Michael Prentiss Prechtl v. State ( 2015 )

Affirmed as Modified; Opinion Filed November 5, 2015.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-01068-CR
No. 05-14-01069-CR
No. 05-14-01070-CR
MICHAEL PRENTISS PRECHTL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1135251-X, F-1135252-X, and F-1410028-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Evans, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Lang
Michael Prentiss Prechtl appeals the trial court’s: (1) judgment of conviction for the
offense of assault involving family violence;1 and (2) judgments adjudicating his guilt for the
offenses of (a) possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or
more, but less than two hundred grams,2 and (b) possession of oxycodone in an amount less than
one gram.3 The jury found Prechtl guilty of assault involving family violence and the trial court
assessed his punishment at ten years of imprisonment. Also, the trial court adjudicated Prechtl
guilty of the offense of possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine and assessed his
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2014).
2
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010).
3
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a)–(b) (West 2010).
punishment at twenty-five years of imprisonment. Further, the trial court adjudicated Prechtl
guilty of the offense of possession of oxycodone and assessed his punishment at six months of
confinement.
In two separate briefs, Prechtl raises a total of two issues arguing: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction for assault involving family violence; and (2) the trial court
abused its discretion when it granted the State’s motion to proceed with adjudication of guilt and
adjudicated him guilty of the offenses of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine and
possession of oxycodone.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Prechtl’s conviction for assault
involving family violence. Also, we conclude the trial court did not err when it adjudicated
Prechtl guilty of the offenses of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine and
possession of oxycodone. Further, we modify the judgments adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt to
reflect the correct statutes for the offenses. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed as modified.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2012, Prechtl was indicted for the offenses of possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more, but less than two hundred grams and
possession of oxycodone in an amount less than one gram. Prechtl waived a jury trial and
pleaded guilty to both offenses. Pursuant to plea agreements, on January 2, 2013, the trial court:
(1) deferred adjudication of Prechtl’s guilt in the possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine case and ordered that he be placed on seven years of community supervision;
and (2) deferred adjudication of Prechtl’s guilt in the possession of oxycodone case and ordered
that he be placed on community supervision for five years.
Eternity Allcock met Pretchl in January 2014 and immediately began living with him.
During the three months they lived together, Allcock and Prechtl “pass[ed] the time” by having
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sex, using drugs, and taking “a lot of pictures.” Also, Allcock claimed that, during this time,
Prechtl kept the door locked and she was not free to leave, unless Prechtl or one of his friends
accompanied her.
On March 16, 2014, Allcock went shopping with a friend. While they were out,
Allcock’s friend told Allcock that she “needed to get out.” Also, the friend stated that she was
not taking Allcock back to Prechtl. However, Allcock wanted to go back to the hotel room
where she stayed with Prechtl to get her “stuff.” Allcock’s friend refused to accompany her back
to the hotel room because she was scared, so Allcock “had two black guys take [her] back.” One
of those men was a good friend of Prechtl.
At the hotel, Prechtl told the men who accompanied Allcock to leave and they did. As a
result, Allcock was alone in the hotel room with Prechtl who was angry with her. Also, Allcock
told a hotel employee that she was staying with Prechtl. Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. that night,
Prechtl’s probation officer met with Prechtl in the hotel room. The probation officer observed a
woman standing quietly to the side, but she did not appear to be threatened or in danger.
According to Allocock, “all that day and then all night” Prechtl hit her, including
breaking her cellular telephone over her head, and strangled her. Allcock stated Prechtl strangled
her multiple times and that she sometimes lost consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, Allcock found burn marks on her face and legs. Also, Allocock stated she was
high on methamphetamine the entire time and admitted it sometimes affects her memory.
The next morning, Prechtl told Allocock to put on a turtleneck and sweatpants to cover
up the marks and bruises on her body. Then, he instructed her to go to the hotel lobby and “tell
them that [Allcock’s] dad was coming [t]o pay [for the room].” Instead, Allcock asked the hotel
office to call 9-1-1. The hotel employee observed that Allcock was scared and crying. Allcock
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told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that a her boyfriend had choked her until she passed out. The police
arrived shortly afterward and arrested Prechtl.
Prechtl was indicted for the offense of assault involving family violence. A trial was held
on July 15–16, 2014. The jury found Prechtl guilty and the trial court assessed his punishment at
ten years of imprisonment. Also, on July 16, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
State’s motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, alleging Prechtl violated several
conditions of his community supervision. Pursuant to plea agreements on the State’s motions,
Prechtl pleaded true to all of the State’s alleged violations except for the allegation that he
committed the offense of assault involving family violence. The trial court took judicial notice
of the entire contents of its files in each of Prechtl’s three cases and acknowledged that it heard
the testimony in Prechtl’s assault involving family violence case. The trial court granted the
State’s motions, finding Prechtl violated the conditions of his community supervision as alleged
in the State’s motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The trial court adjudicated
Prechtl guilty for the offense of possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine and
assessed his punishment at twenty-five years of imprisonment. Further, the trial court
adjudicated Prechtl guilty for the offense of possession of oxycodone and assessed his
punishment at six months of confinement.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR ASSAULT INVOLVING FAMILY VIOLENCE
In his sole issue in the assault involving family violence case, Prechtl argues the evidence
is insufficient to support his conviction for assault involving family violence. Prechtl claims the
evidence supporting his conviction came from the complainant who admitted she was using
methamphetamine at the time. He contends the complainant was “unbelievable” and her
testimony was contrary to the testimony of the police officers and hotel employee. The State
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responds that a rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the offense of assault
involving family violence were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–
19 (1979); Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Appellate courts are required to
determine whether any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19. An
appellate court is required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the
jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony.
See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. All
evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted, will be considered when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010) (per curiam);
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1988); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
B. Applicable Law
A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). “Bodily injury” means physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Id. § 1.07(a)(8); see also Lane v. State, 763
S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (“This definition [of bodily injury] appears to be
purposefully broad and seems to encompass even relatively minor physical contacts so long as
they constitute more than mere offensive touching.”).
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The offense of assault is a third degree felony if it is committed against a person with
whom the defendant had a dating relationship and was a member of his family or household, if it
is shown that (A) prior to the commission of the assault, the defendant was previously convicted
of assault involving family violence, or (B) the offense was committed by intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person
by applying pressure to the person’s throat or neck. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021(b), 71.003, 71.005 (West 2014).
C. Application of the Law to the Facts
The record shows that Allcock testified she lived with Prechtl and he strangled her until
she lost consciousness. The hotel employee stated that when Allcock asked her to call 9-1-1, she
saw bruises on Allcock’s face and neck. One of the police officers who responded to the 9-1-1
call testified Allcock seemed agitated and frightened and stated he observed a mark on her neck,
around her throat, which could have been a fingerprint bruise. Photographs of Allcock’s injuries
were also admitted into evidence. Further, the written statement Allcock gave to the police on
March 17, 2014, was admitted into evidence. It states:
[Prechtl] started when I [] came to hotle [sic] room to get the rest of [my]
belongings. [] Prechtl was not happy & told [] myself [sic] that if I did not stay he
would gut me like a fish if I did try to leave. So I had to tell the hotel lady I was
staying. Once we got into the hotel room, [Prechtl] slapped [] me with his hands
& kept telling me I was going to die & he was going to kill me. Later on [Prechtl]
was going threw [sic] my phone & saw something [Prechtl] didn’t like. He took
the phone & started pounding it on [] my head. [Prechtl] yelled all night. [B]ut
after he broke the phone[,] [Prechtl] started choking me on the bed. [Prechtl’s]
knees was [sic] in my chest where I couldn’t breath. I felt the life get sucked out
of me. When I came to, [Prechtl] had a cigarette held to my face. [Prechtl] told
me I was NOT going to keep doing that, I guess passing out. That occurred 3
times that I remember. [Prechtl] woke me up and told me I needed to go pay [for]
the room. I don’t ever remember going to sleep. I looked at a clock at 7 am.
When [Prechtl] woke me it was 10:30 am. [Prechtl] wouldn’t let me pick out my
colhes [sic]. [Prechtl] got up & got a long sleeve shirt & long pants. [Prechtl]
told me that I haven’t even seen anything yet. So I went down stairs [sic] to pay
the room & hotel lady let me call the cops.
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Prechtl maintains that the “entirety of the evidence supporting [the alleged offense] came
from [Allcock]” and focuses his argument on the inconsistencies in Allcock’s testimony as well
as her admissions that she was high on methamphetamine when the alleged assault occurred, she
was physically able to leave the hotel numerous times, but did not do so, and in the past, she had
burned her legs, arms, and hands with a methamphetamine pipe. Prechtl claims that Allcock’s
version of the events was just “a story—with all of the inconsistencies one can expect to
accompany a methamphetamine addict’s fiction.” He claims this is supported by the fact that
there was no evidence Allcock required medical attention as a result of her alleged injuries.
Prechtl points to the testimony of his probation officer that it did not appear that Prechtl was
threatening Allcock when he visited the motel room that night and the marks on Allcock’s neck
probably would not have caused him concern. Also, Prechtl points to one of the police officer’s
testimony that he did not recall Allcock accusing Prechtl of threatening her with a knife. Prechtl
also notes that the hotel employee testified to events differently than Allcock. He notes that
Allcock stated Prechtl yelled at her most of the night, but the hotel employee stated she did not
hear anything from Prechtl’s room and no other guests complained about the noise. Prechtl
argues that Allcock’s inconsistent statements combined with the contrary testimony of the hotel
employee and the police officers “show that [Allcock’s] testimony was unbelievable.”
The substance of Prechtl’s complaint on appeal relates to the weight assigned to
Allcock’s testimony and the credibility of her statements, which are to be resolved by the jury.
See Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Accordingly, we conclude there
was sufficient evidence to convict Prechtl of assault involving family violence.
The sole issue in the assault involving family violence case is decided against Prechtl.
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III. ADJUDICATION OF GUILT
In his sole issue in the cases involving the judgments adjudicating his guilt, Prechtl
argues the trial court abused its discretion when it adjudicated Prechtl guilty because (a) the State
did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed assault and (b) his
constitutional rights were violated when he pleaded true to some of the alleged violations of the
terms of his community supervision since the trial court failed to admonish him as to the range of
punishment.
A. Standard of Review
The decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge and revoke
deferred adjudication community supervision is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation
hearing in a case where the adjudication of guilt has not been deferred. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (West Supp. 2014). Appellate review of an order revoking
community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d
759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies
outside the zone of reasonable disagreement, is arbitrary and unreasonable, or is without
reference to any guiding rules or principles. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 103
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v.
Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The mere fact that a trial court decided
a matter within its discretionary authority differently than an appellate court would have resolved
the matter does not demonstrate such an abuse. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at 103–04.
B. Evidence of Assault Involving Family Violence
Prechtl contends the trial court abused its discretion when it adjudicated him guilty
because the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed assault in
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violation of the conditions of his community supervision. In support of his argument, he points
to Allcock’s inconsistent statements and testimony. The State responds that Prechtl pleaded true
to all of the alleged violations of his community supervision except the allegation of assault
involving family violence. The State argues that proof of one allegation was sufficient to find a
violation, permitting the trial court to proceed to adjudicate Prechtl’s guilt and assess
punishment.
1. Applicable Law
An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would create a reasonable
belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64.
The violation of a single condition of community supervision is sufficient to support a
revocation. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Thus, to
prevail on appeal, an appellant must successfully challenge all of the trial court’s findings that
support revocation. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The
trial court’s judgment will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient to support any ground alleged.
See Dunavin v. State, 611 S.W.2d 91, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
b. Application of the Law to the Facts
We note that we have already concluded there is sufficient evidence to support Prechtl’s
conviction for assault involving family violence. Nevertheless, the record shows that pursuant to
a plea agreement, the trial court signed an order deferring further proceedings without entering
an adjudication of guilt and placed Prechtl on community supervision for seven years in the
possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine case and five years in the possession of
oxycodone case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5(a). On March 23, 2014, the
State filed motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt alleging several violations of the
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conditions of his community supervision: (1) violating the laws of Texas by intentionally
committing the offense of assault involving family violence; (2) three instances where a
urinalysis tested positive for methamphetamine; (3) failure to pay court costs and fees as ordered
by the trial court; and (4) failure to pay community supervision fees as directed. Pursuant to plea
agreements on the State’s motions, Prechtl pleaded true to all of the violations except for the
allegation that he committed the offense of assault involving family violence. After a hearing,
the trial court found that Prechtl violated all of the conditions as alleged in the State’s motions.
On appeal, Prechtl challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court’s finding that he violated the conditions of his community supervision by committing the
offense of assault involving family violence. However, the violation of a single condition of
community supervision is sufficient to support a revocation. See Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926.
Accordingly, we address Prechtl’s next argument that his pleas of true were involuntary because
he was not properly admonished as to the ranges of punishment.
C. Admonishment as to Range of Punishment
Prechtl contends the trial court abused its discretion when it adjudicated him guilty
because his constitutional rights were violated when he pleaded true to some of the alleged
violations of the terms of his community supervision because “the trial court . . . failed to
admonish him as to the range[s] of punishment to which he was subject as a result of his plea[s]
of true.” Specifically, he claims that his pleas of true were involuntary because “Never, though,
did the [trial] court connect the two [offenses] and specifically admonish Prechtl that, by
pleading true, he would be subject to imprisonment for five to 99 years.” The State does not
respond to this argument.
The record shows Prechtl and the State entered into written plea agreements pursuant to
the State’s motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The plea agreements were open as
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to punishment and included, in part, the following admonishment: “If you are on unadjudicated
community supervision, are found to have violated a condition of community supervision, and
your guilt is adjudicated by the [trial court], . . . the court may assess your punishment anywhere
within the range provided by the law for the offense.” Also, the plea agreements contained a
statement and waiver by Prechtl that he “understand[s] the nature of the accusation made against
[him], the range[s] of punishment of the offense[s] [he] was placed on community supervision
for, and the consequences of a plea of true.”
Further, during the hearing on the State’s motions to proceed with an adjudication of
guilt, the trial court reminded Prechtl of the punishment ranges for the offenses and Prechtl
acknowledged he understood the punishment ranges, as follows:
Trial Court: Mr. Prechtl, in the first cause number I called out you have been on
[community supervision] for the first-degree felony offense of
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, more
than 4 grams but less than 200 grams. The punishment range for
this offense is anywhere from a minimum of five years [of]
confinement in the penitentiary up to a maximum of 99 years or
life with an optional fine not to exceed $10,000. Do you
understand that that is the punishment range for the first-degree
felony offense for which you [have] been on [community
supervision]?
Prechtl: Yes.
Trial Court: And in the second case that I called out you have been on
[community supervision] for the state jail felony offense of
possession of a controlled substance less than one gram. The
punishment range for a state jail felony is anywhere from a
minimum of 180 days confinement in the state jail up to a
maximum of two years confinement with an optional fine not to
exceed $10,000. Do you understand that that is the punishment
range for this offense for which you have been on [community
supervision]?
Prechtl: Yes, ma’am.
....
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Trial Court: . . . . Do you understand, Mr. Prechtl, in an open plea or contested
hearing that you are basically placing yourself on the mercy of the
Court?
Prechtl: Yes, ma’am.
Trial Court: Sometimes the court has mercy, sometimes it doesn’t; and you
understand that?
Prechtl: Yes, ma’am.
....
Trial Court: All right. Has your attorney gone over with you and do you
understand all of the other admonishments contained in these two
documents?
Prechtl: Yes, ma’am.
....
Trial Court: Mr. Prechtl, your attorney has just entered a plea of true on your
behalf to all of the allegations in the State’s motions except for
allegation A [assault involving family violence]. Is that your plea
in both cases?
Prechtl: Yes, ma’am.
Trial Court: Are you entering each of those pleas freely and voluntarily?
Prechtl: Yes, ma’am.
During the hearing, the trial court found that Prechtl was mentally competent to enter the pleas
and that his pleas of true were freely and voluntarily made.
We conclude that Prechtl has not shown his pleas of true were involuntary because the
trial court failed to admonish him as to the applicable punishment ranges. Rather, the record
shows the trial court did admonish Prechtl as to the punishment ranges for the offenses.
D. Conclusion as to Adjudication of Guilt
We conclude the trial court did not err when it adjudicated Prechtl’s guilt. The sole issue
in the cases involving the judgments adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt is decided against Prechtl.
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IV. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
Also, although neither party raises the issue, we observe the judgments adjudicating
Prechtl’s guilt incorrectly list the statutes for the offense. First, in cause no. 05-14-01068-CR,
Prechtl was indicted for the offense of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an
amount of four grams or more, but less than two hundred grams. Section 481.112 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code provides that “A person commits an offense if the person knowingly
manufacturers, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver [methamphetamine]” and the offense
is “a felony of the first degree if the amount of the [methamphetamine] . . . is, by aggregate
weight, including adulterants or dilutants, four grams or more but less than 200 grams.” TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d). The judgment adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt
stated the offense for which Prechtl was convicted was “possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver methamphetamine 4G.” However, it lists the statute for the offense as
“481.1121 Penal Code.” The Texas Penal Code does not currently have a section numbered
481.1121. Also, section 481.1121 of the Texas Health and Safety Code relates to the
manufacture, delivery, or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in
Penalty Group 1-A. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.1121. “Penalty Group 1-A
consists of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.”
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.1021.
Second, in cause no. 05-14-01069-CR, Prechtl was indicted for the offense of possession
of oxycodone in amount less than one gram. Section 481.115 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code provides that “a person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally
possesses [oxycodone], unless the person obtained the substance directly from or under a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of professional practice” and the
offense “is a state jail felony if the amount of the [oxycodone] possessed is, by aggregate weight,
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including adulterants or dilutants, less than one gram.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
481.115(a)–(b). The judgment adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt stated the offense for which Prechtl
was convicted was “possession of a controlled substance oxycodone.” However, it lists the
statute for the offense as “481.115 Penal Code.” The Texas Penal Code does not currently have
a section numbered 481.115.
An appellate court has the authority to modify an incorrect judgment to make the record
speak the truth when it has the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Asberry v. State, 813
S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). We conclude the trial court’s
judgments adjudicating guilt should be modified to state the correct statutes for the offenses. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley, 865 S.W.2d at 27–28; Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529–30.
Accordingly, the judgment adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt in cause no. 05-14-01068-CR should be
modified to state the statute for the offense is “481.112 Health & Safety Code” and the judgment
adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt in cause no. 05-14-01069-CR should be modified to state the statute
for the offense is “481.115 Health & Safety Code.”
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence is sufficient to support Prechtl’s conviction for assault involving family
violence. Also, the trial court did not err when it adjudicated Prechtl guilty. The judgments
adjudicating Prechtl’s guilt are modified to reflect the correct statutes for the offenses.
The trial court’s judgments are affirmed.
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 /Douglas S. Lang/
141068F.U05 DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MICHAEL PRENTISS PRECHTL, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1135251-X.
No. 05-14-01068-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices
Evans and Whitehill participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt is
MODIFIED as follows:
The portion of the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt that states the statute
for the offense is “481.1121 Penal Code” is modified to state “481.112 Health &
Safety Code.”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 5th day of November, 2015.
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MICHAEL PRENTISS PRECHTL, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1135252-X.
No. 05-14-01069-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices
Evans and Whitehill participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt is
MODIFIED as follows:
The portion of the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt that states the statute
for the offense is “481.115 Penal Code” is modified to state “481.115 Health &
Safety Code.”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 5th day of November, 2015.
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MICHAEL PRENTISS PRECHTL, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1410028-X.
No. 05-14-01070-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices
Evans and Whitehill participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 5th day of November, 2015.
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