Frederick Don Gaddis v. State ( 2015 )

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed October 20, 2015.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-01000-CR
FREDERICK DON GADDIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 380-81994-2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Richter1
Opinion by Justice Stoddart
A jury convicted Frederick Don Gaddis of one count of aggravated sexual assault of a
child and sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement. The jury also convicted him of two
counts of indecency with a child and sentenced him to twelve years’ confinement for each
offense. In two issues on appeal, Gaddis asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials and by denying his motion for
new trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1
The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Assigned.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Gaddis filed a pre-trial motion asking the trial court to suppress statements he made on
April 29, 2013, May 1, 2013, May 6, 2013, and May 14, 2013, to Detective Chris Jones of the
Plano Police Department. He also sought suppression of his statements to a polygraph examiner
on May 6, 2013. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and listened to recordings of
two of the conversations between Gaddis and Jones.
Jones testified at the hearing that he was assigned to the Children’s Advocacy Center in
Plano, Texas, and he investigated the allegations against Gaddis. Jones first contacted Gaddis by
phone on April 29, 2013. During the phone call, Jones informed Gaddis that the complainant
alleged Gaddis inappropriately touched her. Gaddis agreed to an in-person interview with Jones.
On May 1, 2013, Gaddis voluntarily met Jones at the Children’s Advocacy Center.
Gaddis was not transported to the center in police custody. The center is not part of the Collin
County jail, and does not include any jail cells or holding cells. However, the center has a secure
entrance and a person must be admitted to access rooms other than the reception area. Gaddis
and Jones met in the “family room” at the center. Gaddis was not handcuffed and was not
given the warnings required by Miranda2 or the code of criminal procedure.3 Jones testified: “As
a matter of fact, I told him that he would not be arrested today, however, I would still be
conducting an investigation.” Jones let Gaddis know he was free to leave, he did not have to
make a statement, and he could stop talking to Jones if he wanted to.
On May 1, Jones told Gaddis about the complainant’s allegations. Jones also informed
Gaddis that Jones did not need to interview him and could have obtained a warrant for his arrest.
Gaddis denied the allegations during the interview.
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN art. 38.22 (West Supp. 2014).
–2–
The second time Jones and Gaddis spoke in person was on May 6, 2013, after Gaddis had
undergone a polygraph examination. Gaddis drove himself to the polygraph examiner’s office.
Before Jones spoke to Gaddis on May 6, Jones spoke to the person administering the polygraph.
The polygraph examiner told Jones that Gaddis failed the polygraph.
When Gaddis talked to the polygraph examiner and to Jones on May 6, he was not
handcuffed and he was told he was free to leave. Jones said to Gaddis: “Even though we are not
in a police room setting or whatever, if you don’t want to talk about it no [sic] more, you don’t
have to. You can leave at any time.” Gaddis did not leave, but instead talked to Jones and
admitted to inappropriate contact with the complainant. After the interview, Gaddis left in his
own car.
Jones arrested Gaddis on May 14, 2013, and interviewed him at the Plano jail. Prior to
the interview, Jones Mirandized Gaddis and Gaddis executed a written statement showing he
waived his Miranda rights. During the May 14 interview, Gaddis again admitted to
inappropriate sexual contact with the complainant.
After hearing Jones’s testimony, two recordings of conversations between Jones and
Gaddis, and the arguments of counsel, the trial court concluded Gaddis had noncustodial
conversations with Jones on May 1 and May 6, and he had noncustodial conversations with the
polygraph examiner on May 6. After the May 1 and May 6 conversations, Gaddis was allowed
to leave, was not placed under arrest, and was not detained in any way. The trial court further
concluded the methods used to obtain Gaddis’s May 14 statement did not violate the constitution
or article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure. The trial court denied Gaddis’s motion to
suppress.
Gaddis later filed a motion for new trial arguing the trial court erred by admitting
Gaddis’s statements to Jones because Gaddis did not receive proper warnings.
–3–
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial
court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court’s application of the
law to the facts de novo. Id. We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts, particularly when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor. Id. We give the same deference to the trial court’s conclusions with
respect to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz,
382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review mixed questions of law and fact that
do not turn on credibility and demeanor as well as purely legal questions de novo. Id. As a
general rule, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and
afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013).
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion
standard. Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When a trial court
denies a motion for new trial, it abuses its discretion “only when no reasonable view of the
record could support the trial court’s ruling.” Id.
LAW & ANALYSIS
Gaddis argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress and for new trial
because he made statements to law enforcement officials without receiving proper warnings and,
therefore, the admission of his statements violated article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure and his constitutional rights.
–4–
The constitutionally required Miranda warnings and the warnings mandated by article
38.22 are intended to safeguard a person’s privilege against self-incrimination during custodial
interrogation. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Herrera v. State,
241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A person is in custody only if, under all the
objective circumstances, a reasonable person would believe his freedom of movement was
restrained to the degree associated with an arrest. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254-55
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The determination of custody is made on an ad hoc basis and depends
entirely on the objective circumstances. Id.
The court of criminal appeals outlined four general situations that may constitute custody:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; (2)
when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave; (3) when law enforcement
officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of
movement has been significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and
law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Id. at 255. The first three
situations require that the restriction on a suspect’s freedom of movement must reach “the degree
associated with an arrest” instead of an investigative detention. Id. The fourth situation requires
that the officer’s knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect. Id.
The record shows Gaddis was not in custody when he spoke to Jones on April 29, 2013,
May 1, 2013, and May 6, 2013. He also was not in custody when he spoke to the polygraph
administrator on May 6, 2013. Therefore, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings or warnings
pursuant to article 38.22.
Gaddis’s first conversation with Jones was by telephone. Nothing in the record indicates
Gaddis was in custody during the telephone call, and the simple act of talking to an officer on the
telephone does not constitute a custodial interrogation. See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 294-95; see
–5–
also Bolton v. State, No. 08-10-00091-CR, 2011 WL 241970, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 26,
2011, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Poitinger v. State, No. 14-07-00155-CR, 2008
WL 1838981, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (appellant not in custody when officer spoke to him on the phone and
no Miranda warnings were required).
Likewise, when Gaddis met with Jones and the polygraph examiner in person, he was not
in custody. During these meetings, Gaddis was not physically deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way and neither Jones nor the polygraph examiner created a situation that
would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement had been significantly
restricted. Rather, Gaddis drove himself to both meetings, was not handcuffed, was told he was
free to leave, and did leave on his own at the end of the meetings. There was no restraint on the
freedom of his movements. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254-55.
Because Gaddis was not in custody on April 29, 2013, May 1, 2013, or May 6, 2013,
when he spoke to Jones and the polygraph examiner, Gaddis was not entitled to warnings under
the constitution or the code of criminal procedure. See Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526 (citing TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22). We conclude the trial court did not err by denying Gaddis’s
motion to suppress these statements.
As to the May 14 interview, Gaddis argues that the statements he made on April 29, May
1, and May 6 were tainted and “any of the same or substantially the same statements
subsequently made by Appellant [on May 14] ought to have been deemed equally and fully as
[sic] tainted as well.” He does not assert he was not properly warned on May 14. However,
because we conclude Gaddis was not entitled to warnings on April 29, 2013, May 1, 2013, and
May 6, 2013, and Gaddis did receive warnings before making his May 14, 2013 statement—at
which time he was under arrest and in custody—we conclude the trial court also did not err by
–6–
denying the motion to suppress the May 14 statements. For the same reasons, we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for new trial on the same grounds.
We overrule Gaddis’s first and second issues.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Craig Stoddart/
CRAIG STODDART
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
141000F.U05
–7–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
FREDERICK DON GADDIS, Appellant On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-14-01000-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 380-81994-2013.
Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Fillmore and Richter participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 20th day of October, 2015.
–8–