Donald S. Metoyer A/K/A Donald Scott Metoyer A/K/A Donald Metoyer v. State ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-18-00573-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DONALD S. METOYER a/k/a
DONALD SCOTT METOYER a/k/a
DONALD METOYER, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 347th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Donald Scott Metoyer was convicted on three counts of sexual assault,
enhanced to a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1). Metoyer
argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the report of Elizabeth Williams, a sexual
assault nurse examiner (SANE), because it violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment; and (2) even if the report was properly admitted, it should have been
excluded under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
TEX. R. EVID. 403. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 15, 2013, an argument broke out between the complainant, E.J.,
who was eighteen years old at the time, and her mother. E.J. testified that she left her
house after midnight and walked to a park where she sat on a swing. While sitting down,
she noticed someone approaching her. The man stood next to her at the right side of the
swing. The man did not introduce himself but asked her questions concerning why she
was at the park late at night, where she lived, and if she smoked or drank. E.J. testified
that the man tried to forcefully kiss her. E.J. attempted to dial 911 on her phone; however,
as she was pushing him away, the screen locked. He noticed her trying to unlock the
phone, and he knocked the phone out from her hand. E.J. stood up and tried pushing
him away, but the man hit her on the face and placed his hand on her throat. As he was
squeezing her throat, she fell down to the ground. Once E.J. was on the ground, the man
pulled up her shirt and covered her face with it. He took off her bra and licked her breasts.
With his free hand, he unbuckled her pants and tried to penetrate her, but E.J. told him
that she was on her period, hoping that he would stop. However, he flipped her over and
attempted to penetrate her anus using his finger and penis. From there, he masturbated
and ejaculated on the back of her thigh. Afterwards, he told E.J. to get up, walk ahead of
him, and not to turn around.
2
E.J. flagged down a car and called her mother and the police. E.J. was taken to
the hospital where multiple DNA samples were taken from her body. Because E.J. did
not know her attacker and there were no witnesses at the time of the assault, police sent
the SANE report to the Department of Public Safety to process the evidence. The DNA
evidence was matched to Metoyer.
Metoyer was indicted for three counts of sexual assault. See id. § 22.011(a)(1).
During trial, nurse Sonja Eddleman testified about the SANE report that was conducted
by nurse Williams. Metoyer’s counsel objected under Rules 403 and 602, asserting that
Eddleman “is not the one in the affidavit. . . . She does not know if it is a true copy. She
is only talking about a couple of pages that she has reviewed. So it is not a complete
record.” See TEX. R. EVID. 403, 602. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed
Eddleman to testify about the SANE report.
On September 19, 2018, the jury found Metoyer guilty on all three counts. The
State sought to enhance Metoyer’s punishment to that of a habitual felony offender based
on his prior felony conviction, and the trial court found his prior conviction true. Metoyer
was sentenced to seventy-five years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of the Criminal Justice for each count and the sentences were to run
concurrently. This appeal followed.
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In his sole issue, Metoyer argues that because Eddleman’s testimony was based
on the SANE report conducted by Williams, its admission violated his right to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
3
The defendant has the right to confront witnesses against him. See id. The
Confrontation Clause applies to both in-court testimony and out-of-court statements that
are testimonial in nature. Crawford v. Washington, 451 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). If the
defendant objects to the admission of out-of-court testimony under the Confrontation
Clause, the State has the burden of establishing that the testimony is admissible under
Crawford. Vinson v. State, 252 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see De La Paz
v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
The central question in a Confrontation Clause analysis is whether the statements
were testimonial or nontestimonial in nature. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). Testimonial statements include those “that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. Medical
reports that are created for treatment purposes are generally not considered to be
testimonial nor within the meaning of Crawford. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 312 (2009); Berkley v. State, 298 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2009, pet. ref’d). Testimonial hearsay is only admissible if the declarant is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
564 U.S. 647, 660 (2011); Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
On appeal, whether a statement is testimonial is a question of law subject to de novo
review. De La Paz, 273 S.W.3d at 680; Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
B. Analysis
4
Metoyer argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the
admission of the SANE report. More specifically, Metoyer asserts that Williams’ report
was testimonial because it was used primarily for law enforcement purposes; he also
argues that Eddleman had no personal knowledge of the items within the report because
she did not personally conduct the exam on E.J. However, Eddleman testified that
William’s report was primarily generated to assist in diagnosing and rendering medical
treatment to E.J. Because there was evidence before the trial court that the purpose of
Williams’ report was for medical treatment, we hold that the trial court did not err by
admitting it. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361–62 (2011) (concluding that
reports created primarily to render medical treatment are non-testimonial and “the
Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of
cross examination”); Berkley, 298 S.W.3d at 715 (observing that “medical records,
created for treatment purposes, are not ‘testimonial’ within the meaning of Crawford”); cf.
Kou v. State, 536 S.W.3d 535, 544 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding
that the State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the primary purpose for testing
the complainant for herpes was for medical treatment because nothing in the record
reflected “that the lab test results were used for anything other than prosecution”). We
overrule Metoyer’s first issue.
III. RULE 403
In the last paragraph of his brief, Metoyer argues that even if Eddleman’s testimony
about Williams’ report was properly admitted without violating the Confrontation Clause,
such testimony should have been excluded under Rule 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. Even
5
though Metoyer only devoted a single paragraph to the issue and provided no case
citations, we will liberally construe his brief and address the issue.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. See Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);
Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “As long as the trial court’s
ruling is within the ‘zone of reasonable disagreement,’ there is no abuse of discretion, and
the trial court’s ruling will be upheld.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009).
Rule 403 states that a trial court may exclude relevant evidence if the evidence’s
“probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. However, courts
presume that the probative value of relevant evidence exceeds any potential danger of
unfair prejudice until proven otherwise. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (op. on reh’g). A trial court’s decision on a Rule 403
objection is “rarely” disturbed and is given “an especially high level of deference.” United
States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 354 (5th Cir. 2007); see Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d
205, 218 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d); see also Garza v. State, No. 13-17-00677-
CR, 2018 WL 3655519, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). When performing a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court
must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of
evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3)
any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4)
any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
6
issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury
that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence,
and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an
inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Of
course, these factors may well blend together in practice.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
B. Discussion
On appeal, Metoyer asserts that Eddleman’s testimony was “prejudicial to the
Defendant with little probative value beyond her ability to attempt to circumvent the
Confrontation Clause.” Before Eddleman testified, Metoyer’s counsel lodged a Rule 403
objection and the following exchange occurred
[Metoyer’s
counsel]: I believe the evidence coming in substantially outweighs by
[sic] the unfair prejudice due to time, due to late notice, due to
this witness not being the actual person who conducted the
examination.
[Trial court]: The court finds at this time that Ms. Eddleman’s testimony is
relevant and it is probative and that the probative value in this
case is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion and misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time or cumulative evidence.
Metoyer has not, before the trial court or on appeal, elaborated as to how the probative
value of Eddleman’s testimony was outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice. See
TEX. R. EVID. 403. Metoyer has offered no further explanation as to how Eddleman’s
testimony was irrelevant or would cause jury confusion or needlessly waste time. See id.
Thus, Metoyer has not overcome the presumption that the probative value of Eddleman’s
testimony exceeds any potential for unfair prejudice, and we will defer to the trial court’s
ruling. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389; Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 218. The trial
7
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878.
We overrule Metoyer’s second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
25th day of July, 2019.
8