J. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services ( 2014 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-14-00003-CV
    J. D., Appellant
    v.
    Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. 257,875-B, HONORABLE JACK WELDON JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Based on jury findings, the trial court terminated J.D.’s parental rights to his son,
    G.W.1 Appellant raises four issues on appeal challenging the legal and factual sufficiency to support
    the jury findings that underlie the termination. We will affirm the judgment.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The parent-child relationship can be terminated if there is clear and convincing
    evidence that (1) the parent has engaged in conduct set out as statutory grounds for termination and
    (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001. When multiple statutory
    1
    This case at one time concerned the parental rights to four boys born to W.W. and
    three different fathers. W.W. eventually relinquished her rights to G.W. and another son. Her
    parental rights are not at issue on this appeal, nor are those of the other presumed or alleged fathers.
    This case proceeded to trial only as to appellant’s parental rights.
    W.W. regained custody of her other two sons under a monitored return. According to
    appellant, the Department thereafter removed those children and sought termination of her parental
    rights to those children, alleging that W.W. violated the terms of that return.
    grounds for termination are alleged and the trial court issues a broad-form question asking the jury
    whether the parent-child relationship should be terminated, we must uphold the jury’s finding if it
    is supported by any of the statutory grounds alleged. Spurck v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Prot. Servs.,
    
    396 S.W.3d 205
    , 221 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.)
    We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the factfinder’s determination and will uphold a finding if a reasonable
    factfinder could have formed a firm conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    , 266 (Tex. 2002). We must assume that the jury resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if
    it could reasonably do so. 
    Id. We disregard
    evidence a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved
    or found incredible. 
    Id. When reviewing
    the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case,
    we view all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether a reasonable factfinder
    could form a firm belief or conviction that a given finding was true. In re C.H., 
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 18-19
    (Tex. 2002). We assume that the jury resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
    jury could do so, and we disregard evidence that a reasonable jury could have disbelieved or
    found incredible. 
    J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266
    . Evidence is factually insufficient only if a reasonable
    factfinder could not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding and if that disputed
    evidence is so significant that the factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
    conviction. 
    Id. 2 DISCUSSION
    The trial court submitted a single broad-form question asking the jury whether
    appellant’s parental rights to G.W. should be terminated. The court instructed the jury that the
    parental relationship could be terminated only if the jury found by clear and convincing evidence
    that termination was in the child’s best interest and that one of the following events occurred:
    (1) appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed G.W. with persons who engaged in conduct
    that endangered G.W.’s physical or emotional well-being; (2) appellant failed to support G.W. in
    accordance with his ability in the relevant period; or (3) appellant constructively abandoned G.W.
    See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(E), (F), (N), (2).
    Evidence supporting the first ground arose before G.W.’s birth. Appellant met
    G.W.’s mother, W.W., when they both lived in South Carolina and she was pregnant with one
    of G.W.’s older brothers. He testified that later, after he learned that W.W. was pregnant with his
    child, G.W., she came to live with him and his mother in New York City. He testified that problems
    soon arose:
    She—because she said she wanted me to baby-sit her kids at that time while she
    sleep, and she was just too nasty for me. What I mean “nasty”—her hygiene, the way
    she was taking care of the kids was unacceptable to me, and I just couldn’t take her
    no more, and I just told her I wanted to go my separate ways.
    W.W. went to live with her brother in Kansas, where in June 2006 she gave birth to G.W.2
    Appellant did not visit G.W. during the two years he lived in Kansas. W.W. moved back to
    2
    G.W.’s caseworker testified that he was “in care” while in Kansas (without stating a
    reason) and in Massachusetts after an allegation that one of G.W.’s brothers was sexually abused.
    There is no evidence that appellant was aware of the Kansas removal. Appellant testified that he
    thought G.W. was “in care” in Massachusetts.
    3
    New York City in 2008 and soon thereafter her children were removed from her after one of them
    was burned with an iron while being watched by a teenaged neighbor. Appellant testified that the
    children were then in foster care for a year and a half and that, during the pendency of the removal,
    he went to one court hearing. He also said he visited G.W. in foster care with W.W. almost weekly
    for about a year until he felt that his arguments with W.W. were too distracting. He said he did not
    intervene in the court proceeding because he felt that conflict with the mother was going to “be a
    distraction” from the mother regaining custody and be contrary to his son’s wishes and best interest.3
    When New York restored custody of her four children to W.W., she moved with the children to
    Massachusetts in May 2011. Appellant testified that he lost touch with W.W. shortly thereafter. In
    2012, W.W. sent the children to live with relatives in Texas, asserting that she would follow soon
    after. When it became apparent that W.W. was not coming, the relatives called the Department. In
    June 2012, the Department initiated this proceeding. Appellant testified that he believed that G.W.
    was in Massachusetts until April 2013, when he learned that G.W. was in Texas from a nephew who
    was Facebook friends with W.W.
    Appellant then contacted the caseworker, who advised him regarding steps he could
    take to stave off termination. In May 2013, the trial court granted the maximum six-month extension
    of this proceeding. Appellant interacted with G.W. once through the Texas caseworker. At her
    prompting, he exchanged texted photos with the seven-year-old G.W., who did not recognize him.
    3
    The record contains criminal history for appellant. During 2008-09, appellant was arrested
    three times for having cigarettes lacking required tax stamps, once for petty larceny, and once for
    criminal mischief. These followed his August 2007 arrest for marijuana possession. He had other
    criminal history through the 1990s, plus a robbery and burglary charge in 1985 that led to a two-year
    prison term. He also had verbal confrontations with his wife—not G.W.’s mother—in 2011 and
    2012 that led him to call the police, and his wife called the police in 2012 charging him with grand
    larceny of some of her jewelry.
    4
    He did not visit or attend court hearings, citing the expense of travel and lodging, and did not
    participate in the court hearings or mediation. He participated in the trial by telephone.
    G.W.’s caseworker and guardian ad litem described G.W. as a sweet and gentle,
    but also angry, troubled, and confused boy. They said that he was intelligent and could bond with
    others, but was subject to fits of anger in which he would hit his teachers, classmates, and brothers.
    They said that the brothers knew how to trigger each other’s anger and did so. Although the
    brothers were initially placed with a foster family trained to deal with challenging children, G.W.
    was eventually moved to a residential treatment center to focus on his issues. The Department’s
    witnesses testified that G.W.’s problems likely stemmed from his unstable surroundings during
    his life. The guardian ad litem testified that, although appellant may not have directly created the
    unstable environment, he is a cause of it through omission by allowing G.W. to remain in such an
    environment with the child’s mother.
    Appellant denied responsibility for G.W.’s situation. He never paid child support,
    though he said he did provide W.W. with money when he could. His income was limited to monthly
    $797 disability payments, which he said were paid due to depression, bad knees, high cholesterol,
    and asthma. Appellant argues that he did not endanger G.W. personally and did not knowingly place
    him with someone who did. He asserts that G.W.’s mother severed contact with him and that he was
    unaware of his child’s surroundings. He relies on a case in which a court of appeals reversed the
    termination of the parental rights of a prisoner who was estranged from the mother of his children
    and was unaware of the conditions in which the mother placed the children after his imprisonment.
    In re K.W., 
    138 S.W.3d 420
    , 432 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). He also notes that,
    despite the removals and other interventions, state authorities always returned the children to
    5
    W.W. Even in this case terminating W.W.’s rights to G.W. based on her relinquishment, her
    positive drug tests, and her other history, the Department returned two of her sons to her custody,
    indicating that she was not an unfit parent. The caseworker testified that W.W. had tried to improve
    her parenting skills.
    Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s implied finding that
    appellant knowingly placed G.W. with someone whose conduct endangered G.W.’s physical or
    emotional well-being. G.W. has emotional problems and engages in physical violence, issues that
    witnesses attributed to the environments in which W.W. raised him. Appellant himself testified
    that while W.W. lived with him before G.W.’s birth, her “hygiene and the way she was taking care
    of the kids was unacceptable.” In response, he “went [his] separate way” while he knew she was
    pregnant with G.W. Appellant did not seek visitation, much less custody, then or at any time during
    G.W.’s seven years of life until this proceeding. He did not see G.W. after he was born and did not
    investigate whether W.W.’s parenting continued to be “unacceptable.” Appellant did not challenge
    W.W.’s custody when she returned to New York City, even after G.W. was removed from
    her care after another of her children was injured. Appellant testified that the children were not
    placed with him because W.W. “objected.” W.W. broke off contact with appellant after moving to
    Massachusetts—which appellant testified occurred when the children were removed from her
    care in New York—and still he did not seek to remove G.W. from her care through official processes
    or informal offer. Viewing the record in the proper light, we conclude that factually and legally
    sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence
    that appellant knowingly placed G.W. with someone who endangered his physical and emotional
    well-being.
    6
    Because we have found the evidence sufficient to support one ground for termination,
    we need not address the remaining grounds for termination. See 
    Spurck, 396 S.W.3d at 221
    .
    Best interest of the child
    In a parental rights termination case, the best interest of the child is assessed using
    a non-exhaustive list of factors. See In re R.R., 
    209 S.W.3d 112
    , 116 (Tex. 2006); Holley v. Adams,
    
    544 S.W.2d 367
    , 371-72 (Tex. 1976). The nine, non-exhaustive Holley factors are: (1) the desires
    of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the
    emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parenting abilities of
    the parties seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the parties seeking custody; (6) the
    plans for the child by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed
    placement; (8) the acts or omission committed by the parent which may indicate the existing
    parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions committed
    by the parent. 
    Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72
    . The Department need not prove all nine Holley
    factors. 
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27
    . We will discuss evidence relating to the Holley factors relevant to
    this case.
    G.W. did not testify regarding his wishes. G.W.’s foster home counselor said
    G.W. did not talk about his dad or even knew him. The caseworker said that G.W. did not recognize
    appellant in a picture, did not ask to call him, and did not mention him. G.W.’s guardian ad litem
    said that G.W. wants to move on and be adopted into a safe, stable home.
    The Department’s witnesses testified that G.W. should be released from the
    residential treatment center within months, though no particular timetable was set. After that, G.W.
    7
    will need a highly structured environment with people who understand his need for boundaries and
    notice when he is getting upset and when others are pushing his buttons.
    There is not much evidence of appellant’s parenting abilities. He has five grown
    children who he says he raised and stayed involved in their lives even though he did not live
    with their mothers. Three were involved with state child-protection authorities because, according
    to appellant, their mothers abandoned them. Those children did not come to live with him, but he
    said he stayed involved in their lives “to some extent.” Appellant asserts that he can provide for
    G.W.’s needs. Although appellant was staying in his mother’s living room, he said he planned to
    get an apartment with his fiancee that could accommodate her children and G.W. He anticipated
    accessing government services that G.W. would need.
    The Department said it had a prospective adoptive family lined up, although the
    family had not been certified as a foster home or an adoptive placement. The proposed parents are
    a retired military father and nurse mother who run a licensed in-home day-care. They have grown
    children. They knew G.W.’s foster family through church and had known G.W. for a year through
    that interaction. The Department planned for G.W.’s oldest brother to be adopted by another family
    from the same church, so the boys would be near each other and in contact but not in the same
    house, which G.W.’s caseworker described as best for G.W. The Department acknowledged that
    the adoption was not certain because the proposed adoptive parents might not be approved or could
    conceivably change their minds.
    G.W.’s guardian ad litem opined that appellant had not shown any change in
    his priorities in favor of G.W. despite knowing that their familial relationship was at stake. In
    two phone calls, appellant did not ask for help and did not ask how G.W. was doing. He testified
    8
    that appellant is responsible for G.W.’s situation because he knew that G.W.’s environment was
    unacceptable and yet allowed him to remain in it. Appellant testified that he did not know whether
    he could talk to G.W. so he did not ask. The guardian ad litem testified that termination was in
    G.W.’s best interest.
    Viewing the record in the proper light, we conclude that the record contains legally
    and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
    termination of appellant’s parental rights is in G.W.’s best interest.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment terminating appellant’s parental rights to his son, G.W.
    Jeff Rose, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Rose
    Affirmed
    Filed: April 24, 2014
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-14-00003-CV

Filed Date: 4/24/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/17/2015