Datril Boston v. Bryce Daniel, Inc. D/B/A Fast & Free Real Estate ( 2015 )


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  • Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 24, 2015.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-14-00124-CV
    DATRIL BOSTON, Appellant
    V.
    BRYCE DANIEL, INC. D/B/A FAST & FREE REAL ESTATE, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 269th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2008-74789
    MEMORANDUM                    OPINION
    This is an attempted appeal from the trial court’s November 8, 2013 order
    dismissing this case for want of prosecution, and the trial court’s December 6,
    2013 order denying appellant Datril Boston’s amended motion to reinstate the
    case. The record, however, shows that in this case—an appeal from Cause No.
    2008-74789—the trial court rendered final judgment in Boston’s favor on February
    21, 2011.
    Absent a timely post-judgment motion extending the trial court’s plenary
    power, the trial court retains jurisdiction over a case for thirty days after the final
    judgment is signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). After the trial court’s plenary
    power expires, it cannot substantively modify the judgment except by a bill of
    review. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f).1 A bill of review, however, is an independent
    proceeding. Tice v. City of Pasadena, 
    767 S.W.2d 700
    , 702 (Tex. 1989) (citing
    Schwartz v. Jefferson, 
    520 S.W.2d 881
    , 889 (Tex. 1975) (orig. proceeding)); see
    Amanda v. Montgomery, 
    877 S.W.2d 482
    , 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    1994, orig. proceeding) (holding that trial court’s refusal to order severance of a
    bill-of-review proceeding from the underlying case was an abuse of discretion
    warranting mandamus relief). And, although the record before us shows that
    appellee Bryce Daniel, Inc. did file a separate bill-of-review action, this is not an
    appeal from that proceeding; it is an appeal from orders that the trial court signed
    in the original suit more than two years after the trial court’s plenary power
    expired.
    When a trial court grants a bill of review, it should not dispose of the new
    cause number and proceed to trial in the old cause number. It should proceed to
    the merits of the case under the new cause number (here the 2011 cause number).
    The trial court instead rendered judgment in the 2011 bill-of-review proceeding,
    issued a new docket control order in the original 2008 case, and proceeded as
    though the 2008 case had been re-opened. These actions were improper and have
    led to the void orders in the 2008 cause number that Boston has attempted to
    appeal.
    1
    Even after its plenary power has expired, the trial court may sign a judgment nunc pro
    tunc to correct a clerical error, and it may declare a judgment void if the judgment was signed
    after the trial court’s plenary power expired. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f).
    2
    Because the trial court’s plenary power in the 2008 cause expired shortly
    after the trial court rendered final judgment in 2011, the challenged orders are void.
    See Jefferson v. Unity Nat’l Bank, No. 14-14-00197-CV, 
    2015 WL 1779254
    , at *2
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex.
    Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 
    397 S.W.3d 162
    , 168 & n.21 (Tex.
    2013)). We lack jurisdiction to review the merits of a void order. See 
    id. We accordingly
    notified the parties on October 16, 2015, of our intent to dismiss this
    case for want of jurisdiction unless Boston filed a response demonstrating grounds
    for continuing the appeal.
    In his response, Boston conceded that the challenged orders are void, and
    asked us to hold that an additional order signed on April 30, 2013 is void. Boston
    argued that the order is void because it “contains the same cause number as in the
    underlying suit,” and for the reasons described above, the trial court lost plenary
    power over the original suit in 2011.
    Although it is true that the order “contains” the cause number of the
    underlying suit, the face of the order shows that it was a final judgment rendered in
    the separate bill-of-review proceeding. In the order, the trial court began by noting
    that Bryce Daniel, Inc. “prevailed in his [sic] claim for relief in this cause, a Bill of
    Review case.”2 The order concludes as follows:
    IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff have judgment granting its claim for
    bill of review. It is therefore ORDERED that the judgment signed
    and rendered in Cause Number 2008-74789, previously pending in the
    269th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas is vacated in its
    entirety. This Order disposes of all claims in Cause No. 2011-34714,
    is a final judgment in Cause No. 2011-34714, and is appealable.
    2
    Emphasis added.
    3
    The order contained a typed cause number for 2011-34714. This number
    was struck through and the original 2008 cause number was written above it. In
    addition, both the 2008 and the 2011 cause numbers were again handwritten on the
    side of the order. Thus, the sole ambiguity is whether this judgment rendered in
    the bill-of-review proceeding was duplicated in the original suit now before us. In
    the bill-of-review proceeding, the judgment was rendered while the trial court had
    plenary power to render judgment.      The order therefore is not void, and we
    accordingly deny Boston’s request that we hold otherwise.
    Boston has failed to demonstrate this court has jurisdiction to continue this
    appeal.
    We order the appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Donovan.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-14-00124-CV

Filed Date: 11/24/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2016