Andrew Whallon, Dahlia Garcia and Richard Grayshaw v. City of Houston ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-11-00333-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
11/3/2015 11:16:28 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
Case No. 01-11-00333-CV
______________________________________
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
In the Court of Appeals for the HOUSTON, TEXAS
First Supreme Judicial District 11/3/2015 11:16:28 PM
at Houston, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
_______________________________________________ Clerk
Andrew Whallon, Dalia Garcia, and Richard Grayshaw,
Appellants
vs.
City of Houston,
Appellee
______________________________________
th
On Appeal from the 270 Judicial District Court
of Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Number 2008-51588
______________________________________
Appellant Andrew Whallon’s Motion for En Banc Reconsideration of this
Court’s Opinion and Judgment of February 5, 2015
_______________________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, APPELLANT Andrew Whallon, in the above styled and
numbered appeal and files this, his Motion for En Banc Reconsideration of this
Court’s Opinion and Judgment of February 5, 2015, relative to this Court's
affirmance of the underlying Judgment against him. Pursuant to Rule 49 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Whallon would respectfully show
the Court as follows:
On February 5, 2015, this Court affirmed the underlying trial court’s
Corrected Final Judgment against Appellant Whallon, where the City of Houston
brought suit in District Court for demolition costs and attorneys fees, after having
first sought and received administrative remedies related to the same matters under
the Local Government Code §54.017 and Chapter 10 of the Houston Municipal
Code.
By this Motion, Appellant Whallon respectfully asks this Court to revisit its
decision as to Appellant Whallon, and more specifically, as to the Trial Court's
jurisdiction to hear the underlying matter. Appellant Whallon believes that en banc
reconsideration is appropriate because it appears that the Court panel
misinterpreted Appellant's arguments as to the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the
underlying case. Appellant believes that, had the panel focused its analysis on the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction, (a threshold matter that the Court
"admittedly had the affirmative obligation to ascertain ... regardless of whether the
parties questioned it" 1) rather than on Appellant's res judicata argument, the
Opinion would have read differently.
Additionally, the primary issue concerning the trial court’s jurisdiction
following an earlier administrative proceeding resulting in final and binding Orders
(which were not appealed to the district court), is a developing area of the law. In
fact, the Texas Supreme Court has issued two opinions (in 2011 and 2012) which
1
Opinion at pg. 9 citing In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010).
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deal with the issue of jurisdiction in this type of case differently. See City of
Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2012), and City of Beaumont v. Como,
381 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2012). For these reasons, Appellant urges the entire court to
consider the following facts and arguments. 2
UNDERLYING FACTS
On Nov 7, 2007, the Building Standards Commission issued eight (8) Orders
requiring that the Owners/lien holders of the Candlelight Trails Condominium
complex secure the complex to City specifications within 60 days. It also provided
that if the Complex was not secured within that period, the COH had the authority
to secure, repair or demolish the Complex as the COH saw fit. (FOF 9) (RR Vol. 6
at 170-323 - Defendant’s Trial Exs. 1, 2 & 3) The COH was also granted a
privileged lien against the owners/lien holders’ property. (RR Vol. 5 at 53-121 -
Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 6-13) Any appeal of the Commissions Orders had to be filed
within 30 days. The Commission’s orders were not appealed. Instead, on August
27, 2008, long after the Commission’s Orders became “final and binding,” the
COH filed the underlying lawsuit in District Court (APP L) seeking essentially the
same relief as it had received from the Building Standards Commission (e.g.,
demolition, a privileged lien for demolition costs and administrative costs (App H -
Sec. 10-373).
2
Appellant also incorporates his prior arguments, briefing and Appendices, as if set forth in their
entirety.
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After a trial to the Bench, the District Court found for the Plaintiff (COH)
and Defendants Whallon, Garcia and Grayshaw appealed, arguing (among other
things) that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying matter,
once the issues had been tried through the administrative proceedings before the
Building Standards Commission. Appellants improperly cited the doctrine of res
judicata in their argument.
Ultimately, this Court reversed and rendered Judgment as to Appellants
Garcia and Grayshaw, but affirmed the Trial Court's Corrected Final Judgment as
to Appellant Whallon.
ARGUMENT
The Res Judicata Analysis
Initially, this Court began examination of Appellant's argument, that the
underlying trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case before it, by comparing
and contrasting subject-matter jurisdiction with res judicata, based upon
Appellant's earlier argument of res judicata.
The Court began with the premise that subject matter jurisdiction is
“essential to a court’s power to decide a case,” citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000), and continued stating that "[A] court
acting without such power commits fundamental error that we may review for the
first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
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443–44 (Tex. 1993).
The Court pointed out that "as a threshold matter, Appellant improperly
conflate[d] the concept of res judicata and subject-matter jurisdiction"; however,
even if true, the Court admittedly had the affirmative obligation "to ascertain that
subject matter jurisdiction exists, regardless of whether the parties questioned it."
Opinion at pg. 9 citing In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex.
2010).
Although the Court admitted its responsibility in this regard, in its Opinion,
the Court failed to meet that responsibility, and instead, limited its analysis to "res
judicata" and Appellant's misapplication of that concept to the case at hand. In its
Opinion, the Court stated that
"Appellants’ res judicata arguments rest entirely on the erroneous
premise that the City could have sought and obtained an award of
demolition costs and most of its attorneys’ fees in a proceeding before
the commission. But appellants do not cite authority for that
proposition, and our own research has not found support for it in the
Texas Local Government Code, in the relevant ordinances, or in the
case law."
Opinion pg. 16.
The Court went on to say that
"Both the Texas Local Government Code and the Houston City
Ordinance authorize the commission to order repairs, order that
property be vacated, and order that property be demolished. They also
both authorize liens against the real property and civil penalties in
commission proceedings, but neither authorizes an award of
demolition costs or attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, appellants cannot
demonstrate, through reference to statutory authority, that recovery of
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demolition costs and attorneys’ fees was relief that the City could
have, but did not, seek before the commission for purposes of res
judicata."
Opinion pg. 17.
The Court made these determinations despite Appellant Whallon's argument
in his Brief under Issue 1, beginning in the last paragraph of pg. 22 and concluding
on pg. 23, where Whallon directs the Court to "See Houston Municipal Code,
Article IX, Division 4, Sec. 10-373 (2007); (APP H)."
Division 4 of the Houston Municipal Code of Ordinances regarding
"Dangerous Buildings" and Division 5, “Building and Standards Commission”
establish a statutory scheme which include very specific provisions for abating the
nuisance of dilapidated buildings and construction as well as implementation of
Local Government Code Chapter 54, Sec. C, establishing Houston’s Building and
Standards Commission, (Houston Municipal Code of Ordinances, Sec. 10-391 et
seq). The Court of Appeals Opinion highlights only one or two of those provisions
while omitting the rest.
In fact, the Orders issued by the Building Standards Commission,
themselves, stated on their face that:
UPON THE EARLIEST DATE OF ANY FAILURE BY THE
OWNERS OR LIENHOLDERS TO TIMELY COMPLY WITH
THIS ORDER, THE CITY OF HOUSTON SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED TO REMEDY, ALLEVIATE, OR REMOVE ANY
SUBSTANDARD OR DANGEROUS BUILDING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 10-351 AND 10-370 OF THE
CITY'S CODE OF ORDINANCES. PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 10-
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351 AND 10-395 OF THE CITY'S CODE OF ORDINANCES, A
PRIVILEGED LIEN, INFERIOR ONLY TO TAX LIENS AND
LIENS FOR STREET IMPROVEMENTS, MAY BE PLACED
UPON THE LAND DESCRIBED HEREIN, PLUS TEN PERCENT
(10%) INTEREST PER ANNUM UNTIL PAID. (Emphasis added)
Sec. 10-351 of the City's Code of Ordinances specifically authorized the
City to perform any and all work as may be required to bring the property into
compliance with the applicable order, and the city's expenses related to such work
to constitute a lien against the property.
Sec. 10-370 of the City's Code of Ordinances specifically authorized the
neighborhood protection official to cause the building to be vacated, repaired,
secured, and/or demolished pursuant to the order, should the persons having an
interest in the property fail to comply with the order of the hearing official within
the time specified in the order for compliance.
Sec. 10-395 of the City's Code of Ordinances specifically provides that, if
the city causes any dangerous building or vector conditions to be abated with its
own employees or through contractors, the cost of the work and the administrative
expenses incurred for the work performed under this division shall constitute a lien
on the property.
Appellant points out the above ordinances as references cited within the
Commission's Orders; however, Appellant would also refer the Court to additional
ordinances which were available to the City in the underlying administrative
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proceeding: specifically, Secs. 10-371 through 10-373.
Sec. 10-371 provides that the hearing official's file will remain open for
three years from the date of the Commission's Order and if the neighborhood
protection official receives evidence that the building has not remained secured ...
the hearing official shall reconvene the hearing. If the hearing official finds that the
building remains a dangerous building, the hearing official may issue a revised
order that the building be demolished.
Sec. 10-372 provides that the Orders of the hearing official are final and
binding, absent an appeal.
Sec. 10-373 provides that the administrative expenses incurred by the City
for inspecting buildings, locating owners, conducting hearings, issuing notices and
orders, together with all associated administrative functions, as well as the costs of
securing, demolishing or performing other work in connection with an order either
by the city or by persons doing so under contract with the city, shall be separately
calculated and assessed in each instance in which the city takes the described
action pursuant to this division, and this amount shall constitute a priority lien on
the property.
Finally, Sec. 54.036 of the Local Government Code authorizes the Building
Standards Commission to (5) determine the amount and duration of the civil
penalty that the municipality may recover as provided by Sec. 54.017 (which
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allows the City to recover civil penalties against property owners who commit acts
in violation of the ordinance or failed to take action necessary for compliance with
the ordinance relating to dangerously damaged or deteriorated structures).
In this case, the Orders rendered by the Building Standards Commission
after the 11/7/07 hearing, gave the City all of the relief requested by the City: the
property was vacated, ordered secured and/or, if it was not secured, allowing the
demolition of the buildings. Although the COH chose not to request or prove its
monetary damages before the Commission it was granted a privileged lien
(apparently for any demolition costs that may have been properly proven and
certified as required by law). It also did, to some extent, partake of the benefits that
it (the COH) was, or could have been entitled to receive as a result of the
Commission’s initial eight Orders. Not only did the COH exclude the Complex’s
owners from their own property, but it also secured the entire premises from entry,
even by the unit’s actual owner, resident or mortgagee. All of this was under the
authority of the eight Commission Orders that the City later appeared to otherwise
totally disregard.
Any remedy that the City did not receive from the Commission, was because
it did not ask for it. The only remedy that the COH sought in their District Court
filing that it could not have recovered in the underlying Administrative proceeding
was its almost $500,000 in unnecessarily incurred attorneys fees, and that was
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because it did not incur those fees until after it left the realm of the Commission
and moved to District Court. The City could, however, have sought administrative
costs (including attorneys fees) in the underlying administrative action, had it
chosen to do so.
The Jurisdiction Analysis
Certain limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of courts are imposed
by the Texas Constitution. These include the constitutional requirement of
standing, which imposes certain threshold standards regarding the stake a plaintiff
must possess in a dispute before a court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction to
resolve it. See Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 44345. Standing under the Texas
Constitution requires "a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy
between the parties that will be resolved by the court." The general test for
constitutional standing in Texas courts is whether there is a "real" (i.e., justiciable)
controversy between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial
declaration sought.
The controversy in this action was adjudicated before an administrative
body: the Building Standards Commission, and brought to a final Order that was
binding on all parties. There was no justiciable issue to be brought in District
Court.
As subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide
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a case, standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction. Under the
Texas Constitution, standing is implicit in the open courts provision, which
contemplates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering an injury.
Specifically, the open courts provision provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added).
Appellant contends that the City did not have standing to bring suit in the
District Court as all controversies were (or could have been) resolved by the
Building Standards Commission.
Ripeness:
Just as subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party bringing the suit
have standing, that there is a live controversy between the parties, and that the case
be justiciable, State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994),
Ripeness is also an element of subject matter jurisdiction. Ripeness is a legal
question subject to de novo review. Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 755
(Tex. 2011); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). In
evaluating ripeness, we consider whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts are
sufficiently developed so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather
than being contingent or remote. Robinson, 353 S.W.3d at 755; Waco Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000); Patterson v. Planned Parenthood
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of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The ripeness
analysis focuses on whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events
that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. Robinson, 353 S.W.3d at
755; Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442. A case is not ripe when determining whether a
plaintiff has a concrete injury depends on contingent or hypothetical facts. Waco
Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 S.W.3d at 852. The ripeness doctrine serves to avoid
premature adjudication. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442.
At the time that the City filed suit in the District Court, Appellant contends
that, not only was there no justiciable issue in the case, but also that the case was
not ripe for consideration, as the Building Standards Commission still had
jurisdiction over the issues raised. The commission had already provided for
demolition of the property in the event that the property was not secured. The
costs associated with demolition was already available to the City, in the form of
privileged liens on the property and/or civil penalties; a remedy that the City
received and subsequently perfected in April of 2009.
Attorneys fees and expenses were also available through the administrative
process for a period of three years from the date of the initial orders (or until
November 7, 2010). The City prematurely brought their suit in District Court in
August, 2008, prior to the expiration of the Commission's jurisdiction. Additional
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attorneys fees (incurred because of the filing in District Court) only arose based
upon the District Court action, and was not a justiciable issue at the time of suit.
Appellants contend that the District Court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the issues presented in the underlying case and the Court of
Appeals panel erred in finding otherwise.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Appellant Andrew Whallon requests that the Court grant rehearing in this
matter and find that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the
underlying matter in District Court, and, as such, reverse the Corrected Final
Judgement and render judgment for the Appellant.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED for all of the reasons set forth
herein and in his Brief, Appellant Andrew Whallon, respectfully requests that this
Court grant this Motion for Rehearing of the Court’s February 5, 2015 Opinion and
Judgment, and for all other such relief that Appellant may be justly entitled.
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Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Denise Wells
DENISE WELLS
SBOT No. 00797165
15935 Manor Square Dr.
Houston, TX 77062
Telephone: (832) 817-2234
Facsimile: (855) 796-9376
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of November, 2015, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was served, pursuant to the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, on all counsel of record via the efiling system used in the
State of Texas.
By: /s/ Denise Wells
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