Raymond Broussard v. State ( 2012 )

NUMBERS 13-12-00092-CR & 13-12-00093-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
RAYMOND BROUSSARD, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By one issue in this consolidated appeal, 1 appellant Raymond Broussard
contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his community
supervision. We affirm.
1
We granted appellant’s motion to consolidate appeals because the trial court held a single
hearing on motions to revoke community supervision. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1
I. BACKGROUND2
In February 2007, Broussard was convicted for possession of cocaine (Cause No.
13-12-0093-CR), a state jail felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
481.115(a)–(b) (West 2010). He was sentenced to two years of community
supervision.3 In March 2007, Broussard was convicted for injury to a child (Cause No.
13-12-0092-CR), a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (West
2011). The trial court sentenced him to seven years of community supervision.
In 2011, the State sought to revoke Broussard’s community supervision in both
causes. The State alleged that Broussard violated various conditions of his community
supervision including: (1) committing an aggravated robbery; (2) failing to report to his
community supervision officer for June 2011; (3) failing to pay court costs; (4) failing to
attend a drug offender education program; (5) failing to attend a felony victim impact
panel; (6) failing to complete 120 hours of community service restitution; (7) associating
with known felons/drug dealers/users; and (8) failing to observe the curfew imposed by
the terms of the community supervision.
Broussard pleaded “true” to allegations 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above. Broussard
pleaded “not true” to the remaining allegations. At the hearing, testimony was received
from community supervision officers, the victim of the alleged aggravated robbery, the
Corpus Christi police officer who arrested Broussard the night of the alleged aggravated
robbery, the crime scene investigator who processed the scene of the aggravated
robbery, and Broussard. See id. § 29.03 (West 2011). At the conclusion of the
2
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for
it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
3
This term was later extended by three years.
2
hearing, the trial court found allegations one (aggravated robbery) and two (failure to
report) to be “true” and found allegation four (failure to attend a drug offender education
program) to be “not true.”
Accordingly, the trial court revoked Broussard’s community supervision terms on
the possession of cocaine and on the injury to a child charges and sentenced Broussard
to two years and seven years’ imprisonment, respectively, in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. This appeal ensued.
II. MOTION TO REVOKE
By one issue, Broussard asserts that the trial court abused its discretion for
finding that Broussard’s commission of an aggravated robbery was “true” because the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an abuse of
discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jones v.
State, 112 S.W.3d 266, 268 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
In determining questions regarding sufficiency of the evidence in revocation
cases, the State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
allegations asserted. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. In other words, the greater
weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the
defendant has violated a condition of his probation must support the trial court’s order.
Id. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. See
Jones, 112 S.W.3d at 268; Canseco v. State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 438 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, the trial court is the exclusive judge of the
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credibility of the witnesses and must determine whether the allegations in the motion to
revoke are sufficiently demonstrated. Canseco, 199 S.W.3d at 438.
B. Discussion
Here, Broussard argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding
of true regarding his role in the alleged aggravated robbery. We disagree. C.M., the
victim of the alleged aggravated robbery, testified that Broussard was one of three
attackers who physically assaulted him around midnight on September 23, 2011 and
took $70 from his front pants pocket inside of his Corpus Christi, Texas apartment.
C.M. also testified that he did not know any of his alleged attackers prior to this incident.
The trial court also admitted C.M.’s telephone call to 911 emergency operators
immediately following the attack. Our review of the 911 call indicates that C.M.’s
account to emergency operators that night matched his testimony to the trial court at the
revocation hearing.
Broussard admitted that he visited C.M.’s home on the night in question along
with two male friends, as well as his girlfriend, Cecilia, who Broussard described as a
“known prostitute.” Broussard testified that he and his friends accompanied Cecilia so
that she could collect money owed to her by C.M. for sexual services rendered.
Broussard testified that C.M. did not want to pay Cecilia and eventually Broussard’s
friend, Ricky Perales, struck C.M. on Cecilia’s orders. C.M. contended that he gave the
$70 to his attackers, after Perales continued to beat him. Broussard stated that at no
point did he strike C.M. during the altercation.
Our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
because it was within the trial court’s discretion, as the exclusive judge of witness
4
credibility and finder of fact, see Jones, 112 S.W.3d at 268, to find that the State’s
allegation that Broussard participated in the aggravated robbery of C.M. was proven true
by a preponderance of the evidence.4 See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. Accordingly,
Broussard’s sole issue is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgments are affirmed.
__________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed the
23rd day of August, 2012.
4
Even if we assume arguendo that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
of true on the aggravated robbery allegation, the trial court was still within its discretion to revoke
Broussard’s community supervision. Pleas of true, standing alone, support revocation of community
supervision. Jones v. State, 112 S.W.3d 266, 268 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing Cole v.
State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)). In this case, Broussard pleaded true to
five of the eight allegations asserted by the State. With those five pleas, the trial court was within its
discretion to revoke Broussard’s community supervision regardless of its finding of true on the aggravated
robbery allegation.
5