Fedrick Harris Stralow v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                     ACCEPTED
    12-15-00224-CR
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    11/13/2015 1:54:50 PM
    Pam Estes
    CLERK
    CASE NO. 12-15-00224-CR
    FILED IN
    IN THE
    12th COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    11/13/2015 1:54:50 PM
    PAM ESTES
    TYLER,TEXAS
    Clerk
    FEDRICK HARRIS STRALOW, Appellant
    vs.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the
    County Court of Law Number Two
    Henderson County, Texas
    (Trial Court Case Number 2014-0626CL2)
    BRIEF OF APPELLEE
    Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Henderson County Attorney's Office
    100 E. Tyler Street, Room 100
    Athens, Texas 75751
    Telephone: (903) 675-6112
    Facsimile:    (903) 675-6192
    EMAIL:
    barry.spencer@co.henderson.tx.us
    State Bar No.:       24013548
    ATIORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Identity pf Parties and CounseL ....................................................................................... ii
    Index of Authorities ........................................................................................................ iv
    Statement of the Case .................................................................................................... 1
    Issue P~esented ...............................................................................................................2
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    Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................... 2
    Summa,:), of Argument ..................................................................................................... 4
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    Argumert and Authority ..................................................................................................5
    Conclusion .......................................................................................................................8
    Prayer .,............................................................................................................................9
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    Statem~nt Regarding              Oral Argument. .............................................................................. 9
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    Certifica.te of Service ...................................................................................................... 10
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    Certific~te      of Compliance with Rule 9.4 ......................................................................... 10
    ...
    111
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES
    i
    Bro9ks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    (Tex,Crim.App. 2010) ................................................. 5
    Caslanello v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 800
    (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no pe1.) ........................ 5
    JacKson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    SUD. Ct. 2781 (1979) .................................................. 5
    Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    .11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........................................... 5
    !
    ROdtiguez v. State. 
    212 S.W.3d 819
    (Tex. ADD-Austin. 2006, no pet.) ......................... 6
    Saxtbn v. State. 
    804 S.W.2d 910
    (Tex. Crim App. 1991) ............................................... 6
    S
    Zuliani v. State, 
    97 S.W.3d 589
    (Tex. Crim. ApD. 2003) ................................................. 5
    STAn-UTES AND RULES:
    I
    Tex*s Penal Code Ann. Section 9.31 (a) ......................................................................... 6
    Texas Penal Code Ann. Section 9.31 (b)(5) ....................................................................6
    Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. 38.04 .......................................................................................... 7
    IV
    CASE NO. 12·15·00224-CR
    INTHE
    "TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER,TEXAS
    FEDRICK HARRIS STRALOW, Appellant
    vs.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the
    County Court of Law Number Two
    Henderson County, Texas
    (Trial Court Case Number 2014-0626CL2)
    APPELLEE'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
    TO       E HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    Comes now Appellee, THE STATE OF TEXAS, by and through her attorney,
    Barry. L. Spencer, Jr., and respectfully submits her brief on the merits urging that
    Appellant's conviction for the offense of Assault-Family Violence be affirmed and that
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    he b~ punished in accordance with the trial courts judgment in this case.
    Appellant hereby waives oral argument.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    FEDRICK HARRIS STRALOW, Appellant, was charged by complaint and
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    information for the offense of Assault Causing Bodily Injury to a Family Member alleged
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    to h~we occurred on October 1, 2014. (Clerk's Record, Volume 1, Pages 1-2). On May
    11, 2015, a jury heard evidence and found Appellant guilty of the offense charged. (CR
    1:3S).    On July 22, 2015, a sentencing hearing was held and the Court sentenced
    ApPl3l1ant to three hundred sixty five (365) days confinement in the Henderson County
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    Jail       ~nd         assed a $750.00 fine, but probated the sentence for twenty-four (24) months.
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    (CR ~ :44-48).
    Appellant filed a timely Motion for New Trial on July 28,2015. (CR 1:49-51).
    Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on August 27,2015. (CR 1:68).
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    Appellant raises one issue on appeal:
    Appellant claims the evidence is legally and factually
    insufficient to reject Appellant's self-defense plea and to
    support the jury's finding of Defendant guilty.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    FEDRICK HARRIS STRALOW, Appellant. was charged by complaint and
    information for the offense of Assault Causing Bodily Injury to a Family Member alleged
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    to hqve occurred on October 1, 2014. (CR 1: 1-2).
    On May 11, 2015, a jury heard evidence and found Appellant guilty of the offense
    charged. (CR 1:38). On July 22, 2015, a sentenCing hearing was held and the Court
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    sentenced Appellant to three hundred sixty five (365) days confinement in the
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    Henperson County Jail and assed a $750.00 fine, but probated the sentence for twenty­
    fourl(24) months. (CR 1:44-48).
    Appellant has appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals.
    i            The testimony at trial consisted of the testimony of four witnesses:   Stephanie
    Dug~an (the complainant), Melody Ellerbe (Duggan's other brother's girlfriend), Thomas
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    Goddell (Henderson County Sheriff's deputy), and Appellant
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    Duggan testified that she is Appellant's biological niece and adopted sister. (RR
    2:6d). That on October 1, 2014 at about 3:30 or 3:45 in the afternoon that she went to
    the ihome of her mother (where Appellant was staying with their mother) to drop her
    Chil~               off with Ellerbe to watch.    (RR 2:61,63,68).   Duggan testified that once she
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    drop*ed her child off in the basement with Ellerbe, that she went back upstairs into the
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    kitch$n to get her keys to leave and Appellant comes out of his room and gets onto
    Duggan about her child putting dog food into the water bowl the previous day.              (RR
    2:64,p5). Duggan testified that Appellant was upset and angry when he came into the
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    kitchen.           (RR 2:65).   Duggan testified that an argument began.    (RR 2:66).   When
    Dugdan began arguing with Appellant, Appellant raved and approached her quickly.
    (RR ?:66). Duggan stayed where she was when Appellant approached. (RR 2:67).
    Appellant got between 6-8 inches from Duggan's face and was yelling at her and
    spittirg in her face. (RR 2:67). Duggan was scared of Appellant and pushed him to try
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    to g~t him back from her. (R R 2:68-69).         Duggan had no plans to get into an altercation
    with i Appellant and felt as though she was defending herself when she pushed
    App~lIant. (RR 2:75). At that point, Appellant began punching her in the face. 
    Id. When Appellant
    hit Duggan in the face, she fell and Appellant got over her and
    cont~nued          striking her in the face and the arms. (RR 2:69-71). Appellant was so afraid
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    that she wet herself. (RR 2:73). The assault only stopped when Ellerbe came into the
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    roo~.           (RR 2:72).
    Ellerbe testified that she was home on October 1, 2014. (RR 2:91). That after
    Dug~an dropped her child off for Ellerbe to watch, that she heard Stephanie scream and
    a loyd crash like someone falling on the floor.          (RR 2:92). That when she heard the
    sOU~dS, Ellerbe ran upstairs to see what had happened. (RR 2:92). When she got up
    the Stairs, Ellerbe saw Appellant pounding on Duggan. (RR 2:93). Duggan was curled
    up on the floor and Ellerbe saw Appellant hitting her four or five times in the face. (RR
    2:9~). Ellerbe yelled at Appellant to get off her and Appellant quit striking Duggan. (RR
    2:94-95). From what Ellerbe saw, Duggan had no hopes of defending herself.                 (RR
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    2:95). Appellant then went after Ellerbe. (RR 2:96).
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    Ellerbe testified that from what she saw, Appellant was not defending himself or
    using only the amount of force necessary to defend himself. (RR 2:97).
    Deputy Goodell testified that he was dispatched to the residence on an assault
    call ~>n October 1, 2014.               (RR 2:102-103).     That after arriving at the residence that
    Goo~ell spoke to a couple of females who told him that Duggan had been assaulted.
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    (RR2: 104-105).               Goodell then went into the residence to speak to Appellant.        (RR
    2:105).
    I Goodell testified that he looked at Appellant for injuries and found no blood, no
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    scra1ches, no red marks, or any other sign that Appellant had been assaulted.                    (RR
    2:10p-106).
    Appellant testified that he observed Duggan from his open bedroom door and got
    up to ask why she hadn't cleaned the food out of the water bowl.                (RR 2: 115). That he
    wasm't angry or aggressive. 
    Id. I I
    Appellant testified that they approached each other and Duggan pushed him
    twice, then grabbed him by the throat with both hands. (RR 2: 116), He then reached
    oven and hit her one time. 
    Id. Duggan then
    fell on the ground. (RR 2: 117). He "just hit
    her and she was lying on the ground crying like a little baby." (RR 2: 127). Appellant
    testified that he only hit Duggan one time and that Ellerbe was being dishonest. (RR
    2: 11:7-119,130).
    The jury rejected Appellant's claim of self-defense and found Appellant guilty of
    the   ~ffense charged.           It is that verdict that Appellant appeals.
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    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
    The evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant gUilty of the offense of Assault
    Causing Bodily Injury to a Family Member beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant does
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    not claim the State did not meet the statutory elements of the offense, but rather that the
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    Stat~ failed to disprove Appellant acted in self-defense when the offense was
    comfitted. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove Appellant did not act
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    in s9lf-defense when the offense was committed. Appellant provoked the difficulty, the
    forc~                  used by Appellant was not immediately necessary to protect Appellant, and the
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    use 10f force by Appellant was excessive in response to the justified use of force by
    Duggan.
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    I                                           ARGUMENT
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    1. Standard of Review
    The standard of review to determine sufficiency of the evidence is whether, in
    viewiing all the evidence in light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
    coul~ have found the essential elements of the crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. I
               I
    307'1
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 560
    , 99 S. Gt. 2781 (1979); Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    1(Tex.Grim.App. 2010). This is true both for direct evidence and for circumstantial
    evidence. The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
    weiQht to be given to their testimony. Castanello v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 800
    , 807 (Tex.
    Appl-Austin 1991, no pet.). They may accept all of the testimony of a witness, reject
    all   at the testimony of a witness, or accept any part of the evidence.                
    Id. Any disparity
    of conflicts within the evidence is solely up to the jury to resolve. 
    Id. When a
    def~ndant                  challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing
    courlt reviews all the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State's evidence
    taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of gUilt, although
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    ade~uate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
    Zuli8ni v. State, 
    97 S.W.3d 589
    (Tex. Grim. App. 2003); Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    ,111 (Tex. Grim. App. 2000).
    2. The Law of Self-Defense
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    Texas Penal Code Ann. Section 9.31 (a) provides in part. "A person is justified in
    uSins force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the
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    forcel is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted
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    use Qf unlawful force."
    The defendant has the initial burden of producing some evidence to justify
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    subnjlitting a self-defense instruction, the State must then prove beyond a reasonable
    dou~t that the defendant did not act in self-defense.              Saxton v. State, 
    804 S.W.2d 910
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    (Tex, Crim App. 1991). Although the State has the burden of persuasion, it does not
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    have the burden of producing evidence to refute self-defense affirmatively. Saxton at
    913.: Jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant's conduct was not justified by
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    self-(Jefense. It is not necessary; however, that the unanimously agree as to why.
    ROd~iguez v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 819
    (Tex. App-Austin, 2006, no pet.).
    Texas Penal Code Ann. Section 9.31 (b)(5) provides, 'The use of force against
    anot~er              is not justified: if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of
    unlawful force, unless: (A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates
    to the other his intent to do so or reasonably believing he cannot safely abandon the
    encQunter; and (8) the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force
    against the actor."
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    The trial court must give a charge on provocation when there is sufficient
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    eVid~nce (1) that the defendant did some act or used some words which provoked the
    attafk on him, (2) that such act or words were reasonably calculated to provoke the
    attack, and (3) that the act was done or the words were used for the purpose and with
    the intent that the defendant would have a pretext for inflicting harm on the other. Smith
    v. Slate, 
    965 S.W.2d 509
    . 513 (Tex. 1998).
    Each of the three elements may be proved circumstantially. 
    Id. at 515,517-18.
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    A prpvocation instruction should be submitted to the jury only when there is evidence
    from which a rational jury could find every element of provocation beyond a reasonable
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    douqt. 
    Id. at 514.
    The inquiry is whether "a rational jury could have found provocation beyond a
    reasbnable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to giving the
    instr~ction.     
    Id. I The
    jury is the exclusive judge of all the facts presented in court and what weight
    to bEt given to the testimony. Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. 38.04.
    3. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Finding of Guilt
    . Appellant does not claim the State did not meet the statutory elements of the
    offel)se, but rather that the State failed to disprove Appellant acted in self-defense when
    the Offense was committed. The State will therefore address why the jury did not err in
    denying Appellant's claim of self-defense.
    Appellant did not act in self-defense.
    Appellant was the one who initiated the difficulty. Appellant was upset and angry
    wheh he came into the kitchen. (RR 2:65). Appellant comes out of his room and gets
    onto, Duggan about her child putting dog food into the water bowl the previous day. (RR
    2:641,65).
    Appellant approached Duggan quickly. (RR 2:66). Duggan stayed where she
    was [when Appellant approached. (RR 2:67). Appellant got between 6-8 inches from
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    Duggan's face and was yelling at her and spitting in her face. (RR 2:67). Duggan was
    scared of Appellant and pushed him to try to get him back from her. (RR 2:68-69). The
    jury was free to not believe Appellant's claim that Duggan choked him.
    i       Goodell testified that he looked at Appellant for injuries and found no blood, no
    scr~ches, no red marks, or any other sign that Appellant had been assaulted. (RR
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    2:105·106). Appellant never attempted to abandon the encounter, but decided to
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    cont~nue the assault on Duggan. The jury was free to not believe Appellant's claim that
    his u!se of force against Duggan was immediately necessary to protect himself. Duggan
    lawf~lIy used a minimal amount of force against Appellant to defend herself.
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    Appellant then used an unreasonable amount of force against Duggan.
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    App$lIant then hit Duggan in the face, she fell, and Appellant got over her and continued
    striki'ng her in the face and the arms. (RR 2:69-71). Ellerbe saw Appellant pounding on
    Dug~an. (RR 2:93). Duggan was curled up on the floor and Ellerbe saw Appellant
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    hitting her four or five times in the face. (RR 2:94). According to Appellant, "she was
    lying on the grourld crying like a little baby." (RR 2:127).
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    Appellant was not defending himself nor using only the amount of force
    nec~ssary           to defend himself from Duggar. (RR 2:97). Duggan had no hopes of
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    deferding herself from Appellant's attack. (RR 2:95). The jury was free to not believe
    Appel/ant's claim that the amount of force that he used was reasonable or that it was
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    immj9diately necessary to protect himself from Duggan's use of unlawful force, if any.
    The jury, as the exclusive judge of all the facts presented in court and what
    weight to be given to the testimony, rejected Appellant's claim of self-defense.
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    CONCLUSION
    In conclusion, the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty for the
    offense of Assault Causing Bodily Injury to a Family Member. The victim testified as to
    eacth and every essential element of the Information and much of her testimony was
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    corroborated by other witnesses. Additionally, the testimony of the victim and other
    witnesses showed that Appellant provoked the difficulty, the force used by Appellant
    was; not immediately necessary to protect Appellant, and the use of force by Appellant
    was; excessive in response to the justified use of force by Duggan. Appellant's
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    contdntion that the verdict is irrational due to the jury disbelieving his claim of self-
    defe~se is without merit and Appellant's issue on appeal should be overruled.
    PRAYER
    : WHEREFORE, Appellee prays that this Court affirm the judgment of the
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    conviction of the County Court at Law Number Two of Henderson County, Texas and
    ente~ a judgment of guilty.
    Respectfully submitted,
    lsi Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Attorney for the State
    100 E. Tyler St., Room 100
    Athens, Texas 75751
    State Bar No. 24013548
    903675-6112 Telephone
    903 675-6192 Facsimile
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Appellee respectfully requests that oral arguments in this case be waived that all
    arguments
    ,     that would be asserted in oral arguments have been advanced in the brief.
    lsi Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Attorney for the State
    9
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I do hereby certify that on this, the 13th day of November, 2015, a true copy of
    the tPpellee's brief will be served on the following parties bye-mail or bye-service, if
    availpble.
    ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT"
    LINDA ALTIER
    Altier Law Offices
    1527 E. Fifth St.
    Tyler, Texas 75701
    Tel: 903 595-4232
    Fax 903 595-0031
    e-mail: altierlaw@gmaiLcom
    SBN: 00783541
    lsi Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Attorney for the State
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4
    Using Microsoft Word word count utility, I have determined that this document
    con~ains 2130 words, not including the "caption, identity of parties and counsel,
    stat~ment    regarding oral argument, table of contents. index of authorities, statement of
    issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature,
    proOf of service, certification, certificate of compliance and appendix".
    Lsi Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Barry L. Spencer, Jr.
    Attorney for the State
    10