basis.”).
    In regard to Jimoh’s assertion that the trial court’s $5,000 attorney’s fees
    award “does not bear a reasonable relationship” to the Nwogos’ damages award,
    we note that the trial court awarded the Nwogos $3,737 in damages, not $737 as
    asserted by Jimoh. Further, Jimoh does not explain how the fee award in this case
    “does not bear a reasonable relationship” to the damages awarded. At most, she
    appears to argue that the attorney’s fee award “does not bear a reasonable
    relationship” to the damages awarded because it constitutes a greater sum of
    money. However, there is no legal rule that an attorney’s fees award may not
    exceed a damages award; and, in circumstances where it does, this fact does not
    render such an attorney’s fees award unreasonable. See Bundren v. Holly Oaks
    Townhomes Ass’n, 
    347 S.W.3d 421
    , 441 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied);
    see also Bank of Tex. v. VR Elec., Inc., 
    276 S.W.3d 671
    , 684–85 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (rejecting argument “that the award of
    attorney’s fees was unreasonable because they were excessive with respect to the
    amount in controversy”).
    Here, the trial court heard evidence that, based on Opande’s experience in
    performing similar legal services in the same locality, a fee of $5,000 was
    “reasonable” because of the work done by Opande. See Metroplex Mailing Servs.,
    16
    LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co., 
    410 S.W.3d 889
    , 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,
    no pet.) (“It has consistently been held that an attorney’s testimony about his
    experience, the total amount of fees, and the reasonableness of the fees charged is
    sufficient to support an award.”); see also In re 
    M.A.N.M., 231 S.W.3d at 567
    –68
    (affirming award of attorney’s fees where attorney did not testify about his hourly
    rate or number of hours spent on case, but did testify as to reasonableness of fees).
    The trial court also heard evidence regarding Opande’s experience, the nature of
    the Opande and Nwogos fee arrangement, and the amount in controversy. See
    Arthur 
    Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818
    .           And Jimoh presented no evidence
    controverting or rebutting the Nwogos’ evidence that Opande’s fees were
    reasonable.
    Because there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the trial court’s
    award of attorney’s fees, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the
    award.
    We overrule Jimoh’s first issue.
    17
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Terry Jennings
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Massengale.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-13-00675-CV

Filed Date: 12/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015

Authorities (23)

Texas Department of Public Safety v. Burrows , 976 S.W.2d 304 ( 1998 )

Harrison v. Gemdrill International, Inc. , 981 S.W.2d 714 ( 1998 )

In Re ABP , 291 S.W.3d 91 ( 2009 )

Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster , 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 3752 ( 2004 )

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola , 121 S.W.3d 735 ( 2003 )

Atlantic Shippers of Texas, Inc. v. Jefferson County , 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1821 ( 2012 )

Huey v. Huey , 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7575 ( 2006 )

In Re MANM , 231 S.W.3d 562 ( 2007 )

C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor Inc. , 135 S.W.3d 768 ( 2004 )

Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Co. , 881 S.W.2d 279 ( 1994 )

Hays & Martin, L.L.P. v. Ubinas-Brache , 192 S.W.3d 631 ( 2006 )

Bank of Texas v. VR Electric, Inc. , 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 9745 ( 2008 )

Bundren v. Holly Oaks Townhomes Ass'n, Inc. , 347 S.W.3d 421 ( 2011 )

Nelson v. Najm , 127 S.W.3d 170 ( 2003 )

Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp. , 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 591 ( 1997 )

City of Keller v. Wilson , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 848 ( 2005 )

Richard v. Cornerstone Constructors, Inc. , 921 S.W.2d 465 ( 1996 )

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs , 304 S.W.3d 871 ( 2010 )

Burnside Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. T.S. Young ... , 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7529 ( 2003 )

Academy Corp. v. Interior Buildout & Turnkey Construction ... , 21 S.W.3d 732 ( 2000 )

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