Ex Parte Dedrick Houston ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00359-CR
EX PARTE DEDRICK HOUSTON
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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. C-213-010777-1343879-AP
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Dedrick Houston appeals the trial court’s denial of his article
11.072 application for writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 11.072 (West 2015). We will affirm.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Houston was indicted on two counts of improper photography or visual
recording for intentionally or knowingly photographing or recording a visual image
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
of a woman at a location that was a bathroom or private dressing room with
intent to invade the woman’s privacy or with the intent to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of himself or another person. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 21.15(b)(2) (West 2011). Houston later pleaded guilty to the first count,
and the trial court deferred a finding of guilt, placed Houston on three years of
deferred adjudication community supervision, and assessed a $300 fine.
Houston recently filed an article 11.072 application for writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court, arguing that the statute on which his judgment was
based, section 21.152 of the penal code, was found to be facially unconstitutional
in Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 348–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The
trial court denied Houston’s habeas application.
III. THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF HOUSTON’S HABEAS APPLICATION
Houston is appealing the trial court’s denial of his article 11.072 application
for writ of habeas corpus.3
2
The legislature amended this statute in 2015. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 21.15 (West Supp. 2016). All references in this opinion to section 21.15 will be
to the prior version of the statute, the version upon which the trial court’s order of
deferred adjudication rests. See Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 500,
§ 1, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 500 (amended 2015) (current version at Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 21.15).
3
In an appeal from a trial court’s denial of an application for writ of habeas
corpus, an appellate court may, but is not required to, request briefing from the
parties. See Tex. R. App. P. 31.1 (“When the appellate court receives the
record, the court will—if it desires briefs—set the time for filing briefs, and will set
the appeal for submission.”). As the issue presented here—whether Thompson’s
holding should void the judgment entered against Houston—was adequately
2
A. Standard of Review
We generally review a trial court’s decision to deny an article 11.072
habeas application for an abuse of discretion. Chacon v. State, No. 02-16-
00012-CR, 2016 WL 5443358, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2016, no
pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex parte Jessep, 281 S.W.3d
675, 678 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d). Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we determine whether the trial court
acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Chacon, 2016 WL
5443358, at *1; Jessep, 281 S.W.3d at 678.
B. Thompson’s Holding
In his habeas application, Houston argues that his conviction is void
because of the court of criminal appeals’s holding in Thompson. Before we
address the holding in Thompson, we think it is important to note that the statute
at issue here and in Thompson—the applicable version of section 21.15 of the
penal code—contained different elements depending on whether the images
were taken in a bathroom or private dressing room (section 21.15(b)(2)) or
whether they were taken at a location other than a bathroom or private dressing
room (section 21.15(b)(1)). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.15. Section 21.15
stated, in pertinent part,
presented at the trial level through Houston’s habeas application and the State’s
response, we submitted this case without briefing.
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(b) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) photographs or by videotape or other electronic
means records, broadcasts, or transmits a visual image
of another at a location that is not a bathroom or private
dressing room:
(A) without the other person’s consent; and
(B) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person;
(2) photographs or by videotape or other electronic
means records, broadcasts, or transmits a visual image
of another at a location that is a bathroom or private
dressing room:
(A) without the other person’s consent; and
(B) with intent to:
(i) invade the privacy of the other
person; or
(ii) arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person[.]
Id. (emphasis added).
In Thompson, the appellant was charged under section 21.15(b)(1) for
taking photographs of a person without consent at a location that was not a
bathroom or private dressing room. 442 S.W.3d at 330. The appellant argued
that section 21.15(b)(1) was unconstitutional on its face because it violated the
free speech clause of the First Amendment. Id. The court of criminal appeals
held that strict scrutiny had not been met because section 21.15(b)(1) was “not
the least restrictive means of protecting the substantial privacy interests in
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question.” Id. In reaching that holding, the court referenced the fact that by
excluding the bathroom or private dressing room element and by failing to
include any required intent to invade the privacy of another, section 21.15(b)(1)
was designed to be a general “catch-all” provision. Id. at 348–49. The court then
contrasted section 21.15(b)(1) with section 21.15(b)(2), noting that section
21.15(b)(2), in addition to including the bathroom or private dressing room
element, also included a culpable mental state concerning the intent to invade
the privacy of another. Id. at 349. The court went on to state that in contrast to
section 21.15(b)(1), section 21.15(b)(2) “is in fact narrowly drawn to protect
substantial privacy interests.” Id. at 348–49.
C. Application of Thompson’s Holding to this Case
Houston bases his application entirely on the fact that the court of criminal
appeals found section 21.15(b)(1) to be unconstitutional in Thompson.4 But
Houston was not charged under section 21.15(b)(1); rather, because his alleged
crime concerned photographs or recordings taken in a bathroom or private
4
Houston references two other cases, Porterie v. State, No. 03-14-00214-
CR, 2015 WL 1514530, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) and Shohreh v. State, No. 05-14-00134-CR,
2014 WL 5804190, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 10, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication), that discuss Thompson and the constitutionality
of section 21.15(b)(1). Neither of those cases, however, involved the application
of section 21.15(b)(2), and both cases make clear that Thompson only
invalidated a portion of section 21.15, not section 21.15 in its entirety. See
Porterie, 2015 WL 1514530, at *1 (“[T]he court of criminal appeals held that the
portion of the statute set out above [i.e., section 21.15(b)(1)] was facially
unconstitutional.”); Shohreh, 2014 WL 5804190, at *1 (“[T]he court of criminal
appeals held section 21.15(b)(1) facially unconstitutional.”).
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dressing room, Houston was charged under section 21.15(b)(2). See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.15(b)(2). In Thompson, the court of criminal appeals specifically
stated that section 21.15(b)(2) was “narrowly drawn to protect substantial privacy
interests” and declared only section 21.15(b)(1) facially unconstitutional. 442
S.W.3d at 348–49. Because the court of criminal appeals’ holding in Thompson
did nothing to invalidate section 21.15(b)(2), the provision applied to Houston, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Houston’s application for writ of
habeas corpus.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Houston’s application for writ of
habeas corpus.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, GABRIEL, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 27, 2016
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