in Re Courtney Lee ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00375-CV
IN RE COURTNEY LEE RELATOR
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
TRIAL COURT NO. 57,660-C*1-2
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In a petition for writ of mandamus and writ of prohibition that relator
Courtney Lee filed on October 13, 2016, she asked this court to require the trial
court to reinstate a bond and to stay further proceedings with regard to her
criminal charges until that court resolved an issue concerning her competency.
Relator contended that the trial court violated article 46B.004(d) of the code of
criminal procedure by not staying the proceedings before declaring her bond
insufficient and increasing the amount of the bond. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Ann. art. 46B.004(d) (West Supp. 2016) (“If the court determines there is
evidence to support a finding of incompetency, the court . . . shall stay all other
proceedings in the case.”). On October 17, 2016, we requested a response to
relator’s petition.
On October 26, 2016, the State of Texas, which is the real party in interest
in this proceeding, filed a “Notice of Cause Resolution.” The State informed this
court that the competency issue has been resolved2 and that relator has entered
into a plea bargain that disposes of her charges. The State’s response showed
that in accordance with the plea bargain, the trial court deferred its adjudication
of relator’s guilt to the charges and placed her on community supervision for ten
years. Finally, the State suggested that in light of the resolution of the
competency issue and the disposition of relator’s charges, she was “no longer
requesting any relief at this point, but only an improper advisory opinion.”
Relator filed a response. In the response, relator agreed that the “case in
question ha[d] been temporarily resolved,” but she urged us to nonetheless rule
on her mandamus petition. She contended that this case is not moot because
the trial court’s action is capable of repetition but evades review.
2
The State represented that “upon agreement from both the State and
[relator], the trial court found [relator] to be competent.” The trial court’s
October 26, 2016 order on competency states, “The Defendant, along with her
counsel, . . . agreed with [the doctor’s] report that she was competent to stand
trial. The Court then found her competent to stand trial.”
2
“The rule is an elementary one that a writ of mandamus will not issue if for
any reason it would be useless or unavailing.” Holcombe v. Fowler, 118 Tex. 42,
44, 9 S.W.2d 1028, 1028 (1928) (orig. proceeding); see Dow Chem. Co. v.
Garcia, 909 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); A Am. Stamp &
Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Wettman, 658 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, orig. proceeding) (“A writ of mandamus will not issue if it would be
useless or unavailing . . . . Under such circumstances, the courts have
considered that the subject matter is moot and have refused to order the
issuance of a writ of mandamus.”). If a controversy ceases to exist, the case
becomes moot. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001).
One “rare” exception to this rule of mootness may occur when an issue is
capable of repetition but evades review. In re Fort Worth Star Telegram, 441
S.W.3d 847, 852 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, orig. proceeding). To invoke the
exception, “a party must establish both that the challenged act is of such short
duration that the issue becomes moot before review may be obtained and that a
reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected
to the same action again.” Id. (emphasis added).
We cannot conclude that any such “reasonable expectation” exists here.
Relator’s argument assumes too many uncertain future events: that sometime in
the next ten years, the State will allege that she violated a term of her community
supervision; that the State will file a motion for the trial court to adjudicate her
guilt; that during such an adjudication proceeding, another issue concerning her
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competency will arise; and that the trial court will not stay proceedings in
accordance with article 46B.004(d) after determining that some evidence
supports a finding of incompetency. Cf. Ex parte Nelson, 815 S.W.2d 737, 739
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (declining to apply the exception when a habeas corpus
applicant’s claim hinged on the future possibility that he would “once again
violate a condition of his parole”); see Ex parte Bohannan, 350 S.W.3d 116, 119–
20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Nelson and reaching a similar conclusion); see
also Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 826 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.)
(explaining that the “mere physical or theoretical possibility that the same party
may be subjected to the same action again is not sufficient to satisfy the test”).
Because the trial court has determined the competency issue and has
resolved relator’s criminal charges, any relief we could issue in this proceeding
would be useless and unavailing. Thus, we dismiss relator’s petition as moot.
See In re Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
/s/ Terrie Livingston
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER, J.; CHARLES BLEIL (Senior Justice,
Retired, Sitting by Assignment).
DELIVERED: November 14, 2016
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