Lea Percy McLaurin v. Scott Sutton McLaurin ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-14-00710-cv
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
8/12/2015 11:58:37 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-14-00710-CV
_________________________________
FILED IN
IN THE 1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS 8/12/2015 11:58:37 PM
HOUSTON, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
_________________________________ Clerk
LEA PERCY MCLAURIN,
Appellant
v.
SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN,
Appellee
____________________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
____________________________________________________
Todd Frankfort
State Bar No. 00790711
Richard L. Flowers, Jr.
State Bar Number 07180500
5020 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77006
Telephone 713/654-1415
Facsimile 713/654-9898
Email: rflowers@rflowerslaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN,
APPELLEE
Oral Argument Not Necessary
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 39.7, Appellee, Scott Sutton McLaurin, requests
that this cause be decided without oral argument.
1
Table of Contents
Oral Argument Not Necessary .................................................................................1
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................2
Index of Authorities ..................................................................................................3
Record References & Abbreviations ......................................................................7
Statement of Facts ....................................................................................................9
Summary of the Argument ...................................................................................33
Argument and Authorities .....................................................................................34
I. LEA’S SUIT WAS FRIVOLOUS AND BROUGHT IN BAD
FAITH, SO SANCTIONS WERE PROPER (APPELLANT
ISSUE I. A. & B.) ........................................................................................34
II. LEA DID NOT PRESERVE ERROR CONCERNING THE
SANCTIONS ORDER, AND THE SANCTIONS ORDER
PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR SANCTIONS. (APPELLANT
ISSUE I. D.) ................................................................................................46
III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
IMPOSE A DATE AND TIME CERTAIN FOR APPELLANT
TO PAY THE SANCTIONS ORDERED. (APPELLANT
ISSUE II.) ...................................................................................................49
IV. ALTHOUGH THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY FINDINGS
OF FACT, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS IN SUPPORT
OF THE FINDINGS, THE SANCTIONS ORDER, AND THE
DENIAL OF LEA’S REQUESTED RELIEF. (APPELLANT’S
ISSUES I.C. AND 3) ...................................................................................52
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................60
2
Index of Authorities
Cases
Alexander v. Alexander,
956 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) ... 44, 45
Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones,
192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006)............................................................................50
Braden v. Downey,
811 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex. 1991)............................................................................48
Bradt v. Sebek,
14 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) ...............33
Bushell v. Dean,
803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (op. on reh’g) ....................................................44
Byrnes v. Ketterman, 440 S.W.3d 688, 690 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.)...48
Catalina v. Blasdel,
881 S.W.2nd 295, 297 (Tex. 1994)..........................................................................51
Cire v. Cummings,
134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004)............................................................................32
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 398, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2457, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990)................. 40, 43
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,
701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985)............................................................................33
Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Tyson,
862 S.W.2d 728, 734 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) .......................................49
Elkins v. Stotts-Brown,
103 S.W.3d 664, 668-69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) ..................................35
Falk & Mayfield L.L.P. v. Molzan,
974 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, writ denied) ..........34
3
Franz v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist.,
35 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) .....................49
Gaspard v. Beadle,
36 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) ..............46
Greene v. Young,
174 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ..... 35, 43
Harrison v. Harrison,
363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ................35
Hatteberg v. Hatteberg,
933 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. App. 1994, no writ) .....................................................33
In re Barber,
982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998)............................................................................32
In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd.,
98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003)....................................................................... 47, 48
In re King's Estate,
150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).............................................................51
Keith v. Keith,
221 S.W.3d 156, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ...................47
Lewis v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n,
151 Tex. 95, 97-98, 246 S.W.2d 599, 600 (1952) ...................................................44
Low v. Henry,
221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007)..................................................................... 32, 38
Mattox v. Grimes County Com'rs Court,
305 S.W.3d 375, 386 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) ..........37
McGalliard v. Kuhlmann,
733 S.W.2d 694, 696-97 (Tex. 1986) ......................................................................51
4
Monroe v. Grider,
884 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994), writ denied ................................35
Nath v. Texas Children’s Hosp.,
446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014)............................................................... 33, 40, 43
O'Connor v. Towns,
1 Tex. 107 (1846) .....................................................................................................44
Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)............................................................................51
Robinson v. National Cash Register Co.,
808 F.2d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir.1987),
overruled on other grounds, 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.1988) ......................................35
Rudisell v. Paquette,
89 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ............................46
Scott & White Mem'l Hosp. v. Schexnider,
940 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. 1996) .............................................................. passim
SMB Partners, Ltd. v. Wightman,
01-99-00217-CV, 1999 WL 994057, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct.
28, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication)..................................................44
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc.,
836 F.2d 866, 868 (5th Cir. 1988) ...........................................................................48
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,
811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 2002)............................................................................40
Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa,
299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009)......................................................................... 32, 38
Westergren v. Jennings,
441 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ...................33
Statutes
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 10.001 (Vernon)...........................................37
5
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 10.002 (Vernon)...........................................38
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 10.004 (Vernon)...........................................37
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 .....................................................................................................40
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.................................................................................................44
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) .............................................................................................49
Tex. R. App. P. 44.1.................................................................................................46
Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 .............................................................................................. 34, 35
Tex. R. Civ. P. 308 ...................................................................................................47
6
Record References & Abbreviations
All references to the Clerk’s Record will be noted by “CR” followed by the
appropriate page number (e.g. CR 17).
All references to the Supplemental Clerk’s Record will be noted by “Supp.
CR” (e.g. Supp. CR 12).
All references to the Reporter’s Record will be noted by “RR” followed by
the appropriate volume and page number (e.g. RR 2:22 refers to Reporter’s Record
Volume 2, Page 22).
All references to the exhibits offered at trial by Appellant (Petitioner at trial)
will be noted by “PE ___” followed by the trial exhibit number, and page number,
if applicable.
The exhibits offered at trial by Appellee (Respondent below) will be denoted
“RE ___” followed by the trial exhibit number and page number, if applicable.
7
NO. 01-14-00710-CV
__________________________
IN THE
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
___________________________________
LEA PERCY MCLAURIN,
Appellant
v.
SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN,
Appellee
_________________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
__________________________________________________
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellee, Scott Sutton McLaurin (“Scott”), submits this Appellee’s Brief, in
response to Appellant’s Brief, filed by Lea Percy McLaurin (“Lea”). This matter
stems from Lea’s post-divorce filing of an enforcement action against Scott. At
the conclusion of trial, Scott was awarded sanctions against Lea for her having
filed a frivolous motion. All matters between the parties were heard in the 309th
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Sherry Y. Dean,
presiding.
8
Statement of Facts
To correct certain inaccuracies contained in Appellant’s Statement of Facts,
Scott offers this Statement of Facts.
Lea and Scott, each a medical doctor by training, were married, but on
February 4, 2009, Lea filed a divorce action. (RR 1:46).
In their divorce action, Lea’s counsel was J.D. Bucky Allshouse
(“Allshouse”), and Scott’s counsel was Richard L. Flowers, Jr. (“Flowers”) (PE 1).
The parties attended two mediation sessions in an effort to resolve the issues in
their divorce. (RR 3:45) They reached an agreement at mediation, which was
ultimately memorialized in a Final Decree of Divorce (“Decree”) (PE 1) and an
Agreement Incident to Divorce (“AID”) (PE 2). The parties signed the AID and
the trial court entered the Decree on September 3, 2010. (PE 1 & 2).
On September 7, 2010 – four days following the divorce – Flowers sent a
letter to Allshouse, which, included the following pertinent statements:
• “I’m sending an assignment for Scott’s share of the savings
bonds. However, I think the bonds will have to be endorsed.”
• “The Lincoln Investment account is being divided as per the
AID. The actual securities are being divided so Lea will need
to let Ross McLaurin 1 know where he is to send her share of
these securities.”
• “Otherwise, here’s what I see as the remaining action items:
1
Ross McLaurin shall be hereinafter referred to as “Ross.”
9
1. The savings bonds need to be divided. Lea has
possession of all the bonds so I need to know when
and where to pick them up from her.
2. Scott will exchange the diamond for his Rolex.
Again, please let me know when Lea’s ready to do
that.
3. Scott needs to get the plates, Christmas ornaments and
stuffed animals ready for Lea to pick up.
4. The parties need to make arrangements for copying
photos and videos.”
(RE 20). The letter was part of Scott’s effort to divide the property awarded to
each of the parties pursuant to the AID and Decree. (RR 6:25).
Following the September 7 letter, Scott received additional documents from
Allshouse that he was to sign in order to transfer “things” to Lea. (RR 5:154).
On September 8, 2010, Scott executed three transfer documents, assigning to
Lea various assets. (RE 22). Scott signed these documents in an effort to promptly
effectuate transfer following the conclusion of the divorce. (RR 6:26). Later,
Flowers sent a “corrected Assignment of Interest” to Allshouse for Lea’s signature
(R 23) to effectively divide the savings bonds. (RR 6:28).
On Tuesday, January 4, 2011, Lea, by and through Daniel Lemkuil
(“Lemkuil”) filed a Motion to Enforce Final Decree of Divorce and Agreement
Incident to Divorce (the “Original Enforcement”) (Supp. CR 37). In the Original
Enforcement, Lea sought (generally and in addition to various unfounded tort
claims) to enforce the transfer of ten items awarded to Lea in the AID: (i) a
diamond given to Lea by Patrick Brannan (“Item 1”); (ii) “coins belonging to Lea
10
or Christopher” (the parties’ son) (“Item 2”); (iii) real property in Oklahoma (“Item
3”); (iv) a First Colony Life Insurance Policy (“Item 4”); (v) a portion of an
account with Lincoln Investments (“Item 5”); (vi) various United States Savings
Bonds (“Item 6”); (vii) a 2006 Lexus GX470 (“Item 7”); (viii) the award of “fifty
percent (50%) net of taxes of ANY bonuses or reimbursements received by
Husband through April 30, 2010” (“Item 8”); (ix) the contents of safety deposit
boxes at BBVA Compass and Wells Fargo banks (“Item 9”); and (x) various
Christmas ornaments and other personal property (“Item 10”). (Supp. CR 37-44).
Upon learning of the Original Enforcement, Flowers sent Lemkuil a letter
dated January 11, 2011, which – in pertinent part – said:
As a vital part of the reasonable inquiry you
are required to have done prior to initiating
this motion, I’m assuming you have spoken
to Bucky Allshouse and members of his
staff, including Rebecca Tipton about the
efforts they made along with my office to
conclude the property transfers. I invite you
to call Ross McLaurin, telephone number
713/789-0800, and inquire about his many
efforts to date to transfer property to your
client. You (sic) client refuses to cooperate
with anyone. She also refuses to transfer
property she has to my client.
(RE 24).
11
On January 25, 2011, Flowers sent a letter to Lemkuil “following up to
schedule a meeting to discuss what remains to be done to close this case.” (RE
26).
On February 1, 2011, Lemkuil sent a letter to Flowers, asking Flowers to
make Items 1 through 10 available to him at a meeting scheduled for February 3,
2011. (RE 25).
On February 3, 2011, Flowers and Lemkuil met at Flowers’ office,
ostensibly to resolve the matter. (RR 6:133; RE 27). Lemkuil abruptly ended the
meeting after a short period. Flowers then sent an email outlining Scott’s position
relative to the Original Enforcement, stating, “The September 7th letter [to
Allshouse] addresses nearly every item made the basis of your enforcement action.
Virtually every issue not addressed in my September 7th letter but made the basis
of your enforcement suit has never been requested or addressed until you filed your
lawsuit.” (RE 27). Flowers specifically addressed the following issues:
Item 1 (Diamond)
“We’ve always stood ready to exchange the diamond for
my client’s Rolex watch, but Lea refuses.”
Items 4 & 6 (First Colony & Savings Bonds)
“Also attached are copies of assignments signed by my
client last September and October which we’ve had ready
to exchange for the assignments from your client to
mine.”
12
Item 5 (Lincoln Investments)
“In my January 11, 2011 letter to you I invited you to call
my client’s financial advisor, Ross McLaurin, and
provided his telephone number, 713/789 – 0800. I know
you never called Ross. If you had you would have
learned about his efforts to transfer funds to your client.
You also seemed to know nothing about the financial
advisor Lea hired who Ross has been working with. You
also knew nothing about the information Ross and Lea’s
financial advisor had exchanged about the very issue
made the basis of your lawsuit. You could have asked
Ross to provide the documentation your client wants
about the Lincoln account.”
Item 10 (Christmas Ornaments)
“[Lea has] never attempted to arrange to pick up the
plates, ornaments, and other items which have been
boxed and ready to exchange for months.”
Id. Flowers concluded, stating, “Dan, if you pursue this lawsuit without making
any inquiry I will immediately file a bad faith claim against you and your client.
Handle it correctly and we’ll get it resolved.” Id. In response to Flowers’
February 3 email, Lemkuil pithily stated, “You are wrong. Strike three.” Id.
On March 15, 2015, at 10:34 a.m., Lea non-suited the Original Enforcement.
(Supp. CR 47).
That same day, at 2:09 p.m., Lea filed a Motion to Enforce Final Decree of
Divorce and Agreement Incident to Divorce (the “New Enforcement”). (Supp. CR
48). In her brief, Lea claims that she filed the New Enforcement after “having
13
narrowed the issues,” but Items 1 through 10 in the New Enforcement were
identical to the Original Enforcement. (Supp. CR 37).
On April 25, 2011, upon learning of the filing of the New Enforcement,
Flowers agreed to accept service on Scott’s behalf, and inquired as to Lemkuil’s
authority for serving a precept in what amounted to a breach of contract case. (RE
28). The record is void of any response from Lemkuil.
On April 27, 2011, Flowers, having accepted service of a precept, inquired
as to the legal authority upon which Lemkuil relied. Lemkuil refused to discuss
the matter. (RE 29). At the conclusion of his April 27 letter, Flowers stated, “You
are urged once again to immediately non-suit this bad faith claim so as to mitigate
any further unnecessary expense to my client. It’s been very obvious since you
first appeared in this matter that you have made no inquiry into these facts
whatsoever.” Id. The record is void of any response from Lemkuil.
Later in the day on April 27, 2011, Flowers sent a follow-up letter,
correcting a misunderstanding about a hearing date. (RE 30). At the conclusion of
the second April 27 letter, Flowers gave a similar warning to Lemkuil. Id. The
record is void of any response from Lemkuil.
On Sunday, May 1, 2011, Flowers sent another email to Lemkuil, which
says, in part, “You’ve failed to respond to my letters regarding the improvident
14
motion to enforce and the show cause order and precept you had issued.” (RE 31).
The record is void of any response from Lemkuil.
On June 21, 2011, Flowers’ office sent another letter, again addressing each
of the items raised in the New Enforcement. (RE 32). The June 21 letter begins,
“I have called your office several times to discuss closing this case. I have not
heard back from you. This is another effort at resolving this matter and to
minimize the time and unnecessary expenses accruing in concluding this matter.”
Id. Moreover, the June 21 letter specifically addresses each of Items 1 through 10.
Id. Rather than recite the entire contents of the June 21 letter, a true and correct
copy has been attached hereto as Appendix 1.
After a few months, on August 18, 2011, Scott filed a Motion for Sanctions
for Bad Faith Filing, but Scott proceeded to trial on his Second Amended Motion
for Sanctions for Bad Faith Filing (“Sanctions Motion”). (CR 3-8). In the
Sanctions Motion, Scott sought recovery of his attorney’s fees, court costs, and
litigation expenses, jointly and severally from Lea and from Lemkuil. (Id.)
On September 7, 2011, Flowers sent yet another email to Lemkuil after Lea
had appeared, unannounced, at Flowers’ office. (RE 33). The letter concludes,
“This is another amazing chapter of a ridiculously difficult case. There is no
conceivable way this could be worth the time and money which has been and will
be spent.” Id.
15
On May 25, 2012, Flowers sent “another attempt at settlement” to Lemkuil.
(RE 37). (The letter dated May 25, 2012 is among the voluminous attachments to
RE 37. For ease of reference and to save the Court’s time in reviewing exhibits, a
true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Appendix 2 and cited as
“RE 37-A.”) In Flowers’ May 25 letter, he again tracks Items 1 through 10, states
his belief that each of the Items had been resolved, and offers to settle the matter.
(RE 37-A)
On November 9, 2012, Lea filed a First Amended Motion to Enforce Final
Decree of Divorce and Agreement Incident to Divorce (the “1st Amended
Enforcement”), in which she restated the allegations contained in the Original
Enforcement and the New Enforcement. (Supp. CR 58). Over the course of the
litigation, Lea filed five different versions of her enforcement pleading, amended
her pleading four times, each time, either omitting causes of action that were
clearly not valid OR not changing the allegations in the pleading – AT ALL.
(Supp. CR 66, 71, 144)
On March 27, 2013, Lea filed her Fourth Amended Motion to Enforce Final
Decree of Divorce and Agreement Incident to Divorce (“4th Amended
Enforcement”), in which she abandoned all prior allegations, EXCEPT for the
following:
• The award of the diamond given by Patrick Brannan, and located
in a safe deposit box at Chase Bank, Medical Center location;
16
• The “fifty percent (50%) net of taxes of ANY bonuses or
reimbursements received by Husband through April 30, 2010”; and
• A cause of action for conversion against Scott.
(RE 55).
During trial, each side testified on their own behalf. In addition, Scott called
one fact witness to present evidence of some of the difficulties that had been
encountered in transferring property to Lea. Given Lea’s sufficiency challenges
and challenges to the findings of fact, it is important to review a summary of the
pertinent testimony adduced at trial.
Scott’s Testimony
During trial, Scott testified that at the beginning of the lawsuit, he
recognized that he was being sued over a list of “about 10 things,” initially. (RR
6:68):
Item 1 (Diamond) – Scott testified that there was some confusion, at least in
his mind, about which diamond Lea had, which diamond was in question, and
which diamond he was obligated to turn over to Lea. (RR 6:74). Scott said that he
turned over both the “mine cut diamond” and the “Brandon (sic) diamond.” (RR
5:129). He testified that he found one diamond in his safe, and – thinking it was
the Patrick Brannan Diamond –gave it to Lea. (RR 5:149). He later found a
second diamond, and turned it over to Lea, too. (RR 5:150). He further testified
17
that each time Lea insisted that he had the Patrick Brannan Diamond, he looked for
it, and was unable to find it. (RR 6:74)
Item 2 (Coins) – Scott testified that he did not have any of the coins
referenced in the AID. (RR 5:133). Flowers’ office confirmed as much to
Lemkuil in writing. (RE 32).
Item 3 (Oklahoma Property) – Scott testified that he was not given a deed to
sign, transferring any interest in the Oklahoma property, but that when Lea finally
did send a deed, he “accepted it.” (RR 6:57-58) Correspondence from Flowers’
office informed Lea and Lemkuil of this fact. (RE 32)
Item 4 (Life Insurance Policy) – Scott testified that he did not recall any
document pertaining to transfer of the First Colony Life Insurance policy to Lea
(RR 5:159-160); however, Scott did sign an Assignment of Interest dated
September 8, 2010, and received from Allshouse, which purported to transfer the
policy to Lea. (RE 22).
Item 5 (Lincoln Investments) – Scott testified that he signed a document
transferring the Lincoln account to Lea. (RR 5:143).
Item 6 (Savings Bonds) – Scott testified that he signed documents
transferring the applicable savings bonds to Lea, around the time their divorce was
finalized. (RR 5:159; RE 20, 22). Scott further testified on cross-examination that
he executed transfer documents for the savings bonds awarded to Lea “every time
18
[he] was asked to do it.” (RR 5:107). Correspondence from Flowers’ office
confirms Scott’s testimony. (RE 20, 22, 27, 32, 37-A). Although at one point
during the litigation, Lea claimed that all of the savings bonds were lost, in fact,
Lea had some in her possession, and Scott had none. (RR 6:22).
Item 7 (Lexus) – Scott maintained that he did not possess Lea’s Lexus keys.
(RR 5:132). Correspondence from Flowers’ office informed Lea and Lemkuil of
this fact. (RE 32, 37-A).
Item 8 (Bonus & Reimbursement) – Scott testified that he recognized that he
had an obligation to pay Lea a portion of bonuses and reimbursement that he
received by April 21, 2010. (RR 5:139). Scott further testified that he was paid a
bonus for the first quarter 2010, but that he did not receive it until the end of April,
2010 – after April 21. (RR 6:10). Scott presented a copy of his bonus check (RE
7), identified the net amount of the bonus received, and testified that he paid Lea
one-half of that amount. (RR 6:11-12). Scott identified the cashier’s check
payable to Lea for half of his first quarter 2010 bonus. (RE 9; RR 6:12). Finally,
Scott testified that while investigating whether he had paid the correct amount of
bonus, he realized that on May 3, 2010, he received his “February draw check,”
and gave a reason for the delay in payment. (RE 5 & 6; RR 6:14-17). Scott
confirmed this additional draw check was paid after the date the parties signed the
AID. He further confirmed that Lea had never claimed any interest in this draw,
19
but that upon receipt, he tendered to Lea a cashier’s check for half. (RE 8; RR
6:18-19).
Item 9 (Safe Deposit Boxes) – Although Scott did not testify regarding the
existence (or not) of a safety deposit box to which Lea was entitled, RE 32 and 37-
A both state, “Scott doesn’t have a document listing the contents of the safe deposit
boxes at BBVA Compass or Wells Fargo Bank as of September 3, 2010.”
Item 10 (Christmas Ornaments) – Scott testified that he made the Christmas
ornaments and other related personal property available for Lea, as required by the
AID, and the items sat, boxed at his residence for 1.5 years, and then at Flowers’
office because Lea refused to retrieve them. (RR 5:111-112).
Lea’s Testimony
Lea, in response to the questions, “What inquiries did you make into
whether or not Mr. McLaurin had your things before you sued him about it?” and
“You filed a lawsuit that preceded this one on the same issues, right, virtually?,”
stated:
“I have no idea.”
(RR 3:103 & 60, respectively). Lea further testified that she did not see any of her
pleadings prior to filing, and could not vouch for their contents because she had not
read them. (RR 4:30). Lea testified that she was unaware of any of the efforts
made to settle the case (RR 4:32), but then – moments later – testified about a letter
20
Lemkuil had received (RE 37), and admitted that she was aware of settlement
efforts. (RR 4:33).
Testifying over the course of 4 of the 5 days that the case was presented, Lea
spoke at length about Items 1 through 10. Although Lea’s testimony was difficult
to follow at times and she received several admonishments from the trial court
concerning her answers (See, e.g. RR 2:50, 2:55, 2:60, 2:68, 3:20, 3:25, 3:28, 3:31,
3:39, 3:40, 3:42, 3:45, 3:57, 3:65, 3:101, 3:126, 3:1372, 4:16, 4:20, 4:36, 4:40,
4:44, 4:46, 5:18, 5:21, and 5:45), her testimony may be summarized as follows:
Item 1 (Diamond) – Lea testified that she was awarded the Brannan
Diamond in the AID. (RR 2:48). She testified that she received a diamond from
Scott following their divorce, but that it was not the Brannan Diamond. (RR 2:54).
Lea, later, testified that it was possible that she had received the Brannan Diamond.
(RR 3:7). Later still, she testified that Scott had showed her the inside of his safe
deposit box, and that it contained 2 diamonds. (RR 3:117). Lea confirmed that she
is not a jewelry collector; has no specialized knowledge of diamonds; and has no
special training or knowledge to enable her to discern one diamond from another.
(RR 3:119-120). Lea further admitted that she was “unsure” whether the
description of the Brannan Diamond contained in her pleading was accurate. (RR
3:131). Finally, Flowers asked: “You’ve made these comparisons if it wasn’t the
2
The trial court admonished Lea, this time, by saying, “And ma’am, I’m telling you right
now, if I hear you ask one more question, I’m going to fine you. Do you understand that?”
21
round cut diamond it’s the old mine cut diamond. You put it in your pleading.
That’s what I’m asking you about. I’m asking you what investigation research,
inquiry, what sort of legwork, if you will, did you do to investigate that claim
before you made it?” (RR 3:138). Lea’s response: “Nothing.” Id.
Item 2 (Coins) – In response to Flowers’ question “Did you ever send a
demand asking your husband -- former husband for coins and stamps out of the
safe deposit box?,” Lea stated, “I have no idea.” (RR 3:66). Moreover, despite
her testimony that she and Scott do not communicate via email and that she only
“occasionally” speaks to him on the telephone (RR 3:67), Lea testified that she
asked him for the coins (and stamps) on more than one occasion before she filed
the New Enforcement, but could not recall when or how many times. (RR 3:66-
67).
Item 3 (Oklahoma) – Lea testified that she had asked Scott to execute a
Quitclaim deed to the Oklahoma property “several times,” but that he never signed
it. (RR 2:56-57). On cross examination, however, she stated that she did present
Scott with a deed, but did bring a copy to trial because she did not know to. She
testified that she gave the deed to Scott directly, but that the document was also
sent “by the attorney” to Scott and to Flowers’ office; and that she “had no idea”
whether anyone responded to the request. (RR 3:102-103). The record is void of
any such document, and Lea abandoned the issue at trial. (RE 55).
22
Item 4 (Life Insurance) – Lea testified that she believed Scott was holding
the copy of the life insurance policy that she was awarded pursuant to the AID
because “he’s mean” and for “revenge,” but had “no idea” whether he had
economic reasons for holding the policy. (RR 3:89) (emphasis added). She further
testified that prior to filing for divorce, , she had taken “some boxes” with “some”
financial documents out of the house. (RR 3:92). Lea’s removal of financial
documents would dove-tail with Scott’s assertion that he did not have the
insurance documents.
Item 5 (Lincoln) – Regarding the Lincoln Investments account, Lea testified
that: (i) she hired Allen Weiner, a third party, to assist with dividing the Lincoln
account (RR 3:81); (ii) she refused to sign documents that would have transferred
her share of the Lincoln account to her (RR 3:78); (iii) she “had no idea” that the
funds could not be transferred to her without her providing account information
(RR 3:85); (iv) she – finally – admitted that she did not provide an account into
which her share could be transferred until August, 2012 (RR 3:85), (v) she was no
longer pursuing a claim against Scott related to the Lincoln account (RR 3:86), and
(vi) she had “no idea” how much money Scott had spent on lawyers dealing with
that issue (RR 3:87).
Issue 6 (Bonds) – Lea admitted that she refused to sign documents that
would transfer her share of the savings bonds to her (RR 3:78), but she had also
23
already received all of the savings bonds to which she believed she was entitled.
(RR 3:14).
Issue 7 (Lexus) – Lea testified that, if she had sent a written demand for
return of the key prior to filing suit, she did not bring a copy of that demand with
her to court. (RR 3:66). When asked whether she received a letter from Flowers’
office, stating that Scott does not have the keys to the Lexus, Lea replied, “I have
no idea.” (RR 3:65). Lea gave the same response to an inquiry as to the value of
the Lexus key for which she sued. (RR 3:66). Lea was, in fact, advised in writing
that Scott did not have her Lexus key. (RE 32, 37-A).
Issue 8 (Bonus & Reimbursement) – During cross-examination, the
following exchange occurred:
Q: (By Mr. Flowers) In that first paragraph [of page 3 of the
4th Amended Enforcement], just for clarity, I’ll read it
and you tell me if I read it correctly. ‘The bonuses and
reimbursements referenced in the Agreement Incident to
Divorce include all bonuses or reimbursements earned or
received net of taxes only from February 1, 2009 through
April 30th, 2010 in an amount not less than $8,526.31 nor
more than $75,310.89 prior to interest on the IMED pay,
together with other bonuses and reimbursement claims as
expressed below for an additional pre-interest claim of
$31,618.95.’
Did I read that correctly?
A: Umm, okay.
Q: Did I read it correctly?
A: Yes.
* * *
24
Q: (By Mr. Flowers) Can you please tell the Court what in
the world that means?
A: That he has agreed to pay me 50 percent net of taxes of
any bonus or reimbursement.
Q: Where did you get the number $8,526.31? Why is that
the minimal?
A: I’m not sure.
Q: Okay. Where did you get the number $75,310.89?
A: I’m not sure.
* * *
Q: Okay. Let me break it up. I’m sorry. Bad question. Let
me start with IMED pay. Prior to interest on the IMED
pay, what is the interest on the IMED pay?
A: I’m not sure.
(RR 4:19-21).
Ultimately, Lea was unable to testify as to an exact amount of money that
she was seeking or as to how any amount was calculated. (RR 4:26). At first, she
indicated that she needed additional paperwork, but could not identify any
document that had not been produced (RR 4:27), and admitted that she had not
asked the trial court to order production of documents. (RR 4:28).
The following day, Lea testified that she was “not sure” whether she had
ever itemized her reimbursement claim for Scott (RR 5:71) or had ever sent the list
of expenses (RR 5:72-73). Lea “believed” the total amount owed to her was
$98,000 (RR 5:73), but was unable to offer any basis for the amount of the claim.
(RR 5:75-76).
25
Issue 9 (Safe Deposit Boxes) – Lea testified that, pursuant to the AID, she
was to receive the contents of two safe deposit boxes, one at BBVA Compass, and
one at Wells Fargo. (RR 2:70). She maintained she received the entire contents of
the Wells Fargo box, but was abandoning the claim. (RR 2:70-71). The record is
void of any accounting of items from the Wells Fargo safe deposit box to which
Lea claimed she was entitled.
Issue 10 (Christmas Ornaments) – Lea testified that she (i) requested the
Christmas ornaments from Scott by sending him typewritten letters, (ii) “may or
may not” have copies of the letters, (iii) did not bring any such letters to court (RR
3:56), and (iv) could not remember the time frame of sending the letters.
(RR3:58). Although Lea testified that she believed she did not receive all of her
Christmas things, she did not ask the trial court to make any orders concerning
them (RR 3:14), and the record is void of any reference to any specific item still
outstanding.
Ross McLaurin
Scott called Ross McLaurin, his brother. Ross is employed with Lincoln
Investments, and acted as the parties’ investment advisor both before and during
the parties’ marriage. (RR 4:71-72). During the time that Ross managed the
parties’ money, Lea never complained about fees, did not question Ross’ honesty,
and did not write complaint letters to Lincoln. (RR 4:122). After the parties’
26
divorce, Ross was to divide the accounts in conformity with the mediated
settlement agreement. (RR 4:75). A brokerage account and a retirement account
were to be divided. (RR 4:76). The retirement account called for a specific
amount to go to Lea, but in the brokerage account, he “took a pro-rata share of
each investment and each accounting that’s shared and divided it to each party.”
(RR 4:75-76). In arriving at the division, Ross “…was trying to be as impartial as
[he] could to give each person the equal share, after tax benefit, of the assets.” (RR
4:100).
Ross testified that in order to initiate a transfer to Lea, she needed to provide
the account into which she wanted her shares placed, and that he had difficulty in
obtaining that information from Lea. (RR 4:75-76). Ross made effort to obtain the
information from Lea directly and from Mr. Weiner. (RR 4:78).
Ross calculated the division of the account in September, 2010. (RR 4:90).
He discussed those calculations with Mr. Weiner in mid-November, 2010. (RR
4:79). Ross segregated Scott’s portion of the account into a separate account on
December 21, 2010. (RR 4:90). In early January, Ross also removed Scott’s share
of dividends that were paid into the account. (RR 4:91). The interest, dividends,
gains, and losses on Lea’s portion of the account remained with Lea. (RR 4:111).
In speaking with Mr. Weiner in mid-November, 2010, Ross explained the
method by which the account was divided, and Mr. Weiner voiced no objection.
27
(RR 4:79). Lea did not send any letters to Lincoln Investments, objecting to Ross’
division of the account or his management of it. (RR 4:99) Even after Ross and
Mr. Weiner reviewed a “spreadsheet with all of the details,” neither of them were
able to get Lea to designate an account for the transfer or sign paperwork necessary
to effect transfer of the Lincoln Investments account. (RR 4:79-80).
Nearly two years later, Ross received a Brokerage and Client Account
Transfer Form, signed by Lea and dated August 22, 2012, that finally designated
the account into which Lea wanted her assets transferred. (RR 4:81). Ross
testified that Scott signed the document within less than a week following receipt,
and the assets eventually were transferred to Lea. (RR 4:82-83).
Ross testified that at the end of 2012, when Lea attempted to transfer the
assets, she did not include all of the paperwork necessary to effectuate the transfer,
so “…[he] provided additional documentation to make the transfer occur, including
a letter from Scott, which he signed immediately, to expedite the transfer and make
it happen.” (RR 4:85). The transfer was completed on January 4, 2013, but the
delay was not a result of anything that Scott did. Id. Moreover, Ross testified that
he asked Lemkuil for assistance in expediting the transfer of Lea’s assets, and that
Lemkuil told him he would not assist. (RR 4:86-87).
28
Despite any whatever complaints she may have had, Lea still asked Ross to
transfer the assets to her Vanguard account (RR 4:125), and had dropped Lincoln
Investments complaint by the time of trial. (RR 4:126-127).
Flowers Testimony
Testifying as an expert on the issue of attorney’s fees, Flowers first received
notice of Lea’s enforcement action before any attempt at service via an email he
received from the district clerk’s office. (RR 6:119). Almost immediately,
Flowers reached out to Lemkuil in an effort to resolve the matter. When Flowers
initially inquired as to whether Lemkuil had reviewed the file, Lemkuil responded,
“why would he review the file, this is a new case.” (RR 6:120). From that point,
Flowers began to investigate the case himself, and realized that the breach of
contract matter had been improperly filed as a contempt case, with the issuance of
a precept (rather than citation). Id. Ultimately, that issue was resolved, but before
Flowers filed a motion and prevailed at the hearing. (RR 6:121).
In addition to attending to the matter of the improperly issued precept,
Flowers continued his efforts to resolve the case. (RR 6:122; see e.g. RE 32, 37-
A). Flowers discovered that no effort had been made by Lemkuil or Lea to make
inquiry into the claims asserted prior to filing either lawsuit. Id. As early as
February, 2011, Flowers informed Lemkuil of his belief that no investigation had
been made. (RR 6:133-134).
29
Lea (through Lemkuil) served written discovery to which Scott (through
Flowers) had to respond (RR 6:122). Lea (through Lemkuil) noticed several
depositions which Flowers attended. (RR 6:124). There were several discovery
disputes, each of which required a discovery hearing before Judge David Farr,
312th Judicial District Court. Id. In November, 2011, everyone realized that Judge
Farr had previously mediated the parties’ temporary orders during a time when he
was not on the bench, so the matter was assigned to the 309th. Id. All of these
ancillary matters consumed substantial time and effort from Flowers and his staff.
In addition to the several court appearances and trial resets that occurred
(RR 6:125), it proved necessary for Flowers to spend an extraordinary amount of
time trying to “sort out the very nebulous claims that had been made.” Id. Flowers
testified that “…up to this moment we didn’t know what the claims were. It’s been
difficult. It was very difficult to sort through that…a lot of attorney time to sort
through these various things to figure out what it was she claimed was missing.”
(RR 6:125-126).
Flowers testified that the total amount invoiced by his firm was $68,844.25
based upon three invoices, which were collectively admitted into evidence. (RR
6:126; RE 36). Flowers further testified to an additional amount of $25,000.00,
which were the attorney’s fees Scott incurred through the trial of the case. (RR
6:127).
30
Trial Court Ruling
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under
advisement. (RR 6:148). On March 3, 2014, the trial court rendered its ruling, and
on April 8, 2014, the trial court entered its Final Judgment on Lea Percy
McLaurin’s Motion to Enforce and Scott Sutton McLaurin’s Motion for Sanctions
and Bad Faith Filing (the “Sanctions Judgment”). (CR 12).
The Sanctions Judgment denied Lea the relief she sought (CR 13), granted
the Sanctions Motion (CR 13-15), and ordered sanctions, stating, in pertinent part:
The Court having considered the pleadings,
evidence, and arguments of counsel finds that the
allegations contained in LEA PERCY
th
McLAURIN’s 4 Amended Motion to Enforce
Final Decree of Divorce and Agreement Incident
to Divorce are generally false, groundless and
brought in bad faith. The lawyer filing these
pleadings failed to make reasonable inquiry before
filing said groundless and bad faith pleadings.
Rule 13, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court makes the following findings in support of
this final judgment for sanctions, to wit
* * *
The attorney who filed these pleadings failed to
make the reasonable inquiry required prior to filing
the suit. Further, after these fact were brought to
the attention of the attorney during a meeting with
the undersigned, he continued to refuse to dismiss
this frivolous suit.
The Court having considered the pleadings,
evidence and argument of counsel GRANTS the
31
Motion for Sanctions for Bad Faith Filing filed by
SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN. It is therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN is hereby granted
a judgment against LEA PERCY MCLAURIN as
reimbursement for attorney’s fees incurred and
paid in this case in the amount of Fifty Two
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Eight and
88/100 Dollars ($52,378.88). It is further
ORDERED that all Lea PERCY MCLAURIN
shall pay to SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN the
judgment amount of $52,378.88 by cash, cashier’s
check or money order on or before June 12, 2014
at or before 3:00 PM, by delivering cash, cashier’s
check or a money order in said amount payable to
SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN at the law offices
of Flowers & Frankfort, attention Richard L.
Flowers, Jr., 5020 Montrose Blvd., Suite 700,
Houston, Texas.
(CR 13-15).
Lea timely appealed the Sanctions Judgment (CR 62), but has neither
superseded nor paid the amount of the judgment.
Given the evidence presented at trial, the trial court was well within its
discretion to: (i) issue the Sanctions Order, (ii) to include a date and time certain by
which Lea was to comply with the sanctions issued, and (iii) to deny Lea the relief
she sought.
The Sanctions Order should be AFFIRMED.
32
Summary of the Argument
I. LEA’S SUIT WAS FRIVOLOUS AND BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH,
SO SANCTIONS WERE PROPER (APPELLANT ISSUE I. A. & B.)
II. LEA DID NOT PRESERVE ERROR CONCERNING THE
SANCTIONS ORDER, AND THE SANCTIONS ORDER
PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR SANCTIONS. (APPELLANT ISSUE
I. D.)
III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
IMPOSE A DATE AND TIME CERTAIN FOR APPELLANT TO
PAY THE SANCTIONS ORDERED. (APPELLANT ISSUE II.)
IV. ALTHOUGH THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY FINDINGS OF
FACT, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE
FINDINGS, THE SANCTIONS ORDER, AND THE DENIAL OF
LEA’S REQUESTED RELIEF. (APPELLANT’S ISSUES I.C. AND
3)
33
Argument and Authorities
I. LEA’S SUIT WAS FRIVOLOUS AND BROUGHT IN BAD
FAITH, SO SANCTIONS WERE PROPER (APPELLANT
ISSUE I. A. & B.)3
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW & REQUIREMENTS FOR SANCTIONS
Standard of Review
A court’s imposition of a sanction order under is to be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); see also GTE
Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993) (applying
abuse of discretion standard for review of Rule 13 sanctions). The trial court’s
ruling should only be reversed upon a showing that the trial court “acted without
reference to any guiding rules and principals, such that its ruling was arbitrary or
unreasonable.” Id.; Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). “The
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting
evidence and some evidence supports its decision.” Unifund CCR Partners v.
Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009) (citing In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366
(Tex. 1998)).
In conducting its review, the appellate court “must indulge every legal
presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling and view the evidence in the light
3
To avoid confusion, the issue raised by Appellant’s Brief is listed (in parentheses) to
which the indicated heading is responsive.
34
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Hatteberg v. Hatteberg, 933 S.W.2d
522, 526 (Tex. App. 1994, no writ). A mere error in judgment by the trial court
does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 761
(Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The Supreme Court of Texas
“…will not hold that a trial court abused its discretion in levying sanctions if some
evidence supports its decision.” Nath v. Texas Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355,
361 (Tex. 2014).
Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his
discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar
circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.”
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). The
appellate court should “…make an independent inquiry of the entire record to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the particular
sanctions.” Westergren v. Jennings, 441 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) No abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court decision is
based upon conflicting evidence where some evidence supports the decision.
Barber, 982 S.W.2d at 366. (Tex. 1998).
Importantly, “[t]he degree of discretion afforded the trial court is…greater
when sanctions are imposed for groundless pleadings than when imposed for
35
discovery abuse.” Falk & Mayfield L.L.P. v. Molzan, 974 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.
App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, writ denied).
Rule 13
“Courts impose sanctions against parties filing frivolous claims to deter
similar conduct in the future and to compensate the aggrieved party by reimbursing
the costs incurred in responding to baseless pleadings.” Scott & White Mem'l
Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. 1996). Rule 13 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, the following:
The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a
certificate by them that they have read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
their knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not
groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless
and brought for the purpose of harassment... If a
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing,
shall impose an appropriate sanction available
under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. As used in Rule 13, the term “groundless” means that the suit
“had no basis in law or fact and [was] not warranted by good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. In making its
determination of whether a pleading was groundless, the trial court should use the
objective standard of whether the party and her counsel made a reasonable inquiry
36
into the legal and factual basis of the claim, looking “to the facts available to the
litigant and circumstances at the time the suit was filed.” Harrison v. Harrison,
363 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). In
addition, the trial court may consider the entire history of the case. Greene v.
Young, 174 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
In addition to showing that the offending pleading is groundless, the party
seeking sanctions must further demonstrate that it was brought in bad faith. Tex.
R. Civ. P. 13. “A party acts in bad faith when discovery puts him on notice that his
understanding of the facts may be incorrect, and he does not make reasonable
inquiry into the facts before filing the pleading.” Elkins v. Stotts-Brown, 103
S.W.3d 664, 668-69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) In other words, sanctions
may be imposed “…for a party’s or his counsel’s failure to inquire into the facts
after he is on notice the facts are not what he believes.” Monroe v. Grider, 884
S.W.2d 811, 817 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994), writ denied (citing Robinson v.
National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir.1987), overruled on
other grounds, 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.1988)).
In this case, Lemkuil was notified that his understanding of the facts may be
incorrect as early as January, 2011, but he did not make further inquiry into the
facts. (RE 24, 25, 26, 27,) Instead, he filed the New Enforcement. (Supp. CR 48
& ___). Lemkuil’s investigation of Lea’s claims was minimal at best, but was
37
certainly not adequate. At trial, Lea ended up abandoning all but 2 of the initial
Items 1 through 10 (RE 55), but not before Scott had to endure years of litigation
in disproving Lea’s nebulous claims. Lea admitted that she did “nothing” to
investigate her claims related to the Brannan Diamond (RR 3:138), and could not
substantiate any of the $98,000 bonus/reimbursement claim. (RR 5:73-75).
The trial court properly granted sanctions because – examining the facts at
the time the New Enforcement was filed and considering the entire history of the
case, Lea’s pleading was groundless and, after she (or her lawyer) learned that the
facts may not what she believed, no reasonable inquiry was made. The trial court’s
judgment should be affirmed.
Chapter 10 – Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Similar to Rule 13, Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
provides further relief for litigants, stating:
The signing of a pleading or motion as required by the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a
certificate by the signatory that to the signatory's best
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry:
(1) the pleading or motion is not being presented for
any improper purpose, including to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(2) each claim, defense, or other legal contention in
the pleading or motion is warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
38
modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) each allegation or other factual contention in the
pleading or motion has evidentiary support or, for a
specifically identified allegation or factual contention,
is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) each denial in the pleading or motion of a factual
contention is warranted on the evidence or, for a
specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a
lack of information or belief.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 10.001 (Vernon).
In other words, “[s]anctions under chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code are authorized if the evidence establishes that (1) a pleading or
motion was brought for an improper purpose, (2) there were no grounds for legal
arguments advanced, or (3) a factual allegation or denial lacked evidentiary
support.” Mattox v. Grimes County Com'rs Court, 305 S.W.3d 375, 386 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). When a court determines that a
litigant has filed a pleading in violation of Sec. 10.001, it may impose a sanction,
which may include “an order to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred by the other party because of the filing of the pleading or
motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 10.004 (Vernon). Furthermore, “[t]he court may award to a party prevailing on a
motion under this section the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in
39
presenting or opposing the motion, and if no due diligence is shown the court may
award to the prevailing party all costs for inconvenience, harassment, and out-of-
pocket expenses incurred or caused by the subject litigation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 10.002 (Vernon).
B. LEA DID NOT MAKE THE APPROPRIATE INQUIRY BEFORE
FILING THE NEW ENFORCEMENT, SO TRIAL COURT WAS
WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO ORDER SANCTIONS AGAINST HER.
To support the Sanctions Motion, Scott needed competent proof that (1) a
reasonable inquiry into Lea’s allegations would have disclosed that not all the
allegations pled had or would likely have evidentiary support, and (2) Lea did not
make a reasonable inquiry before filing suit. Unifund, 299 S.W.3d at 97 (Tex.
2009) (citing Low, 221 S.W.3d at 617 (Tex. 2007))..
Flowers notified Lemkuil that Lea’s claims were frivolous in January, 2011
(RE 24), at least twice in February, 2011 (RR 6:133; RE 27), at least twice in
April, 2011 (RE 29 & 30), and at least once in May, 2011 (RE 31). In June, 2011,
Flowers’ office sent Lemkuil a detailed letter, specifically addressing Items 1
through 10. (RE 32). The record is void of any evidence of Lemkuil’s
investigation of Lea’s claims following his receipt of any of these notifications
(especially after Flowers’ June, 2011 letter); instead, Lemkuil proceeded with
serving written discovery and noticing depositions, causing Scott’s prolonged
involvement in frivolous litigation – at great expense. (RR 6:122, 124, 125).
40
Lea has taken the position that her amending her pleadings to eliminate moot
issues renders the Sanctions Order improper because it is based, in part, on the
eliminated allegations, a situation similar to that presented in Scott & White
Memorial Hospital v. Schexnider. In Scott & White, the plaintiffs filed suit against
some 33 defendants in a medical malpractice suit. Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d at
595 (Tex. 1996). All 33 defendants, filed a motion for summary judgment, but
before the trial court could rule, plaintiffs nonsuited all but two defendants by
omitting them from an amended pleading. Id. The trial court ended up granting
summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, after which all
defendants moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 13, which the trial court granted.
Id. The Austin Court of Appeals overruled the sanctions order. Id. In overturning
the court of appeals, the Supreme Court of Texas followed the United States
Supreme Court holding interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (prior to
that rule’s amendment to allow a “safe-harbor”):
Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice
in motion, burdening courts and individuals
alike with needless expense and delay. Even
if the careless litigant quickly dismisses the
action, the harm triggering Rule 11’s
concerns has already occurred. Therefore, a
litigant who violates Rule 11 merits
sanctions even after a dismissal. Moreover,
the imposition of such sanctions on abusive
litigants is useful to deter such misconduct.
If a litigant could purge his violation of Rule
11 merely by taking a dismissal, he would
41
lose all incentive to “stop, think and
investigate more carefully before serving
and filing papers.
Id. at 597 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398, 110 S. Ct.
2447, 2457, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
11).
Similarly, Lea should not be permitted to escape sanctions for her frivolous
claims on the basis that she eliminated those claims along the way. Lea did not
conduct any investigation of her claims prior to filing suit, and had she done so, the
ensuing two and a half years of litigation would probably not have occurred. The
Sanctions Order should be affirmed.
C. THE SANCTIONS ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE “JUST,”
AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.
In considering whether sanctions ordered by a trial court comport with due
process, the Supreme Court of Texas, in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell, adopted a two prong test. See Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 363 (Tex. 2014).
“First, a direct relationship must exist between the offensive conduct and the
sanction imposed. This means that that a just sanction must be directed against the
abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused the innocent party.”
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 2002).
“Second, just sanctions must not be excessive. The punishment should fit the
crime.” Id.
42
In this case, the trial court heard the following evidence:
• Scott was in the process of executing
documents to effectuate the transfer of Lea’s
property almost immediately following their
divorce. (RR 5:154, 6:26).
• Without warning or investigation, Lea filed
a contempt action in an effort to enforce the
AID, a contract. (Supp. CR 37; RR 6:119-
120).
• When Flowers attempted to resolve the
matter before protracted litigation occurred,
it became apparent that no investigation had
occurred. (RR 6:120).
• After Flowers informed Lemkuil that the
facts may not be as Lemkuil understood,
Lemkuil non-suited the Original
Enforcement and filed the New
Enforcement, a virtually identical pleading.
(RE 27; Supp CR 47 & 48)
• Substantial attorney and staff time was
devoted to responding to discovery and
attempting to figure out what property Lea
claimed she did not receive. (RR 6:125-
126).
• Lea conducted several depositions of
witnesses (RR 6:124), but the record does
not reflect that any of them were used at
trial.
• By trial, Lea had abandoned all but two of
the claims related to Items 1 through 10:
issues related to the Brannan Diamond and
bonus/reimbursements. (RE 55).
43
• Lea did “nothing” to investigate her claims
related to the Brannan Diamond before
filing suit. (RR 3:138).
• Lea has no special training or knowledge to
enable her to discern one diamond from
another (RR 3:119-120), and it was possible
that she had received the Brannan Diamond.
(RR 3:7).
• On April 30, 2010, Scott received a bonus
for the first quarter of 2010 in the net
amount of $12,955.27 (RE 7), and prior to
her filing the Original Enforcement or the
New Enforcement, he paid Lea the sum of
$6,877.63, by cashier’s check. (RE 9).
• Lea was “not sure” how the damages related
to bonus/reimbursement contained in her
pleading were calculated. (RR 4:19-21).
• In defending against the frivolous suit(s) Lea
filed, Scott incurred attorney’s fees and
expenses in the amount of $68,844.25 (RE
36; RR 6:126), plus an additional
$25,000.00 incurred through the trial of the
case (RR 6:127).
Scott incurred $93,844.25 in attorney’s fees, and asked the trial court to
sanction Lea in that amount. (RR 6:127). After considering the evidence, the trial
court sanctioned Lea in the amount of $52,378.88 (CR 29), an amount that is over
$41,000 less than the amount Scott requested.
44
A sanction “…should be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its
legitimate purposes.” Nath, 446 S.W.3d at 363 (Tex. 2014). Two legitimate
purposes of sanctions against frivolous claimants are the deterrence of similar
conduct in the future, and the compensation of the aggrieved party by reimbursing
the costs incurred in responding to baseless pleadings. Scott & White, 940 S.W.2d
at 597 (Tex. 1996).
Here, Lea, through her abusive litigation and her failure to “stop, think and
investigate more carefully before serving and filing papers,” caused Scott to incur
nearly $100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and expense related to his defense. Cooter &
Gell, 496 U.S. at 398, 110 S.Ct. at 2457, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990). Moreover, in
issuing sanctions, the trial court may consider the entire history of the case.
Greene, 174 S.W.3d at 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
The trial court made specific findings related to certain of Items 1 through
10, considered the pleadings and evidence presented (including the entire case
history), and, based upon such evidence and findings, “therefore” ordered
sanctions against Lea. (CR 13-15).
The sanctions ordered by the trial court were directly related to Lea’s and
Lemkuil’s conduct, were directed against the abuse and towards remedying the
prejudice caused to Scott, and were not excessive; therefore, the Sanctions Order
should be affirmed.
45
II. LEA DID NOT PRESERVE ERROR CONCERNING THE
SANCTIONS ORDER, AND THE SANCTIONS ORDER
PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR SANCTIONS. (APPELLANT
ISSUE I. D.)
A. LEA’S FAILURE TO PRESERVE ANY PERCEIVED ERROR IN THE
SANCTIONS ORDER RESULTS IN HER WAIVING COMPLAINTS ON
APPEAL.
It is well established – since the beginning of Texas jurisprudence – that
“…to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial
court a timely request objection or motion, state the specific grounds therefor, and
obtain a ruling.” Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (op. on reh’g);
Lewis v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 151 Tex. 95, 97-98, 246 S.W.2d 599, 600 (1952);
see also O'Connor v. Towns, 1 Tex. 107 (1846); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. It follows
that an appellant must object to a lack of particularity of a sanctions order in the
trial court before it may raise the complaint on appeal. Alexander v. Alexander,
956 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); accord
SMB Partners, Ltd. v. Wightman, 01-99-00217-CV, 1999 WL 994057, at *1-2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 28, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for
publication).
In the instant case, the record is devoid of any objection by Lea to the lack of
specificity of the Sanctions Order, about which she now complains. Lea’s point of
46
error relating to the specificity of the Sanctions Order, accordingly, should be
overruled. Alexander, 956 S.W.2d at 714.
47
B. EVEN IF LEA HAD PRESERVED ERROR, IT IS HARMLESS ERROR,
SO THE SANCTIONS ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
“A Rule 13 sanction order must be supported by specific allegations of good
cause,” and the failure to do so may be an abuse of discretion. Gaspard v. Beadle,
36 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Such a
failure may be harmless error if a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law provide the particulars of good cause. Id. The Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals has concluded that error by the trial court in failing to state the particulars
of good cause may be harmless based upon whether the trial court “…did not so
‘obscure its reasoning’ as to prevent…being able to present [the] issue on appeal.”
Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no
pet.) (citations omitted); see also, Tex. R. App. P. 44.1.
In the instant case, the trial court made specific findings in the Sanctions
Order concerning Item 1 (diamond), Item 2 (coins), Item 3 (Oklahoma property),
Item 5 (Lincoln Investment account), Item 6 (savings bonds), and Item 10
(Christmas ornaments, etc.). (CR 28-29). In addition, the trial court’s Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (collectively, the “Findings of Fact”) made specific
findings regarding each of the items addressed in the Sanctions Order. (CR 34-38).
On the final page of the Findings of Fact, the trial court judge interlineated on the
typewritten document, which concluded, “After the facts surrounding Lea’s, by
48
and through her attorney of record, failure to make reasonable inquiry were
brought to their attention in a meeting with Scott’s attorney of record, he continued
to pursue a trial regarding Lea’s allegations.” (CR 38)
Even if Lea had not waived her objection to the Sanctions Order’s lack of
particularity, the Sanctions Order and the Findings of Fact contain sufficient
particularity such that the trial court did not obscure its reasoning to the extent that
Lea was prevented from being able to present the issue for appeal. (See CR 13-15,
34-38). Moreover, the findings contained in the Sanctions Order and the Findings
of Fact give sufficient evidence that the sanctions ordered by the trial court
“…were carefully weighed and imposed in an appropriate manner when justified
by the circumstances.” Keith v. Keith, 221 S.W.3d 156, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
The Sanctions Order should be affirmed.
III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
IMPOSE A DATE AND TIME CERTAIN FOR APPELLANT
TO PAY THE SANCTIONS ORDERED. (APPELLANT ISSUE
II.)
A. LEA DID NOT SUPERSEDE THE SANCTION ORDER WHILE ON
APPEAL, AS PERMITTED UNDER TEXAS LAW.
Texas Courts have an affirmative duty to enforce their judgments. In re
Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd., 98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003); Tex. R. Civ. P.
308. Lea has taken the position that her having appealed the Sanctions Order
49
should – in effect – abate the trial court’s ability to enforce it; however, the
Supreme Court of Texas and the other appellate courts have held otherwise. Id.
(“Our procedural rules allow a judgment debtor to supersede a judgment, thereby
suspending enforcement, by posting security set by the trial court, not by merely
filing an appeal.”); Byrnes v. Ketterman, 440 S.W.3d 688, 690 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2013, no pet.) (holding that the losing party “has a choice to either submit to
the judgment or supersede the judgment by filing of a proper bond while the case is
pending appellate review”).
The Supreme Court of Texas addressed an issue with a similar argument in
Braden v. Downey, a mandamus proceeding where a district judge ordered a
litigant to pay sanctions, and gave a specific deadline by which the sanctions
needed to be paid. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex. 1991). In
Braden, the deadline for payment preceded the final resolution of the litigation in
the trial court. Id. The relator contended that the imposition of the monetary
sanctions would threaten his ability to continue the litigation. Id. In determining
the circumstances under which appeal would provide an adequate remedy at law,
the Braden court reasoned that deferral of the due date for payment of the sanction
until entry of a final judgment would afford the sanctioned party an opportunity to
supersede the judgment and perfect his appeal. Id. at 929 (citing Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 868 (5th Cir. 1988)).
50
In the instant case, the Sanctions Order allowed Lea a period of over two (2)
months to pay the sanctions, giving her plenty of time to have superseded the
Sanctions Order, pending the outcome of this appeal; however, she did not avail
herself of supersedeas relief, so Lea’s Issue 2 should be overruled. See Elec. Data
Sys. Corp. v. Tyson, 862 S.W.2d 728, 734 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ).
B. LEA DID NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEF ISSUE 2, SO THIS COURT
SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Aside from one case relating to waiver of appeal upon payment of judgment
– an issue Scott does not contest – Lea cites no authority for the position she
adopts related to the deadline for payment of the sanctions imposed by the trial
court, as required by Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Her failure to do so constitutes a
waiver of the issue on appeal, so Issue 2 should be overruled, and the Sanctions
Order should be affirmed. Franz v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 S.W.3d 749, 755
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
C. THIS COURT HAS RULED ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
SANCTIONS ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTE A
DEBT, SO SCOTT DOES NOT ADDRESS THAT ISSUE HERE
In her Issue 2, Appellant has taken the position that the sanction awarded in
the Sanction Order is an “adjudicated debt” for which she cannot, constitutionally,
be imprisoned, an issue which the parties briefed extensively in No. 01-14-00920-
CV, Appellant’s habeas application. This Court granted Lea’s petition for habeas
relief on the basis that “Lea cannot be imprisoned pursuant to either civil or
51
criminal contempt for failing to pay a debt.” In re McLaurin, 01-14-00920-CV,
2015 WL 1967536, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2015, no pet.).
Based on this Court’s prior ruling, Scott will not address whether the awarded
sanction constitutes a debt.
IV. ALTHOUGH THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY FINDINGS
OF FACT, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS IN SUPPORT
OF THE FINDINGS, THE SANCTIONS ORDER, AND THE
DENIAL OF LEA’S REQUESTED RELIEF. (APPELLANT’S
ISSUES I.C. AND 3)4
A. APPELLATE COURTS MUST INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE
ENTIRE RECORD WHEN EXAMINING A SANCTIONS ORDER, SO
THEY ARE NOT BOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. (APPELLANT ISSUE I. C.)
“In reviewing sanctions orders, the appellate courts are not bound by a trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; rather, appellate courts must
independently review the entire record to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion.” Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex.
2006). Since appellate courts are not bound by the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law, it seems that Lea’s point challenging them should be
disregarded as moot.
4
Out of an abundance of caution, Lea’s challenges to the findings of fact and conclusions
of law will be addressed; however, in an effort to most efficiently present this Court with the
appropriate factual review, Scott will review the trial court evidence only one time, in response
to Lea’s various challenges.
52
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CHALLENGED FINDINGS OF FACT
5
AND FOR FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
Findings of fact following a bench trial are reviewable for factual sufficiency
of the evidence under the same standards used to review a jury’s finding. Catalina
v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2nd 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). In determining a factual
sufficiency challenge, the reviewing court must weigh and consider all of the
evidence and determine (i) whether the evidence in support of a finding is so weak
as to be clearly wrong and unjust, or (ii) whether the finding is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly
unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Pool v. Ford
Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662,
244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
Unchallenged findings of fact with a reporter’s record are binding on an
appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or if there is no
evidence to support the finding. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 733 S.W.2d 694, 696-
97 (Tex. 1986).
C. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT EACH OF THE TRIAL
COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE DENIAL OF LEA’S
REQUESTED RELIEF
5
While Lea, in Appellant’s Brief, does not specifically state that she is challenging the
factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the denial of her requested relief, she does seem to
apply the same standard, stating that “great weight and preponderance of the evidence supported
[her position].” Again, out of an abundance of caution, Scott has included a discussion of the
factual sufficiency standard.
53
Lea has challenged 24 of the 29 findings of fact issued by the trial court as
well as the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the denial of Lea’s
requested relief. Sufficient evidence exists in support of each of the challenged
findings, as follows 6:
6
Rather than recite each individual finding of fact herein, Scott has attached the Findings
of Fact as Appendix 3, for ease of referral by this Court.
54
Findings 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 – Amended Enforcement Pleadings
At Flowers’ request, the trial court took judicial notice of its file, including
the Original Enforcement and each amendment to the Original Enforcement, over
Lea’s objection. (RR 3:38). Lea’s statements to the effect that the clerk’s record
does not contain such a motion are curious in that Lea designated the original
clerk’s record, omitting each amended enforcement pleading, even though a
reference to each amended enforcement pleading is contained in the Findings of
Fact. The Original Enforcement is, in fact, contained in the clerk’s record (Supp.
CR 48-55), as are the 1st Amended enforcement pleading (Supp. CR 58-65), the 2nd
Amended enforcement pleading (Supp. CR 66-70), the 3rd Amended enforcement
pleading (Supp. CR 71-76), and the 4th Amended enforcement pleading (Supp. CR
144-148).
Additionally, the record is replete with references, by Lemkuil, to the
various causes of action that Lea had, at one point, included, but had since
abandoned. (See, e.g. RR 2:57, 58, 69). The argument that the trial court did not
consider the allegations contained in these pleadings is untenable.
Additionally, the Findings of Fact specifically refer to each of the amended
enforcement pleadings, stating, “Lea, by and through her attorney of record, failed
to make reasonable inquiry into the facts surrounding the allegations contained in
55
the [New] Enforcement, the [1st] Amended Enforcement, the 2nd Amended
Enforcement, the 3rd Amended Enforcement, or the 4th Amended Enforcement,
prior to filing each such pleading.”
The trial court took judicial notice of its file and these documents are
contained as part of the clerk’s record, so Findings 3 through 7 are appropriate.
Findings 11, 12, & 13 – Savings Bonds Assignments of Interest
The evidence adduced at trial was that, more than once, Scott signed
documents purporting to transfer the applicable savings bonds to Lea. (RR 5:159;
RE 20). The assignment document referenced in Finding 11 was prepared by
Lea’s then counsel of record, and Scott signed it. (RR 5:154-155). During the
course of the litigation, Lemkuil determined that the parties were not using the
appropriate forms for the transfer of these documents, and, as referenced in
Finding 13, asked that new documents be executed, which Scott received on March
8, 2015, and executed on March 19, 2013. (See RR 5:146).
The purpose of the assignment document referenced in Finding 12 (included
in RE 23) was to transfer savings bonds to Scott, which – as indicated in
Appellant’s Brief – is “of no moment.”
Finding 14 – Attempted exchange of Rolex for Diamonds
Flowers attempted to exchange the Brannan Diamond for Scott’s Rolex
watch on several occasions, all of which are included in the record. (RE 20, 27,
56
and 32). Moreover, Flowers conducted an extensive cross-examination of Lea
concerning the Rolex watch, its whereabouts, and whether she was asked to return
it (RR 3:94-101); Lea gave the following responses:
• “I never swore I didn’t have it. You didn’t
ask for it.” (RR 3:94).
• That the divorce had been over for 2 years
before sending the watch. (RR 3:95-96).
• “I don’t know when [you asked for it.]”
(RR 3:97).
• In response to the question, “Is it still your
testimony that there were no written
demands made of you for that watch before
you sent that watch to my office through Mr.
Lemkuil almost two years after the fact?,”
Lea replied, “I don’t know.” (RR 3:101).
For Lea to now take the position that no evidence was presented at trial concerning
the Rolex watch and a proposed exchange for the Brannan Diamond is simply
unfounded.
Finding 15 – Delivery of Diamonds
Lea testified that it is possible that she received the Brannan Diamond. (RR
3:7).
Findings 16, 17, 18, & 19 – Christmas Ornaments & Photos
Like the Rolex watch, Flowers, on Scott’s behalf, tried to make
arrangements for Lea to retrieve the Christmas ornaments, etc. on numerous
57
occasions, each of which is reflected in the record. (RR 5:111-112; RE 27, 32, 33,
37-A). Moreover, Lea did appear, unannounced at Flowers’ office for the purpose
of retrieving these items, mentioned that not all of the property was present, and
took the property that WAS present, but never specified what items she believed to
be missing (RE 33).
Findings 20 & 21 – Bonus/Reimbursement
Lea did not, in fact, make demand for any alleged money due prior to filing
the Original Enforcement or the New Enforcement, as none is apparent from the
record. The record reference given in Appellant’s Brief in support of their
“response” to Finding 20 deals with the transfer of the Lincoln Investments
account, which is not the subject matter of the finding.
Scott testified that a week prior to giving testimony on September 16, 2013,
he became aware that during the 1st quarter of 2010, he received mileage checks
totaling $150, and that Lea should receive 50% of that amount. (RR 5:140)
Findings 22, 23 & 24 – Oklahoma Property
The evidence concerning a deed to the Oklahoma property was not
conflicting, as Lea asserts; on any of the 5 days of trial, she could not produce a
copy of a deed that she had sent to Scott for signature. (RR 3:102-103) Lea
further admitted that she “had no idea” whether she checked into the deed issue
58
before filing suit about it. Id. Scott agrees that Lea did not send a deed for Scott’s
signature until after the litigation had started, on May 3, 2012.
Findings 25, 26, & 27 – Lincoln Investment
Lea has taken the position that the attempts and difficulties experienced in
transferring her portion of the Lincoln Investment account are “irrelevant”;
however, Lea did not object as to relevance to ANY of the questions asked of her,
of Scott, or of Ross concerning these items, so the objection would be waived.
Moreover, the individual Lea hired to review the transfer of these funds approved
Ross’ calculations of the division. (RR 4:79). The fact that Lea delayed in
providing an account into which assets should be transferred is undisputed. Scott
and Ross tried for nearly 2 years to receive the information from her (RR 4:81),
and she did not complain about any of the calculations until August, 2012. (See
PE 19).
Lea testified that: (i) she hired Allen Weiner, a third party, to assist with
dividing the Lincoln account (RR 3:81); (ii) she refused to sign documents that
would have transferred her share of the Lincoln account to her (RR 3:78); (iii) she
“had no idea” that the funds could not be transferred to her without her providing
account information (RR 3:85); (iv) she – finally – admitted that she did not
provide an account into which her share could be transferred until August, 2012
(RR 3:85), (v) she was no longer pursuing a claim against Scott related to the
59
Lincoln account (RR 3:86), and (vi) she had “no idea” how much money Scott had
spent on lawyers dealing with that issue (RR 3:87).
Lea has not cited any evidence of the “more accurate percentage” for which
she was hoping by filing suit.
Findings 28 & 29 – Reasonable Inquiry
Scott has reviewed evidence in support of these findings, above, in Section
I.B., and disagrees that these findings are not the basis for sanctions. See Scott &
White, 940 S.W.2d at 596 (Tex. 1996).
CONCLUSION
Lea’s suit was frivolous and brought in bad faith because she did not make
adequate inquiry into the facts prior to filing, and even after she learned that the
facts may not be as she believed, she and her lawyer continued to pursue a trial
regarding Lea’s spurious claims. The Sanctions Order and the Findings of Fact are
sufficiently specific to support sanctions. Sufficient evidence exists to support the
Findings of Fact, the sanctions ordered, and the entry of a take nothing judgment
denying Lea’s claims. For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be
AFFIRMED.
60
Respectfully submitted,
FLOWERS & FRANKFORT,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
By: /s/ Todd Frankfort
TODD FRANKFORT
State Bar No. 00790711
RICHARD L. FLOWERS, JR.
State Bar Number 07180500
5020 Montrose Boulevard, Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone 713/654-1415
Facsimile 713/654-9898
Email rflowers@rflowerslaw.com
Service Email: Service@rflowerslaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR SCOTT SUTTON
MCLAURIN, APPELLEE
Appendices
Appendix 1 – Respondent’s Exhibit 32
Appendix 2 – Respondent’s Exhibit 37-A (as so designated herein)
Appendix 3 – Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
61
TRAP 9.4(i)(3) Certification
I certify that (i) the foregoing is a computer generated document, (ii) I am
relying upon the word count of the computer program used to prepare the
document, and (iii) that the document contains 11,827 words.
/s/ Todd Frankfort
Todd Frankfort
62
Certificate Of Service
I hereby certify that on this the 12th day of August, 2015, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Appellee’s Brief was served in accordance with Rule 9.5 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on the following party’s attorney of record
by e-service:
/s/ Todd Frankfort
Todd Frankfort
63
LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD L. FLOWERS, JR.
·'
5020 Montrose, Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77006
Telephone (713) 654-1415
Facsimile (713) 654-9898
June 21, 2011
Mr. Daniel J. Lemkuil (Via Facsimile 713/225-0099)
The Law Office of Daniel J. Lemkuil
1314 Texas Avenue, Suite 1515
Houston, Texas 77002
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES AND ADMISSBLE ONLY ON THE ISSUE OF
ATTORNEYS FEES
Re: No. 2009-06775; In the Matter of the Marriage of Lea Percy Mclaurin and Scott
Sutton Mclaurin and In the Interest of Christopher Mclaurin, a Minor Child; In
the 31ih Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas
Dear Mr. Lemkuil:
I have called your office several times to discuss closing this case. I have not
heard back from you.
This is another effort at resolving this matter and to m1mm1ze the time and
unnecessary expenses accruing in concluding this matter. I am confident that if you'll
call me back we can coordinate an agreeable date and time to exchange the following
documents and other things necessary to end this.
Outstanding issues as per your February 1, 2011 letter:
1. Scott will exchange the diamond given to Lea by Patrick Brannan for his
Rolex watch.
2. Scott does not have any coins belonging to Lea or Christopher;
3. Scott will execute a quitclaim deed for the Oklahoma property if you provide
one;
4. Scott doesn't have the First Colony life insurance policy number 5164362;
5. Scott's financial advisor, Ross Mclaurin, had been working with Lea's
financial advisor, Allen Weiner, to transfer Lea's share of the Lincoln account
ending 0305. That effort apparently broke down when Lea refused to provide
information for an account where she wants her share of the Lincoln account
g; EXHIBIT
~
i fl-.~2
1\ ~ _ r'\ - ·- • - I I I ___ I . . . I
lVII. UdiiiC"I J . Lt;l I 11\ LIII
.J une 21, 2011
Page I2
assets transferred . Ross is under the impression he had provided all
documentation 1\tlr. \J\Jeiner requested . If you 'll provide the account
information, Ross will transfer the assets . If you need additional
documentation on this account let me know what you want and I'll do my best
to provide it.
6. Scott has executed forms Bucky Allshouse sent for transferring the savings
bonds. Copies of those documents were sent to Mr. Allshouse . If you want
Scott to sign different forms, please provide the completed forms and we'll
exchange them for Scott's bonds that Lea has and similar transfer documents
signed by Lea .
7 . Scott does not have any keys to Lea's Lexus GX4 70;
8. Bonus/reimbursement Documents reflecting · Scott's bonuses and
reimbursements were previously provided and additional copies are attached
for your convenience. Scott received no reimbursements during the period in
question.
On May 28, 2010 Scott received a bonus from GHA in the amount of
$12,648.31. I understand that on the date the divorce decree was entered
Lea received a $6,877.47 check, which is $553.32 more than half of the
bonus . She was reportedly upset that day about the amount of the check.
However, she accepted and negotiated the check.
Scott's now aware of the overpayment. Scott offers to allow Lea to let keep
the overpayment if that ends this matter. If that's not agreeable, Lea owes
Scott $553 .32 .
9. Scott doesn't have a document listing the contents of the safe deposit boxes
at BBVA Compass or Wells Fargo Bank as of September 3, 2010;
10. Scott has previously offered to make the Christmas ornaments, Gibson
plates, and stuffed animals available for Lea to pick up but she never
arranged to do so . Let us know when she wants to do that.
11 . We will also arrange to have the family photographs and videos delivered to a
commercial copying service for duplication . Let us know which service Lea
wants to use . Each party is responsible for half of the copying charges.
12. Finally, page 12 of the AID states the amount Scott received for his 2009 tax
refund : $31,943 .00 . Lea was provided with a copy of the U.S. Treasury
Department refund check. Lea received a check for $16,000.00 when the
decree was entered. The amount owed is a sum certain and Lea accepted
the check. It's outside the scope of discovery to request Scott's tax return.
IVIr. Oan1e1 J. LemKUII
Page I3
However, in a further effort to settle this matter Scott offers to provide a copy
of his tax return in exchange for a copy of Lea's. If she received a refund she
never disclosed such to Scott. Again, he's willing to let that go it we can end
this.
I hope you'll view this as I do - a simple matter of coordinating the exchange of
property. Thank you for your assistance in wrapping this up. I look forward to hearing
from you soon.
LCB:dmh
Enclosure
cc: ScottS. Mclaurin, M.D.
LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD L. FLOVVERS, JR.
5020 Montrose, Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77005
Telephone (713) 554-1415
Facsimile (713) 554-9898
May 25, 2J 42
!v1r. Da:-tiel J. Lemkuii (Via Facsimile r 3!225-0:J99)
The Law Office of Daniel J. Lemk~il
1314 Texas Avenue, Suite 1515
Houston, Texas 77002
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES AND ADMISSIBLE ONLY ON THE ISSUE OF
ATTORNEYS FEES
Re: No . 2009-06775; In the Matter of the Marriage of Lea Percy Mclaurin and Scott
Sutton Mclaurin and In the Interest of C~ristop~er Mclaurin, a Minor Child ; In
the 3~ih Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas
Dear Mr. Lemkuil:
Here's another attempt at settlement.
Outstandinq issues as per your Feb;uary 1. 2011 letter:
1. Lea has returned Scott's Rolex watch .
2 . We received the partial diar71o:-td appraisa ~ report you sent. The report
describes a 2 carat stone. I've never seen the stone, but reportediy :t does
not appear to be 2 carats . Scott thinks t.,e :epor. may describe the
engagement ring he gave Lea. In .any event, S::;ot will take the stone a no the
repor: you se:1t to the store Lea p~oposed - Rei :~ er's Fine Jewelry, 221 0
Vvestheimer Houston, TX 77098. lf he has the stone des::;ribed in the report,
I'll have the stone del:verec:i to your office. If not, we oug ht ~o have the stone
in Lea's engagement ring co:npared to the report. Othervvise, if Sco:t does
not have the stone descri::>ed in t1e report tell me how you want to handle.
3. Scott does not have any coins belonging to Lea or Christopher.
4. Please e:!it the quitc!air.l deej for the Ok~ahoma p;-operty yo ~ previously
p:-ovided to in~ l ude the fo 'iov\•ing language: "For the Co:~sideratio:~ , G rar:tor
quit::;laims to Grantee ai: of G ~antor' s rig~t . :itle, anc ::1terest in anci :c t~e
p:-operty, if a:-1y, to have a:1d to hold to Grantee and Gran:ee's heirs,
successors, and assig;,s 7orever. Neither Grantor nor Grantor's heirs ,
successors, or assigns will have, c aim, Oi :lema:ld any :-ight or titie to the
lk. Da1ie' ~. ~eiKw i!
May 25, 2: ~ 2
Pa~e . 2
p-~oe::}' or a:1y par. :>~ it". S..J:,je:: to hat change being 1ade, Sco:t wili s igl
a o.1i~claim deed .
5 Scott ooss~/t have t~e First Coiony iife i'lsu:-a:~:e p:>licy nurlbei 5 ~ 54352. rle
does ·'lot :~ave t'le "::,:>ok" ~'OU Jesc-ibeo i :~ our ias: telephone· cal:.
6 We've :Yc:>:r.Jced all tne statemen~s for the Li;,co!:: accou1t yo:.: reJJeste::: . is
his iss:.Je reso ~ved? If so, the assets wil ' be t-a'lsfe:-red to a 1 a:c::>:.J'l: Lea
des1~nates . 8:.J: to do that she wil 1ave to ;xovide us he acc::;,unt
info'Tlati::w.. l7 there's still a problem, what is it?
7. Lea delivered Scott's savi;,gs bonds. Encbsed are the f:Jiiy executed forms
yo:J sent Do we have any remaining issues on the savings bo:~ds?
8. Scott does ;,ot have any keys to Lea's Lexus GX470;
9. Reimbursement - All reimbursements have been accou:1ted fo:. Scott
received no reimbursements foliowing mediation. What reimb.Jrseme:~t issue
remains?
10. Bonus - Lea has :eceived her share of the bonus . All the bon:Js money
received was accounted for and shared. If there's still an iss:Je aboJt bon us
money, what is it?
11. As furthe: discussed below, the mo:Jt1~y draw that had been skipped bec3 use
o~Scott's iow production followin~ his bike wreck but paid afte~ mediation has
bee:-t disciosed. A cashier's check for ~ea's share was tendered at Steven
Jahn's depost:ion. You ::leclineo :o accept it. Let :ne k:1ow if your clier.t wa1:s
it
'i 2. Scott doesr. ·: have a documer.t iis:ing t:Je contents of the safe deposi: boxes
a: BBVA Compass o:- Wells Fargo Bank as of September 3, 2010;
~ 3. Lea picked up t~e ChristMas o ~na m e .'l ts, Gibson plates, and stL.:~ed ani;na !s
c:vai:able . is :here any reMaini ng issue here?
',4 . Let me know whicr. service Lea wa:1ts to use to ~opy :he fa:niiy p~ob;; :-ap h s
c:nci videos.
~ 5. Lea has ~ece ' ved he: s~a~e of he 20)9 hco:-ne tax re~..:nd.
At:o-nev's Fees
This case should have never bee l ~i 1 ed . Scott peio:-:-neo a:-td/or :e1oe;ed ft..t
perfo:mance foliowing e:;t-y of tne dec~ee. ~ ea re~used to perfo:-:7~ a::y par. of her
!vi~ . :)anie: .J. Le'TlKJi'
!Jiay 25 , 20i 2
Page 13
ojiigat1o:s. S~e ::>enie: havi:-1;; Scott's Roiex unti i the j::y it was oel !vereQ She·s
de'lied havi:"lg the savings b:m:is t:-1a: a``;\,e:::J wit" the wat:::~ . She's ::>ee ~ n ::>rea:::- alJ
can ha-d!y co -n;:> lair a:>ou: a breach ever if :here was o'le .
if there was a ? ~oble:-n , Lea faile:J ~o send a w:-itte:-1 der11a:rd prior to fi lhg t:1is
b:-each of :::or.t:-act case a:-1d th:Js :::annot ~ecover a :m~;,ey · s fees . -:-e>~ Civ. ?ra:::. Rem.
Code §38 .::10 1, et seq. Yo:.; co:J id ~ave ever: calied me. instead Lea jus: filed t1ls
lawsuit.
~ ea told Scot (though the mediator) a: the final mediation that :1e was getting a
bonus . Lea has he ~ share of that bonus. T:-:rough investigating that claim I came to
iearn that i'l addition to a b:nus , Scott also :eceived a mo:-1th!y d;-aw whi:::h had beer.
withheld due to his lack of production following his November 25 , 20::19 cycling accide :~t.
I did not know prior to investigating that claim that the draw had even ~eer. withneld .
As soar: as I sorted through w~at had happened, I re;:>orted it to you . No later
tha:l the day Steve~ Jahn was deposed the details of :h a~ were discl:::lsed and Lea's
s~are of the m:::>'ley te;,dered. That shoulc have bee~ the end of this.
Despite that effort t1is iawsuit co:ltin:Jed . Another deposition was taken. We've
bee:-~ breed to prepare for final trial and eve1 attended a p:-etrlal confere:1ce . Sco:t's
fees prior to writing this letter exceed $35 ,0:>0
Scott o~ght to try this case and iet J:Jdge Dean decde wh:::>'s in breach . Instead ,
once again he offers to resolve t~i s entire matter and move forward .
If this case is settie::i immediately, Sco~t wili waive recovery of his attorney's fees
:Jpon receipt o7 p :oo ~ Lea has deposited $ ~ J ,OOCJ ir.to Ch~isto:>he :-'s 529 Plan.
There's usual'y 'lO poi::t to deadlines on settle;.,ent proposals . So :·t: say only
that this offer can be wit1drawn a: any '.:ine. Le:'s end this.
Very trJ~Y yo;.rs,
Richard L. Fiowe:-s , J".
R.LF:dr:lh
C.ncios:J:-es
c:: S:;::>t: S. fvi c L au ~i n * rV. .D.
CAUSE NO. 2009-06775
IN THE MATTER OF § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE MARRIAGE OF §
§
LEA PERCY MCLAURIN §
AND §
SCOTT SUTTON MCLAURIN § HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§
AND IN THE INTEREST OF §
CHRISTOPHER MCLAURIN, §
A MINOR CHILD § 309rh JUDICIAL DISTRICT
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Comt.:s Now Respondent/Countt.:r-Penciont.:t, Scott Sutton i\Ic.Launn ("Scort'' or
"Respondent"), and subnuts the followmg Proposed Findmgs of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. lf any statement dus documenr listed as a finding of bet IS actually a conclusion of law,
10 It
will be considered as :~ conclusJOn of law If anv statement in this document ll~reJ as ::1
concluston of law 1s actually a findmg of fact tt wtll com1dered a flndmg of fact.
2. Scott was marned to Lea Perc~· :\IcLaunn (''Lea" or "PecitJOner"), and on September 3, 2fll 0,
that marri::~ge was chssokcd by Final Decree <.)f DiYotce ("Decree"), which mcorporated an
.r\grcemcnt Incident to Di,·nrce, wluch w::~s also ("Xecuted on September 3, 2010 (":\lD")
3. In \larch, 2011, Lea filed a l\locion to Enforce Final Decree of D1,·orce and :\brrecment
lnCJdent to Dn·orce (the "Enforcement"). Ill which ~he·
• Sought ro enforce the pro,·islon of the Decree and ;\ ID, awarcLng Lea the
diamond gJ"I:'n to -..vtfe by Parnck Brannan, \Vhtch was located in a safe depostt
box at Chase Bank, Medical Center locanon,
• Sought to enforce the prm·ision of the Decree and :\10, a\vardll1g Lea the coms
belongmg ro Lt.:a or Chnstopher :--fcl.aurm, \\'htch \Vas located m a safe deposit
box at Chase Bank, .tvfed1eal Center location;
• Sought to enforce the p10v1s1on of the Decree and.:\ ID, awardmg Lea certarn 1e:tl
property loc::~tcd 111 Pa~·nc County, Oklahoma;
• Sought to enforce the provlSlon of the Decree and :\ID, aw:nd111g Lea the F1tst
Colony L.tfc Insurance Poltcy No. 5164362;
• Sought 10 enforce the pronston of the Decree and AID, a\vardmg ] .ea a poruon
of the Lincoln I m-e:;tmenrs account endmg 111 0305,
McLmnn l" i\1cLmn11- Propo:;ed Fmclmgs of Fact and Condu,1ons of La••
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• Sought to enforce the prm·is10n of the Decree and A lD, awarding Lea cerram
United Stales S:n·ings Bonds, 111 Scort 's possession;
• Sought to enforce the prO\·ision of the Decree and AID, awardwg Lea a ~006
Lcxus GX4 70,
• Sought to enforce the provision of the Decree and AID, awardmg Lea "fifty
percent (50'%) net of taxes of ANY bonuses or reunbursemcnts rccervcd br
Hu~band through i\plil30, 2010";
• Sought to enforce the provision of rhc Decree and AID, awardmg Lea the
contents of the safe deposit boxes at BBV i\ Compass and \X' dis Fargo Bank,
• Sought to enforce the prm·ision of the Decree and A 10, awardmg Lea \·arious
Chnstrnas ornaments, Gibson plate~, stuffed animals, and f:uruly photographs and
vtdeos (collectively, the "Personal Property");
• Brought a cause of action for conversiOn against Scott; and
• Sought recm-ery oi her attorney's fee~.
4. On November 9. 2012, Lea se.rYed on Scott\ counsel of record a rust I\ mended 1\.fotion to
Enforce Fmal Decree of D1n>rce and :\greement Inctdem to OiYorce (the "1 '' :\mended
Enforcement"), in wluch she restated the :tllegation~ conramed tn the Enforcement
5. On r>.hrch 6, 2013, Lea sen·ed upon Scott's counsel her Second Amended Mouon ro Enforce
Final Decree of Di\·orce and ;\grcement lnctdem to Dt\·orce ("2 ·" :\mended Enforcement"),
tn whtch she abandoned all pr10r allegatwns, l=<".XCEPT for tho~e in whtch she.
• Sought to enf01cc the prO\·ision of the Decree and :\10, awardmg Lea Lhe
diamond g1ven ro wife by Patrick Brannan, wluch \\·as located 111 a :;;afc depos1r
box at Chase Bank, i\fcdtcal Center locanon;
• Sought to enforce the prO\·isinn of the Decree and :\ID. awarding Lea certam
lfmted States Sannb~ Bonds, 111 Scott's pos~ession;
• Sought to enforce the prO\'ISion of the Decree anJ AID, awarding Lea "fifl~·
percent (Sll~'o) net of taxes of ANY bonuses or retmburscmenr:, tcccrnd b\·
Husband through Apnl 30, 20 I 0":
• Brought a cause of acnon for conYerston agamst Scott; and
• Sought reCl1\'ery of her attorney's fees
6. On i\farcb 1 H, 2013, l.xa serYed upon Scott's counsel her Thud :\mended ,\lotion to Enforce
Fmal Decree of Di,·orce and Agreement lnctdenr to Ot\·orce ("3rd Amended Enforcemcm"),
111 which she restaled those alkganons cont:uned 111 the 2"J :\mended Enforcement.
7 On \larch 27, 2013, Lea ~etYed upon Scort's counsel he1 Fourth _\mended i\1otJOn to
Enforce Ftnal Decree of Di\·orce and Agreement lncident to Dn·orce ("4'" .\mended
Enforcement"), in which she abandoned all pnor allegauons, EXCEPT for those m which
she:
• Sought to enforce the pro\·tston of rhe Deetee and :\ ID, awardmg Lea the.:
diamond gn·en to wife by Patnck Brannan. wlllch was located 111 a safe depostt
box at Chase Bank, \·kdical Center locauon,
• Sought to enforce the proYtston of the Decree and ...-\JD, awardtng l.<:a "fifty
percent (SO~'o) net of taxes of ;\~Y bemuse:> or reimbursements received by
,\fcLmn11 t' }/.J.....;;,m'n- Proposed FHlthngs of F:tct and Conclus10n:: <)fLaw Pc~ge 2 of S
35
Husband through April 30, ~01 0"; and
• Brought a cause of action for cotwer~lon a!:,ratnst Scott.
8. fn response to Lea's claims in the Enfotcemenr, the :\mended Enforcemenr, rhe 2"'1
1
_-\mended Enforcement. 3" .-\mended Enforcement and 4' 11 Amended Enforcement on !vb\·
13, 20B, Scott filed a Second .Amended \lon~n f01 Sanctions for Bad hu:h rthng
("Sancnons Motion"), seeking recovery of Ius attorney's fees, courr costs, and linganon
expenses, JOmtly and seYcrally from Lea and from Lea'~ counsd of record, Daniel Lcmkutl
("Lemkwl").
9. All issues were heard and ruled upon by the Coun
I0. On 7\farch 3, 2014, the Court 1ssued Its rcndnwn in this matter iJy wnrten letter addressed to
both attorneys of record for the parties
Savil(g.r Bondi
11 Lea's pnor counsel prepared and forwarded to Scort's counsel an Asstgment of Interest,
transfernng certain Umted Stares Savmgs Bonds to Lea, and on or about September 8, 2010,
Scott exccut<:d such .Asstgnment of Inrere~t, and returned It to Lea's counsel.
12. On or about October 28, 20 I U, Scott, by and through Ius counsel of recotd, pronded a
"corrected" Assignment of Interest transfernng such Umtcd States Sa,·ings Bonds to Lea.
wluch he had executed, to Lea's counsel of record, for Lea's cxecutwn, and Lea refused to
execute such ;\sstgnmcnt of I nrere~t.
13. On or about i\farch 8, 2013, while the ltugation \\·as pending, LemkuJ.l pronded a new form
of an assi,gnment of interest in !iuch Unttcd States Sa\·ings Bond:;. Scott executed the new
asstgnmenr of mterest prior to ttlal
Diamond & CoJ/1.1
14. Pnor to the imnarion of th1s lawsutt, Scott auempted to exchange rhc d1amond and coins (if
any) wluch had been located in lhe safe deposn box at Chase Bank, .).·fed.tcal Center locauun
u1 Scort's name for the Rolcx watch, wh1ch was awarded to him pursuam to the Decree and
AID; howc,·er, Lea refused to cooperate in c~:changmg such ttem!i.
15. On or around November 7, 2012, Scott tendered to Lea, b) ddin·rv lO her atwmcy, the
illamond referenced in Lea's plead1ngs.
Pe1:ronal Pmprrry
16. Pnor to the llltnation of rh1s l:nvsuit, Scort packaged the Chnst nus mnaments. the Gibson
plates, and the stuffed ammals, and made them available to Lea
17. Lea made no attempt to rake posscsston of the Chnstmas ornaments, the Gibson plates, or
the stuffed ammals after Scott made them available.
:Hd....:nmn v. :\J,LJUr:n- Proposed Fmillngs of F,1.:t and Conc!ustoi~:i oi Law Page 3 of 5
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17. Lea made no attempt 10 take pos:,cssion of rhc Christmas ornaments, the Gibson plates, or
rhe stuffed arumals after Scott made them aY:ulable.
18. _-\fter the i.tuuauon of thi::: lawsuit, Lea retrieved some of the Personal Property from Scott's
counsel's ofl:ice.
19. The AID stares that Scott shall make rhe family photographs and \·ideos m·auable to Lea so
that she may duplic:!te them; howe\·cr as of her filmg of this lmgation, Lee had not requested
the phorographs or vrdeos for duplicatron
Boll/IS rlmds
20. Pnor to m1Uatmg rhis hugation for performance of rhc.: contt::tct for performance of rhe
contract or payment of any alleged momcs due and owmg, neither Lea nor her attorney of
record may demand upon Scott, upon h1s attorney of record, or upon anv other duly
authorized agent for performance or payment.
21. Pnor to entry of the Decree, Scott paid all sums owed to Lea a~ a result of the provis10n of
the Decree and _-\ID awarding Lea "fifty percent (50%) net of taxes of :\NY bonuses or
reimbursements recei\Tcd by Husband thtough _r\pru 30, 201 0."
Oklaboma Proper()'
22. Pnor to miuanng this iltigauon for performance of the contract as 1t relates to rhc re:~l
property in Payne Count:.', Oklahoma, Lea did not present any conveyance document to Scott
for execution.
23 On or about ~lay 3, 2012, Lemkml forwarded to :.'->cott's counsel :1 Qwtcl:um Deed,
tramfcrring the real property located 10 Pain County, Oklahoma, and asked that Scott execute
such Qwtclaim Deed.
24. Scott executed the Qwtcl:um Deed, and returned It ro Lcmkuu.
U11rol11 lm.'fslmmiJ Aal. j\1o. 0305
~5. Prior to Lea 1111Uaung this lrugauon, Scou made numerous ,utcmph ro transfer Lea's port10n
of Lmco\n Investments account no. 0305 (the "Lincoln ,\ccount") to her.
26. Lee continually refused to supply- Scott, h1s fi.n:mCJal aJ,·i:::or, or her own finane1al adnsor
\\·ith the mform:ltlon tcquired to enable Scclft to transfer her pornon of the Lmcoln :\ccount
to her
27. In Nm·ember, 2011, after the unnecessary expcndnure of attorney's fees, Lea proY1c.led the
requtred mformanon to enable the transfer of her pottlon of the Lincoln Account. and the
transfer was completed
.\-f.!.Am'!lll'..H.-i..Liunn- Propo;ed Fmding> of Fact :1:1d Conclusion:; ot L:m Page 4 oi 5
37
Lf4 by``)'(}u`` her a.\Wr ne y '1A..tcPzr1
28. "Jififiiiliijf f:nled to make rea::.onablc mguiry into the facts smroundmg the alleganons con tamed
ill rhe Enforcement. the "\mended Enforcement, the 2"J :\mended Enforcement, the 3'J
.\mended Enforcement, or the 4'h ;\mended Enforcement, prior to fihng each such pleading. CJ
leA's ~(.ote.nt'/fttrouj-4 ~rr~eyo+r~Q)rz;( . Jqjj)/
29 ..After the facts surroundtngU~ failure to make reasonable inquiry were brought to``
@ attennon 111 a meeting with Scotr's attorney of res;ord, 1-w co.ntmued to~
~fur~ue.u-h"'"iA...L~&t'~ Leq~ ··-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
·~..``
C()ll
1. The Court has JUrischction of all parues and the subJeCt matter of this sun.
2. The amended plcadmgs of the parties upon whiCh 1he case was tned are m due form and
contained aU the allcgauons and information reglllred by law
3. Lea proceeded to mal wnh the 4'" Amended Enforcement as her ''live" plc:~dmg.
4. The attorney fees incmred by Lea in th1s matrer were both reasonable and necessary.
5. The atwmey fees incurred by Scotr in this matter were both reasonable and necessar).
6. The Court, h:n·i.ng considered the aboYe Fmdings of Fact, demcd the relief sought 111 the 4'h
Amended Enforcemcnr.
7. The Court, hanng constdered the abon: Findings of Fact, granted the rellef sought 111 rhe
Sanctions 1\-louon, and granted attorney's fcc~ in the amounr of SS2.378.88 agamst Lea
8. On J\prll 8, 2014, the Court entered a "Fmal Judr:,rrnent on Lea Percy \IcL:lllnn's \lotion to
Enforce and Scott Sutton 1\-lcL:wnn's l\·lcmon for Sancuons d Bad Farrtl -·
1/ltJ/XJ;?
RECORDER'S MEMORANDUM
This lnslrumant Is r:A poor quallly
at the lime of inaging
:\f,Lmmn v Md..-aunn- Propo~ed f-md:ngs oi Fact and CvndusJOns of 1.:1\\ Page 5 of j
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