Diana Arriaga v. Cameron County, Texas, Cameron County Auditor, and Martha Galarza, in Her Official Capacity ( 2012 )

NUMBER 13-10-00484-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DIANA ARRIAGA, Appellant,
v.
CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS, CAMERON
COUNTY AUDITOR, AND MARTHA GALARZA,
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Appellees.
On appeal from the 138th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Vela, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
This is an appeal from a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissal granted in favor of
appellees, Cameron County Auditor, Martha Galarza in her official capacity and Cameron
County ("Cameron County") and against appellant, Diana Arriaga ("Arriaga"). Arriaga
argues on appeal that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear her discrimination complaint
because she met the statutory definition of employee pursuant to section 21.002(7) of the
Texas Labor Code and immunity was waived because Cameron County and its auditor
were employers pursuant to section 21.002(8) of the Texas Labor Code. See TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West Supp. 2011). We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
In June of 2004, Arriaga applied for a job with the Cameron County Human
Resources Department and was hired to work for the Cameron County Auditor. In
February of 2008, Arriaga and several of her female coworkers filed a sexual harassment
complaint against Robert Almon, the Cameron County Auditor at the time. Mr. Almon
resigned in April of 2008 and Martha Galarza was appointed in his place. In June of
2008, Arriaga's employment was terminated due to alleged misconduct. Arriaga
subsequently filed suit against Cameron County, the Cameron County Board of Judges,
the Cameron County Auditor, Martha Galarza, individually, and Robert Almon,
individually. On May 17, 2009, the trial court granted the pleas to the jurisdiction of
Cameron County and the Cameron County Auditor and dismissed the case for want of
jurisdiction. On June 29, 2009, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss individual
defendants Galarza and Almon.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and
defeats a cause of action without regard to the merits of a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether the trial court had subject matter
2
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). The trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction must be affirmatively established by the facts as alleged by the plaintiff. Tex.
Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). If a plea to the
jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence
submitted by the parties that is necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Tex. Dep't.
of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004); Bland, 34 S.W.3d at
555.
A trial court's review of a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the existence of
jurisdictional facts mirrors that of a traditional motion for summary judgment. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 228; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). A governmental unit is required to
meet the summary judgment standard of proof for its assertion that the trial court lacks
jurisdiction. Id. When the facts underlying the merits and subject matter are
intertwined, the plaintiff is then required to show that there is a disputed material fact
regarding the jurisdictional issue. See Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co. L.P., 19
S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. 2000); Phan Son Van v. Pena, 990 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. 1999).
If the evidence creates a fact question regarding jurisdiction, the trial court must deny the
plea to the jurisdiction and leave its resolution to the fact finder. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
228. But if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional
issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id.
3
III. ANALYSIS
Cameron County argues that Arriaga was in an appointed position of Assistant
Auditor or became a de facto Assistant Auditor. As a public officer, Cameron County
argues that Arriaga cannot be an "employee" for purposes of liability under the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). For purposes of standing, the TCHRA
defines an employee as:
An individual employed by an employer, including an individual
subject to the civil service laws of this state or a political subdivision of this
state, except that the term does not include an individual elected to public
office in this state or a political subdivision of this state.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(7).
The TCHRA defines an employer as:
(A) a person who is engaged in industry affecting commerce and
who has 15 or more employees . . .
(C) an individual elected to public office in this state or a political
subdivision of this state; or
(D) a county, . . . regardless of the number of individuals employed.
Id. § 21.002(8).
The County cites to section 84.012 of the Texas Local Government Code, which
sets forth the appointment process for hiring assistants for county auditors. See. TEX.
LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 84.021 (West 2008). This section provides:
(a) From time to time the county auditor may certify to the
district judges a list stating the number of assistants to be appointed,
the name, duties, qualifications, and experience of each appointee,
and the salary to be paid each appointee. The district judges, after
careful consideration of the application for the appointment of the
assistants and after inquiry concerning the appointees'
qualifications, the positions sought to be filled, and the
reasonableness of the requested salaries, shall prepare a list of the
4
appointees that the judges approve and the salary to be paid each.
The judges shall certify this list to the commissioners court, which
shall order the salaries to be paid on the performance of services and
shall appropriate an adequate amount of money for this purpose.
(b) If an emergency exists, the county auditor shall
recommend the appointment of temporary assistants, and after a
hearing held in accordance with section 152.905, the district judges
shall determine the number, salaries, and duration of employment of
the assistants.
(c) An assistant must take the usual oath of office for faithful
performance of duty. The county auditor may require an assistant
to give a bond and may determine the terms of the bond. The bond
must run in favor of the county and the county auditor as their
interests indicate. The county shall pay for the bond.
Id.
Thus, the County concludes that Arriaga is a public officer, much like the county
auditor in Guerrero v. Refugio County, 946 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997,
disapproved by NME Hospitals, Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 146–7 (Tex. 1999) and
Thompson v. City of Austin, 979 S.W.2d 676 , 682 (Tex App.—Austin 1998, no writ). If
portions of Guerrero remain viable after the supreme court's opinion, we nevertheless,
find it distinguishable. First, in Guerrero, it was undisputed that the party who was the
subject of the appeal was, in fact, the Refugio County Auditor, who had taken an oath and
posted a bond. See id. at 562–70. In this case, Arriaga submitted evidence in response
to the plea to the jurisdiction, that she did not take an oath or post a bond. Second, the
Guerrero opinion was based partially upon this Court's decision that there was insufficient
evidence that Refugio County maintained sufficient control over the auditor to determine
whether a direct employment relationship existed that would support liability. The Texas
Supreme Court ultimately ruled, however, in Rennels, that a direct employment
5
relationship is not necessary for liability under the TCHRA. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d at 146.
Thompson is also distinguishable. In Thompson, the court was presented with
the issue of whether two municipal judges were employees of the city of Austin for
purposes of liability under the TCHRA. Id. at 678. The Thompson court concluded that
the municipal judges were not employees, but were public officers. Id. at 681.
Arriaga counters the County's arguments, through sworn affidavit in response to
the plea to the jurisdiction, that she was hired by Cameron County to be a clerk in the
Cameron County Auditor's office. She averred that she never took an oath of office, and
was never voted on or appointed by a board of judges. She stated that the auditor's
office had more than fifteen employees. She said prior to hire she completed an
employment application with the Cameron County Human Resources Department and
the "W-2" forms identified her as an employee of Cameron County. She also said she
was bound by the County's personnel manual.
While the County's motion to dismiss states that Arriaga was employed as an
assistant auditor, Arriaga's responsive evidence creates fact questions with respect to
both Cameron County's status as employer and Arriaga's status as employee. Thus, we
sustain Arriaga's first issue and reverse and remand the case to the trial court.
V. CONCLUSION
The plea to the jurisdiction is reversed and the cause is reversed and remanded.
ROSE VELA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
29th day of August, 2012.
6