Crystal Bingham Hernandez v. Tiffany Polley ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-15-00384-CV
7881342
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/18/2015 11:02:52 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-15-00384-CV
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
FOR THE
11/18/2015 11:02:52 AM
THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JEFFREY D. KYLE
AUSTIN, TEXAS Clerk
CRYSTAL BINGHAM HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
TIFFANY POLLEY,
Defendant/Appellee.
On Appeal from Tom Green County Court at Law No. 2
Tom Green County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 12C482-L2
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL
KIRK D. WILLIS
State Bar No. 21648500
JOSEPH M. GREGORY, III
State Bar No. 08436525
LORIN M. SUBAR
State Bar No. 19456800
THE WILLIS LAW GROUP, PLLC
10440 N. Central Expy. Suite 520
Dallas, Texas 75231
Telephone: 214-736-9433
Facsimile: 214-736-9994
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a), below is a supplement to the list of
parties and their counsel as provided to the Court in Appellant’s Brief on Appeal:
Benton Williams, counsel for Tiffany Polley in the trial court, is no longer
counsel for the Appellee
Joseph M. Gregory, III was counsel for Tiffany Polley before the trial court
and is counsel for Tiffany Polley on appeal. His address is: The
Willis Law Group, PLLC, 10440 N. Central Expy, Suite 520, Dallas,
Texas 75231;
Lorin M. Subar is counsel for Tiffany Polley on appeal. His address is: The
Willis Law Group, PLLC, 10440 N. Central Expy, Suite 520, Dallas,
Texas 75231;
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2
RESPONSE POINTS PRESENTED ......................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................................................................... 3
STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................... 8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 9
RESPONSE POINT ONE - The Trial Court did not commit reversible error
in dismissing the lawsuit as a sanction for failure to comply with the
Trial Court’s order to produce certain documents. ........................................ 10
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE POINT ONE ..................... 10
A. Plaintiff’s Duties Under TEX. INS. CODE § 462.001, et seq. ...................10
B. Plaintiff Did Not Produce Documents She was Ordered to Produce ......12
C. Dismissal was neither unreasonable nor improper..................................14
RESPONSE POINT TWO - The Trial Court did not commit reversible error
in failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in the same
manner as presented by the Plaintiff. ............................................................ 21
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE POINT TWO .................... 21
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 22
PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 23
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1986).................................8
Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. 2002) ......................................20
Cortinas v. Lopez, No. 13-14-00242-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13194 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 10, 2014, pet. denied) .......................................18
Donalson v. Horton, 256 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) ..............................................................................................................22
GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1993) ............16
Stritzinger v. Wright, No. 03-10-00455-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1427 (Tex.
App.—Austin Feb. 23, 2011, pet. denied). ......................................................8
Thompson v. Lee Roy Crawford Produce Co., 233 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1950) .........22
Transamerica Natural Gas Corp., v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992) ...........14
Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986,
no writ)...........................................................................................................22
Wade v. Taylor, 228 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1949, no writ) ........22
Statutes
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.001 ........................................................................................10
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.251 ................................................................................. 10, 15
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.252 ........................................................................................11
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.253 ........................................................................................11
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page iv
Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) .............................................................................................17
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a) .............................................................................................. ii
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.7(b) ...........................................................................................13
TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b) ...........................................................................................17
TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b)(5) ......................................................................................20
TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 ...................................................................................................21
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page v
NO. 03-15-00384-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
CRYSTAL BINGHAM HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
TIFFANY POLLEY,
Defendant/Appellee.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW Tiffany Polley (hereinafter “Defendant”), and files her
Response to the Brief on Appeal of Appellant Crystal Bingham Hernandez
(hereinafter “Plaintiff”), and requesting that the dismissal and judgment in her
favor be affirmed, would show this Court of Appeals the following:
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant accepts the Statement of the Case as stated in Appellant’s Brief,
with the following additional information:
On April 27, 2011, the automobile insurer for Defendant, Reinsurance
Company of America, Inc., was placed into liquidation proceedings by an Illinois
court and designated as an “impaired insurer” by the Texas Commissioner of
Insurance pursuant to Texas Insurance Code chapter 462.1
RESPONSE POINTS PRESENTED
RESPONSE POINT ONE
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in dismissing the
lawsuit as a sanction for failure to comply with the Trial Court’s
order to produce certain documents.
RESPONSE POINT TWO
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in failing to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the same manner as
presented by the Plaintiff.
1
CR 64.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 19, 2013 Defendant served discovery requests (interrogatories
and document requests) on Plaintiff. On May 15, 2013 Defendant advised Plaintiff
that she had wholly failed to respond to the discovery requests. 2 Thereafter, on
July 8, 2013, with no responses having been received, Defendant filed a Motion to
Compel.3 The parties submitted an Agreed Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to
Compel and Plea in Abatement which was signed by the Trial Court on September
23, 2013.4 The Order provided Plaintiff would:
1. Answer all interrogatories;
2. Respond to all discovery requests;
3. Execute an Affidavit Regarding Other Insurance;
4. Provide insurance information regarding underinsured motorist
coverage or provide a signed rejection page for such coverage;
5. Provide insurance information regarding personal injury protection
coverage or provide a signed rejection page for such coverage;
6. Provide information regarding other applicable insurance coverage
through Plaintiff or her spouse or others;
7. Documents releasing assignments and explanation of benefits
documents.5
2
CR 71.
3
CR 64.
4
CR 72-73.
5
CR 72-73.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 3
When the documents were not produced as promised by the Plaintiff and as
ordered by the Court, on June 30, 2014, Defendant filed her Motion to Dismiss and
for Sanctions.6 Plaintiff filed no response to that Motion prior to the Court’s
hearing the Motion on October 7, 2014.
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, held on October 7, 2014, Plaintiff
provided no reason or excuse for failing to respond to the discovery requests of the
Defendant or the prior Order of the Court. In fact, as noted by Defendant’s counsel
at the hearing, and without objection by Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff did not
produce even a copy of the relevant insurance policy7 and other documents until
the hearing.8
At the hearing, the parties discussed additional production of documents by
November 17, 2014. The Trial Court therefore indicated:
This is what I’m going to do. I’m going to give you the date that y’all
agreed upon before I walked into the courtroom, but he doesn’t have
everything he should have under the prior motions and by that date,
I’m going to grant his motion to dismiss.9
The response to the Trial Court from Plaintiff’s counsel was “Okay.”10
6
CR 74.
7
RR Vol. II, p. 4, line 18.
8
RR Vol. II, p. 6, lines 16-19.
9
RR Vol. II, p. 8, lines 7-12.
10
RR Vol. II, p. 8, line 13.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 4
But the Trial Court was not through addressing the issue with Plaintiff’s
counsel. The Trial Court noted that while some of the information to be produced
was under the control of others, a year was more than enough time to respond fully
to the discovery as requested, and therefore the Trial Court again indicated it
would grant the Motion to Dismiss if there was not a full response.11
The day after the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff produced some
of the records responsive to the Court’s Order.12 The records produced showed
that Plaintiff had made no real effort to meet the original Order (dated September
27, 2013) from the Trial Court. In fact, the produced documents indicate no effort
was made until after Defendant filed her Motion to Dismiss in July of 2014:
1. A letter from NexClaim regarding an assignment of benefits was
dated July 8, 2014 even though the last service date was September
16, 2013;
2. An Explanation of Benefits letter from CIGNA was dated July 8, 2014
even though the last treatment covered was on December 16, 2010.
On January 8, 2015, the Trial Court reconvened to address whether Plaintiff
had met the September 2013 Order on Defendant’s Motion to Compel. At the
hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that all he had to produce was four medical
11
RR Vol. II, p. 8, line 14 to p. 9, line 1.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 5
records in order to avoid further sanctions from the Trial Court, and therefore he
met all of the requirements under the Trial Court’s Order. 13 The above-referenced
exchange between the Trial Court and Plaintiff’s counsel (regarding dismissing the
case) was then quoted back to the Trial Court – “everything he should have under
the prior motions and by that date.”14 The Trial Court addressed some of the
crucial information still lacking; specifically information regarding other insurance
payments made on the Plaintiff’s behalf.15
As noted by counsel for the Defendant, and as agreed upon by counsel for
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff for the second time walked into court with a document
dump of information,16 trying to contend that now he had provided all of the
information ordered to be produced. But as argued by Defendant’s counsel, even
with the document dump, Plaintiff had still not provided the information crucial to
move forward with the litigation – what was actually paid by insurance.17
The Trial Court was not oblivious to the actions of Plaintiff’s counsel in
dumping documents on Defendant’s counsel at the courthouse then attempting to
12
CR 86.
13
RR Vol. III, p. 7, line 21 to p. 8, line 21.
14
RR Vol. III, p. 7, lines 17-23.
15
RR Vol. III, p. 14, line 5 to p. 15, line 3.
16
RR Vol. II, p. 6, lines 16-19; RR Vol. III, p. 11, lines 1-5 and attachments; RR Vol. III, p. 25,
lines 12-18.
17
RR Vol. III, p. 25, lines 12-18.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 6
force Defendant’s counsel to agree he had met the requirements of the Court’s
Order. As stated by the Trial Court:
I don't expect you or you ever to be handed something or any other
attorney to be handed something in court without time to review it, to
give it a cursory look over, and be held to that if you get back to the
office and after review said oh, well, wait a minute, it doesn't have
this. I wouldn't want somebody to hold me to that, and I wouldn't hold
the attorneys in my court to that. Something that is produced in court
and handed to you and said, oh, here this is and you've got it, okay,
that looks like what I've asked for, okay. If you get back to the office
and go, well, Judge, that wasn't quite all I asked for, I'm not going to
argue with you about that. I'm not going to hold you to that either.18
After Plaintiff’s counsel was given an opportunity to explain why, some 22 months
after being served with discovery, the discovery was still not responded to in full,
the Trial Court continued:
The issue before the Court is that this has been pending for quite
sometime; and the responses to the discovery, even from what I'm
looking at in a very limited capacity before the Court, at what I'm
seeing has been filed before the Court, is – is sometimes your client's
responses were sloppy, sometimes they were inaccurate, and
sometimes they were incomplete. It would be one thing if this was
three or four months into it, but it is not.19
Therefore, after again noting Plaintiff had enough time to respond, the Trial Court
dismissed the case.20
18
RR Vol. III, p. 26, lines 10-23.
19
RR Vol. III, p. 38, line 17 to p. 39, line 1.
20
RR Vol. III, p. 39, lines 17-23.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As stated by the Texas Supreme Court:
A trial court may impose sanctions on any party that abuses the
discovery process. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215. The discovery sanctions
imposed by a trial court are within that court's discretion and will be
set aside only if the court clearly abused its discretion.21
Therefore, the standard of review is whether the trial court clearly abused its
discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit. As stated by the Hon. Bob Pemberton:
A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts in an arbitrary and
unreasonable manner or without reference to any guiding rules and
principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,
241-42 (Tex. 1985). An abuse of discretion does not occur merely
because the trial court decides a matter within its discretionary
authority in a different manner from an appellate court in a similar
circumstance. 22
21
Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986).
22
Stritzinger v. Wright, No. 03-10-00455-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1427, *13-14 (Tex.
App.—Austin Feb. 23, 2011, pet. denied).
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Both the decision to dismiss the lawsuit and the timing of that decision were
within the sound discretion of the Trial Court. The Trial Court extended itself in
every manner possible prior to dismissing the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff’s
counsel acknowledged on the record that he understood the case would be subject
to dismissal if Plaintiff failed to produce the information contained in the
AGREED Order on Defendant’s Motion to Compel. Therefore, the Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the lawsuit based on Plaintiff’s repeated
failure to produce the required documents. Consequently, this Court of Appeals
should affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 9
RESPONSE POINT ONE (RESTATED)
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in dismissing the
lawsuit as a sanction for failure to comply with the Trial Court’s
order to produce certain documents.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE POINT ONE
A. Plaintiff’s Duties Under TEX. INS. CODE § 462.001, et seq.
As pled by the Defendant and as acknowledged by the Plaintiff, Defendant’s
automobile insurer was designated an impaired insurer pursuant to the Texas
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Act23 (the “Guaranty Act”). Plaintiff’s
rights against the Defendant became subject to the Guaranty Act, which provides
certain protections for Defendant and imposes duties on Plaintiff, as follows:
§ 462.251 - Exhaustion of Rights Under Other Policy Required:
(a) Any person who has a claim under an insurance policy, other
than an impaired insurer’s policy, and whose claim arises from the
same facts, injury, or loss giving rise to a claim against an impaired
insurer or the insurer’s insured, must first exhaust the person’s rights
under the insurance policy, including:
(1) a claim for benefits under a workers’ compensation
insurance policy or a claim for indemnity or medical benefits
under a health, disability, uninsured motorist, personal injury
protection, medical payment, liability, or other insurance
policy[.]24
****
23
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.001, et seq.
24
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.251.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 10
§ 462.252 - Reduction in Amount of Covered Claim for Other
Policy:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), an amount payable as a
covered claim under this chapter is reduced by the full applicable
limits of another insurance policy described by Section 462.251, and
the association shall receive a full credit in the amount of the full
applicable limits of the other policy[.]25
****
§ 462.253 - Effect on Insured of Reduction in Amount of Covered
Claim:
To the extent that the association’s obligation is reduced by the
application of Sections 462.251 and 462.252, the liability of the
person insured by the impaired insurer’s policy for the claim is
reduced in the same amount.26
Of particular note in the above-quoted sections of the Insurance Code are:
(1) it is the duty of the Plaintiff to first exhaust her rights under all other insurance
policies, including automobile and health insurance policies,27 and (2) the
Defendant’s potential liability to Plaintiff is reduced by the full amounts of any
applicable insurance policy.
The importance of directing the Court and Plaintiff as indicated immediately
above is two-fold. First, Plaintiff has to actively seek recovery from all other
25
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.252.
26
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.253.
27
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.251.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 11
sources of insurance before pursuing her claim against the insured of an impaired
insurer. Second, the Defendant is entitled to a credit for the full limits of such
other insurance policies. Therefore, a plaintiff with health insurance who fails to
submit her medical bills for payment is nevertheless subject to an offset for the full
amount of available insurance.
B. Plaintiff Did Not Produce Documents She was Ordered to
Produce
In the end, the Trial Court did not base its dismissal on the broad request for
production of all documents proving Plaintiff had met the minimum provisions of
the Texas Insurance Code,28 but rather on the overall nature of the failed responses
after two years and two orders compelling the production.
Rule 192.7 (b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure states that “Possession,
Custody, or Control of an item means that the person either has physical
possession of the item or has a right to possession of the item that is equal or
superior to the person who has physical possession of the item.” 29 Plaintiff never
asserted that she did not have the better right to obtain the requested information
regarding other insurance. Plaintiff never contended that the Defendant would be
in a better position to get the records, or even in an equal position to get the
28
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.251 (that all rights of recovery under all other policies of insurance had
been exhausted).
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 12
records. Further, Plaintiff never indicated she could not get the information. On
the contrary, Plaintiff admitted that at some point (about a year after the Trial
Court had compelled the same) she did obtain some of the requested information.
Yet even having possession of the responsive documents, Plaintiff did not produce
the documents until the date of the hearing, and even then, the production was still
wanting.30
Plaintiff waited more than a year after being ordered to produce documents
and only until facing dismissal before making any attempt whatsoever to comply
with the Trial Court’s Order of September 13, 2013 or to otherwise meet the
requirements of TEX. INS. CODE § 462.251 to ensure all other insurance had been
exhausted.
At any time prior to the dismissal, Plaintiff could have produced the
information requested. Instead, Plaintiff produced nothing but argument. The
Trial Court gave Plaintiff numerous opportunities to comply, but in the end,
dismissing the case was solely the result of Plaintiff’s consistent and continual
failure to act until it was too late.
29
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.7(b).
30
RR Vol. III, p. 32, line 9 to p. 40, line 11.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 13
C. Dismissal was neither unreasonable nor improper.
Plaintiff was charged with prosecuting her own case and wholly failed to
make any effort to do so until her case was dismissed. From March 19, 2013 until
September 27, 2013, Plaintiff did nothing to respond to discovery requests (even
though she herself had served discovery with her Original Petition). Plaintiff
further did nothing to meet her burden under the Texas Insurance Code.
After agreeing to produce the list of documents in the September 27, 2013
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Compel, she then did nothing until dumping
documents on the Defendant at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss more than a
year later.
Plaintiff cites the usual list of cases, starting with Transamerica Natural Gas
Corp., v. Powell,31 regarding the use, imposition, and purpose of sanctions and,
with specificity, the “death penalty” sanction of dismissal. But Plaintiff provides
this Court with no facts or argument as to why that ultimate penalty was improper
in this case.
As stated by the Supreme Court in TransAmerica:
Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the merits of a
party's claims or defenses unless a party's hindrance of the discovery
process justifies a presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit.
However, if a party refuses to produce material evidence, despite the
31
811 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992).
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 14
imposition of lesser sanctions, the court may presume that an asserted
claim or defense lacks merit and dispose of it.32 [Emphasis added].
As the Court states, when a party systematically ignores the trial court’s orders to
produce evidence, the court may presume that the claim lacks merit.
An examination of the information sought in the present case not only
supports the presumption, but bears its imposition. As noted above, Plaintiff’s
ability to bring a claim against the Defendant hinges on the Plaintiff first showing
that all other sources of insurance have been exhausted.33 Plaintiff was ordered to
produce this information in September of 2013. Plaintiff took no action until
October of 2014, and which time she was told she needed to produce the
information by November of 2014 (as agreed upon by the Plaintiff) or the case
would be dismissed. Plaintiff was again given another month and a half to comply
but still failed to produce the necessary information.
Because Plaintiff refused to produce the necessary information “the court
[could therefore] presume that an asserted claim or defense lacks merit and dispose
of it.”34 The only issue therefore is how the need to “test lesser sanctions” has
been interpreted by the courts.
32
TransAmerica, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
33
TEX. INS. CODE § 462.251.
34
TransAmerica, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 15
It bears repetition at the beginning of this analysis that months before the
Trial Court’s final judgment, Plaintiff’s counsel specifically admitted he was
well aware that failure to produce the required records would result in dismissal.
Plaintiff relies on Cire v. Cummings,35 for the proposition that the Trial
Court acted improperly in dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit. But Plaintiff fails to
recognize the Cire Court’s limitation on TransAmerica.
In Cire, the Supreme Court noted while the general rule still persists in the
Court’s desire to have trial courts consider lesser sanctions:
Nothing in the standard . . . requires that a trial court test the
effectiveness of lesser sanctions by actually implementing and
ordering each and every sanction that could possibly be imposed
before striking the pleadings of a disobedient party. Nor does . . . [the
standard] . . . require a trial court to list each possible lesser sanction
in its order and then explain why each would be ineffective.36
Other Texas Courts have since applied the Cire standard that “"the court
need not test the effectiveness of each available lesser sanction by actually
imposing the lesser sanction on the party before issuing the death penalty.” 37
While it is admitted that the discovery issues in Imagine Auto were much more
convoluted than in the instant cause,38 the basic and most important fact remains
35
134 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2004).
36
Id. at 842 (citing GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex.
1993)).
37
Imagine Auto. Group, 430 S.W.3d at 634, (citing Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 842).
38
Imagine Auto., 430 S.W.3d at 626-29.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 16
the same – that in each case the trial court gave the offending party multiple
opportunities to comply, with the only sanction being the threat to dismiss prior to
actually dismissing the case.39
While the Cire Court’s opinion stated that the above provision was not
universal, its application being only for “exceptional misconduct,”40 Defendant
would show that the “exceptional” standard exists here.41
Plaintiff’s position demands that a trial court back up its discovery orders
with sanctions at every turn as it assumes that without sanctions, the parties, and
more importantly their attorneys, would always ignore the gravity of the order
compelling discovery itself, essentially making a party immune from dismissal so
long as the trial court fails to impose some other sanction. Further, it suggests that
a trial court’s reticence to otherwise sanction a party with one of the list of Rule
215 non-dismissal sanctions42 moots even the express threat to dismiss a case for
noncompliance.
39
Id. at 630 (“’it took the Court to threaten contempt upon the defendants’” to obtain their
compliance.”).
40
Id.
41
No reasoning was provided in the Trial Court’s ruling; however any error regarding the
technical aspects of the final dismissal was waived. See TEX. R. APP. P 33.1(a); see also
Alexander, 956 S.W.2d at 714 (Although rule requiring the court to specify the basis for
sanctions was mandatory, the error is waived if the complaining party fails to object to the form
of the order.).
42
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b).
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 17
Defendant would be remiss in not addressing the Thirteenth Court of
Appeals’ decision in Cortinas v. Lopez,43 which also addressed the issue of the trial
court dismissing a plaintiff’s lawsuit for repeated failures to respond to discovery.
That discussion must begin by Defendant pointing out to this Court that while
Plaintiff presented her argument on Cortinas as a block-quote, in fact the cited
language, save one portion, does not appear in the Court’s opinion, nor does it
reflect the language or tenor of the appeals court’s opinion. Specifically, the Court
of Appeals never “rebuked” the defendant’s argument regarding the lien
assignment, nor “denounced” defendant’s argument that the trial court had, as in
the instant cause, warned the offending party that continued discovery abuses
would lead to a dismissal.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to point to the distinct differences between
Cortinas and the present cause, making the discovery abuses in this case much
more distinct. As the Cortinas Court noted, the discovery issues which led to the
dismissal were not even included in any actual discovery requests.44 The discovery
request were seeking an insurance policy page; however defendant’s counsel, for
43
No. 13-14-00242-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13194, *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 10,
2014, pet. denied).
44
Id. at *19.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 18
the first time in a hearing, asked instead for explanation of benefits documents.45
Likewise, the Cortinas Court discussed the “confusion” surrounding the other
document at issue, a Release of Assignment of Lien, which again was not included
in either any discovery request or order.46
Neither of the document confusion issues in Cortinas exist in the present
case. The Order on Defendant’s Motion to Compel was an “Agreed Order”
bearing the signature of Plaintiff’s counsel agreeing to produce all of the
documents identified therein, including a full and complete Affidavit Regarding
Other Insurance and, as specifically and separately set out, “all Release of
Assignment documents from any healthcare provider, as well as any and all
Explanation of Benefit documentation.”47 Therefore, unlike in Cortinas, the
Plaintiff in the instant case could not claim confusion in an attempt to avoid the
dismissal.
What is similar both here and in Cortinas is that in each case, the trial court
made clear that failure to fully comply with its expectations would be met with the
most severe of sanctions. And the argument put forth before this Court by counsel
for this Defendant is the same as that put forth by the same counsel for the
45
Id.
46
Id. at *20-21.
47
CR 72.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 19
defendant in Cortinas: When a party has wholly failed to abide by the rules of
discovery to the point where a trial court expressly and specifically states their
case will be dismissed for any further abuses, should the offending party simply be
able to intentionally ignore the trial court, knowing that the court’s very specific
edict really means nothing? Is there not some reason why a party, especially one
represented by counsel, should not assume that the trial court has the power to back
up its words with deeds, as specifically set out and allowed for under TEX. R. CIV.
P. 215.2(b)(5)?
In revisiting the standard of review of the Trial Court’s dismissal, as set out
by the Texas Supreme Court in Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright and its progeny, it is
not up to this Court to “substitute [their] judgment for that of the trial court in
matters committed to the trial court's discretion.”48 Further, the only reason a
reviewing court will veer away from that principal is if a trial court “acts in an
arbitrary and unreasonable manner or without reference to guiding rules or
principles.”49 The Trial Court gave Plaintiff every opportunity to comply with its
agreed production order, right up to the date the case was dismissed.
Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that the case would be ripe for dismissal if
all of the documents covered in the Trial Court’s Order were not produced, yet
48
Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002).
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 20
even four months later, Plaintiff’s counsel was still attempting to excuse Plaintiff’s
non-compliance. Plaintiff has provided no compelling reason why the Trial
Court’s Judgment should be disturbed on appeal.
RESPONSE POINT TWO (RESTATED)
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in failing to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the same manner as
presented by the Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY FOR RESPONSE POINT TWO
Plaintiff contends the Trial Court committed reversible error in not accepting
the verbiage of a finding of fact as suggested by the Plaintiff.
Specifically, Plaintiff demanded that the Trial Court find that the sole reason for
dismissing Plaintiff’s lawsuit was that she failed to fill in a blank in the Affidavit
of Other Insurance indicating the amounts she had received by other insurers.50
The operative procedural rule, TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, does not demand that a
court accept a proposed finding of fact as the finding of the court. “Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law need not be in any particular form other than that
they must be in writing, Rule 296, and be ‘filed with the Clerk and shall be part of
49
Id.
50
CR 200.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 21
the record.’”51 Further, “[i]t is not required to make findings on evidentiary
matters as distinguished from controlling matters or on every controverted fact or
on findings that are in conflict with its original findings.”52 A court is not
compelled to make findings in the specific form requested, but, rather, is
authorized to make its own findings prepared in its own way.53 Rather than being a
point of error for the party seeking to force a court to accept their rendition of the
facts, some courts have found that the refusal to make a particular tendered finding
is tantamount to a finding contrary to the request.54
The Trial Court made clear in both its initial findings of fact and in its
additional findings of fact that the dismissal was the result of the Plaintiff’s
continuing to ignore the Trial Court’s Order, making it necessary under TEX. R.
CIV. P. 215 to dismiss the case.55
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court provided the Plaintiff with ample opportunity to comply
with the Court’s production order so as to meet the requirements of the Rules and
the Insurance Code and proceed to trial. Plaintiff failed to avail herself of
51
Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ).
52
Wade v. Taylor, 228 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1949, no writ).
53
Donalson v. Horton, 256 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
54
Thompson v. Lee Roy Crawford Produce Co., 233 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1950).
55
CR 206.
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 22
numerous opportunities over the course of two years to avoid dismissal. As
Plaintiff has failed to meet the minimum standard for reversal of the Trial Court’s
dismissal, this Court of Appeals should affirm the Judgment.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Tiffany Polley prays that this
Court affirm the judgment of Tom Green County Court at Law No. 2 in dismissing
the claims and causes of action of Crystal Bingham Hernandez, and for all other
and further relief, both at law and in equity, to which Defendant is due and owing.
Respectfully submitted,
THE WILLIS LAW GROUP, PLLC
___/s/ Lorin M. Subar _______
KIRK D. WILLIS
State Bar No. 21648500
JOSEPH M. GREGORY, III
State Bar No. 08436525
LORIN M. SUBAR
State Bar No. 19456800
10440 N. Central Expy Ste 520
Dallas, Texas 75231
Telephone: (214) 736-9433
Facsimile: (214) 736-9994
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document has been forwarded to all parties or their counsel of record on
this 18th day November, 2015 in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Via Facsimile – 325-658-8000
Rick DeHoyos
Law Offices of Rick DeHoyos, PLLC
502 S. Irving
San Angelo, Texas 76903
/s/ Lorin M. Subar
LORIN M. SUBAR
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Should the same be necessary, Appellee would show the Court that the total
number of words in the body of this Brief (pages 1 through 25 exclusive of
footnotes) is 4,172 words.
_/s/Lorin M. Subar ___
Lorin M. Subar
APPELLEE’S RESPONSIVE BRIEF ON APPEAL – Page 24