Tommy Coronado v. State ( 2011 )


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  • NO. 07-08-0496-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL C
    OCTOBER 26, 2011
    ______________________________
    TOMMY CORONADO, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 222ND DISTRICT COURT OF DEAF SMITH COUNTY;
    NO. CR-07L-208; HONORABLE ROLAND SAUL, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
    The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has decided that the  statutory  procedure  established  by
    article 38.071, section 2(b)  of  the  Texas  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  is  not  an  appropriate
    constitutional accommodation for the right of confrontation.  Accordingly, the prior opinion of  this
    Court, Coronado v. State, 
    310 S.W.3d 156
    (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2010, pet. granted),  was  reversed  and
    the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the  Court  of  Criminal
    Appeals.   Coronado  v.  State,  ___S.W.3d  ___,  No.  PD-0644-10,  2011  Tex.Crim.App.  LEXIS   1248
    (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 14, 2011).  On remand, we reverse and remand the case to  the  trial  court  for
    further proceedings.
    Background
    On December 19, 2007, Appellant was indicted for aggravated  sexual  assault[1]  and  indecency
    with a child.[2]  On November 14, 2008, a pretrial hearing was held to  determine  the  admissibility
    of the videotaped recording of the three-year-old child victim's forensic interviews  at  the  Bridge
    Children's Advocacy Center, in accordance with the provisions of article 38.071 of the Texas Code  of
    Criminal Procedure.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court  determined  that  the  child
    was "unavailable to testify" in the presence of Appellant, as that term is used  in  article  38.071,
    and then ordered, as a condition precedent to the admissibility of  that  recording,  that  Appellant
    have the opportunity to present written interrogatories to the child through  a  subsequent  recorded
    interview.  Following the conclusion of the pretrial hearing, the interview on written questions  was
    conducted.  At trial, in lieu of the child victim's live testimony, the State offered the  videotaped
    recordings of the child's Bridge interviews.  A jury then convicted Appellant  of  aggravated  sexual
    assault, a first degree felony, and indecency with a child, a  second  degree  felony.   Following  a
    plea of "true" to the allegations contained in the enhancement portion of the  indictment,  the  jury
    assessed Appellant's sentence, as to each offense, at confinement for life and  a  fine  of  $10,000.
    Judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
    Confrontation of Witnesses
    Appellant contends that because he was allowed to cross-examine the child  victim's  videotaped
    statements only through the use of written interrogatories,  presented  by  a  third  person,  via  a
    videotaped interview, he was denied his right to face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination  as
    guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed finding that the  submission
    of written interrogatories pursuant to the procedure authorized by section 2(b) of article 38.071  is
    not a meaningful and effective  substitute  for  in-court,  sworn  testimony,  subject  to  "rigorous
    adversarial testing" via face-to-face  confrontation  and  cross-examination  in  a  criminal  trial.
    Coronado, 2011 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS, at *39 - 40.  Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred  by
    allowing the State to introduce the child victim's videotaped Bridge interviews.
    Harm Analysis
    A Confrontation Clause violation is subject to harmless error analysis.  Rubio  v.  State,  
    241 S.W.3d 1
    , 3 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).  However, before constitutional error can  be  held  harmless,  the
    reviewing court must be able  to  determine  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  error  did  not
    contribute to the appellant's conviction.  Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    ,  26,  
    87 S. Ct. 824
    ,
    829, 
    17 L. Ed. 2d 705
    (1967).  Therefore, if there is a  reasonable  likelihood  that  a  Confrontation
    Clause violation materially affected the jury(s deliberations, then the error is not harmless  beyond
    a reasonable doubt.  
    Rubio, 241 S.W.3d at 3
    .  Ultimately, the  question  is  whether  the  State  has
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of  did  not  contribute  to  the  verdict
    obtained.  
    Id. In the
    instant case, the child victim's allegations of sexual abuse  were  hotly  contested  by
    Appellant.  The only evidence implicating Appellant in the commission of these offenses were the out-
    of-court statements of the three-year-old child victim.  Although the sexual assault  nurse  examiner
    testified that the victim suffered injuries consistent with a  sexual  assault,  nothing  about  that
    testimony directly implicates Appellant.  Based upon these facts, we cannot say beyond  a  reasonable
    doubt that the introduction of the child  victim's  statements  did  not  contribute  to  the  jury's
    verdict of guilt.
    Conclusion
    Having found that the violation of Appellant's right of  confrontation  of  witnesses  was  not
    harmless, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded to the  trial  court
    for further proceedings.
    Patrick               A.               Pirtle
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    -----------------------
    [1]See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(1) and (2)(B) (West 2011).
    [2]See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11 (a)(1) (West 2011).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-08-00496-CR

Filed Date: 10/26/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2018