Evangel Healthcare Charities, Inc. v. Texas Workforce Commission and Jeneba Isha Bangura ( 2018 )


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  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 18, 2018.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-17-00942-CV
    EVANGEL HEALTHCARE CHARITIES, INC., Appellant
    V.
    TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION AND JENEBA ISHA BANGURA,
    Appellees
    On Appeal from the 400th District Court
    Fort Bend County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 14-DCV-218138
    MEMORANDUM                       OPINION
    Evangel Healthcare Charities, Inc. appeals the trial court’s summary judgment
    affirming the Texas Workforce Commission’s final decision ordering Evangel to
    pay its former employee Jeneba Bangura wages owed under the Texas Payday Act.
    According to Evangel, the decision violates the Act and is not supported by
    substantial evidence. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Evangel Healthcare Charities, Inc. (Evangel) is a home health care business
    that hires nurses with various qualifications to see patients in their homes. Evangel
    employed Jeneba Bangura, a licensed vocational nurse, to work as a pediatric nurse
    from March 2011 to September 2013.
    In October 2013, Bangura filed a wage claim with the Texas Workforce
    Commission (TWC) alleging that she was not paid for the last six weeks of her
    employment. See Tex. Lab. Code §§ 61.001–.095 (Texas Payday Act). Bangura
    sought unpaid wages totaling $8,640.00.
    The TWC ruled in Bangura’s favor and ordered Evangel to pay unpaid wages
    of $8,640.00. After Evangel exhausted the administrative appeal process, the TWC
    issued its final order on June 26, 2014. Evangel requested a rehearing, which was
    denied on September 11, 2014.
    On October 3, 2014, Evangel appealed the TWC’s final order by filing suit
    against the TWC and Bangura in the district court for a trial de novo. See
    
    id. § 61.062.
    In March 2017, the TWC and Bangura jointly filed a motion for
    summary judgment. In the motion, the TWC and Bangura argued that the TWC’s
    administrative decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
    Evangel responded that the time sheets Bangura submitted to the TWC could
    not constitute substantial evidence because they were not supported by nurse’s notes
    and other documentation Evangel required for payment. Evangel further claimed
    that Bangura had submitted fabricated time records in which she purported to be
    caring for Evangel’s patient when she was working for other employers at the same
    time.
    After an oral hearing, the trial court signed an order granting the TWC and
    2
    Bangura’s motion for summary judgment on September 25, 2017. Evangel moved
    for rehearing and a new trial. TWC and Bangura each filed responses to Evangel’s
    motion. Evangel’s motion was denied by written order.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Evangel contends that: (1) the TWC’s decision authorizing
    payment of wages without supporting records violates the Texas Payday Act; (2) the
    time sheets independently compiled by Bangura without corresponding supporting
    records and accurate nursing notes do not suffice as proof of services provided for
    which wages were due; (3) the TWC’s decision is not supported by substantial
    evidence; and (4) this court should consider evidence that Bangura fabricated time
    sheets and was simultaneously employed full time by six other employers.
    A.    Substantial Evidence Review
    The trial court reviews the TWC’s decision on wage claims by trial de novo
    to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the TWC’s ruling. See
    Tex. Lab. Code § 61.062(e). A TWC ruling is supported by substantial evidence
    when the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the
    time of the TWC’s decision that reasonably support the decision. See Collingsworth
    Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 
    988 S.W.2d 706
    , 708 (Tex. 1998); JMJ Acquisitions
    Mgmt., LLC v. Peterson, 
    407 S.W.3d 371
    , 373 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
    Because substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than
    a preponderance of evidence, the evidence may preponderate against the TWC
    decision but still amount to substantial evidence. Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Prod.,
    L.P., 
    353 S.W.3d 569
    , 572 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied); see also
    Lewis v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
    550 S.W.2d 11
    , 13 (Tex. 1977).
    Whether substantial evidence exists to support the TWC’s decision is a
    3
    question of law. See Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Alford, 
    209 S.W.3d 101
    , 103 (Tex.
    2006; 
    Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572
    . The trial court may not set aside the TWC’s
    decision merely because it would have reached a different conclusion. See Mercer
    v. Ross, 
    701 S.W.2d 830
    , 831 (Tex. 1986); JMJ 
    Acquisitions, 407 S.W.3d at 374
    .
    Nor may the trial court set aside the decision because the testimony was conflicting
    or disputed or because it did not compel the result reached by the agency. Firemen’s
    and Policemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Brinkmeyer, 
    662 S.W.2d 953
    , 956 (Tex.
    1984); JMJ 
    Acquisitions, 407 S.W.3d at 374
    . The TWC’s decision carries a
    presumption of validity and may be set aside only if it was made without regard to
    the law or the facts and therefore was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. See
    
    Collingsworth, 988 S.W.2d at 708
    ; JMJ 
    Acquisitions, 407 S.W.3d at 374
    . The
    burden rests with the complaining party to demonstrate an absence of substantial
    evidence. Tex. State Bd. Of Dental Exam’rs v. Sizemore, 
    759 S.W.2d 114
    , 116 (Tex.
    1988).
    When reviewing a summary judgment granted by the trial court in its de novo
    review of a TWC decision, we compare the TWC decision with the evidence
    presented to the trial court and the governing law. 
    Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 573
    .
    We decide whether the evidence presented established, as a matter of law, that
    substantial evidence existed to support the TWC decision. Id.; JMJ 
    Acquisitions, 407 S.W.3d at 374
    . We review questions of statutory construction de novo. See First Am.
    Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 
    258 S.W.3d 627
    , 631 (Tex. 2008).
    B.    Application of Law to Facts
    1.    Payday Act Violation
    In its first issue, Evangel contends that the TWC’s decision violates the Texas
    Payday Act. Evangel argues that throughout the administrative proceeding, Evangel
    testified that it determined compensation based on time sheets and accurate records
    4
    of services provided, and that Bangura “followed this practice from hire until she
    began to defraud Evangel.” According to Evangel, the TWC’s decision that Bangura
    was owed wages when she submitted time sheets without the additional
    documentation Evangel required runs contrary to the Payday Act, which “affords
    [the] employer the right to compute [the] employee’s wages in a certain manner.”
    Evangel cites the Payday Act’s definition of “wages” as “compensation owed by an
    employer” for “labor or services rendered by an employee, whether computed on a
    time, task, piece, commission, or other basis.” See Tex. Lab. Code § 61.001(7)(A).
    Evangel asserts that it computes compensation for its nurses based on time and task
    and that “[t]he task encompasses the required record.”
    Evangel complains that the TWC told Bangura to complete her time sheets to
    include hours she believed she worked only after the purported services were
    provided, and therefore the time records could not have been signed by the patient
    or patient’s guardian at the close of each visit and were produced “after the fact.”
    Thus, Evangel argues, the TWC “meddled with Evangel’s records because the
    signed time [sheet] is part of the accurate record requested of Bangura that she could
    not produce.” However, the time sheets that were provided to the TWC and included
    in the summary judgment record reflect the dates, times, and total hours worked by
    Bangura, as well as the signatures of both Bangura and the patient’s guardian on
    forms provided by Evangel. Evangel did not object to these time record in its
    response to the summary judgment motion.
    Evangel claims it requires both the time records and the additional
    documentation of the services provided to patients before it can accurately calculate
    Bangura’s compensation, and it also requires this documentation so that Evangel can
    be reimbursed for those services by federal and state agencies.1 Evangel’s position
    1
    Evangel provides no documentation of any company policy or procedure requiring both
    5
    is that if Bangura provided time sheets without accurate records of the services she
    provided, she did not do the work and so was not entitled to be paid. The TWC did
    not agree with this position, however, and ordered Evangel to pay Bangura based on
    her testimony and the time sheets documenting the hours she worked.
    Evangel may disagree with the TWC’s decision that Bangura was entitled be
    paid based on her testimony and time records, but Evangel points to no statutory
    provision or other authority to support its contention that the TWC’s decision
    somehow violates the Payday Act. The TWC’s decision is not unreasonable merely
    because the testimony was conflicting or disputed or did not compel the result the
    TWC reached. See 
    Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956
    ; JMJ 
    Acquisitions, 407 S.W.3d at 374
    . We overrule Evangel’s first issue.
    2.      Sufficiency of Time Records as Evidence
    In its second issue, Evangel contends that the TWC’s reliance on Bangura’s
    time sheets is not evidence of work done because the “timesheet by itself does not
    equal time worked without accurate records showing time and task.” Consequently,
    Evangel argues, the time records are only “a scintilla” of evidence that is not
    sufficient to entitle Bangura to wages. In support of this argument, Evangel cites two
    cases in which the TWC’s decisions were reversed because they were not supported
    by substantial evidence. See Kellum v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 
    188 S.W.3d 411
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Lohmuller v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 14-
    00-00008-CV, 
    2000 WL 1862824
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 200),
    no pet.) (not designated for publication).2
    time sheets and specific additional documentation prior to payment for services rendered, nor does
    Evangel point to any federal or state agency rule, regulation, or other provision that health care
    providers like Evangel must follow to be reimbursed for their services.
    2
    Evangel also cites Murray v. Texas Workforce Commission, but contrary to Evangel’s
    premise, the court affirmed the TWC’s decision. See 
    337 S.W.3d 522
    , 523–25 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    6
    Both Kellum and Lohmuller addressed whether substantial evidence
    supported the TWC’s decisions to deny unemployment benefits to discharged
    employees who allegedly engaged in “misconduct” as that term was defined for
    purposes of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act. In Kellum, the court
    reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the TWC, concluding that under the
    existing law and the evidence, the employee’s belief that his deferred adjudication
    was not a conviction when he filled out his job application was neither unreasonable,
    unsupportable, nor dishonest, and thus did not satisfy the statutory definition of
    misconduct. 
    See 188 S.W.3d at 414
    –15. In Lohmuller, this court concluded that the
    TWC’s decision to deny benefits was not based on substantial evidence when the
    employee’s refusal to work was due to the employer’s “unconscionable act” of
    demanding that the employee work for a period of time without pay, and therefore
    the employee’s refusal did not meet the statutory definition of misconduct. See 
    2000 WL 1862824
    , at *3.
    Unlike Kellum and Lohmuller, the present case does not involve a proceeding
    under the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act, nor does it involve the
    interpretation of a statutory exception to the payment of wages under the Payday
    Act. While Kellum and Lohmuller reflect that a TWC decision may be reversed
    based on a lack of substantial evidence, Evangel does not explain why these cases
    compel reversal of the TWC’s decision in this case. Evangel argues only that
    Bangura’s time records were provided “after TWC told her to write down the times
    that she believed she worked” and so lacked contemporaneous verification and the
    2011, no pet.) (holding that substantial evidence supported TWC’s decision to deny unemployment
    benefits to fired employee when evidence showed that employee repeatedly violated employer’s
    disciplinary system used to address absences and tardiness even after receiving and signing
    warnings that further tardiness could lead to termination and therefore his conduct satisfied the
    statutory definition of “misconduct” under the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act).
    7
    additional documentation Evangel contends is required for payment.
    As discussed above, the time sheets Bangura provided to the TWC reflect the
    dates, times, and total hours worked by Bangura, as well as the signatures of both
    Bangura and the patient’s guardian on forms provided by Evangel. This evidence
    constitutes more than a scintilla of proof supporting the TWC’s decision. We
    overrule Evangel’s second issue.
    3.     Substantial Evidence
    In its third issue, Evangel contends that the TWC’s decision is not supported
    by substantial evidence. According to Evangel, the TWC’s decision is erroneous as
    a matter of law because the TWC concluded that Bangura was entitled to wages
    without a showing of services provided by means of the records and accurate nurse’s
    notes. Evangel argues that its own evidence and its allegation that Bangura
    committed fraud reflect that Bangura “did not work the purported hours.”
    Under the substantial evidence standard, the only issue is whether the
    evidence introduced before the trial court shows, as a matter of law, that facts in
    existence at the time of the TWC’s decision reasonably support the decision. See
    
    Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d at 116
    ; Collingsworth Gen. 
    Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708
    . If
    substantial evidence would support either affirmative or negative findings, we must
    uphold the order, resolving any conflicts in favor of the agency’s decision. See Auto
    Convoy Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 
    507 S.W.2d 718
    , 722 (Tex. 1974). We have already
    concluded that more than a scintilla of evidence shows facts in existence at the time
    of the TWC’s decision that reasonably support its decision. Accordingly, we
    overrule Evangel’s third issue.
    4.     Evangel’s Evidence of Fraud
    In its fourth issue, Evangel contends that this court should consider the
    8
    evidence that Bangura “engaged in the fraud of fabricating her time sheets and
    records for wages” while simultaneously working full time for six other employers.
    The evidence Evangel refers to is a petition it filed against Bangura in a Harris
    County district court seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud based on
    fabricated time sheets, as well as an agreed judgment in that case. Evangel first
    submitted the documents in its motion for rehearing and a new trial, which the trial
    court denied. Evangel contends that because of the “overwhelming evidence of
    fraud” perpetrated by Bangura in fabricating records of services not provided,
    Bangura is not owed any wages.
    Evangel does not contend that the trial court erred in denying its motion for
    rehearing and a new trial, but construing Evangel’s brief liberally we will assume
    that is the basis of Evangel’s argument. In response to Evangel’s motion, both the
    TWC and Bangura argued that Evangel presented no new evidence and failed to
    show good cause for granting a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered
    evidence. See Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 
    313 S.W.3d 796
    , 813 (Tex. 2010). To
    obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a party must show the trial
    court that (1) the evidence has come to light since trial; (2) it is not due to lack of
    diligence that it was not produced sooner; (3) the new evidence is not cumulative;
    and (4) the new evidence is so material that it would probably produce a different
    result if a new trial were granted. 
    Id. The trial
    court’s denial of a motion for new trial
    is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. In its
    motion, Evangel did not argue that it was entitled to a rehearing or new
    trial based on newly discovered evidence. Further, Evangel’s Harris County petition
    and agreed judgment reflect that the evidence was not “newly discovered.” The
    documents show that Evangel filed the petition in 2015 and the agreed judgment was
    signed on August 7, 2017—well before Evangel filed its summary judgment
    9
    response on September 14, 2017.3 Evangel offers no excuse for not presenting this
    evidence earlier, and Evangel does not argue that the evidence is not cumulative or
    that it is so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial
    were granted. See Waffle 
    House, 313 S.W.3d at 813
    . Thus, the trial court reasonably
    could have concluded that Evangel did not demonstrate grounds for a new trial based
    on newly discovered evidence.
    In its appellate reply brief, Evangel takes a different tack, arguing that it raised
    its fraud allegations during the administrative process but the TWC failed to consider
    its complaints. Evangel also argues that “[t]he evidence of fraud perpetrated by
    Bangura was in existence at the time of the trial court’s summary judgment hearing”
    and was presented to the trial court during the summary judgment proceedings. To
    emphasize the latter point, Evangel refers generally to its summary judgment
    response, the attached affidavit of its vice-president and administrator stating that
    Evangel was defrauded by Bangura and had filed a lawsuit against her, the evidence
    presented by both sides, and the argument of Evangel’s counsel at the summary
    judgment hearing.
    Evangel’s acknowledgement that both the TWC and the trial court were
    presented with Evangel’s allegations and evidence concerning fraud allegedly
    committed by Bangura demonstrates that Evangel is merely complaining that neither
    the TWC nor the trial court sufficiently credited its evidence controverting
    Bangura’s evidence in support of her wage claim. But as we have explained, when
    applying the substantial evidence standard of review, the reviewing court is
    3
    Although the agreed judgment reflects that Evangel is to recover from Bangura a sum of
    money, it contains no admission of liability, and there are no findings of fact or conclusions of law
    indicating that the trial court resolved contested issues or found Bangura liable for fraud. Thus,
    even if considered, this evidence adds little, if anything, to the arguments Evangel made before the
    TWC that Bangura had submitted falsified time sheets for hours she did not work.
    10
    concerned only with the reasonableness of the administrative order, not its
    correctness. See 
    Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956
    . The TWC’s decision may not be
    set aside because the testimony was conflicting or disputed or because it did not
    compel the result reached by the agency. See id.; JMJ 
    Acquisitions, 407 S.W.3d at 374
    . On this record, Evangel has not satisfied its burden to demonstrate that an
    absence of substantial evidence exists to support the TWC’s decision that Bangura
    was entitled to payment for unpaid wages based on her testimony and time sheets
    documenting her hours worked. See 
    Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d at 116
    . We overrule
    Evangel’s fourth issue.
    III. CONCLUSION
    On this record, we conclude that reasonable minds could have reached the
    conclusions that the TWC must have reached to justify its decision, and therefore
    the trial court did not err in granting the TWC and Bangura’s joint motion for
    summary judgment. We therefore overrule Evangel’s issues and affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    /s/     Ken Wise
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Donovan, Wise, and Jewell.
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