Daniel Ores Pulver v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
07-15-00112-CR
SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
9/16/2015 5:48:52 PM
Vivian Long, Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO FILED IN
7th COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
______________________________________________________
9/16/2015 5:48:52 PM
VIVIAN LONG
NO. 07-15-00112-CR CLERK
______________________________________________________
DANIEL ORES PULVER
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
_____________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE 222ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OLDHAM COUNTY, TEXAS
____________________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CRIMINAL APPEAL
___________________________________________________
W. BROOKS BARFIELD JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 308
AMARILLO, TX. 79105
barfieldlawfirm@gmail.com
806.468.9500
806.468.9588 Fax
SBN 00783597
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (a), I hereby certify that the following
individuals have an interest in this case. I make these representations i n order
that the members of this Court may evaluate possible disqualifications o r
recusal.
Trial Judge: Hon. Roland D. Saul
235 E. 3rd Street Rm.305
Hereford, TX 79045
State’s Attorney: Kent Birdsong
P.O. Box 698
Vega, TX 79092
Appellant: Daniel Ores Pulver
TDC#1985728
Polunsky Unit
3872 FM3505
Livingston, TX 77351
Trial Counsel: Bryan David Denham
P.O. Box 981
Pampa, TX 79066
Appellate Counsel: W. Brooks Barfield Jr.
P.O. Box 308
Amarillo, TX 79105
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Certificate of Interested Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,5
Issues Presented for Appeal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Issue One: The trial Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motion
To Supress Evidence based on the length of the traffic detention
Issue Two: The trial court erred when it allowed testimony of Appellant’s
prior criminal record during the guilt innocence portion of the trial
Issue Three: Appellant was indigent and should not have to pay court
appointed attorney’s fees
Statement of The Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Certificate of Compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
SUPREME COURT CASES
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
TEXAS CASES
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) . . . . . . . . 18
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673. (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . 18,19
St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . 18
Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . 18
Wiede v. State, 214 S.W, 3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
State v. Kelley, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . 19
State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . 19
Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) . . . . . . . . . 19
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . 19
Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App. –Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’) 19,20
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 97 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Tijerina v. State, 334 S.W.3d 825, 835 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2011, pet ref’d). 24
Downer v. Aquamarine Operations Inc, 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42
(Tex. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . 25
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Mayer v. State, 274 S.W.3d 898, 901 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2008) . . . . . . . . . 27
aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Barrera v. State, 291 S.W.3d 515, 518. (Tex. App. Amarillo 2009, no pet.)
(per curiam). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
STATUTES AND RULES
Texas Transportation Code Section 545.352 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Article 38.23 Texas Rule Criminal Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Tex. Code Criminal Procedure Art. 26.04(p) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 26.05(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS
Fourth Amendment United States Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,23
TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Article 1 Section 10 of the Texas Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Issue One: The trial Court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motion
To Suppress Evidence based on the length of the traffic detention.
Issue Two: The trial court erred when it allowed testimony of Appellant’s
prior criminal record during the guilt innocence portion of the trial.
Issue Three: Appellant was indigent and should not have to pay court
appointed attorney’s fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, heroin, in
amount of 400 grams or more enhanced. CR vol.1 pg.6-7. Appellant was appointed
counsel as indicated by counsel’s pay sheet. CR vol.1 pg.98. The trial court
conducted a suppression hearing wherein the trial court denied defense’s motion to
suppress evidence based on the length of the traffic stop detention.CR vol.1 pg.9-
11. RR vol.2 pg.63. A jury trial was held and Appellant was found guilty and
sentenced to 70 years in prison and fined $70,000.00 by the jury. CR vol.1 pg. RR
vol.5 pg.155; vol.6 pg. 67. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of law were filed on
January 18, 2015. CR vol.1 pg.52-53. The bill of costs reflects that appellant was
charged appointed attorney’s fees of $2397.00. CR pg.101.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUPPRESSION HEARING
Testimony Paul Weller
DPS Trooper Weller testified his duties were traffic enforcement and drug
interdiction on Interstate 40, U.S. 385 and any road in Oldham County. RR vol.2
pg.6. He testified he had been involved in about 12 to 15 drug stops. In 2012
Trooper Weller stopped Appellant for traveling 78 miles per hour in a 75 mile per
hour zone around the 29 mile marker on Interstate 40 in Oldham County. Trooper
Weller initially observed a Chevrolet Malibu headed eastbound and confirmed the
speed with radar. RR vol.2 pg.7-8,128.
When Trooper Weller approached the vehicle he asked appellant for his
driver’s license and rental agreement. Trooper Weller advised appellant he was
going to give him a warning and appellant went back to the patrol car and sat in the
passenger seat. Trooper Weller noticed Appellant had a limp and Appellant advised
that he had an artificial limb. RR viol.2 pg.9.
The trooper described appellant as nervous with shallow breathing and
avoiding eye contact. Trooper Weller testified appellant was not sure how to answer
some of the trooper’s questions. Appellant advised the trooper initially he was
headed to an Elton John concert in Chicago. RR vol.2 pg.10. Trooper Weller
checked on line with his phone and discovered Elton John was not playing a concert
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in Chicago that weekend. RR vol.2 pg.11.
The trooper asked appellant whether his driver’s license had ever been
suspended and if appellant had ever been arrested. Appellant advised his license
was suspended 10 years ago. The trooper’s computer did not show a license
suspension but it showed appellant had a significant criminal history, including
possession charges. RR vol.2 pg.12-13. The trooper testified he believed appellant
misrepresented his criminal history to him because appellant only advised the
trooper of two previous convictions. The Trooper testified after prompting from the
prosecutor that the vehicle had a lived in look and that was an indicator in drug
interdiction. The trooper also testified that both his patrol vehicle and family vehicle
have a lived in look so he didn’t feel that fact was important enough to include in
his report. RR vol.2 pg.13-15,36.
Trooper Weller testified there was a passenger in the vehicle named Brandi
Lynn Grammer. She also told the trooper they were going to Chicago to see an Elton
John Concert. Ms. Grammer indicated she did not even know what State they were
in and that they stayed somewhere in California and that they were going to the
coast. The trooper could not remember exactly what she said as to where she lived.
The trooper then went back to talk to appellant. Appellant told the trooper that they
were coming from Jerome Idaho that they had considered going to the coast but it
was too far. Appellant advised that they came through Las Vegas. RR vol.2 pg.15-
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16.
Appellant told the trooper that they had stayed at the Royal Inn in Riverside
or Chino. That did not make sense to the trooper because that location was only 50
minutes from the coast. At that point Trooper Weller asked if there was anything
illegal in the vehicle, including marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, large
amounts of cash, or prohibited weapons. Appellant responded no to all. RR vol.2
pg.17-19. Trooper Weller asked appellant if he could search the vehicle. Appellant
asked the trooper why he wanted to search the vehicle. Trooper Weller advised that
he believed there was illegal contraband in the vehicle. RR vol.2 pg.19.
Appellant advised the trooper that he was kind of in a hurry. Trooper Weller
advised he was going to call the canine unit. Trooper Weller made the stop at 5:17
RR vol.2 pg.20. Trooper Weller was not sure what time he asked for consent to
search the first time but believed it was 11 minutes in to the stop and the dog was
called within 12 minutes. However, no dog was available from either DPS. RR vol.2
pg.21. There were also no dogs available in Oldham County or Deaf Smith County.
RR vol.2 pg.23. A dog from Randall County finally arrived at approximately 6:10
p.m. but the trooper was not sure of the time. RR vol.2 pg.24.
Once the dog got there the Trooper testified he observed the dog alert to the
vehicle. A search was then conducted. RR vol.2 pg.25. The trooper found four
bundles of heroin in the rear door panel on the passenger side of the vehicle. RR
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vol.2 pg.26. State’s Exhibits 1-9, photographs of the scene were admitted. RR vol.2
pg.27. The trooper stated that the reason he asked to search the vehicle was based
on appellant’s misrepresentation of his criminal history, the reason for the trip to see
Elton John in Chicago when he was not even having a concert in Chicago were
determining factors for the trooper. RR vol.2 pg.27. In addition the coast story, and
the travel route described was also a factor in his decision. RR vol.2 pg.28.
The trooper’s synopsis in his report for the stop was the route of the trip,
appellant was nervous, and appellant’s criminal history. RR vol.2 pg.29. Trooper
Weller testified that the statements of Ms. Grammer and appellant were consistent
with one another. RR vol.2 pg.30-3,40-41. The trooper testified that someone would
be nervous just talking with a police officer. RR vol.2 pg.33. The trooper testified
that there were times when he searched a vehicle based on his suspicion and no drugs
were found. RR vol.2 pg.34.
Testimony Brandon Riefers
Trooper Riefers testified on March 22, 2012, he was involved with a stop with
Trooper Weller. Trooper Riefers did not write a report on the incident and testified
he only remembered bits and pieces of the incident. Trooper Riefers found the
contraband in the rear passenger side door panel. RR vol.2 pg.43-44. Trooper Weller
told Trooper Riefers that he found a star bit in the trunk by the spare tire. Trooper
Riefers testified that tool should not be in a rent car unless somebody put it there for
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a reason. So he started looking for where it would fit in the rental car. Trooper
Riefers pushed the grommet in on the rear door, looked in the door and saw the foil
bundles. RR vol.2 pg.45. Trooper Riefers noticed the screw in rear door had been
tooled and then the door panel was removed. The amount they found was 6.3 pounds
of heroin according to the lab report. RR vol.2 pg.46.
Brandi Grammer
Ms. Grammer testified that Mr. Pulver was her boyfriend. She recalled when
they were pulled over. RR vol.2 pg.49. She testified they were headed to Chicago
Illinois to see an Elton John concert as a gift. They were coming from Jerome Idaho
via Los Angeles. RR vol.2 pg.50. The reason for going through Los Angeles was
because it was a scenic route. When they were pulled over Ms. Grammer was asleep.
When she spoke to the trooper she told him they were going to see Elton John. RR
vol.2 pg.51. Ms. Grammer testified she had known appellant for seven years and he
did not appear to be nervous during the stop. Ms. Grammer testified that neither
she nor appellant gave consent to search the vehicle. RR vol.2 pg.52-53,56.
The trial court denied defense’s motion to suppress base on the totality of the
circumstances and on the fact that the defendant gave consent to search the vehicle
after he initially refused. RR vol.2 pg.63; CR vol.1 pg.52-53.
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JURY TRIAL
Paul Weller Testimony
On March 22, 2012, Trooper Weller stopped appellant, who was driving a
silver rental car from Washington State, for speeding in Oldham County. The trooper
testified the vehicle was traveling 78 in a 75 mile per hour zone. RR vol.4 pg.79-
80,102. Trooper Weller testified he did not observe anything unusual about
appellant’s demeanor. RR vol.4 pg.81. He asked appellant to have a seat in the patrol
car which he did. RR vol.4 pg.81.
Trooper Weller asked appellant where he and the passenger in the vehicle
were going. Appellant informed the Trooper they were traveling from Jerome Idaho
to a concert in Chicago. RR vol.4, pg. 126. Trooper Weller noticed a difference
between what appellant told him about appellant’s criminal history and what he
found on the computer search. RR vol.4 pg.83. In addition the Trooper testified he
did an internet search and saw that Elton John was not going to be in Chicago that
weekend. RR vol.4 pg.87. The passenger, Ms. Grammer, confirmed they were going
to an Elton John concert and that they had been out in California. RR vol.4
pg.88,126. Trooper Weller testified that appellant and Ms. Grammer’s statements
corroborated one another. RR vol.4 pg.126.
Trooper Weller testified appellant advised that they had traveled to Chino or
El Reno. RR vol.2 pg.89. The trooper testified that he became suspicious based
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upon the manner in which appellant answered his questions, appellant was avoiding
eye contact and appellant’s shallow rapid breathing. The trooper testified that those
were indicators for criminal activity. In addition, although the trooper didn’t put it
in his report nor did the trooper use it as an indicator of criminal activity the vehicle
had a lived in look. RR vol.4 pg.90.
Trooper Weller asked for consent to search the vehicle and whether appellant
had anything illegal in the vehicle. Appellant denied there was any contraband in
the vehicle. RR vol.4 pg.91. When asked for consent to search, according to the
trooper, aappellant avoided the question, but inquired of Trooper Weller why he
wanted to search the vehicle. Trooper Weller advised because he believed that there
was contraband in the vehicle. Appellant advised he was in a hurry and he would
prefer that the trooper not search the vehicle. At that point the trooper called a canine
unit, and at that point appellant consented to the search. Trooper Weller testified it
was his policy that once there was a refusal that he considered that a refusal for all
purposes. RR vol.4 pg.92-93.
A canine arrived from Randall County which was approximately 45 miles
away. The trooper was not sure how long it took for the dog to arrive at the scene.
RR vol.4 pg.94.
Deputy Riley, the Canine officer, conducted the search and the dog got a
positive hit for the smell of narcotics. The dog started scratching at the car which
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gave the trooper probable cause to search the vehicle. Trooper Weller’s search lasted
approximately 15 minutes. Trooper Riefers assisted with the search. Trooper Weller
during the search found a set of star bits and a ratchet in the trunk in the spare tire
well which the trooper believed would not be consistent with being in a rental
vehicle. RR vol.4 pg.95, 119. The trooper started looking in the vehicle to detect any
areas in the interior of the vehicle that may have been tooled or messed with.
Trooper Riefers actually noticed a door panel could have been taken off. He removed
a rubber grommet and shined his flashlight inside the door panel and saw aluminum
foil. The troopers placed appellant and Ms. Grammer under arrest. Then the trooper
took off the door panel of the passenger rear door. Inside were four bundles of
contraband which contained white powder which weighed 6.3 pounds. RR vol.4
pg.96, 108.
They field tested the substance the next day and the field test turned blue
indicating contraband. RR vol.4 pg.97. State’s Exhibits 1-3 and 6-11, photographs
of the scene and evidence seized were admitted. RR vol.4 pg.100.
Appellant never admitted to having knowledge of the contraband. RR vol.4
pg.104. State’s Exhibit 4, a map of the United States was admitted. RR vol.4 pg.106.
The trooper used a blue marker on the map to indicate the route as described
by appellant. RR vol.4 pg.106-107. State’s Exhibit 12 the DVD of the stop was
admitted in evidence. RR vol.4 pg.113. When appellant was asked to provide a rental
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agreement and his license he complied and there was nothing unusual about either
document. Appellant cooperated with the stop. RR vol.4 pg.116.
Scott Riley Testimony
Deputy Riley testified he worked for the Randall County Sheriff as a canine
officer. He attended 80 hours of training to be a canine officer. RR vol.5 pg.13-14.
His canine was named Luno. RR vol.5 pg.15. Deputy Riley described the canine
training in detail. RR vol.5 pg. Deputy Riley testified that Luno was certified by the
National Narcotic Dog Detection Association and the National Police Canine
Association. RR vol.5 pg.16. State’s Exhibits 24, 25 and 26 the canine certification
documents were admitted in evidence. RR vol.5 pg.18.
On March 22, 2012, Deputy Riley came to Oldham County with Luno from
the Randall County Sheriff’s Office to mile marker 29 in Oldham County a distance
of 46 miles. RR vol.5 pg.20. He arrived on scene at 6:12. RR vol5 pg.21. Deputy
Riley testified that if Luno alerts he will notice the dog’s breathing gets more rapid
and a change in its body posture. When Luno has an aggressive alert he will scratch
and a passive alert he sits. RR vol.5 pg.23. For the incident in question Luno
scratched. RR vol.5 pg.24.
The dog alerted on the driver’s passenger side first and then it alerted again
on the passenger rear door. RR vol.5 pg.26. Once the dog alerted he advised Trooper
Weller and appellant. At that point Deputy Riley stood back while the troopers
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conducted the search. RR vol.5 pg.27.
Deputy Riley testified that Luno missed narcotics but he did not know the rate.
RR vol.5 pg.29. Deputy Riley testified that the probable cause for the search was
the alert. RR vol.5 pg.34.
Testimony Brandon Riefers
On March 22, 2012, Trooper Riefers assisted Trooper Weller in searching the
vehicle appellant was driving. He testified that he observed the bit tool found in the
trunk of the vehicle. He testified that in his experience that often times drugs are
hidden in door panels in vehicles. Trooper Riefers explained how he found the
contraband. Trooper Riefers identified State’s Exhibit 29 as being a photograph of
the star bit tool. RR vol.5 pg.38-39. That tool was used to open the door panel. RR
vol.5 pg40. State’s 14, photo of appellant on the day of the arrest was admitted.
Trooper Riefers did not know how long his average traffic stop lasts. RR vol.5 pg45.
Trooper testified that the street value for the drugs as being $757,472.34. RR vol.5
pg.137.
Marjorie Robison Testimony
Ms. Robison testified that she was a chemist for the Texas Department of
Public Safety as a forensic scientist. RR vol.5 pg.51. She testified she tested the
evidence contained in State’s Exhibit 28. The tests revealed the contents were
heroine in the amount of 2.67 Kilograms or 5.85 pounds which included the
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adulterants and dilutants. The Lab report prepared by Ms. Robison was admitted as
States Exhibit 23. RR vol.5 pg.55-58, 60-62,105.
Brian Frick Testimony
Investigator Frick testified he worked for the Texas Department of Public
Safety. RR vol.5 pg.109. On March 22, 2012, he interviewed appellant in Oldham
County over the telephone. RR vol.5 pg.113. He and D.E.A. Agent Carlos Perez then
interviewed appellant in person in Oldham County on March 23, 2012 for about 45
minutes. Appellant was Mirandized and did not ask for an attorney. RR vol.5
pg.114-115,119. Appellant advised Investigator Frick that he was coming from Los
Angeles California from Jerome Idaho. RR vol.5pg.117-118. Appellant related to
the investigators that he had gone to a hotel in Indio California that he was going to
be paid $1500.00 to transport 2,670 grams of heroin. RR vol.5 pg.121. Appellant
had advised that he had made a previous trip to Chicago in the same rental car on
the same route making a dry run. RR vol.5 pg.122-124. In addition to the $1500.00,
he was also given front money of $800.00 for travel expenses. RR vol.5 pg.125.
Appellant obtained the drugs in Indio and then headed for California. RR vol.5
pg.125. The recording of the interview was admitted as State’s Exhibit 19. RR vol.5
pg.126.
The jury found appellant guilty. RR vol.5 pg.155. Appellant plead true to the
enhancement paragraph in the indictment. RR vol.6 pg.6. State’s Exhibit 20,
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Appellant s judgment made the basis of the enhancement in the indictment was
admitted in evidence. The jury sentenced Appellant to 70 years in prison and a fine
of $70,000.00. RR vol.6 pg.67.
ARGUMENT
In his first point of error appellant contends the trial Court abused its
discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the duration
of the traffic stop.
In his second point of error appellant contends the trial court erred in
overruling defense counsel’s objection to evidence of appellant’s prior criminal
conduct during the guilt innocence portion of the trial.
In his third point of error appellant asserts he was indigent throughout the
trial and should not be accessed court appointed attorney’s fees.
ISSUE ONE: STANDARD OF REVIEW MOTION TO SUPPRESS
An appellate Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence for an abuse of discretion standard. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323,
327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The appellate Court uses a bifurcated standard of
review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673. (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The
appellate Court does not engage in its own factual review. St. George v. State, 237
S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543
18 | P a g e
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The appellate Court gives almost total deference to the
trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, especially when based on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions
that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Armador, 221 S.W.3d at
673. Appellate Courts review de novo “mixed question of law and fact” that do not
depend upon credibility or demeanor. Id.
An appellate court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W, 3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
State v. Kelley, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An appellate
Court may uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct
under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736,
740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A police office may lawfully stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants
for investigative purposes if, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer has
a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that a traffic offense has
occurred. See Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In such
a circumstances the detention must be no longer than is reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop. Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997); Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App. –Amarillo 2003, pet.
19 | P a g e
ref’d). As part of the traffic stop, the officer may require the detainee to identify
himself, produce a driver’s license, and provide proof of insurance. Id. The officer
may also inquire of the driver and passengers about their destination and the purpose
of their trip. Id. The officer may also check for outstanding warrants for the
detainees and once the purpose for the stop has been effectuated, request for
voluntary consent to search the vehicle or continue the detention. Id At that point,
the detention may be involuntarily extended only if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion, again sufficiently supported by articulable facts that the detainee has
been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21-22 (1968); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
In the present case the trial court in denying appellant’s motion to suppress
found that the totality of the circumstances justified an involuntary detention. RR
vol.2 pg.63. CR vol.1 pg.52-53.
Trooper Weller testified he stopped Appellant’s vehicle for traveling 78
miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone. Appellant does not argue the legality of
the initial traffic stop. See Texas Transportation Code Section 545.352.
There is no dispute in this case that the seizure was a warrantless seizure.
Appellant contends that Trooper Weller violated his constitutional rights pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment United States Constitution, under Article 1 Section 10
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Texas Constitution, and Texas Rule Criminal Procedure Article 38.23. “No
evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence
against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. §38.23.
Appellant contends that the evidence in the case demonstrates Appellant was
cooperative during the traffic stop. Appellant provided a valid driver’s license, and
valid rental agreement when requested. He cooperated with the stop and answered
Trooper Wellers questions regarding the destination of the trip and purpose of the
trip. Appellant told Trooper Weller they were headed to Chicago to see a concert,
and that they had traveled from Jerome Idaho to Los Angeles and were then headed
to Chicago. This was entirely and completely confirmed by Ms. Grammer whom
was left in the alone while appellant was in the patrol vehicle. Trooper Weller did
not receive conflicting stories from the detainee’s regarding the purpose or their
destination.
There was no indication of any other criminal activity in this case. The rental
agreement confirmed Appellant did not own the vehicle and the vehicle was rented.
The contraband was found inside the vehicle’s rear passenger door totally
inaccessible to the occupants of the vehicle. The star bit device was not observed
during the initial detention to raise suspicion that any contraband was hidden in the
vehicle. Trooper Weller did not observe any obvious altercations to the vehicle
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during the initial detention to raise suspicion contraband was being transported.
The trooper did not smell any scent such as marijuana, alcohol or other
chemicals emitting from the vehicle to raise suspicion of criminal activity. The
trooper did not observe any drugs or drug paraphernalia in the vehicle or on the
person of either detainee. No evidence was present during the stop Appellant was
driving impaired by the use of alcohol or drugs.
Trooper Weller found it totally reasonable that the vehicle had a lived in
look as the detainees were going on a long trip and the trooper’s vehicles
themselves normally had a lived in look. Further, neither detainee had outstanding
warrants to require further detention. Ms. Grammer testified at the suppression
hearing that appellant was not acting nervous and that she had known him for
seven years. In addition, Trooper Weller at the suppression hearing testified that it
would be perfectly reasonable for someone with a criminal history, as appellant
had, to be nervous when detained by law enforcement. Appellant denied that there
was any contraband in the vehicle, nor did Ms. Grammer do anything to indicate
criminal activity was afoot.
Appellant gave a very appropriate response by asking why the trooper
wanted to search the vehicle and appellant gave a reasonable answer that he was in
a hurry to get to Chicago when asked for consent to search. Instead of
acknowledging appellant’s answers and writing a warning or citation for speeding
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Trooper Weller continued to press appellant to search the vehicle while appellant
was still in the patrol vehicle and threatened further detention with a canine search.
Holding appellant in the patrol vehicle for almost another thirty minutes while a
canine unit arrived. Appellant contends at that point is when the detention became
an unconstitutional illegal detention.
Appellant contends when viewed under the totality of the circumstances the
evidence unequivocally proves there was no reasonable articulable basis for
Trooper Weller to involuntarily detain appellant other than to issue the original
warning that he advised appellant he was going to issue originally. Appellant’s
conviction should be reversed.
HARM ANALYSIS
Appellate asserts that he was harmed because of the fact that the illegally
obtained evidence was admitted in to evidence. Davis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 94, 97
(Tex. App. Amarillo 2001). An appellate court reviews the harm from a trial court’s
erroneous denial of a motion to suppress and subsequent admission of the evidence
obtained in violation of the United States Constitution Fourth Amendment under
the constitutional standard of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a). The
evaluation by the appellate Court of the entire record is then made “in a neutral,
impartial, and even handed manner, not in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.” Unless the appellate court determines “beyond a reasonable doubt that
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the error did not contribute to appellant’s conviction or punishment” the Court
“must reverse a judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.” Tijerina v.
State, 334 S.W.3d 825, 835 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2011, pet ref’d).
In the present case appellant contends that there was a reasonable probability
the erroneous introduction of the heroin found inside the door compartment of the
rental car certainly resulted in not only in his conviction but in the 70 years prison
sentence and $70,000.00 fine handed out by the jury. Id. Because of the trial court’s
error, appellant contends his conviction should be reversed and or remanded for new
trial on the merits without the introduction of the illegally obtained evidence.
ISSUE TWO: TEXAS RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the present case appellant asserts the trial court arbitrarily and/or
unreasonably overruled defense counsel’s Rule 403 objection as to appellant’s prior
criminal record during the guilt innocence portion of the trial. Appellant contends
the trial court abused its discretion and said ruling did not conform to the guiding
rules and principals of law. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operations Inc, 701 S.W.
2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). The abuse of discretion standard applies to evidentiary
rulings. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Texas Rule of Evidence 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
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prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Appellant contends the trial court did not conduct the proper legal analysis
when it made its ruling. The trial court when faced with a Rule 403 objection “must
balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with
(2) the proponents need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence
to suggest decision on improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse
or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be
given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative
force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood the presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.”
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641-642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
APPLICATION TO PRESENT CASE
Defense counsel objected to the Testimony of Trooper Weller testifying
about appellant’s prior criminal record under Rule 403 Texas Rules of Evidence.
Trooper Weller testified:
A: When I ran the criminal history, he informed me that he had
been arrested for DUI and an assault or battery, but there
was some other drug arrests that—he did not mention.
Mr. Denham: Objection, Your Honor. It’s prejudicial, Your Honor.
it has no materiality as to the charge today, Your Honor.
The Court: Well, that’s overruled. I think he has explained that.
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RR vol.4 pg.83.
In the present case the record clearly demonstrates the trial court did not
conduct a Rule 403 balancing test pertaining to the highly prejudicial evidence that
appellant had several prior criminal convictions, including drug convictions.
Consequently, the trial court erred and abused its discretion. Appellant’s conviction
should therefore be reversed.
ISSUE THREE: APPOINTED ATTORNEY’S FEES
In his third point of error appellant asserts he was indigent throughout the
trial and should not be accessed court appointed attorney’s fees.
The Clerk’s record vol.1 pg.101 reflects that Appellant was apparently
charged court appointed attorney’s fees in the amount of $2397.00. There appears
a handwritten notation on the bill of costs to add the exact amount of the fees
claimed by appointed counsel.CR vol.1 p.101. This is not included in the printed
and calculated portion of the Bill of Costs. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution
and in the event appellant was taxed cost for his fee appellant contends that it was
error to charge the attorney fee and that his case should be reversed or the judgment
modified.
A trial court has the authority to order reimbursement of the fees of a court-
appointed counsel if the court determines that a defendant has the financial
resources enabling her/him to offset, in part or whole, the costs of the legal services
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provided. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 26.05(g). Mayer v. State, 274 S.W.3d 898,
901 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2008) aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). But
“[a] defendant who is determined to be indigent by the court to be indigent is
presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless
a material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances occurs.” Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Art. 26.04 (p). “The defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay
are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of
ordering reimbursement of costs and fees.” Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 556.
Accordingly, the record must supply a factual basis supporting a determination the
defendant is capable of repaying the attorney’s fees levied. Barrera v. State, 291
S.W.3d 515, 518. (Tex. App. Amarillo 2009, no pet.)(per curiam).
In the present case the record shows no evidence that the trial court
reconsidered its determination of indecency, the occurrence of a material change of
circumstances in appellant’s financial circumstances, or his ability to offset the cost
of legal services provided. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 26.04(p) and Art. 26.05(g).
Appellant asserts that his financial condition became worse as the jury
accessed a fine of $70,000.00 against appellant. As such appellant contends the
attorney’s fees should be modified.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant contends the trial Court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s
motion to suppress evidence based on the duration of the traffic stop in violation of
the Fourth Amendment U.S. Constitution, Article I Section 10 Texas Constitution
and Article 38.23 Texas Rule Criminal Procedure.
In his second point of error appellant contends the trial court erred in
overruling defense counsel’s objection to evidence of appellant’s prior criminal
record during the guilt innocence portion of the trial pursuant to Texas Rule of
Evidence 403.
In his third point of error appellant asserts he was indigent throughout the
trial and should not be accessed court appointed attorney’s fees.
PRAYER
Appellant prays that his conviction be reversed or reversed and remanded,
the Bill of Costs be modified to remove any accessed appointed counsel fees and
for any and all other relief the Court deems appropriate.
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Respectfully submitted,
/S/ W. Brooks Barfield Jr.
P.O. Box 308
Amarillo, Texas 79105
806.468.9500
806.468.9588 FAX
barfieldlawfirm@gmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document brief was prepared with Microsoft Word 7, and
that, according to that program’s word-count function, the sections covered by
TRAP 9.4(i)(1) contain 7,130 words.
/S/ W. Brooks Barfield Jr.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant’s brief was delivered to the
222nd District Court of Oldham County, Texas; the Oldham County District
Attorney’s office, and mailed to Appellant on September 16, 2015.
/S/ W. Brooks Barfield Jr.
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