Pamela Mehl v. David Stern ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00697-CV
6167008
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
7/21/2015 11:17:34 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-14-00697-CV
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
In The Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS
For The Third Court of Appeals District 7/21/2015 11:17:34 PM
Austin, Texas JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
PAMELA MEHL,
Appellant
v.
DAVID STERN,
Appellee
ON APPEAL FROM THE 250TH DISTRICT COURT
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-002071
BRIEF OF APPELLEE DAVID STERN
Brent A. Devere (Lead Counsel)
Attorney at Law
SBN 00789256
1411 West Avenue, Suite #200
Austin, Texas 78701
Tel: 512-457-8080
Fax: 512-457-8060
Email: BDevere@1411west.com
Counsel for Appellee David Stern
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………....................iii-iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE………………………………………………1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT……………..................2
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………..3-4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT……………………………..................5-6
ARGUMENT……………………………………………………...................6
A. The restricted appeal should be dismissed in light of the
fact that Mehl filed a motion for new trial
in the district court……………………………………………........6-8
B. Venue was established in Travis County as a matter of law
and therefore does not constitute error
apparent on the face of the record…………………………………8-9
C. Judgment for Rescission of the original conveyance
is not error………………………………………………………...9-12
D. Judgment for $20,000.00 damages is not error……………………12-13
E. Double recovery for rescission and damages is not error…………13-14
F. Judgment for attorneys’ fees is not error……………………….....14
G. Failure to join IndyMac is not error…………………………….....15
H. Three day notice required for receiver is not applicable…………..16
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER………………………………………….....17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE………………………………………………19
i
APPENDIX
A. Judgment (CR. 15-26)……………………………………………TAB A
B. Motion for New Trial (CR. 32-33)……………………………….TAB B
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique,
134 S.W.3d 845(Tex. 2004)………………………………………………..6
Champion v. Estlow,
456 S.W.3d 363, 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. filed)……………….8
Cooper v. Hamilton County,
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 30, 2014,
pet. denied)………………………………………………………………....15
Glenn v. Lucas,
376 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.)……………..........11
Goldman v. Olmstead,
414 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied)………..................13
Grynberg v. Christiansen,
727 S.W.2d 665, (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ)……………………...15
McGoodwin v. McGoodwin,
671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984)……………………………………………….12
Scott v. Gallagher,
209 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)………….9
Scott v. Sebree,
986 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)………………......14
Scott v. Wichita County,
248 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)………….9
TAC v. Boothe,
94 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)…………………….......6
Taylor v. State
293 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)……………………….6
iii
Walton v. First Nat'l Bank of Trenton,
956 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. denied)……………..11
RULES / STATUTES
Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1)…………………………………………………………7-8
Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4)………………………………………………………....7-8
Tex. R. Civ. P. 86(1)……………………………………………………………..8-9
Tex. R. Civ. P. 695……………………………………………………………….16
Tex. R. Civ. P. 39………………………………………………………………...15
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §105.003…………………………………………………..6
iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This case is a restricted appeal in connection with
a default judgment obtained by Appellee Stern.
Trial Judge: The Honorable Jon Wisser
250th Judicial District Court
of Travis County, Texas
Course of Proceedings: David Stern, Appellee, filed suit against Pamela
Mehl, Appellant, primarily to seek rescission of a
50% real estate property conveyance that was
originally made pursuant to a property settlement
agreement (CR 3-12).
Stern further sought monetary damages, and the
appointment of a receiver (CR 3-12). Stern’s
Original Petition was the live pleading in this case
(CR 3-12).
Mehl was properly served at the office of her
attorney (CR 13-14). Stern subsequently obtained
a default judgment against Mehl (CR 15-26).
Mehl filed a motion for new trial in the trial court
but failed to pursue said motion (CR 32-33).
Trial Court Disposition: The trial court granted a default judgment for Stern
(CR 15-26).
Mehl subsequently pursued this restricted appeal
notwithstanding the fact that she also filed a
motion for new trial in the trial court (CR 32-33
and CR 34-60).
1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Stern does not seek oral argument in this appeal.
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Stern filed Plaintiff’s Original Petition in the Travis County District Court
on June 26, 2014 (CR 3-12). The primary basis of the lawsuit was to rescind a real
estate conveyance of Stern’s 50% interest to Mehl after Mehl defaulted on the
preexisting third party mortgage (CR 3-12). Stern primarily sought rescission of
the conveyance in his capacity as a creditor pursuant to a vendor’s lien as well as
under a breach of contract claim (CR 3-12). Stern further sought monetary
damages in connection with the arrears as well as damages to his credit (CR 3-12).
Finally, Stern sought the appointment of a receiver primarily to protect the
property from the underlying lienholder (CR 3-12).
On July 3, 2014, Stern served Mehl in person with a citation and a copy of
the lawsuit at the office of an attorney (CR 13-14). Moreover, the process server
filed an affidavit of service with the court on July 8, 2014 (CR 14).
Stern did not dispute that the subject real property is located in Williamson
County. However, Stern alleged several theories in Plaintiff’s Original Petition in
support of Travis County as the appropriate venue, and Stern incorporates
Plaintiff’s Original Petition in this regard (CR 3-12).
3
Mehl failed to timely file an answer in the lawsuit and further failed to
timely object to the venue of the lawsuit (CR 2).
On July 29, 2014, the Travis County District Court formally entered a
default judgment against Mehl in favor of Stern. For the purposes of brevity, Stern
incorporates the judgment of July 29, 2014 and all resulting relief (CR 15-26).
Stern filed supporting documents in support of the default judgment (CR 27-
29). Stern further filed an Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees (Supp. CR 15-17). Stern
also filed a Non-Military Affidavit and Certificate of Last Known Address (Supp.
CR 18-21 and Supp. CR 13-14).
On or about October 13, 2014 Mehl file a Motion for New Trial in Travis
County District Court (CR. 32-33). However, Mehl failed to pursue the matter.
On or about November 4, 2014, Mehl filed a restricted appeal in this cause
(CR. 34-60).
4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The fact that Mehl filed an arguable timely motion for new trial in the Travis
County District Court precludes her from also pursuing a restricted appeal (CR 32-
33). Mehl subsequently abandoned the motion for new trial instead of scheduling
it for a hearing with the trial court.
There is no error apparent on the face of the record in so much as 1) Mehl
has not alleged any defect whatsoever in the service of process, 2) Mehl waived
any challenge to venue and 3) all the relief in the judgment is supported by the
clerk’s record.
The clerk’s record contains considerable evidence in support of the
judgment, including a copy of the warranty deed which recites the obligations of
Mehl to assume the underlying mortgage on the subject property. There is further
written evidence of the many delinquent payments on the underlying mortgage by
Mehl, all of which support the rescission and damages that are the basis of the
judgment. Finally, the record contains an affidavit of attorneys’ fees.
5
Moreover, contrary to the assertions of Mehl, there is no requirement of a
reporter’s record in a no answer default judgment hearing (as opposed to a post
answer default hearing). Taylor v. State, 293 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tex. App.—Austin
2009, no pet.). Furthermore, this case is not a family law case that might require a
reporter record under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §105.003.
ARGUMENT
A. The restricted appeal should be dismissed in light of the fact that
Mehl filed a timely motion for new trial in the district court.
The requirements for a restricted appeal are the following: 1) A notice of
restricted appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment is signed; 2)
The notice is filed by a party to the lawsuit; 3) The party did not participate in the
hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and the party did not file a
timely post-judgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law; and 4) Error must be apparent on the face of the record. Alexander v. Lynda’s
Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004) and TAC v. Boothe, 94 S.W.3d 315
(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
6
The record is clear that the trial court entered a default judgment on July 29,
2014 (CR 15-26). However, on October 13, 2014, Mehl filed a Motion for New
Trial in the trial court (CR 32-33).
Although the deadline for a motion for new trial is typically thirty days after
the entry of judgment, both Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4)
extend the deadline for a motion for new trial if the defendant does not receive
actual or constructive notice of the judgment within twenty days of the entry of
judgment. Instead, under such circumstances the time period for the motion for
new trial deadline begins when the defendant first acquired actual knowledge of
the default judgment and not later than ninety days after entry of the judgment.
Mehl admits in Appellant’s Brief that she never received the notice of
judgment from the district clerk and that she first became aware of the default
judgment in October, 2014 (Appellants Brief, Page 11, paragraphs #13 and #14).
Therefore, by her own admission, the motion for new trial was timely filed
since it was filed on or about October 13, 2014, well within 30 days of when Mehl
supposedly first became aware of the judgment in October of 2014, and less than
90 days after the date of judgment (CR 32-33). Under such circumstances, Mehl’s
7
motion for a new trial was timely filed and she could have pursued relief from the
trial court under both Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(4).
Consequently, Mehl should not be able to pursue this restricted appeal.
B. Venue was established in Travis County as a matter of law and does
not constitute error apparent on the face of the record.
Mehl argues at length that Travis County was an improper venue for the
underlying proceeding, including the appointment of the receiver, in light of the
fact that Williamson County is the mandatory venue. Therefore, according to
Mehl, the filing of the lawsuit in Travis County constitutes reversible error
apparent on the face of the record.
However, the law is clear that venue is waived if a defendant fails to timely
object in the trial court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 86(1) establishes the procedure for
objecting to venue and also clearly states that a failure to timely object is a waiver
of venue. Champion v. Estlow, 456 S.W.3d 363, 364-365 (Tex. App.—Austin
2015, pet. filed).
8
Several courts have confirmed that even mandatory venue is waived if a
party fails to timely object under Tex. R. Civ.P. 86(1). Scott v. Wichita County,
248 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) and Scott v.
Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
Moreover, both courts have confirmed that venue is not jurisdictional and is
waived by a defendant who fails to timely object to venue.
In short, venue, including mandatory venue, is not jurisdictional. The failure
of Mehl to timely file an objection to venue prior to the judgment date constituted a
waiver of venue. Therefore, the district court correctly acquired venue in Travis
County as a matter of law when it entered a default judgment in this proceeding.
C. Judgment for rescission is supported by the record
One of the key aspects of the underlying judgment was the rescission of
the original 50% land conveyance from Stern to Mehl in light of Mehl’s failure to
tender the required payments to the underlying mortgagee.
9
The judgment itself incorporates the original warranty deed as an exhibit
whereby Stern conveyed his 50% interest to Mehl (CR 15-26). The warranty deed
from Stern to Mehl further contains clear language that obligated Mehl to timely
pay all mortgage payments on the existing mortgage and further that she was
required to indemnify Stern from any default (CR 19-26).
In addition, unlike a more typical real estate transaction that involves an
assumption of a prior mortgage, Mehl was already a 50% owner of the property
prior to the conveyance of Stern to Mehl of his 50% interest (CR 19-26). In
addition, the judgment does not disturb Mehl’s preexisting 50% interest and only
focuses on the subsequent 50% interest Mehl received from Stern.
Stern sought rescission of the underlying conveyance in his original petition
pursuant to both a trespass to try title claim to foreclose on his implied vendor’s
lien AND pursuant to a breach of contract claim (CR 3-12). In addition, paragraph
#8 of the original petition referenced a deed of trust to secure assumption in
support of Mehl’s obligations with respect to the conveyance from Stern to Mehl
(CR 3-12).
10
There is case law that supports that a party may seek the remedy of
rescission through a judicial proceeding as a result of failure of a party to pay a
secured debt. Walton v. First Nat'l Bank of Trenton, 956 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. denied) and Glenn v. Lucas, 376 S.W.3d 268, 276
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.). Stern further offered evidence of
the delinquency of the mortgage payments by Mehl which could easily support a
basis of foreclosure of a vendor’s lien and rescission of the original 50% interest
(CR 27-29).
The arguments by Mehl that a rescission does not address a supposedly
larger settlement agreement have no merit. Firstly, the focus of the underlying
judgment was to specifically address a default by Mehl in connection to the
conveyance by Stern of his 50% interest in the subject property.
Mehl has never directly challenged in her brief the existence of the vendor’s
lien and the right of Stern to seek rescission of the conveyance in his capacity as a
creditor in the transaction. Instead, Mehl argues that it is improper to allow a
rescission of only the property conveyance without also addressing the larger
settlement agreement.
11
The Texas Supreme Court recognized an implied vendor’s lien in connection
to the transfer of a particular piece of real estate between spouses pursuant to a
divorce decree. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984).
Therefore, the fact that there is a larger settlement agreement does not invalidate
efforts by Stern to seek rescission of the underlying real estate transaction.
Stern exercised his right to seek rescission of the transaction based on his
implied vendor’s lien and based on a breach of contract claim after Mehl defaulted
on the obligation and exposed Stern and the property to great financial harm. The
vendor’s lien and any contract claims are directed solely at the conveyance itself.
Therefore, as long as Stern prevails under either an implied vendor’s lien or a
breach of contract claim, he would be entitled to rescission.
D. Judgment for $20,000.00 damages is not error
Contrary to Mehl’s assertion that there is no evidence in support of the
monetary damages, Stern offered evidence of the delinquency of the underlying
mortgage which totaled approximately $16,471.50 (CR 27-29). Moreover, Stern
specifically alleged in paragraphs #10 and #11 of his original petition that there
was a material default with at least five delinquent mortgage payments (CR 3-12).
12
Stern further alleged in paragraph #19 of his original petition damages to his credit,
a fact that could easily be supported by the record in light of many months of
delinquent payments for the main mortgage (CR 3-12 and CR 27-29).
Therefore, an award of $20,000.00 was necessary to address the significant
arrears on the mortgage and/or to compensate Stern for damages to his credit.
E. Double recovery for rescission and damages
In the case at bar, Stern sought monetary damages in addition to rescission
of the conveyance. A rescission of the conveyance alone would not have remedied
the damages to Stern’s credit report and would not have remedied the significant
mortgage arrears. Therefore, an award of monetary damages was essential to
facilitate the rescission of the conveyance.
There is case law, in the context of a judgment for specific performance, in
support of an award of monetary damages when such damages are incidental to the
order of specific performance and fall short of damages awarded from a breach of
contract claim. Goldman v. Olmstead, 414 S.W.3d 346, 361-362 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, pet. denied).
13
In essence, the additional monetary compensation harmonizes the rescission
award with any incidental damages so as to place the party in the pre default
situation. As previously stated, Stern offered evidence of delinquent payments and
damages to his credit (CR 3-12 and CR 27-29).
The cases cited by Mehl are inapposite as they appear to focus on rescission
based on fraud rather than in connection to a vendor’s lien/foreclosure.
For example, the Sebree case cited by Mehl involves statutory fraud and specific
performance and does not address a rescission based on a judicial foreclosure
and/or a loan default. Scott v. Sebree, 986 S.W.2d 364, (Tex. App.—Austin 1999,
pet. denied).
F. Judgment for attorneys’ fees is not error.
Stern offered an affidavit of attorneys’ fees at the original default hearing
(Supp. CR 15-17). Therefore, any argument by Mehl that the attorneys’ fees are
not supported by the record have no merit.
14
G. Failure to join Indymac and TRCP 39
Assuming for the sake of argument that Indymac or any other lienholder is
an indispensable party, the failure to join said party does not render the judgment
void and does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Cooper v. Hamilton County,
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 30, 2014, pet. denied).
Instead, in the most extreme sense, the judgment would be voidable only as to the
interest of the omitted third party.
As a practical matter, the lienholder, not Mehl, would have standing to
challenge the judgment to the extent its interest in the property was affected by the
judgment. There is nothing in the judgment that threatens the validity of any lien
on the property one way or the other (CR 15-26).
Moreover, the harm to the lienholder would need to be substantial to justify
a challenge of the judgment. Grynberg v. Christiansen, 727 S.W.2d 665, 666-67
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ).
15
H. Three day notice required for receiver
In light of the fact that Stern served Mehl with the actual lawsuit and the
request for receiver, any issue of her notice is moot (CR 3-12). Obviously, Mehl
had over twenty days from the date of personal service of the lawsuit to file an
answer, a time far greater than the requisite three notice she complains of in her
brief.
Moreover, Tex. R. Civ. P. 695, the receiver statute, deals with adverse
parties. Stern contends that only Mehl, as an owner of the property, is an adverse
party in this lawsuit.
Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that the receiver has
subsequently filed post judgment motions and provided notice to Mehl by and
through her counsel (Supp. CR 49-51).
16
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The filing by Mehl of a motion for new trial precludes her right to also
pursue a restricted appeal. There is no error apparent on the record in the context
of venue in light of the fact than Mehl waived any venue challenge. It is also
undisputed that Mehl was properly served with the lawsuit and there was no defect
in the affidavit of service. Finally, the record contains evidence in support of the
judgment in all respects: a judgment for title based on rescission pursuant to
foreclosure of a vendor’s lien and breach of contract, as well as monetary damages,
attorneys’ fees and all other relief in the judgment.
WHEREFORE Appellee, David Stern, respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellee prays for other and further relief to
which he may be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Brent A. Devere
Brent A. Devere
Texas Bar No. 00789256
1411 West Avenue, Suite #200
Austin, Texas 78701
Tel. (512)-457-8080 Fax. (512)-457-8060
Email: BDevere@1411west.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE,
DAVID STERN
17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft
Word 2013 and contains approximately 3455 words as determined by the computer
software word count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Brent A. Devere
Brent A. Devere
18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.2, I certify that a copy of this
Appellee’s Brief was filed through the electronic filing system. Under Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.5, I further certify that a copy of this brief was served on
July 21, 2015 upon the following counsel for Appellant via electronic notification
after 5:00 P.M.:
The Lefler Law Firm VIA EMAIL: slefler@leflerlegal.com
Sandra M. Lefler
1530 Sun City Blvd., Suite 119
Austin, Texas 78633
Telephone: (512) 869-2579
Telecopieur: (512) 583-7294
Email:slefler@leflerlegal.com
/s/ Brent A. Devere
Brent A. Devere
19
TABA
Notl69 sent. ~ lntenocutOry l'lone
~ isp Part~s~· _,fii_._ - - --- DC BK14217 PG560
Filed in The District Court
Dlsp code: CVD I CLS . YA1 ( \{ of Travis County, Texas
Redact pgs:: _ __::._ _ _--:o::---==:::-
Judg;--rb\ \J Clerk Q--:J JUL 2 9 2014
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-002071
DAVID STERN, * IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff *
*
v. *
* 250n 1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
*
*
PAMELA MEHL, *
Defendant * TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JUDGMENT FOR TITLE TO REAL ESTATE AND DAMAGES
The hearing on this cause was held on July 29, 2014. Plaint in: David Stern, appeared, by
and through counsel and Defendant, Pamela Mehl, although duly cited to appear by filing an
answer herein, failed to file an answer within the time allowed by law.
I. On the claim of Breac h of Contract, the Court find s in favor of Plaintit1~ David Stern, and
against Detendant, Pamela Mehl.
2. On the claim ofTrespass to Try Title, the Co urt finds in favor of Plaintiff, David Stern, and
against Defendant, Pamela Mehl.
15
DC BK14217 PG561
Pursuant to the pleadings and evidence on file , the Court finds and ORDERS as follows :
A. The Court recognizes a vendor' s lien, equitable lien and a deed oftrust to secure
assumption for and in favor of David Stern on the Property (The ''Property" is otherwise known
as 700 Grove Lane, Georgetown, Texas 78626. Williamson County along with all improvements
and mobile homes, and is further described on Exhibit I attached herein) by virtue of David
Stern's prior 50% conveyance of the Property to Pamela Mehl.
B. The Court hereby awards David Stern judgment for title and possession of 50% of
the Property based on a rescission of the prior conveyance under document #20 13063557 of the
Williamson County Real Property Records.
C. The Court further awards David Stern actual damages against Pamela Mehl in the
amount of$20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand and 00/ 100 Dollars) .
D. The Court awards David Stern, attorneys ' fees in the amount of$2,500.00 (Two
Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars) , against Defendant, Pamela Meh I.
E. Plaintiff. David Stern, is entitled to post judgment interest on the total amount of
the judgment awarded hereinabove, at the rate of 5% per annum trom the date this judgment is
signed until paid .
F. Costs are hereby taxed against Defendant , Pamela Mehl.
G. Plaintift: David Stern, has a right to the Property, and the Property is in danger of
being materially injured, thus requiring the appointment of a receiver. The Court appoints Nancy
Perry as receiver. Receiver shall take an oath swearing to perform the duties of receiver
faithfully, and receiver shall post a $200.00 (Two Hundred and 00/ 100 Dollars) bond that shall
be conditioned on faithful discharge of duties as receiver and obedience to the orders ofthe
Court. Receiver shall be vested with the powers to take charge and keep possession ofthe
2
16
DC BK14217 PG562
Property, receive rents, and sell the Property and hire real estate brokers and other agents to sell
the Property, with such sale being subject to Court approval. The rent and sale proceeds shall be
used to pay all valid secured liens on the property and property taxes due plus payment of all
amounts due under this judgment, with the remaining proceeds, if any, being paid 50/50 to
Plaintiff and Defendant. The receiver shall be entitled to compensation at $175 .00 an hour and
reimbursement of reasonable and necessary expenses, after application to and approval by the
Court tor such fee s and expenses. Receiver' s fees and expenses shall be taxed as costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff, David Stern, may record this order in the real
propetiy records as evidence of ownership ofthe Property, and is entitled to enforce this
judgment through abstract, execution and any other process necessary, and all writs and
processes for the enforcement and collect ion of this judgment and costs may issue.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this is a final judgment and finally dis poses of all
parties and all claims and is appealable.
:)c~ ~
SIGN EDthisthe, 1 dayofJul y, 2014.
Approved as to Form :
3
17
DC BK14217 PG563
Q______
l c.J ---------~.
Brent A. Devere
SBN#00789256
1411 West Avenue, Suite #200
Austin, Texas 7870 I
Ph: 512-457-8080
Fax: 512-457-8060
Attorney for David Stern
4
DC BK14217 PG564
EXHIBIT 1
)
I
19
l
1
~
DC BK14217 PG565
12-12209-hcm Doc#124-2 Filed 05/22/13 Entered 05/22/13 16:33:15 Exhibit Pg 7 of 34
Special Warranty Deed
Notice of confidentiality rights: If you are a natural person, you may remove or strike any
or all of the following information from any instrument that transfers an interest in real
property before it is filed for record in the public records: your Social Security number or
your driver's license number.
Date: May 3, 2013
Grantor: David Stem
Grantor's Mailing Address:
b 100 cc tvr&.- OQ.. 4*-b 00
LOI M& t-L~, cA
Grantee: Pamela Mebl
Grantee's Mailing Address:
700 Grove Lane
Georgetown, Texas
Williamson County
Consideration:
A settlement agreement in a bankruptc~ case style In Re: Pamela Christina Mehl, filed
under Case No. 12-12209 in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, and ten dollars and
other valuable consideration paid by Grantee, and Grantee's assumption of the unpaid principal
and earned interest on the note in the original principaJ sum of Two Hundred Fifty-six Thousand
Two Hundred dollars ($256,200.00) dated August 11, 2004, executed by David Stern, and
payable to the order oflndyMac Bank, F.S.B.. The note is secured by a vendor's lien retained in
a deed dated August 11 , 2004, to David Stern and Pamela Mehl, and additionally secured by a
deed of trust dated August 11, 2004, from David Stern and Pamela Mehl to Charles A. Brown,
Trustee, recorded in clerk's file number 2004064127 of the official public records of real
20
DC BK14217 PG566
12-12209-hcm Doc#124-2 Filed 05/22/13 Entered 05/22/13 16:33:15 Exhibit Pg 8 of 34
property of Williamson County, Texas. Grantee agrees to indemnifY and hold Grantor harmless
from payment of the note and from performance of Grantor's obligations specified in the
instruments securing payment of the note. Grantor assigns to Grantee the casualty insurance
policy on the property, all utility deposits for utility service at the property, and all funds held in
escrow for payment of taxes and insurance premiums.
Property (including any improvements}:
The legal description is attached hereto and incorporated herein for all purposes
Reservations from Conveyance and Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty:
Grantor reserves no interest in any oil, gas, and other minerals in and under and that may
be produced from the property.
This deed is subject to all easements, restrictions, conditions, covenants, and other
instruments of record.
Grantor, for the consideration and subject to the reservations from conveyance and
exceptions to conveyance and warranty, grants, sells, and conveys to Grantee all of Grantor's
interest in the property, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any
way belonging, to have and hold it to Grantee and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns
forever. Grantor binds Grantor and Grantor's heirs and successors to warrant and forever defend
all and singular the property to Grantee and Grantee's heirs, successors, and assigns against
every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof when the
claim is by, through, or under Grantor but not otherwise, except as to the reservations from
conveyance and exceptions to conveyance and warranty.
When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns include the plural.
Grantee assumes all ad valorem taxes due on the property for the current year.
21
DC BK14217 PG567
12-12209-hcm Doc#124-2 Filed 05/22/13 Entered 05/22/13 16:33:15 Exhibit Pg 9 of 34
This instrument 'WaS prepared based on information
furnished by the parties, and no independent title
search has been made.
STATEOF Gc.f.r", ·~ §
COUNTY OF Ls A~) q_ t.. r §
This instrument was acknowledged before me on J "'.... 2. <..f 1 u 1J by David
Stem.
PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF: AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO;
@ H. Bryan Hicks, PLC Pamela Mehl
901 2nd St. 700 Grove Lane
Marble Falls, TX 78654 Georgetown, Texas
Tel: (830) 693-2165
Fax: (830) 693-8185
22
DC BK14217 PG568
12-12209-hcm Claim#S Part 2 Filed 10/31 / 12 Exhibit Page 27 of 34
Nllllal ~-ntratt et paron oCI&nd aitvot..l in WUii..m..o• Cow!!y, T - ou1 o(U.cJCIMa.Ty .5vrvey,
Al11ll'ld No. !I .... IJI. M. J. O&tcia Survct. Ahlltr4 No.~ IIIIi bcln1 tNt Trad! OOftW7ed lo
RaJ"'OIId /1.. MPOR by Wtmn17 Deed d.lcod k.ol!'lt lO, l9t~ 1M JICOf6ed in Volume IUt, P•aelJS of
the Official ll.ecetdr ofWilliiiiiiOI County &od dacn'blld bJIIllltCI tnd bouild1 u foilow1:
B!OLNNT1'40 I& 10 lrot\ pip6 fc~ comot po.C ill IlK Noi1JIIiru of Oro•4 1.&``& l'ot tbe ~ _ , . ~t'
thlltna 4~ in 1 Wllfll'dJ De..! to ~by J1111 fKll, recorded in Volum• 7lO,I'qt17l ollhc
Willl&maon Cowoty ee.d 111.~ b&Uia tt.. Souu-.t coroor oC'Mrd Moon TtiiCll &nclthia ti'KI;
•
nmNC'e: s l ,. 16" l-'" w l7~ . 76 r.- will! the North rrnc ororou!Anc 10 an lroa pln riJ\jnQ fet the
ScUhcut Clllrnu or thl Tnct tl u d-.rlbcod in Mid Moen Wart&lll)l Oerd for the Sw!hwuc (#11(1 of
-.ld Trxt I and 1M lnd;
THliN~: lOll~ Ih. QllnfiiO n ll11t oC nidi ,..a I &ncl Trwd tl; N (1' O>' t17" W ~58.05 r~ 1o an leon pin
foo.md &ncl N 16' n• 47" W 4lJ . ~S to &n iron pin found (01"\lltl'lor\hea.l- of' Mid TroQ nand ~n8
Ibe Honh- corner or Mid T r•ct I 1111<1 Oil• tr";
iliENl;;~: wil\ lht ~'l line af lli4T n.a \,
I) N 71" I>' I~ " !I. ~lUI
fca10u lronp\Qfaund.
2) N n• II' H" H tll.1Hn11e b iro11 pia feNnel,
3) IOJ• II' H .. B 60.01 reel lo 111 )Jcm piR raunct.
4) N 6r 19' 11" a 90.11 r..t 1o aa ~ ph1 fOUIIII bt lhoo Wnlli• oC &aid Jar;Qy cr.~& ror lilt
Horthcan ~ oC ••ill Trte~ I lnd tlllllrlet;
THENC;E; 1!0111 che'W~t~t nne or !lid r!ICihy ltKt •a41he l!.qc U``e of "'d Tl"'ll:: 1.
I) S 12" W )0" E J70,a.4 foet 1o UWA pia~.
2) S ltr ll' lJ" a H 1.151 ret t~ an ium pia klulld, ·
l) S ,. 40' ~.(" E 19S . I9f~t lo lho pl!ICC ol'&cfU\niiiJu-4 tOIII&IIllnj 17.lJ auu ofJIIJIII.
RECORDERS MEMORA NDUM
All or parts of the text on this page was
not clearly legible for satisfactory
recorci ~ t ion
Exhibit "_A_. .__•
I
23
DC BK14217 PG569
12-12209-hcm Claim#S Part 2 Filed 10/31 I 12 Exhibit Page 28 of 34
AJl!Nl ccr'ILinlt.a or plftd of land lilualed in Willi~10n County, T~ uu.t ofll\1 John B•ry Sllrvey,
Abl\ncl tolo. SI &lld '*Ill \1111 Trta U r.oJNeycd \0 II.&)UIOTII1 A. Moon 'lly Wlirn.nry Oeecl dllcd Ausull
JO, I ~S lll'od ~(dod in Volume 1138 , P . 2J 5 of \he om~11 Rcc.orda afWilli~m~Gn Coo..~ty and
dcaaibed by mclet 111d bounda ~ fbllowt:
BEG!NNlNG a.t Ul iroa fin fou!\4 inlht NQI\b ltno of Grove 1..Anc for 10. Soo.ttu:..\ comc:r orlhat ````
dciQ'I"bed In 1 Wln'IIIIY Dtlld 10 1\lebald A. Milct, Q Ill!, da\ed Novcfllbei 1, l9a.. Uld r~ in Volumo
1095, Pas• 91J of &aid alli~ial rOCDrdt, bcia& the Soulltw..lt .:ornc:r orttld Mooro ~ and lhiJ 1rae1;
THENCE: N u• l9' 00" w 19-1.76 feet wilh lbc We`````` of said Moore 1110.. ~i na lho bet it of
bearinp cile.d 1-.::reoo~.to 111 iran pin round for lilt l-IMbuJt C>Omd or wd M.ilca 1/'ut beifl& Lbe Northweat
eorn1111 or S&id Moariii'CIIhia 1n1;1:
THEHC'E: N 11• 2~ · )J" E 1)7.19 feet to an lr0<1 pln found for the Nonlnrell corn• oflt.l Trac& l aa
clr:,t;ribN i~ the afortmenlioncd Moore Wan~nty ~ bcina lhe NMhca$1 t.Ornll' o( aaid Moor, Tr.a II
lJ1d thia traa:
TiiEI"CC.: aloag the C<>Glmortlin• ofaaid Tru:t lalldTr.a II, S 16° 53' 47'' E Hl.4) ra~to an iron pin
or
~nd. U14 S o• Ol' O'l" E "SI.OHCC\ \c.., iron pin found in lha Nonh line llid Gtavol.ane for the
Soulh"cs >;Q('IICf of said Tra!Ot I .,d boina 11-c S011lbcas\ tllnlCir o( Ill ill. ind tl ~ thit tnd;
rnENC£: S 11• ]4' 02" W 699,68 feet 10 lbt place of8qiiii\ID8811d containiQIIl6.67 acru orbml.
RECORDERS MEMORANDUM
All or parts of the tex t on this page was
not clearly legible for s>tisfactory
rl"r.ortiAt inn
Exhibit"
------
FILED AND RECORDED
OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORDS 2e04064127
~E.``
98/tl/2004 12 :5& Pft
~LLEN $69 . 00
NANCY E. RISTER, COUNTY ~£RK
UILLI~"SON COUNTY, T£X~S
• •r
· .·, ··:
24
DC BK14217 PG570
1 11~1111~ IIIII 11/llllllmllll/~ IIIII 1~11 11~111111111
DEED
2009086302
5 PGS
CAD Na. R039Gll
Notice or Coalidentlality rlgbtll: If you are 1 natural penoa, yoa may remove or strike aay of the
follmria11 i.Dformatioa from Ibis lastnuaent before it is filed for reeord ia ttac public: ncords: your
toCial aecurity number or your driver's liause number.
GENERAL WARRANTY DEED
DATE: November 14, 2006
GRANTOR: Linda Moore, aNa Linda R. Moore, Individually , and as lndependenl Executrix oflhc Eslall: of
Ra~nd A. Moore, deceased, Kathy Moore. and RAndy Moore
GRANTOR'S MAILING ADDRESS:
GRANTEE.: David R. Slem and Pamela C. Mehl
GRANTEE'S MAILING ADDRESS: 700 Grove Lane, Georgetown, Williamson Counly, Texas 78626
CONSIDERATION:
$10.00 and other valuable consideration, receipt of which is htrip in tlu: NOT!h line of County Road IS2, ai!IO
being the lower Southwest comer of a 139. 17 acre tnct described in a deed to Etna MiUer and laura Millor, dilled
October of 1957;
'!'HENCE North 19 de~ 08 minules Wesi669.J7feet to an ell comer of the 139.17 acres and an ell comer of said
ell shaped sllip;
'fHENCE South 71 i1111ular the rights and
oppunenonces !Mmo in anywise belonging, to have and to hold it to Grantee, Grantee's heirs, executors,
admlnislnltors, successors 1111d ossigns forever. Grantor hereby bin