Melinda Jackson v. Eugene Ethridge ( 2023 )

Opinion issued February 28, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-21-00667-CV
———————————
MELINDA JACKSON, Appellant
V.
EUGENE ETHRIDGE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1176269
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this forcible detainer case, Eugene Ethridge sought to evict Melinda
Jackson from a property that Ethridge owned in Houston. Jackson asserted a claim
for adverse possession, sought imposition of a constructive trust, and requested that
the county court at law transfer the case to district court because the issues of
possession and title were intertwined. The county court declined to transfer the case
and proceeded to trial. Ultimately, the county court signed a judgment finding that
Ethridge had the superior right to possession of the property.
In one issue on appeal, Jackson contends that the county court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over the case because the issues of possession and title were so
intertwined that title to the property necessarily had to be determined before
possession could be determined, but title disputes are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the district courts. We vacate the judgment of the county court and
render judgment dismissing the forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction.
Background
Eugene Ethridge and Melinda Jackson are half-siblings. In 1986, when
Jackson was in high school, Ethridge purchased a parcel of residential property in
Houston from Donald Harriss and his wife Marjory.1 The deed referenced a
promissory note, a vendor’s lien, and a deed of trust. Ethridge testified that he gave
permission for his mother, stepfather, and Jackson to live at the property. Ethridge’s
stepfather and mother lived there until their deaths in 2007 and 2017, respectively.
1
At some point after the sale of the property to Ethridge, Donald Harriss passed away.
Marjory Harriss remarried and changed her name to Marjory Fry. We refer to her
as “Marjory” in this opinion.
2
After Ethridge’s mother died, he allowed Jackson to live at the property. There is no
evidence that Ethridge required his parents or Jackson to pay rent to him.
According to Ethridge, he paid a total of $40,000 in cash for the property. He
did not “know anything about a debt service” on the property. He also did not know
whether his parents paid “any debt service on the property” while they lived at the
house or whether his parents made any payments to Marjory. Ethridge spoke to
Marjory “once or twice” and told her that he wanted to allow his parents to live at
the property.
Ethridge testified that from 2017 through 2020, he allowed Jackson to live at
the property as long as she paid the property taxes. She refused to pay the 2020
property taxes, so Ethridge revoked his permission for Jackson to reside at the house.
Ethridge acknowledged that Jackson eventually paid the 2020 property taxes, albeit
two months late in March 2021. During the dispute over the property taxes, Ethridge
requested that Jackson sign a lease agreement. He proposed that Jackson pay 1/12th
of the estimated property taxes as monthly rent. Jackson refused to sign a lease.
Ethridge sent Jackson a “notice to terminate tenancy” and a notice to vacate, and he
ultimately initiated eviction proceedings in the justice court.
Jackson testified that she began living at the property with her parents in 1986.
She was aware that, at the time Ethridge purchased the property, there was “debt
service that was existing on the property.” In Jackson’s understanding, Ethridge
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purchased the house in his name because their parents did not have good credit. After
the purchase, Jackson’s parents made monthly payments to Marjory that included
“the mortgage, the insurance, everything, and the taxes.” At some point after the
death of Jackson’s mother in 2017, Marjory informed Jackson that “the debt was
free and clear, no more payments were expected.” Jackson then notified Ethridge
that the debt on the property had been paid off. Ethridge did not acknowledge this,
but he demanded that Jackson pay the property taxes. Jackson testified that Ethridge
did not pay cash for the house. He also had “known all along” that Jackson and her
parents had made mortgage payments to Marjory.
Ethridge filed a complaint for forcible detainer in the justice court. In her
answer, Jackson asserted that she owned the property by adverse possession. The
justice court rendered judgment for Ethridge.
Jackson filed an appeal for a trial de novo before the county court at law. In
the county court, Jackson filed an answer and counterclaims. Jackson again asserted
a claim that she owned the property by adverse possession, alleging that her
possession had been “actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive since 2007.”
She also asserted claims for unjust enrichment and constructive fraud. Jackson
alleged that Ethridge was in a confidential relationship with their parents and that he
took title to the property in his name for the benefit of their parents. Jackson sought
the imposition of a constructive trust.
4
Shortly before trial, Jackson filed a motion to transfer the case to district court.
She argued that transfer was appropriate because she had asserted ownership of the
property by adverse possession, but only district courts have jurisdiction to
determine title disputes. Because title to the property had “become an integral part
of the proceeding,” the county court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case.
At the beginning of trial before the county court, Jackson argued that “the
heart of the matter is for adverse possession and that that issue should be ruled on
prior to making any determination on the forcible detainer.” After Ethridge
responded and argued that Jackson did not have a meritorious claim for adverse
possession, the county court stated:
Generally, I go forward. Generally I take the position that I go forward
with the eviction to determine the superior right of possession unless
another court has told me that there is a title issue and I need to stop.
And so unless I’m ordered to abate my case while they determine title
I go forward.
The court later stated, “I don’t see this as an adverse possession claim because
[Ethridge] knew [Jackson] was in there and so I just don’t see it as an adverse
possession claim. I’m going to go ahead and go forward.”
Ethridge and Jackson were the only witnesses to testify at trial. Ultimately,
the county court found that Ethridge has a superior right of possession and Jackson
“has held over after her right to possession ended.” This appeal followed.
5
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of County Courts
In her sole issue, Jackson argues that the county court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to render judgment on Ethridge’s forcible detainer claim because the
right to possession could not be adjudicated without first determining title to the
property, an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts.
A. Standard of Review
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case. City
of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). Subject-matter jurisdiction
is never presumed, and it cannot be waived. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). Whether a court has subject-matter
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226, 228 (Tex. 2004).
B. Jurisdiction Over Forcible Detainer Suits
Texas law grants jurisdiction to the justice courts—and to the county courts
on appeal by trial de novo—to determine eviction suits, which include forcible
detainer suits. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
440 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Gibson v. Dynegy
Midstream Servs., L.P., 138 S.W.3d 518, 521–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no
pet.).
6
The justice courts and county courts lack jurisdiction to resolve title issues;
rather, exclusive jurisdiction to determine title to real property is vested in the district
courts. Bynum v. Lewis, 393 S.W.3d 916, 918 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.); see
Goodman-Delaney v. Grantham, 484 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Neither the justice court nor the county court at law have
subject matter jurisdiction to determine who has title to property.”). The county court
does not have jurisdiction over a forcible-detainer appeal unless the justice court had
jurisdiction. Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d
66, 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
A forcible detainer action is “meant to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive
means of determining the right to possession of the premises.” Mendoza v. Bazan,
574 S.W.3d 594, 602 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied); Rice v. Pinney, 51
S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). To prevail in a forcible detainer
action, the plaintiff is not required to prove title to the property. Mendoza, 574
S.W.3d at 602. Instead, he must only show sufficient evidence of ownership to
demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e)
(“The court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title.”); see
Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006)
(“The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the
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premises.”); Hong Kong Dev., 229 S.W.3d at 437 (noting that judgment of
possession in forcible detainer action determines only right to “immediate
possession,” not “ultimate rights of the parties” to any other issue relating to
property) (quotations omitted).
The “mere existence” of a title dispute concerning the property does not
deprive a justice or county court of jurisdiction. Mendoza, 574 S.W.3d at 602;
Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“If the title issue does not control the right to possession,
it is of no moment.”). Justice courts may adjudicate possession when issues related
to title are tangentially or collaterally related to possession. Gibson, 138 S.W.3d at
522.
Instead, the justice and county courts lack jurisdiction only if the right to
immediate possession “necessarily requires the resolution of a title dispute such that
the issues of title and possession are necessarily intertwined.”2 Mendoza, 574
2
As an example of a situation in which the issues of title and possession are not
necessarily intertwined, courts have routinely held that justice and county courts
have jurisdiction when a deed of trust expressly provides that, upon a foreclosure
sale, the borrower becomes a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by the
purchaser through forcible detainer proceedings. See, e.g., Morris v. Am. Home
Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,
no pet.); Bruce v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 352 S.W.3d 891, 893–94 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., 61 S.W.3d 555,
558–59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). In such cases, the terms
of the deed of trust itself create a landlord-tenant relationship between the borrower
and the purchaser. See Bruce, 352 S.W.3d at 893. Even if the borrower argues
wrongful foreclosure, the landlord-tenant relationship created in the deed of trust is
8
S.W.3d at 602 (quotations omitted); Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d
431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating that justice court
is deprived of jurisdiction “only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to
determination of the right to immediate possession”). Specific evidence of a title
dispute is required to raise an issue as to the justice court’s and county court’s
jurisdiction. Mendoza, 574 S.W.3d at 602 (quotations omitted).
Courts have repeatedly held that claims of adverse possession raise a title
dispute that is necessarily intertwined with issues of possession. See, e.g., Bynum,
393 S.W.3d at 919; Gibson, 138 S.W.3d at 524; Gentry v. Marburger, 596 S.W.2d
201, 203 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Hernandez v.
Martinez, No. 04-19-00076-CV, 2019 WL 5580261, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Oct. 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Laird v. Savannah Bellaire Home Builders, Inc.,
No. 14-04-00128-CV, 2005 WL 2276963, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).
an independent basis for the justice or county courts to conclude that the purchaser
has the right to immediate possession, and the courts are not necessarily required to
determine the wrongful foreclosure question. See Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d
66, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at
559. The borrower is entitled to pursue their wrongful foreclosure claim—a title
determination—in district court, but the justice and county courts have jurisdiction
to determine the superior right of possession, which is the sole issue in forcible
detainer actions. See Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 71.
9
When a case presents issues concerning both title and possession, “the issues
may be litigated in separate proceedings in different courts with appropriate
jurisdiction.” Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 435–36
(stating that forcible detainer actions are not exclusive, but are “cumulative of any
other remedy that a party may have in the courts of this state”). A party who has
been evicted in a forcible detainer action is entitled to bring a separate suit in the
district court to determine title questions, and these suits may run concurrently.3
Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 436; Hong Kong Dev., 229 S.W.3d at 437 (stating that
forcible detainer suit in justice court may run concurrently with suit in another court
“even if the other action adjudicates matters that could result in a different
determination of possession from that rendered in the forcible-detainer suit”).
C. Whether Jackson Raised a Title Dispute
At trial, the county court admitted a copy of the deed conveying the property
from Donald Harriss to Ethridge in 1986. The “Warranty Deed With Vendor’s Lien”
states:
That We, DONALD L. HARRISS and wife, MARJORY HARRISS
of the County of Harris and State of Texas for and in consideration of
the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS and other valuable
consideration to the undersigned paid by the grantee herein named, the
3
In his appellee’s brief, Ethridge informs this Court that Jackson has filed suit in the
Harris County district courts seeking a determination of title to the property.
10
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the further consideration
of the execution and delivery by Grantees of their certain promissory
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of Thirty Eight
Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety One and No/100 Dollars
($38,791.00), payable to the order of Grantors in monthly installments
and bearing interest as therein provided, containing the usual clauses
providing for acceleration of maturity and for attorney’s fees,
the payment of which note is secured by the vendor’s lien herein
retained, and is additionally secured by a deed of trust of even date
herewith to JOHN H. TRUEHEART, JR. Trustee, have GRANTED,
SOLD AND CONVEYED, and by these presents do GRANT, SELL
AND CONVEY [the property] unto EUGENE B. ETHRIDGE . . . .
Ethridge testified that he purchased the property for $40,000 in cash, and he
was not aware of any “debt service” on the property. He allowed his mother and
stepfather to live on the property until their deaths, and he allowed Jackson to live
on the property following their mother’s death in 2017. No written lease agreement
between Ethridge and his parents or between Ethridge and Jackson was entered into
evidence. There was no testimony that Ethridge’s parents or Jackson ever paid rent
to Ethridge.
In 2020, a dispute arose between Ethridge and Jackson concerning the
payment of property taxes. After Jackson initially refused to pay the property taxes,
Ethridge revoked his permission allowing her to live at the property. He proposed
that Jackson sign a written lease agreement requiring her to pay 1/12th of the
estimated property taxes as monthly rent. Jackson refused to sign a lease. She
eventually paid the 2020 property taxes in March 2021.
11
Ethridge testified that his mother and stepfather did not express an interest in
purchasing the property in their names or without his financial assistance in 1986.
Jackson, on the other hand, testified that Ethridge purchased the property in his name
because their parents did not have good credit. On several occasions, Jackson’s
father attempted to refinance the property in his own name, but his credit was never
good enough to obtain financing. According to Jackson, her parents paid monthly
mortgage payments to Marjory, and they also paid property taxes and insurance
payments. Jackson continued making these payments after her mother’s death in
2017.
At some point, Marjory informed Jackson that their debt on the property had
been fulfilled and no further payments were required. Jackson informed Ethridge
and requested a deed to the property. Jackson stated, “[O]ver years we had been
asking [Ethridge] to bring us the deed.” Jackson also disputed Ethridge’s testimony
that he had paid cash for the property. She testified that Ethridge had “known all
along we’ve been paying the mortgage to [Marjory].”
It is undisputed that Ethridge is the record title holder to the property.
However, in both the justice court and the county court, Jackson alleged that she had
obtained title to the property through adverse possession. In the county court,
Jackson also alleged that Ethridge held title to the property in his name for the benefit
of his mother and stepfather, but when Jackson paid off the mortgage on the
12
property, Ethridge “committed a constructive fraud when he claimed to be the owner
of the property.” She alleged that a constructive trust should be imposed so that
Ethridge holds title to the property for the benefit of his mother’s and stepfather’s
estates.
Adverse possession is an “actual and visible appropriation of real property,
commenced and continued under a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is
hostile to the claim of another person.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.021(1);
Bynum, 393 S.W.3d at 918; Masonic Bldg. Ass’n of Houston, Inc. v. McWhorter,
177 S.W.3d 465, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). “The concept
of adverse possession allows a person to claim title to real property presently titled
in another.” Bynum, 393 S.W.3d at 918. To prevail on a claim of adverse possession,
the claimant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) the actual and
visible possession of the disputed property; (2) that is adverse and hostile to the claim
of the owner of record title; (3) that is open and notorious; (4) that is peaceable;
(5) that is exclusive; and (6) that involves continuous cultivation, use, or enjoyment
throughout the statutory period. NAC Tex Hotel Co. v. Greak, 481 S.W.3d 327, 331–
32 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.).
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that is implied by operation of law
and that may be imposed by the trial court to prevent unjust enrichment. Pickelner
v. Adler, 229 S.W.3d 516, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
13
“[A] constructive trust generally involves primarily a presence of fraud, in view of
which equitable title or interest should be recognized in some person other than the
taker or holder of the legal title.” Mills v. Gray, 210 S.W.2d 985, 988 (Tex. 1948)
(quotations omitted); Pickelner, 229 S.W.3d at 527.
A constructive trust “escapes the unquestioned general rule that land titles
must not rest in parol,” so to establish a constructive trust, “there must be strict proof
of a prior confidential relationship and unfair conduct or unjust enrichment on the
part of the wrongdoer.” Pickelner, 229 S.W.3d at 527 (quoting Rankin v. Naftalis,
557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977)); see Mills, 210 S.W.2d at 989. The party seeking
a constructive trust must establish: (1) breach of a special trust or fiduciary
relationship or actual or constructive fraud; (2) unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer;
and (3) an identifiable res that can be traced back to the original property. KCM Fin.
LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2015). This remedy is premised on the
“equitable notion that the acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful” and
the possessor of the property would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to
retain the property. Id. at 88 (quotations omitted).
Jackson alleged that she had acquired title to the property through adverse
possession or, alternatively, that a constructive trust should be imposed because
Ethridge and their parents were in a confidential relationship and he acquired title to
the property for their benefit. As we have noted above, several courts—including
14
this Court—have held that when a party asserts a claim of adverse possession, the
party raises a title issue that is necessarily intertwined with the issue of possession
and that deprives the justice and county courts of jurisdiction over the forcible
detainer action. See, e.g., Bynum, 393 S.W.3d at 919; Gibson, 138 S.W.3d at 524;
Gentry, 596 S.W.2d at 203; Hernandez, 2019 WL 5580261, at *2; Laird, 2005 WL
2276963, at *2. Regardless of whether Jackson can ultimately prevail on these
claims at trial,4 she raised issues that made title to the property “an integral part of
the proceeding.” See Bynum, 393 S.W.3d at 919; Gibson, 138 S.W.3d at 524
4
In her opening argument at trial, Jackson argued that she had acquired title to the
property by adverse possession, and she requested that the county court rule on that
issue prior to making any determination of Ethridge’s forcible detainer action.
Ethridge responded that he did not believe Jackson’s adverse possession claim was
meritorious. The trial court stated, “I don’t see this as an adverse possession claim
because [Ethridge] knew [Jackson] was in there and so I just don’t see it as an
adverse possession claim.” Even if this claim is not meritorious, Jackson raised the
issue of adverse possession in her pleadings and at trial, and the county court was
required to make a determination on that claim—whether Jackson had acquired title
to the property by adverse possession or not—before it could determine who had
the superior right of possession. This is a title determination that can only be made
by the district court. See Bynum v. Lewis, 393 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2013, no pet.); Gibson v. Dynegy Midstream Servs., L.P., 138 S.W.3d 518, 524 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). We note that the El Paso Court of Appeals has
concluded that issues of title and possession to property were not necessarily
intertwined even though the defendants argued adverse possession because the
defendants undisputedly had not occupied the property for at least ten years, as
required by statute. See Mendoza v. Bazan, 574 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2019, pet. denied); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.026(a). The El Paso
Court distinguished Gibson, in which “the tenant pleaded a colorable adverse
possession claim for the property,” and concluded that the defendants’ adverse
possession claim did not constitute specific evidence of an intertwined title dispute.
Mendoza, 574 S.W.3d at 604. The court also noted that “neither did [the defendants]
claim in the lower courts to have title to the property on this basis.” Id.
15
(concluding that “questions of title and possession” raised by defendant’s adverse
possession allegations “are so integrally linked” that justice and county courts could
not have decided forcible detainer claims without deciding adverse possession
claim).
To determine which party had the superior right of possession to the property,
the county court necessarily had to resolve Jackson’s adverse possession claim. See
Bynum, 393 S.W.3d at 919; Gibson, 138 S.W.3d at 524. This is a title determination,
over which the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See Bynum, 393 S.W.3d at
918; see Goodman-Delaney, 484 S.W.3d at 174. We conclude that, in this case,
issues of title to the property and possession were “necessarily intertwined” such that
the county court was required to resolve a title dispute before it could determine who
had the superior right of possession to the property. We hold that the county court
lacked jurisdiction to determine Ethridge’s forcible detainer action.
We sustain Jackson’s sole issue.
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Conclusion
We vacate the judgment of the county court and render judgment dismissing
Ethridge’s forcible detainer cause of action.
April L. Farris
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.
17