James Lee Williams v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-13-00489-CR
    ____________________
    JAMES LEE WILLIAMS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    _______________________________________________________            ______________
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 11-13092
    ________________________________________________________             _____________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In his appeal from the revocation of an order placing him on deferred
    adjudication community supervision, James Lee Williams challenges the trial
    court’s judgment because it includes a provision requiring that he pay restitution to
    the victim. According to Williams, the trial court did not impose a restitution
    requirement when it pronounced his sentence; he concludes that because the
    requirement was not imposed when the trial court pronounced his sentence, the
    trial court erred by including it in the written judgment. The State agrees; it
    suggests that we reform the written judgment. We agree the judgment should be
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    conformed to the sentence that the trial court orally pronounced, and we reform the
    judgment by deleting the language requiring Williams to pay restitution to the
    victim.
    The record shows that during the revocation hearing, Williams pled “true” to
    violating several conditions of the trial court’s community supervision order. At
    the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked its order, found Williams
    guilty of aggravated robbery, and sentenced Williams to life in prison. The record
    further shows that the trial court did not orally pronounce any requirement
    obligating Williams to pay restitution to the victim of his crime. However, the trial
    court’s written judgment includes a provision requiring Williams to pay $6,000 in
    restitution.
    A trial court is required to orally pronounce a defendant’s sentence; the
    judgment is merely the written declaration and embodiment of that oral
    pronouncement. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01 § 1 (West Supp. 2014); Ex
    parte Madding, 
    70 S.W.3d 131
    , 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When the record of
    the proceedings reflects that the oral pronouncement and written judgment differ,
    the oral pronouncement controls. Ex parte Huskins, 
    176 S.W.3d 818
    , 820 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2005). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that restitution is a
    punishment that is required to be orally pronounced at sentencing, and without
    having been orally pronounced, restitution cannot be imposed on the defendant in
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    the written judgment. Ex parte Cavazos, 
    203 S.W.3d 333
    , 338 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006). To be valid, the restitution requirement must be included when the trial
    court orally pronounces the defendant’s sentence. Saucedo v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 767
    , 769 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d); Alexander v. State, 
    301 S.W.3d 361
    , 364 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2009, no pet.). When a restitution order is
    included in the written judgment but it was not orally pronounced at sentencing,
    the proper remedy is to modify or reform the judgment to delete the order requiring
    restitution. 
    Saucedo, 309 S.W.3d at 769
    .
    Although the record shows that the trial court attempted to correct its error
    by entering a judgment nunc pro tunc, it no longer had jurisdiction to act in the
    case when it did so. Rule 23.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure vests a
    trial court with the authority to correct clerical mistakes or errors in a judgment
    through entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc unless the defendant has appealed. Tex.
    R. App. P. 23.1. Additionally, Rule 25.2(g) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
    states that, “[o]nce the record has been filed in the appellate court, all further
    proceedings in the trial court—except as provided by law or by these rules—will
    be suspended until the trial court receives the appellate-court mandate.” Tex. R.
    App. P. 25.2(g). Because the restitution order was not orally pronounced at
    sentencing, we sustain Williams’s issues on appeal. We reform the judgment to
    delete the restitution order.
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    Accordingly, in Cause Number 11-13092, on page one of the judgment,
    under “Restitution[,]” we delete “$6000.00[.]” Also on page one, under
    “Restitution Payable to[,]” we delete the “X” in the “VICTIM” box and under
    “(see below)” we delete the victim’s name and address. On page two of the
    judgment under the heading “Punishment Options[,]” we amend the language
    requiring the defendant to pay “any remaining unpaid fines, court costs, and
    restitution” to read: “Once there, the Court ORDERS Defendant to pay, or make
    arrangements to pay, any remaining unpaid fines and court costs as ordered by the
    Court above.” As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
    ________________________________
    HOLLIS HORTON
    Justice
    Submitted on July 22, 2014
    Opinion Delivered October 22, 2014
    Do Not Publish
    Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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