Kathleen Elaina Hoffman v. State ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
NO. 09-17-00172-CR
NO. 09-17-00173-CR
NO. 09-17-00174-CR
NO. 09-17-00175-CR
NO. 09-17-00176-CR
_________________
KATHLEEN ELAINA HOFFMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 15-307436, 15-307424, 15-307421, 15-307044, 15-307043
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State charged Kathleen Elaina Hoffman (Kathleen) in five separate
causes of cruelty to livestock animals, alleging she failed to provide necessary food,
1
water, or care arising out of her treatment of over two hundred horses.1, 2 See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2) (West 2016). A jury convicted Kathleen in all five
causes. See id. The trial judge assessed punishment of one year in the Montgomery
County Jail for each case, to be served concurrently, and a $4,000 fine in each case.
Kathleen’s sentence was suspended, and she was placed on community supervision
for eighteen months. Kathleen appeals her convictions.
In four issues, Kathleen argues: (1) the judgments should be reversed for a
new trial with separate trial counsel because appellants’ trial counsel was ineffective;
(2) the judgments should be reversed based on Brady and Michael Morton Act
violations; (3) the judgments should be reversed and an acquittal entered because the
evidence is factually insufficient in each case; and (4) the judgments should be
reversed and dismissed with prejudice because appellants were prosecuted twice for
the same offenses violating the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and
Texas Constitutions. We overrule all issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
Her husband, Herman Hoffman, was also charged and convicted for cruelty
to livestock animals arising out of the same instances. They were tried together and
filed a joint brief raising identical issues on appeal. We address Herman Hoffman’s
appeal in a separate opinion.
2
Mrs. Hoffman and her husband were initially charged with twenty separate
counts of cruelty to livestock animals by failing to provide necessary food, water, or
care; however, the State proceeded with five counts for purposes of expediency.
2
I. Factual Background
The State seized 207 horses from Kathleen and Herman Hoffman. Before the
criminal prosecution, the Hoffmans were subject to civil forfeiture proceedings in
Justice Court, which judgment was appealed to the County Court at Law for a trial
de novo pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code section 821.025. See Tex. Health
& Safety Code Ann. §§ 821.023, 821.025 (West Supp. 2018).3 The Justice Court
determined they treated all seized animals cruelly, ordered the animals surrendered,
and ordered the Hoffmans to pay $150,000.00 for costs associated with the care of
the animals. The County Court at Law issued almost identical findings but ordered
the Hoffmans to pay $485,331.68 in costs incurred by the SPCA for housing and
caring for the animals. The Hoffmans were subsequently prosecuted together and
convicted in five causes each of the criminal offense of cruelty to livestock animals
under Texas Penal Code section 42.09(a)(2). See Tex. Penal Code § 42.09(a)(2). The
criminal convictions are the basis of these appeals.
The Hoffmans resided at property on League Line Road in Montgomery
County, Texas. Kathleen and her husband owned around fifteen acres and leased an
additional twenty-five acres adjacent to their property, or around forty acres
3
We cite the current version of the statute as it does not affect the outcome of
these appeals.
3
altogether. In addition to 207 horses,4 the Hoffmans kept dairy cows and goats on
the forty acres.5
Kathleen testified she spent most of her life around horses as her family raised
horses. On cross-examination, she confirmed she was almost an expert in horse care,
and she knew how much she needed to feed the horses for them to be healthy.
A deputy constable from the livestock division, Gordon Welch, indicated his
department began receiving complaints about the body weight and living conditions
of the Hoffmans’ horses in 2014.6 Between 2014 and June 2015, the deputy
constables received and responded to many complaints regarding the Hoffmans’
horses. Welch testified they gave the Hoffmans recommendations for improving the
horses’ condition by “stepping up” the feeding program and ensuring they wormed
the horses. The deputy suggested Kathleen and Herman were both in control of the
horses, and the recommendations were directed to them both. The deputy constables
assigned to the livestock division worked with the Hoffmans for several months
4
State’s Exhibit 233 was a video played for the jury in which Herman
Hoffman estimated they had 190 horses on the property, fifty cows, and twenty
goats.
5
None of the Hoffmans’ other animals were seized.
6
Deputy Welch testified he met the Hoffmans approximately five years prior
to trial when one of their bulls escaped. At the time, the Hoffmans gave Deputy
Welch a tour of their property where Welch observed eighty to one hundred horses
in good health.
4
before issuing a warning on October 10, 2014. Deputy Welch circled the definition
of cruelty indicating “fails unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, or care
for a livestock animal in the person’s custody” on the written warning and directed
the Hoffmans to seek medical assistance for the horses from a licensed veterinarian.
Welch wanted a vet to examine the animals and make recommendations because he
felt the Hoffmans’ feeding program was inadequate due to the large number of
horses in the pens, and the weaker horses were not able to get adequate feed.
According to Welch, veterinarian Dr. David Husfeld visited the Hoffmans’
property and evaluated the horses. Dr. Husfeld opined in a letter dated October 27,
2014, the “condition of this group of horses ranges from [] good to very bad.” Dr.
Husfeld suggested the remedy was “more and better feeding” along with a “good
parasite control program[.]” Dr. Husfeld also suggested “the thinner animals ideally
need to be separated to [feed.]”
The deputy constables received more complaints about the horses’ condition
and made additional visits to the Hoffmans’ property where they observed a further
decline of the animals. On June 23, 2015, Deputy Welch, his partner, and an
investigator with the District Attorney’s office went to the Hoffmans’ property.
Based on their visual observations, they obtained a search warrant for the property
5
on June 24, 2015. As a result of those findings, they also secured and executed a
seizure warrant.
At trial, several witnesses who participated in the seizure described the
deplorable conditions. The participating Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (SPCA) barn supervisor testified her first impression of the property was it
appeared to be a “kill pen.” She also observed many skinny, distressed horses. The
SPCA barn supervisor also testified there was no grass for the horses and no place
for them to graze.
Because of the large number of animals and the logistics of dealing with a
seizure of that magnitude, Montgomery County required help from the SPCA.
Deputy Welch and other State witnesses suggested the Hoffmans’ horses were
unaccustomed to handling, so it took around two weeks to round them up, give them
medical treatment, worm them, and transport them to another location. The SPCA
barn supervisor assisting with the seizure described horses with rain rot7, bones
showing, and overgrown hooves.
Dr. Amy Crum, an SPCA veterinarian, went to the Hoffman property to assess
the overall situation and triage horses in need of emergency veterinary care. Dr.
Crum testified her initial impression of the herd was they were in very poor condition
7
“Rain rot” is an infection of the skin.
6
with nutritional and hoof care problems, respiratory disease, infected wounds, and
many other issues. Dr. Crum testified she was concerned some animals’ deaths were
imminent, so they removed eighteen of those horses to the Houston SPCA for
immediate care. According to Dr. Crum, the horses lacked basic veterinary care and
husbandry, nutrition, and foot care—things horse owners should provide. Of the
horses requiring emergency veterinary care, several were emaciated and in danger
of not being able to support their own weight, while others had debilitating wounds.
Dr. Crum explained how they tracked and cared for the seized horses by assigning
them a unique six number identification and connected the records by using that
number.
State witnesses, including Dr. Crum, discussed how they used the Henneke
Body Conditioning Score (BCS) for horses. That scale provides a score ranging from
1 to 9 for evaluating a horse’s body condition. A score of 1 means a horse is
extremely emaciated, and a score of 9 suggests an obese horse. Dr. Crum and the
SPCA barn supervisor testified an ideal BCS is 5.
Several State witnesses discussed appropriate horse care and husbandry
standards at trial. These witnesses testified horses required regular hoof care by a
farrier, including trimming, and neglecting a horse’s hooves could result in laminitis
and other permanent lameness. Dr. Crum testified this was particularly important for
7
confined horses that had no opportunity to run or naturally wear down their hooves.
Dr. Crum also testified that horses required regular dental care. Failure to
periodically “float” or file down a horse’s teeth, results in the teeth growing to sharp
points and impeding the animal’s ability to eat.
Witnesses testified about the need for a proper parasite control program, and
evidence revealed a veterinarian made that recommendation to the Hoffmans before
the seizure of the animals. Witnesses also discussed the need to seek prompt
veterinary attention for horses with wounds or for animals that collapsed. Evidence
established when there is no grass readily available for horses, an owner should
regularly feed hay and grain to provide adequate nutrition. Finally, to ensure weaker,
thinner animals had an opportunity to feed adequately, evidence showed they should
be separated from the rest of the herd.
Montgomery County seized 207 horses. Dr. Crum testified that around
twenty-five percent of the Hoffmans’ horses were of an adequate weight. The SPCA
barn supervisor testified thirty seized horses could not be saved and were euthanized,
and three horses died unassisted. Some horses had been adopted, and about eight
were available for adoption. Other horses were not ready to be adopted, and the
SPCA continued to work with those.
8
Before trial, the State revealed it was going forward with the criminal
prosecutions against the Hoffmans for five of the horses and elected to consolidate
the trials of Kathleen and Herman. The criminal trial began on May 15, 2017, and
the jury convicted the Hoffmans on all counts on May 18, 2017.
II. Analysis
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Asserted as Kathleen’s third issue, we address her sufficiency complaint first.
Kathleen argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support her convictions for
cruelty to livestock animals.8 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2). When an
appellant raises a claim of insufficiency, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks
v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979)) (concluding the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence);
8
Although Kathleen complains of factual insufficiency, for years, Texas has
recognized the legal sufficiency standard as outlined in Jackson v. Virginia as the
only standard reviewing courts should employ in determining whether the evidence
is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 895, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
9
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We look to “all of the
evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or
inadmissible.” Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(citations omitted). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and weight
to be given to their testimony. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016). Juries may draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts so long as each
inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. Accordingly, we must
defer to the jury’s determinations of weight and credibility of the witnesses. See
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. In conducting a sufficiency
review, an appellate court considers “‘events occurring before, during[,] and after
the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant [that] show
an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.’” Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985)).
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Kathleen
intentionally or knowingly failed to provide necessary food, water, or care for each
of the livestock animals in her custody listed in the complaints for a jury to find her
guilty in all causes. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2). “Necessary food, water,
or care” is defined by the statute to mean “food, water, or care provided to the extent
10
required to maintain the livestock animal in a state of good health.” Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 42.09(b)(6) (West 2016).
The evidence here was overwhelming that Kathleen and her husband both
failed to provide necessary food or care as needed to maintain each of the five horses
in good health. See id. The Hoffmans focus solely on the evidence of the horses’
malnourishment as being insufficient. They argue that without certain blood tests the
State cannot establish the animals were malnourished. While we disagree with
Kathleen’s argument the evidence was insufficient to find the horses were
malnourished, there was sufficient evidence about the lack of care for each one of
these animals. Veterinary records revealed and testimony at trial supported each of
the animals’ hooves had been neglected, and they all suffered from parasites.
Moreover, four of the animals suffered from significant untreated health problems
and wounds.
1. Evidence Regarding Horse 287593
Horse 287593 was an older palomino mare. Evidence revealed she was
extremely emaciated and had significant dental problems. The State admitted
photographs depicting a horse with protruding hip bones, shoulder bones, a sunken
face, and vertebrae showing. Evidence revealed the horse had a BCS of 1, indicative
of extreme emaciation.
11
Testimony from the SPCA barn supervisor suggested a horse would not be in
poor body condition solely because of its age, and if an older horse was provided
with proper nutrition, it should not look skinny. Dr. Crum testified the horse was
severely emaciated, suffered from muscle wasting, and completely lacked muscle
due to starvation. Dr. Crum testified the horse’s dental problems rendered her unable
to chew food, and the horse lacked dental care for an extended period. Kathleen and
Herman testified the horse had been kicked in the jaw, resulting in broken mandibles
years before, and a veterinarian told them to “leave it alone.”
Dr. Crum stated the horse was not in good health when seized, did not have
adequate food, and had been suffering for months. Testimony and veterinary records
revealed the mare had gastrointestinal parasites, particularly strongyle ova, which
Dr. Crum testified were easily treatable with over-the-counter medications and a
basic part of horse care. Dr. Crum described attempts to provide the mare soft food
in the form of mash and intravenous fluids, but even after supporting her with a sling,
they could not keep her standing, so she was humanely euthanized.
2. Evidence Regarding Horse 287598
The evidence for horse 287598 revealed he had a BCS of 4 and extremely
overgrown hooves. Dr. Crum and the SPCA barn supervisor testified the horse’s
hooves had not been trimmed in a very long time, and the left front hoof was
12
extended into an “elf shoe” shape. Photographs admitted by the State depict the hoof
Dr. Crum described. Dr. Crum conveyed this was very abnormal, the hoof was
egregiously overgrown, and it took months for the horse’s hoof to become so
overgrown. Dr. Crum estimated it had been months to years since the horse received
farrier care. Dr. Crum also testified an animal kept in a stall requires more hoof care
because they do not wear their hooves down naturally. Dr. Crum described the
importance of hoof care and if neglected, how a horse’s hooves could lead to other
serious health problems, including laminitis. The State’s evidence and testimony
revealed the horse suffered from laminitis. The SPCA barn supervisor testified
laminitis stems from a separation of the hoof wall from the coffin bone, which is
incredibly painful for the animal. Dr. Crum testified the horse was in pain, as well.
In addition to severe hoof problems and lameness, Dr. Crum revealed this horse had
parasites, pointy teeth that had not been floated in months, and he had not been fed
adequate food. Dr. Crum suggested they euthanized him because of his poor long-
term prognosis.
At trial, Herman attributed the horse’s overgrown hooves to bad genes and
asserted because the horse was lame, he was more comfortable with a long hoof than
a short hoof.
13
3. Evidence Regarding Horse 287609
Trial testimony and evidence revealed horse 287609 suffered from a
significant wound to a distal limb containing granulation tissue and pus, and the
horse had difficulty bearing weight on that limb.9 Dr. Crum testified the horse
suffered from the wound for at least several weeks, and a veterinarian should be
involved in the care of a wound that severe. Dr. Crum also testified she would
recommend surgical debridement, cleaning, and bandaging before closing the
wound. An x-ray of the horse’s leg was admitted as State’s Exhibit 147. Dr. Crum
said the x-ray revealed infection had spread to the bone. This condition limited
treatment options going forward, and due to the animal’s prolonged suffering, they
decided to humanely euthanize it. In addition to the leg wound, the horse had
parasites, cracked hooves, and bad teeth. Dr. Crum estimated it had been without
proper dental care for months.
4. Evidence Regarding Horse 287610
Evidence and testimony revealed horse 287610 had a BCS of 2. State’s
Exhibits 152 through 156 reveal this animal was extremely emaciated. Dr. Crum
testified the horse had gastrointestinal parasites, had not been getting proper food,
9
Evidence suggested the wound was consistent with wire being wrapped
around the leg.
14
and was very weak because he was so emaciated. Dr. Crum suggested horse 287610
was about 400 pounds underweight, and it would take many months for him to
become that emaciated. Veterinary records admitted at trial are in accord with this
testimony. Dr. Crum stated the horse did not have healthy hooves and was without
proper farrier care for at least several months. Dr. Crum testified she did not expect
horse 287610 to survive when she first saw him, but they administered intravenous
fluids to the horse for several days, and thereafter, he only required basic care and
needed to eat.
Testimony revealed this horse collapsed during the seizure after running for
twenty or thirty minutes while they sought to load him and was unable to stand until
they administered intravenous fluids. Dr. Crum suggested it is an emergency
situation when a horse cannot stand.
At trial, Herman contradicted this testimony and claimed people ran the horse
for two-and-a-half hours during the seizure. Herman testified the horse had fought,
played, and ran with the rest of the herd earlier in the day. Herman also suggested
the horse was the dominant male and was always thin.
5. Evidence Regarding Horse 287611
The State admitted photographs of horse 287611, a sorrel mare, as Exhibits
166 through 185. The images depict a sorrel mare significantly underweight with
15
“rain rot.” The photographs also reveal several deep wounds and rotting flesh over
the horse’s left hip. Veterinary records and Dr. Crum’s testimony revealed the mare
had a BCS of 2 and was severely emaciated. The horse had bad hooves and parasites.
Dr. Crum testified the horse had large and chronic lacerations over both her hips
draining pus, suggesting they had been there for at least several weeks; the skin was
also dying from prolonged infection. Dr. Crum testified a prudent owner should have
called a veterinarian to clean appropriately and debride the wound, provide
antibiotics and pain management. Dr. Crum conveyed the injuries were painful, and
the horse was lame in the rear limbs. Dr. Crum testified the horse was not
accustomed to human interaction, would not tolerate restraint, and oral sedatives had
little effect. Dr. Crum revealed the horse was euthanized because it was determined
to be a danger.
Herman testified horse 287611 was wounded when she became wedged
between two trees. Herman contradicted the testimony of Dr. Crum and stated it was
protocol to leave the wound like that, and it would have healed in six months.
Herman testified there was nothing at all inherently dangerous about the wound.
6. Other Evidence
The Hoffmans testified severe weather in the spring of 2015 precluded
deliveries of hay and feed to their property. Herman testified horses “take care of
16
themselves[,]” and he did everything he could for the health and welfare of the horses
given the circumstances. Kathleen testified she did the same and described the
lengths she went to caring for the animals, despite her having serious heart problems.
The Hoffmans both testified they divided the ownership of the animals, where
Herman had the horses, and Kathleen owned the cattle. Kathleen testified Herman
was the actual owner of the horses in June 2015. Testimony revealed this was done
as part of a business arrangement. Ownership is not an element of the offense,
however. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2). Rather, the critical inquiry is
whether the animal was in the person’s custody. See id. “Custody” is defined by the
statute as including the “responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare of a
livestock animal subject to the person’s care and control, regardless of ownership of
the livestock animal.” Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(b)(3) (West 2016) (emphasis
added). Testimony from employees revealed Herman and Kathleen both had control
of the horses. Vicki Henley testified she observed Kathleen heavily involved in the
care of the horses and directing employees on how to care for them. Deputy Welch
also testified he understood both defendants were in control of the horses.
Of the five horses included in the complaints, only Horse 287610 survived.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt
17
every element to support the jury’s verdict finding Kathleen Hoffman guilty of
cruelty to livestock animals for each of the State’s complaints. Thus, we overrule her
third issue.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Brady/Michael Morton Act Violations
We will address Kathleen’s first and second issues together, as they were both
raised in her motion for new trial.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Lewis v. State, 911
S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Likewise, we review a trial court’s denial of a
motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Archie
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We cannot substitute our
judgment for the trial court’s; rather, we determine whether the trial court was
arbitrary or unreasonable in its decision. See Holden, 201 S.W.3d at 763. We must
uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
See Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 699 (citing Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004)). Mistrial is an extraordinary remedy and only appropriate for
highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000).
18
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In her first issue, Kathleen argues she received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Her complaints against trial counsel fall into two main categories: (1)
failure to obtain additional discovery; and (2) a conflict between Kathleen and her
husband rendered the attorney representing them both ineffective.
First, she asserts trial counsel failed to “effectively obtain discovery from the
State and its agents[.]” Kathleen points to trial counsel’s inability to obtain blood
test results, complete records of the seizing agency, the Hoffmans’ seized medical
and feeding records, and photos taken by witnesses, which would have been
favorable evidence for her defense. Kathleen contends that counsel failed to properly
enforce court orders to produce documents and he failed to subpoena documents
needed for expert analysis or otherwise retain a defense expert. However, our review
of the record shows that the discovery requests and subpoenas of which they
complain were apparently issued improperly and were subsequently quashed while
Kathleen and Herman were defending themselves pro se.
Kathleen argues she was more egregiously affected by the ineffective
assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest.10 Particularly, she asserts on
appeal her best defense, considering her debilitating medical condition, would have
10
We note, however, Kathleen and Herman filed a joint brief in this appeal.
19
been to blame her husband for neglect of the horses, but trial counsel failed to assert
such a defense. The Hoffmans moved for a new trial. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion. While trial counsel testified at the hearing, no testimony was
elicited from him regarding his trial strategy. At the hearing, the Hoffmans did not
subpoena any of the witnesses identified as favorable defense witnesses or provide
affidavits to show what each witness would have testified to or introduce records
they alleged contained exculpatory evidence.
“An appellate court looks to the totality of the representation and the particular
circumstances of each case in evaluating the effectiveness of counsel.” Thompson v.
State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Ex Parte Felton, 815
S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, an appellant must meet a two-pronged test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d
53, 55–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “Unless [an] appellant can prove both prongs, an
appellate court must not find counsel’s representation to be ineffective.” Lopez v.
20
State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Allegations of ineffectiveness must be shown in
the record, and the record must affirmatively establish the alleged ineffectiveness.
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct “[fell]
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Jackson v. State, 877
S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see
also Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
As for a defendant being prejudiced by a trial attorney’s deficient
performance, courts have explained “[t]o show prejudice, ‘[t]he defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”
Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
a) Discovery
Assuming without deciding that Kathleen has met her burden under the first
prong and shown that trial counsel’s representation was deficient, Kathleen has
failed to meet the requisite second prong. Kathleen focuses on trial counsel’s “failure
to obtain” certain discovery, including but not limited to records, necropsy reports,
witness interviews, blood test results, and other documents. Beyond asserting the
21
foregoing information was necessary to her defense, Kathleen has made no showing
that trial counsel’s failure to obtain the evidence would have changed the outcome
at trial or that it prejudiced her in any way. The Hoffmans complain that the State
failed to produce blood test results of each of the five horses which they assert are
necessary to accurately assess a BCS score for each horse. The evidence, though,
would only go to the weight of the evidence offered by the State’s expert witnesses
and not to the admissibility of their opinions. The record shows that requested
records were produced electronically by the State. The trial court held any
information unrelated to the five specific horses at issue was irrelevant. While the
SPCA and the State produced requested documentation in their possession or subject
to their control, some documentation the Hoffmans requested was shown not to exist.
Thus, Kathleen failed to show a different outcome would have resulted. Moreover,
although Kathleen claims she was unable to interview certain witnesses, she failed
to call any of these witnesses to testify at the hearing on the motion for new trial. So,
there was no indication of what they would have testified to at trial, much less
whether it would have been favorable to Kathleen. The Hoffmans made no showing
that but for counsel’s deficient representation, there would have been another
outcome at trial. See id. The record reveals the Hoffmans conducted much of the
discovery pro se, and even after the trial court warned them on October 26, 2016, of
22
its intent to set the matter preferentially, they delayed in retaining trial counsel until
sometime after January 24, 2017, for a trial that began on May 15, 2017, which
would have significantly impacted any attorney’s ability to retain experts or pursue
additional discovery.
b) Dual Representation and Conflict
Kathleen and Herman were tried jointly and represented by the same retained
counsel.11 In some situations, the same attorney’s representation of multiple
defendants in the same trial may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Pina v.
State, 127 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1978); James v. State, 763 S.W.2d
776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). “However, multiple representation is not per se
violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” James, 763
S.W.2d at 778. A defendant who does not object at trial to multiple representation
must show actual and not merely speculative conflict of interest before an appellate
11
It has not been lost on this Court that Kathleen and Herman are represented
by shared retained appellate counsel. Prior to filing a brief, they moved to
consolidate their appeals and subsequently filed a joint brief, which may be viewed
as an attempt to invite error by advancing a claim of conflict of interest. Because we
find their claim of a conflict of interest to be wholly without merit, the Court opted
not to strike the brief for violating Texas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.06,
necessitating briefs from new and separate counsel on appeal. See Tex. Disciplinary
Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.06, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G.,
app. A (West 2013).
23
court will reverse. Id. at 778–79; see also Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 581–82
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance based on a
conflict of interest, Kathleen must show (1) her counsel was burdened by an actual
conflict of interest, and (2) the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of
counsel’s performance. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–50 (1980);
Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “[A]n actual conflict
of interest exists when ‘one defendant stands to gain significantly by counsel
adducing probative evidence or advancing plausible arguments that are damaging to
the cause of a co-defendant[.]’” Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 584 (quoting James, 763
S.W.2d at 779).
Although Kathleen asserts her best defense would have been to blame Herman
for neglect of the horses, the existence of a better defense does not rise to the level
of an actual conflict. Kathleen and her husband employed the joint trial strategy that
elements beyond their control prevented them from getting food to the animals. They
argued torrential rains blocked eighteen wheelers from delivering hay and feed to
the livestock. They also sought to argue there was nothing wrong with their animals,
blaming overgrown hooves on bad genetics, rationalizing that emaciated horses had
always been that way, and testifying emaciated horses had been fed adequately.
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On appeal, Kathleen contends her health made it impossible for her to care for
the animals. Yet the record at trial reveals despite any health issues, Kathleen was
involved in directing ranch operations and feeding the livestock. Indeed, she testified
she directed the breeding program as late as June 2015. Like the facts in James, the
Hoffmans’ strategy at trial was that neither was culpable. See 763 S.W.2d at 780.
Moreover, neither Kathleen nor Herman tried to incriminate the other in any way,
consistent with their joint defense. See id. Kathleen testified at trial they both did the
best they could. The acknowledgment of a hypothetically superior trial strategy on
appeal and speculative conflicts does not retroactively create an actual conflict at
trial. Id.
And although trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial,
no testimony was elicited from him to develop the record to support Kathleen’s
claim of conflict of interest or otherwise explain counsel’s strategy at trial. Separate
counsel for each co-defendant might well have proven much more damaging than
the strategy in effect adopted by trial counsel. Any attempt to impeach the other or
place blame on the other spouse would have likely elicited specific, damaging, and
prejudicial facts. We hold that this record fails to reflect any conflict of interest on
the part of retained counsel.
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2. Brady/Michael Morton Act Violations
In her second issue, Kathleen complains the trial court erred in denying her
motion for mistrial and motion for new trial based on Brady and Michael Morton
Act violations.
In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held a defendant’s
due process rights are violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable
to an accused where the evidence is material, regardless of the prosecution’s good
faith or bad faith. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Before an appellate court can find
reversible error for a Brady violation, the defendant must show: (1) the State failed
to disclose evidence, regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith; (2) the
evidence withheld is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence is material, i.e.,
there is a reasonable probability had the evidence been disclosed, it would have
changed the outcome of the trial. Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002). “‘The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might
have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976)); see also Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 812
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). And the Brady rule does not apply when the defendant was
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already aware of the information. Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (citing Havard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195, 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
The Michael Morton Act is codified in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 39.14. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14 (West 2017). It requires
the State, upon request, to disclose certain items to a defendant. See id. art. 39.14(a);
Glover v. State, 496 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
ref’d). If the State has not received a request, it only has an affirmative duty to
disclose exculpatory information. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(h); Glover,
496 S.W.3d at 815.
Here, much of the evidence the Hoffmans complained of was found by the
trial court to be irrelevant or not in existence. The trial court explained
documentation and records for animals seized that were not the subject of the
criminal trial were not relevant. The Hoffmans contended those records would have
shown the large remainder of the herd was healthy. But such records were not shown
to have any bearing on the condition of the five horses in the criminal complaints.
This is particularly true given the fact law enforcement officials and a veterinarian
of the Hoffmans’ choice instructed the Hoffmans to separate the weaker and thinner
horses from the herd to ensure they had adequate access to feed. Moreover, with
respect to evidence of the five specific horses at issue, the State explained in pretrial
27
hearings necropsies were not performed on all the animals and therefore, the
documents being requested did not exist.
Dr. Crum testified at trial that the interpretation of the blood tests was included
in the veterinary records, but the full blood work was stored in a database. The
medical records summarizing the blood tests revealed the animals were
malnourished, which certainly could not be considered exculpatory. The State
maintained they provided the veterinary records on the five horses at issue, and at
trial, Dr. Crum acknowledged some of the records contained mistakes. When
defense counsel moved to strike all the veterinary records because they were
“inherently unreliable on critical issues[,]” the trial court overruled the objection and
noted it went to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. While the
Hoffmans complained about the missing blood test results, the discovery they
propounded did not specifically request those results. The State’s duty to provide
information under the Michael Morton Act is only triggered upon a timely request.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(a). Under Brady and the Michael Morton
Act, the State has only an affirmative duty to produce exculpatory information. See
id. art. 39.14(h); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Hoffmans’ suspicions the State had not
produced evidence does not establish its materiality. See Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at
612. For these reasons, we conclude the Hoffmans have not met their burden of
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establishing the materiality of the evidence, that it was exculpatory, or that such
evidence existed.
The Hoffmans also complain of records seized from their home pursuant to a
warrant, specifically veterinary records and feeding records. They argue these
records are exculpatory and would prove they provided proper care and food to the
horses. At trial, Herman testified a vet recommended they not perform surgery on
Horse 287593’s broken jaw. Herman also testified two different veterinarians
examined the leg of Horse 287609 on three or four occasions and advised the
Hoffmans to spray it with a water hose, allowing it to heal from the inside out.
According to Herman, the vet told them there was not “a thing you can do about it.”
The Hoffmans did not call the veterinarians that allegedly gave this advice to testify
at trial nor did they subpoena records to support these claims. If the records Herman
described existed, the Hoffmans knew about them. Brady applies when there is
information the prosecution is aware of, but a defendant is not. Hayes, 85 S.W.3d at
815. Thus, Brady would not apply to these records.
The Hoffmans repeatedly argue the State “singled out” five horses in bad
shape, and since the animals were in a herd, they should be able to show the
condition of the other horses in the herd as proof they were not guilty of cruelty. At
multiple pretrial hearings, the trial court ruled evidence about the condition of the
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other seized animals was not relevant. This included medical records, blood tests,
and necropsy reports. The trial court instructed the Hoffmans that they could
subpoena any necropsy reports the Hoffmans maintained were missing or that the
State did not have in its possession, directly from the SPCA, which they failed to do.
From the record before us, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Kathleen’s motion for mistrial or motion for new trial. We
overrule Kathleen’s first and second issues.
C. Double Jeopardy
Kathleen argues in her fourth issue she was prosecuted twice for the same
offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Texas
Constitutions. The United States Constitution provides, “No person shall . . . be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Texas Constitution provides, “No person, for the same
offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty; nor shall a person be again
put upon trial for the same offense after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 14.
Initially, we must determine whether jeopardy previously attached at the
justice court hearing before determining whether Kathleen’s subsequent prosecution
for animal cruelty was barred by double jeopardy. See State v. Almendarez, 301
30
S.W.3d 886, 890 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (examining prosecution
for cruelty to livestock animals pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 42.09
following a civil seizure trial under Chapter 821 of the Health and Safety Code); see
also State v. Moreno, 294 S.W.3d 594, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explaining
“jeopardy must have attached initially” before double jeopardy protections apply).
Courts have previously examined the statutory scheme involving forfeiture of
animals through civil proceedings and subsequent criminal prosecutions or vice
versa. See Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 890. The statutory scheme under Chapter 821
of the Health and Safety Code is civil in nature. See id. at 891; Chambers v. State,
261 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting the State filed
“animal cruelty case pursuant to [C]hapter 821 of the [H]ealth and [S]afety [C]ode
dealing with the health and safety of animals, not as a crime” under Texas Penal
Code section 42.09); Granger v. Folk, 931 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
1996, orig. proceeding) (recognizing, although not in a Double Jeopardy case, that
this Court noted “two avenues exist for the State in protecting animals from cruel
treatment, i.e., criminal prosecution under … the [Texas] Penal Code and the civil
remedy provided under [s]ection 821.023 of the [Texas] Health and Safety Code”);
see also Bradley v. State, No. 01-08-00332-CR, 2009 WL 1688200, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
31
publication). “[E]ven in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention
to establish a civil penalty, a court must inquire further whether the statutory scheme
is so punitive in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil
remedy into a criminal penalty.” Capps v. State, 265 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
99 (1997)); see also Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at *3. The factors courts must look
to in making this determination are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment;
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5)
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Hudson, 522 U.S.
at 99–100 (citations omitted).
Texas courts have examined animal cruelty statutes applying the Hudson
factors. See Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 892–95; Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at
**3–4. Those courts have concluded the intent of provisions 821.022–.023 of the
Health and Safety Code are civil in nature. See Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 895;
Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at *3. Moreover, those courts analyzed sanctions
32
similar to the ones the Hoffmans faced here in light of the Hudson factors and
concluded the sanctions were not “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
transform the civil action and remedies imposed into a criminal punishment” and
therefore, subsequent criminal prosecution for cruelty to animals did not violate the
double jeopardy prohibitions of the United States and Texas Constitutions. See
Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 895–96; Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at *4.
In Almendarez, the defendant moved to quash an indictment for cruelty to
animals on the basis it violated double jeopardy since he had already been subject to
proceedings in justice court where two of his horses were seized, and he had to pay
restitution to cover the costs. 301 S.W.3d at 888. The court there noted “proceedings
brought under Subchapter B of Chapter 821 and the remedies authorized therein are
designed to protect animals from cruel treatment, and neither divesting a party from
the ownership of cruelly treated animals nor requiring the payment of money for
their care are excessive to this alternative purpose.” Id. at 895. Like our sister court
in Almendarez, we determine that although larger in scale, the civil seizure of the
Hoffmans’ horses and fine imposed for their care was not excessive.
We conclude jeopardy did not attach to the civil proceedings, and therefore,
the criminal prosecution of Kathleen Hoffman did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the United States or Texas Constitutions.
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Issue four is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support Kathleen’s
convictions of cruelty for each of the five horses at issue. Even if we assume
Kathleen’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Kathleen failed to establish
she was prejudiced by any such deficiency and therefore, did not meet both prongs
required to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, Kathleen failed to
establish violations of the Brady or the Michael Morton Act. Finally, the civil seizure
and forfeiture proceedings for cruelty to livestock animals and the criminal
prosecution for cruelty to livestock animals is not violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States or Texas Constitutions. The judgments of the trial court
are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
________________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on September 4, 2018
Opinion Delivered November 14, 2018
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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