Bob Deuell v. Texas Right to Life Committee, Inc. ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-15-00617-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
11/12/2015 4:04:08 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
No. 01-15-00617-CV
***
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT 1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
HOUSTON, TEXAS 11/12/2015 4:04:08 PM
*** CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
BOB DEUELL, Clerk
Appellant,
v.
TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
Appellee
On Appeal from the 152"'1 Judicial District Court
Of Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2014-32179
Honorable Robert Schaffer, Presiding Judge
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C.
2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609
Austin, Texas 78745-5292
(512) 279-6431
(512) 279-6438 (Facsimile)
George E. Hyde
State Bar No. 45006157
Scott M. Tschirhart
State Bar No. 24013655
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant: BOB DEUELL
Appellant's Counsel: George E. Hyde
State Bar No. 45006157
Scott M. Tschirhart
State Bar No. 24013655
Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal Hyde & Zech, P.C.
2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609
Austin, Texas 78745-5292
{512) 279-6431
{512) 279-6438 {Facsimile)
George E. Hyde
Scott M. Tschirhart
george.hvde(it rnmpage-aus.com
scott.tschirhartca:rampa!!e-aus.com
Appellee: TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.
Appellee Counsel: N. Terry Adams, Jr.
State Bar No. 00874010
Joseph M. Nixon
State Bar No. 15244800
Nicholas D. Stepp
State Bar No. 24077701
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.
1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 2500
Houston, Texas 77056
{713) 623-0887
{713) 960-1527 {Facsimile
tadams(a 1bmpl Ip.com
jnixon(a bmpllp.com
ii
James E. "Trey" Trainor, III
State Bar No. 24042052
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.
401 W. l S'h Street, Suite 845
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 623"6700
(512) 623"6701 (Facsimile)
ttrainor(a.bmpl Ip .com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL. ........................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... v
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT........................................................................ I
l. Appellee's argument that Appellee's lawsuit was not based on Senator
Deuell' s exercise of free speech under the TCPA is misplaced............................ 2
2. Appellee's argument regarding its establishment of a prima facie case of
tortious interference fails because Appellee failed to provide the trial court with
clear and specific evidence of each element. ......................................................... 6
3. Appellee waived all objections and arguments to Appellant's affirmative
defenses of judicial privilege and illegal contract.. ................................................ 9
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 11
PRAYER ................................................................................................................. 11
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 13
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
ACS Investors, Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1997) ....................... 7, 8
Alpert v. Crain, Caaton and James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.--
Houston [I st Dist.] 2005) ........................................................................................ 4
Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
writ denied) ............................................................................................................ 4
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.1993) .............................. 7
Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.- EI Paso 1997) .................. 8
Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1995) .................................................. 7
James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, (Tex. App.- Houston [l st Dist]
2014), reh'g overruled (Nov. 4, 2014) ........................................................... 6, 7, 9
James v. Easton, 368 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, pet. denied) ................................................................................................... 4
In Re Lipsky/, 411S.W.3d530 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth, 2013) .............................. 5
In Re Lipsky JI, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) ........................................................... 5
Rehak Creative Sen1s., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.--Houston
[141h Dist.] 2013) .................................................................................................... 7
Rio Grande H20 Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P's/zip ltd.,
No. 04-13- 00441- CV, 2014 WL 309776, (Tex. App.- San
Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) ............................................................ 5
Sacks v. Zimmerman, 401 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, pet. denied) ................................................................................................... 4
Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.- Austin, 2015) ........................... 6, 9
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011) ........... 3
v
TGS- NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, (Tex. 2011) ................ 7
Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991 ).......................... 7
Statutes
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(1) ............................................................ 2, 3
Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(3) ............................................................. 1, 2
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(4)(A)(i) .................................................. 6, 9
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7) ................................................................ 4
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem, Code§ 27.001(7)(A) .......................................................... 3
Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7)(8) ........................................................... 3
Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7)(C) ........................................................... 3
Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7)(D) ........................................................... 3
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.003(a) ................................................................ 5
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §27.00S(d) ........................................................... 2, 10
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.005(1) .............................................................. vii
Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.009(1) ............................................................... 11
Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.009(2) ............................................................... 11
The Te xa s C 1.t.1zen ' s Pa rt'1c1p
· at·on
1 Act ............................................................. passim
·
Other Authorities
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 229 (I Ith ed. 2003) ................................ 7
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at l I 98 (I l 'h ed. 2003) ........................... 7
vi
Senate Bill 303 .......................................................................................................... 3
vii
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
NOW COMES APPELLANT, Bob Deuell (hereinafter "Appellant" and/or
"Deuell") and files this Appellant's Reply Brief in accordance with the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure ("TRAP").
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. The Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA) clearly defines "the exercise of
the right of free speech" as "a communication made in connection with a matter of
public concern." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(3). Senator Deuell, a sitting
State Senator, had his attorneys send letters to radio broadcasters complaining about
false, defamatory, and illegal campaign ads. These letters dealt with a matter of
public concern, specifically public statements in ads run on public airwaves during
a runoff election. These letters also threatened the exercise of the right to petition
(file a lawsuit) if the ads continued in the same form. These rights to free speech
and to petition are exactly what the TCP A was designed to protect. The trial court
should have dismissed Appellee's lawsuit because Appellant proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Appellee's lawsuit was based on Appellant's
exercise of his right of free speech. See Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §
27.005(1 ).
2. When Appellant met his burden under the TCPA, the burden shifted to
Appellee to establish, by clear and specific evidence, a prima facie case for each
1
element of its tortious interference claim. Appellee failed to meet this burden by
failing to provide clear and specific evidence of each element of its claim.
3. Appellant established by a preponderance of the evidence each essential
element of the valid defenses of judicial immunity and illegality. Appellee failed to
challenge the allegations in the pleadings, the affidavit and other evidence so that
the evidence was uncontested. Appellee failed to object to any pleading issues at
the trial court and thereby waived any complaint on appeal. The case should have
been dismissed by the trial court pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
27.005(d).
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
1. Appellee's argument that Appellee's lawsuit was not based on Senator
Deuell's exercise of free speech under the TCPA is misplaced.
The TCPA clearly defines the "exercise of free speech" and "communication" as
anticipated by the Texas Legislature.
'"Exercise of the right of free speech" means a communication made in
connection with a matter of public concern.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(3)
"Communication" includes the making or submitting of a statement or
document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written,
audiovisual, or electronic.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(1)
2
Appellee argues that the speech in question was not a matter of public concern.
However, Appellee admits that the political ads in question were made in connection
with a runoff election. See Appellee 's Briefpgs. 1-2. The subject matter of political
ads is beyond question a matter for public concern, or there would be no point in
running them on the radio.
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can "be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community," or when it "is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public,".
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172
(2011 )(internal quotes omitted). The radio ads in question are about a political
campaign and are without question a matter of public concern.
Moreover, as Appellee properly points out, these ads dealt with a bill that
Senator Deuell sponsored and the subject matter of S.B. 303 deals with advance
directives and healthcare and treatment decisions. The subject matter of S.B. 303
clearly fits within the definitions set forth in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem, Code
27.001(7)(A)(health or safety); (B)(community well-being); (C)(the government
and its role in the regulation of advance directives and healthcare and treatment
decisions); and (E)(a service in the marketplace, namely medical care). The ads
attacked Senator Deuell and his sponsorship of S.B. 303 which falls under the
definitions of 27.001 (7)(C)(the government) and (D)(a public official or public
figure). So a plain reading of the definitions in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem, Code
3
27.001(7) shows that the letters dealt specifically with a matter of public concern
and therefore fall properly within the TCPA.
Appellee argues that because the letters were written by Senator Deuell's
attorneys, they cannot be considered as Senator Deuell's speech. See Appellee 's
Briefpgs. 8-9. However, Appellee cannot have it both ways. If the statements in the
letters cannot be attributed to Senator Deuell then Appellee cannot complain that
Senator Deuell infringed on Appellee' s contract rights. Of course, Appellee could
not maintain a lawsuit against Senator Deuell's attorney. "Texas courts have long
held that attorneys cannot be held civilly liable for damages to nonclients, under any
theory of recovery, for actions taken in connection with representing a client." Sacks
v. Zimmerman, 401 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.
denied) (citing James v. Easton, 368 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, pet. denied)); Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 405; Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56,
71- 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, writ denied). So Appellee attempts to
attribute the statements in the letters as being Senator Deuell's statements for the
purpose of a tortious interference claim.
Appellee sued Senator Deuell for tortious interference with existing contracts.
(C.R. 84-85). The tortious act that was attributed to Senator Deuell by Appellee,
was the sending of the letters. (C.R. 83). Those letters were "communication(s)
made in connection with a matter of public concern" and properly fall within the
4
legislatures definitions in the TCPA and the trial court should have dismissed the
lawsuit.
Now, Appellee argues that threats and intimidation are not protected speech.
Appellee's Brief pg. 10. However, the threat to file a lawsuit is a threat to exercise
Senator Deuell's right to petition and is protected under the TCPA. So, if Appellee
had argued this in the trial court, the Court could have dismissed Appellee's lawsuit
on the grounds that these alleged "threats and intimidation" were protected under the
TCPA:
Under Section 27.006 of the Act, the trial court may consider pleadings
as evidence. Id. § 27.006(a). The Act does not require Serafine to
present testimony or other evidence to satisfy her evidentiary burden.
See Rio Grande H20 Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P'ship Ltd.,
No. 04-13-00441 - CV, 2014 WL 309776, at *3 (Tex. App. -San
Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) (deciding challenged legal
action related to exercise of right to petition based on consideration of
pleadings as evidence), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky JI, 460
S.W.3d at 587. The Blunts asserted in their tortious-interference
counterclaim that "Serafine willfully and intentionally interfered with
that contract [with the drainage and foundation company] through
threats and the filing ofthis lawsuit." (Emphasis added.) They asserted
in their fraudulent-lien counterclaim that Serafine knew that the lis
pendens she had filed "in relation to this case" was not supported by
any valid interest in the Blunts' property. All that the Act requires is that
the challenged legal action be "based on, relate[ ] to, or is in response
to" the movant's exercise of the right to petition. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem.Code§ 27.003(a). We conclude, based on the facts alleged in the
Blunts' pleadings and in response to Serafine's motion, that the Blunts'
tortious-interference counterclaim is in part based on, related to, or in
response to Serafine's filing of the suit and that their fraudulent-lien
counterclaim is based on, related to, or in response to Serafine's filing
of the lis pendens, both of which filings are exercises of Serafine's
"right to petition" as the Act defines that term. See LipsA-y I, 411 S.W.3d
5
 at 541-42 (determining that nonmovant's claims were based on
movants' exercise of their right to petition based on facts alleged in
nonmovant's pleadings); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §
27.001 (4)(A)(i) (" 'Exercise of the right to petition' means ... a
communication in or pertaining to: ... a judicial proceeding."); James v.
Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147-48 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, pet. filed) (concluding that fraudulent-lien claim based on filing
of lis pendens was "communication in or pertaining to a judicial
proceeding").
Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. App.- Austin, 2015)(emphasis added
to show that the case dealt with a claim of tortious interference). Since this Court
reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss under the TCPA de novo, and the Court
may consider pleadings as evidence, the Court should dismiss Appellee's lawsuit
because the conduct complained ofis related to Senator Deuell' s exercise of the right
to petition.
Appellee argues that dismissing Appellee's lawsuit would undermine the
TCPA's purpose. However, in light of the Serafine v. Blunt decision, it is clear that
the threat to file a lawsuit is specifically protected by the TCPA. See id. Therefore,
Appellee's arguments about the relative merits of the threatened lawsuit should be
disregarded.
2. Appellee's argument regarding its establishment of a prima facie case of
tortious interference fails because Appellee failed to provide the trial court
with clear and specific evidence of each element.
The elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with a
contract are: ( 1) the existence of a contract subject to interference, (2)
the occurrence of an act of interference that was willful and intentional,
(3) the act was a proximate cause of the plaintifrs damage, and (4)
6
actual damage or loss occurred. Browning- Ferris Indus. v. Reyna, 865
S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.1993); Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811
S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.1991 ).
Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Tex. 1995).
"As the statute does not define 'clear and specific' evidence, these
tenns are given their ordinary meaning." Id. (citing TGS- NOPEC
Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011)). '"Clear'
means 'free from obscurity or ambiguity,' 'easily understood,' 'free
from doubt,' or 'sure.' "Id. (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 229 (11th ed. 2003)). " 'Specific' means 'constituting or
falling into a specifiable category,' 'free from ambiguity,' or 'accurate.'
" Id. (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 1198).
"Clear and specific evidence has also been described as evidence that
is 'unaided by presumptions, inferences, or intendments.' "Id. (quoting
Rehak Creative Sen1s., 404 S.W.3d at 726)).
James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Tex. App.- Houston [Pt Dist] 2014),
reh 'g overruled (Nov. 4, 2014).
Appellee argues that it established the existence of two contracts by a
conclusory affidavit that simply states a dollar amount. Appellee's Brief at 22.
However, a statement that there was a contract in a certain dollar amount does not
provide the "clear and specific" evidence of the first element of a tortious
interference claim, specifically "that a contract subject to interference exists." ACS
Investors, Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). Without the
specific language of the contracts in question, the Court cannot detennine the proper
parties to the contract, the specific tenns of the contract, whether the contract was
supported by adequate consideration, or whether the contract was capable of being
7
interfered with. "The cause of action for tortious interference with a contract is
qualified with the requirement that the contract be 'subject to interference.' All
contracts are not subject to interference. There must at least be a 'valid' contract.
Unsupported by any valuable consideration ... these contracts were void and not
simply unenforceable." Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 115 (Tex. App. -
El Paso 1997); see also ACS Investors, Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426,
431 (Tex. 1997)( finding that the express terms of the contract in question showed
that it was not subject to tortious interference allegations, and therefore the defendant
could not have interfered as a matter of law.). Appellee failed to establish the first
element of its tortious interference claim by clear and specific evidence.
Appellee failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, the second
element of its tortious interference claim, specifically, the occurrence of an act of
interference that was willful and intentional. Appellee again cannot have it both
ways, Appellee says that the letters in question are not the letters of Senator Deuell,
but the letters of his lawyers. See Appellee 's Briefpgs. 8-9. If the letters in question
are not attributable to Senator Deuell, Appellee cannot establish that Senator Deuell
willfully and intentionally interfered with Appellee's contracts.
Appellee failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, the third element
of its tortious interference claim, specifically, the alleged the act was a proximate
8
cause of the plaintifrs damage. Appellee has not brought forth any evidence to
support the element of proximate cause.
Finally, Appellee failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, the fourth
element of its tortious interference claim, specifically, actual damage or loss
occurred. Frankly, it would be almost impossible to show that Appellee suffered
any damages at all since there is no way to establish how many votes were gained
or lost by the failure of any of the ads to air.
More importantly, Appellee cannot establish tortious interference by Senator
Deuell's attorney threatening to file a lawsuit. The TCPA provides that "a
communication in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding" constitutes the exercise of
the right to petition. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§ 27.001(4)(A)(i); James
v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Tex. App.- Houston [1 5' Dist.] 2014), rehg
overruled (Nov. 4, 2014 ). Threats related to potential litigation cannot fonn the basis
of a claim for tortious interference. See Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex.
App.- Austin, 2015).
3. Appellee waived all objections and arguments to Appellant's affirmative
defenses of judicial privilege and illegal contract.
Appellee waived all arguments regarding Appellant's affirmative defenses
because Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Chapter 27 Motion to Dismiss (C.R.
90-98) failed to address the affirmative defenses in any way. Senator Deuell's
Motion to Dismiss specifically set forth the affinnative defense of judicial privilege
9
stating that the statements in the letters were made in anticipation of litigation and
were therefore privileged under Texas law. (C.R. 16-20). The claim of judicial
privilege was supported by exhibits (C.R. 24-64) and affidavit (C.R. 65-66).
Appellee failed to challenge the pleadings or offer any controverting documents or
evidence to refute Senator Deuell's affirmative defense at the trial court.
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §27.005(d) states:
Notwithstanding of the provisions of Subsection ( c ), the court shall
dismiss a legal action against the moving party if he moving party
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element
of a valid defense to the nonmovant's claim.
However, nothing in the TCPA requires that the defendant specifically plead these
defenses prior to asserting them in a motion to dismiss. By failing to object at the
trial court, Appellee waived any complaint about the status of the pleadings. Not
only did Senator Deuell establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defense
of judicial privilege, Senator Deuell provided all of the evidence on this point. The
trial court should have dismissed the lawsuit against Senator Deuell.
Likewise, Appellee made no challenges to the pleadings and offered no
controverting affidavits in response to the defense of illegal contract, Appellant has
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, each essential element of a valid
defense of illegal contract to Appellee's tortious interference claim. Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code §27.00S(d). The trial court should have dismissed the lawsuit against
Senator Deuell.
10
CONCLUSION
The trial court should have dismissed Appellee's lawsuit pursuant to the Texas
Citizen's Participation Act and should have awarded costs and attorneys' fees to
Appellant.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant Bob Deuell prays the
Court dismiss Appellee's lawsuit pursuant to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and award
Appellant his appellate costs and remand the case to the trial court for a
determination of court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred
in defending this legal action pursuant to Section 27.009( I) of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code as well as sanctions against Appellee that the trial court
may determine would be sufficient to deter Appellee from bringing similar actions
in the future pursuant to Section 27 .009(2) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code and for such further relief to which Appellant is justly entitled.
11
SIGNED on this the 12111 day of November, 2015.
Respectfully submitted
DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C.
2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609
Austin, Texas 78745-5292
(512) 279-6431
(512) 279-6438 (Facsimile)
georne.hyde(a),rampage-aus.com
scolt.tschirhait(airampage-aus.com
=·
By:
George E. Hyde
State Bar No. 45006157
Scott M. Tschirhart
State Bar No. 24013655
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
BOB DEUELL
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), this is to certify that the
Appellant's Reply Brief contains 2,735 words, which does not include the caption,
identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral arguments, table of contents,
table of authorities, signature, proof of service, certificate of compliance and
appendix.
George E. Hyde
Scott M. Tschirhart
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has
been served upon the below named individuals as indicated, and according to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and/or via electronic notification on this the 11 'h day
of November, 2015:
N. Terry Adams, Jr. via electronic notification
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P. tadams