Ex Parte Charles Christopher Pittman ( 2018 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ________________
    NO. 09-18-00269-CR
    NO. 09-18-00270-CR
    ________________
    EX PARTE CHARLES CHRISTOPHER PITTMAN
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause Nos. 18-29310 and 18-29311
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A grand jury indicted Charles Christopher Pittman 1 on one first-degree felony
    charge of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) and one second-degree
    felony charge of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and the
    trial court set bond at $250,000 in each case. Pittman filed a motion to reduce bond
    in each case. The trial court denied Pittman’s motion in both cases. In each case,
    1
    The indictments identify Pittman as “Charles Christopher Pittman aka
    Charles Pittman[,]” and the notices of appeal refer to Pittman as “Charles C.
    Pittman[.]”
    1
    Pittman then filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking reduction of his
    bond. In his application, Pittman asserted that his bond is excessive, oppressive, and
    beyond his financial means, and he sought an evidentiary hearing and asked that,
    after receiving evidence, the trial judge reduce his bond to a reasonable amount.
    Pittman’s counsel sent correspondence to the trial judge “requesting an evidentiary
    hearing for appellate purposes.” Pittman’s counsel also filed a memorandum in
    support of his application for writ of habeas corpus and a sworn statement by
    Pittman. In the sworn statement, Pittman stated that he had been living with a cousin
    since 2014, and Pittman has seven children for whom he must pay child support.
    Pittman also stated that he worked for his father’s company for approximately four
    years, and he receives “a check” from the company. Pittman further stated that he
    had been convicted of two non-violent felonies in Mississippi, and he denied ever
    failing to meet his obligations to his bail bondsman or to the trial court. Pittman
    explained in his sworn statement that he had been on probation twice for five years
    each time and had successfully completed both, and he stated that his family and
    friends could provide $5000 for bail. The trial judge signed an order denying
    Pittman’s application in each case, and Pittman appealed.
    We review the granting or denial of an application for writ of habeas corpus
    under an abuse of discretion standard. Ex parte Craft, 
    301 S.W.3d 447
    , 448 (Tex.
    2
    App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g); Ex parte Klem, 
    269 S.W.3d 711
    , 718 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. ref’d). We consider the entire record and
    review the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Ex parte 
    Craft, 301 S.W.3d at 448-49
    ; Ex parte 
    Klem, 269 S.W.3d at 718
    . We afford almost total
    deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts supported by the
    record, especially findings that are based on an evaluation of credibility and
    demeanor. Ex parte 
    Klem, 269 S.W.3d at 718
    . We afford the same deference to the
    trial court’s rulings on application of law to fact questions when resolution of those
    questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. 
    Id. We review
    the
    determination de novo when resolution of those questions turns on an application of
    legal standards. 
    Id. Excessive bail
    is constitutionally prohibited. U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV;
    Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 11, 13. When setting bail, certain criteria apply: (1) “bail shall
    be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be
    complied with[;]” (2) the power to require bail is not to be used as an instrument of
    oppression; (3) the nature and circumstances of the offense must be considered; (4)
    “[t]he ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this
    point[;]” and (5) the future safety of the victim and the community shall be
    considered. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (West 2015). Other factors to
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    consider include family and community ties, length of residency, aggravating factors
    involved in the offense, conformity with previous bond conditions, work history,
    prior criminal record, ability to make the bond and previous and outstanding bail. Ex
    parte Rubac, 
    611 S.W.2d 848
    , 849 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). We review
    a trial court’s bail decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. See Tex. Code
    Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15; 
    Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 850
    . The burden of showing that
    bail is excessive lies with the defendant. 
    Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849
    .
    “Just as a defendant’s inability to afford bail does not, in itself, demonstrate
    that bail is excessive, a defendant’s ability to afford bail in the amount set does not,
    in itself, justify bail in that amount.” Cooley v. State, 
    232 S.W.3d 228
    , 236 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). A bond reduction is not favored “when
    the defendant makes vague references to inability to make bond without detailing
    his specific assets and financial resources.” 
    Id. Accordingly, the
    trial court could
    reasonably conclude that Pittman’s evidence regarding his financial circumstances
    was inadequate. See Ex parte Castellanos, 
    420 S.W.3d 878
    , 883 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Ex parte Castillo-Lorente, 
    420 S.W.3d 884
    , 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); 
    Cooley, 232 S.W.3d at 236-37
    .
    4
    Additionally, Pittman was charged with one first-degree felony offense and
    one second-degree felony offense. If convicted, Pittman would face a punishment
    range of five to ninety-nine years or life and a fine of up to $10,000 for the first-
    degree felony case and a punishment range of two to twenty years and a fine up to
    $10,000 for the second-degree felony case. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32,
    12.33 (West 2011). When an offense may result in a substantial prison sentence, bail
    must be set sufficiently high to assure the defendant’s presence at trial. 
    Castellanos, 420 S.W.3d at 882-83
    ; Brown v. State, 
    11 S.W.3d 501
    , 503-04 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Given the seriousness of the alleged offenses and the
    potential for a lengthy sentence in each case, the trial court could reasonably
    conclude that Pittman has a strong incentive to flee the jurisdiction and a high bond
    is necessary to assure Pittman’s presence at trial. See 
    Castellanos, 420 S.W.3d at 883
    ; see also 
    Brown, 11 S.W.3d at 503
    .
    Viewing the entire record in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we hold that the
    trial court could reasonably conclude that a $250,000 bond in each case was justified
    and did not abuse its discretion by denying Pittman’s applications for habeas corpus.
    See 
    Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 850
    ; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. For all these
    reasons, we overrule Pittman’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s order in each
    case.
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    AFFIRMED.
    ______________________________
    STEVE McKEITHEN
    Chief Justice
    Submitted on October 22, 2018
    Opinion Delivered November 7, 2018
    Do Not Publish
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 09-18-00269-CR

Filed Date: 11/7/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2018