Sanjoseph Tan v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-15-00511-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
12/30/2015 3:44:32 PM
No. 01-15-00511-CR CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
In the
Court of Appeals
For the FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
First District of Texas HOUSTON, TEXAS
At Houston 12/30/2015 3:44:32 PM
 CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
No. 1425902
In the 179th District Court
Of Harris County, Texas

SANJOSEPH TAN
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee

STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF

DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
KIMBERLY APERAUCH STELTER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County Criminal Justice Center
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: 713.274.5826
stelter_kimberly@dao.hctx.net
State Bar Number: 19141400
CONNIE SPENCE
MARITZA ANTU
Assistant District Attorneys
Harris County, Texas
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State believes that the matters raised by the appellant are well-
settled, and that the briefs in this case adequately apprise this Court of the
issues and the law. Therefore, the State does not request oral argument.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list
of the names of all interested parties is provided below.
Counsel for the State:
Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County
Kimberly Aperauch Stelter  Assistant District Attorney on appeal
Sean Powers, Stuart Tallichet  Assistant District Attorneys at trial
Appellant and counsel:
Sanjoseph Tan  Appellant
Patrick McCann  Counsel on appeal
Benjamin Plaut  Defense counsel at trial
Trial Judge:
Honorable Leslie Brock Yates  Judge Presiding
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 3
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR ........................................ 4
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S SECOND AND THIRD POINTS OF ERROR .......... 6
PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 13
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).......................................................................... 8
Chambers v. State,
805 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).......................................................................... 9
Clayton v. State,
235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)....................................................................... 10
Curry v. State,
910 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).......................................................................... 6
Dues v. State,
634 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)....................................................................... 12
Ervin v. State,
331 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) ................................................................................. 8
Garcia v. State,
887 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).......................................................................... 6
Horhn v. State,
___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 7300558 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] November 19, 2015 , no pet. reported) .................................. 7
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979)................................................................................................................. 9
Johnson v. State,
871 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)....................................................................... 10
Karenev v. State,
281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).......................................................................... 5
Kiffe v. State,
361 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App. –
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) ................................................................................. 8
King v. State,
29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ......................................................................... 10
iii
Laster v. State,
275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).......................................................................... 9
Marin v. State,
851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cain
v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (1997) ......................................................................................... 5
Mason v. State,
820 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App. –
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet. .................................................................................... 12
Rowshan ......................................................................................................................................... 13
Rowshan v. State,
445 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. App. –
Houston [1st Dist.]2013, pet. ref’d) ............................................................................... 12
Schuster v. State,
435 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App. –
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ..................................................................................... 5
Will. v. State,
235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).......................................................................... 9
Will. v. State,
688 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)....................................................................... 11
STATUTES
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51 (West 2014) .................................................................... 3, 6
Texas Penal Code § 32.51 .......................................................................................................... 4
RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A) ....................................................................................................... i
iv
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by indictment with fraudulent use of
identifying information (CR 9). He entered a plea of not guilty and the case
was tried before a jury (CR 60). The jury found appellant guilty as charged,
and the court assessed punishment at one year in the state jail division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (CR 60). Appellant filed timely notice
of appeal, and the court certified his right to appeal (CR 664-66).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tony Ho had bad credit. He purchased a Hyundai Sonata in 2013 from
the Ron Carter dealership but was told to return it once the dealership did a
credit check (RR3 188, 192). The second time Ho had Appellant purchase a
Hyundai Sonata from the dealership for him (RR3 189, 197). Ho just went to
the dealership to pick up the car from appellant in the parking lot (RR3-189,
192).
The problem with this arrangement was that Appellant used someone
else’s identify to finance the Sonata. Appellant represented himself to the
sales representative and the director of the finance department as Songfan
Jin (RR3 165-166, 199). He put Songfan Jin’s name, date of birth, and Social
Security number on the finance application for the Sonata, and presented
proof of identity under that name (RR3 18). The two forms of identification,
a passport and an international driver’s license, had Jin’s identifying
information, but appellant’s picture (RR3 204, 166, State’s Exhibit No. 10).
Eventually the bank which financed the loan for the Sonata did an
investigation, discovered this identify theft, and required the dealership to
buy back the loan from the bank (RR3 14). The dealership, not knowing who
was actually in possession of the Sonata, reported it stolen, and with the help
of police and a built in tracking system, were able to locate and repossess the
vehicle (RR3 15, 50). Ho was driving the car at the time of the recovery, and
agreed to lead the police to appellant (RR3 189, 190). When arrested,
appellant had several pieces of identification in his own name, but also
identified himself as the person pictured on the international driver’s license
in Jin’s name (RR3 75, 77). Also, the vehicle appellant was driving was
registered in Jin’s name (RR3 82). Appellant was arrested, his fingerprints
were taken, and it was determined that his real name was Sanjoseph Tan
(RR3 83-84).
2
Eventually, the dealership resold the Sontana that had purchased by
appellant in Jin’s name, but since the vehicle had already been preowned, the
dealership could not resell it as a new. Instead, the dealership sold the
vehicle wholesale at auction for a $17,000 loss (RR3 14).
Songfan Jin was also adversely impacted. Jin lived in New York City,
had never been to Texas, and did not know appellant or give him
authorization to use his identifying information (RR3 143, 148-149). He
only learned that someone was using his identity when he got a letter from a
collection agency (RR3 144). He then hired an attorney who investigated the
identity theft and wrote letters to clear Jin’s name with the collection agency
(RR3 145). Despite these efforts, Jin’s credit rating, which had formally been
very good, was “completely destroyed” by appellant’s actions (RR3 153).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant did not preserve any constitutional challenge to Section
32.51 of the Penal Code by raising the issue for the first time on appeal.
Even if appellant had preserved error, the statute is clearly not directed at
any speech or free expression. On its face, the statute neither abridges
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constitutionally protected speech, nor inhibits an individual’s right to
petition for redress of grievances. The statute has been utilized to prevent
identity theft and does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct. Consequently, the appellant’s First Amendment and
overbreadth challenges to the statute should fail.
The evidence is also legally sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction
for the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying information.
Specifically, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant intended to defraud or harm another. While the evidence is also
factually sufficient, the State is no longer required to prove factual
sufficiency on appeal.

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR
In his first point of error, appellant claims that Texas Penal Code §
32.51, the statute upon which his prosecution is based, violates the First,
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Specifically, appellant contends that the Statute in question is facially
4
unconstitutional because it is an overbroad regulation of speech, and might
“chill” constitutionally protected speech (appellant’s brief, p. 11).
Appellant Failed to Preserve Error
Appellant does not indicate and the State could find no reference to
this issue ever being raised or ruled on at trial. A defendant may not raise
for the first time on appeal a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute. Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Under
Karenev, “[a] facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute” falls within
the category of matters for which an objection is necessary to preserve
error. Id. at 434; Schuster v. State, 435 S.W.3d 362, 365 (Tex. App. –Houston
[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279–80 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262
(1997) (recognizing three different rules for error preservation). Similarly,
an “as applied” constitutional challenge is also a forfeitable right under
Marin and must be preserved in the trial court during or after trial. Curry v.
State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Garcia v. State, 887
S.W.2d 846, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Since appellant did not preserve his
5
constitutional challenges to Texas Penal Code §32.51, his first point of error
should be overruled.1

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND AND
THIRD POINTS OF ERROR
Appellant’s final two point of error concern the sufficiency of the
evidence to support appellant’s conviction. Appellant claims that the
evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to prove that appellant
committed this offense with the intent to harm or defraud another.
Standard of Review on Sufficiency of the Evidence
Courts in Texas no longer conduct independent factual sufficiency
reviews of the evidence in criminal cases. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893,
901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Instead, Texas courts review legal and factual
sufficiency challenges using the same standard of review. Ervin v. State, 331
1 Even if appellant had preserved error on this issue, this Court has recently held that
Texas Penal Code § 32.51 does not implicate the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment, is not facially overbroad, and is not a content based restriction on speech.
See Horhn v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 7300558 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
November 19, 2015 , no pet. reported)
6
S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd); Kiffe v. State,
361 S.W.3d 104, 107-08 (Tex. App. –Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).
Under this standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if,
considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
no rational factfinder could have found that each essential element of the
charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient under this standard in two circumstances: (1) the record
contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence, probative of an
element of the offense; or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 n. 11, 320; Laster, 275
S.W.3d at 518; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.
The jury is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence under this
review and can choose to believe all, some, or none of it. Chambers v. State,
805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The presumption is that the
jury resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and a reviewing
7
court should defer to that determination. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,
778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Evidence can be legally sufficient for a conviction even if it is entirely
circumstantial. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The
standard of review for circumstantial and direct evidence is the same. Id. It is
not necessary that every fact point directly and independently to the
defendant’s guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined
and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Johnson v. State,
871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
The evidence is sufficient to prove that appellant intended to
defraud or harm another
Appellant claims there is no evidence appellant used Jin’s identifying
information, but merely possessed it. The facts, however, show otherwise.
Appellant used Jin’s identifying information to establish his
creditworthiness to purchase a car (State’s Exhibit No. 10). He filled out the
loan application in Jin’s name, which made Jin, not appellant, liable for the
loan amount. He provided the dealership with two pieces of identification
with Jin’s information and appellant’s photo (State’s Exhibit No. 10). He also
8
traded in his Volkswagen Passat, which he also owned under Jin’s name, and
which was valued at far less than the amount appellant still owed on it.2
The intent to defraud or harm another may be established by
circumstantial evidence, including an accused’s acts, words, or conduct.
Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Mason v. State,
820 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Tex. App. –Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.) (citing
Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)); Rowshan v. State,
445 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex. App. –Houston [1st Dist.]2013, pet. ref’d).
Appellant’s acts clearly indicate intent to defraud or harm another.
As a result of appellant’s deception, the Ron Carter dealership lost
$17,000 after having to buy back the loan, repossess the Sonata, and sell it
wholesale as a used car and at a price that was substantially less than they
could have received by selling it new to a legitimate buyer. Jin also suffered
harm by having to hire a lawyer to respond to the collection agency and
subsequently having his credit destroyed. Jin’s credit line was burdened by
2
The Sonata had a sale price of $22,500, but after a $15,000 credit for the trade-in of the
Volkswagen and a $24,000 payoff of the loan on the Volkswagen (plus other small fees)
the balance remaining was $32,274.16 (State’s Exhibit No. 10, page 6). Thus, appellant
obtained a loan on the Sonata that was more than the worth of the car, as he actually paid
off his “underwater” loan on the Volkswagen.
9
the loan, while appellant’ s credit was unaffected, as he failed to take any of
these actions under his own identity. This evidence is sufficient to establish
an intent to defraud or harm another. Rowshan v. State, 445 S.W.3d at 298.
For the above reasons, appellant’s last two points of error are without
merit, and should be overruled.

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PRAYER
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
/s/Kimberly Aperauch Stelter
KIMBERLY APERAUCH STELTER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
State Bar Number: 19141400
stelter_kimberly@dao.hctx.net
11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument is being
served by EFileTXCourts.Gov e-filer to the following email address
Patrick McCann
Attorney at Law
Suite 205, Rice Hotel
Houston, Texas 77002
writlawyer@justice.com
/s/Kimberly Aperauch Stelter
KIMBERLY APERAUCH STELTER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 274-5826
State Bar Number: 19141400
stelter_kimberly@dao.hctx.net
12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned attorney certifies that this computer-generated
document has a word count of 2,628 words, based upon the representation
provided by the word processing program that was used to create the
document.
/s/Kimberly Aperauch Stelter
KIMBERLY APERAUCH STELTER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002-1923
(713) 274-5826
TBC No. 19141400
stelter_kimberly@dao.hctx.net
13