James Doyle Collins, Jr. v. State ( 2018 )


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  • Opinion issued December 6, 2018
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-17-00920-CR
    NO. 01-17-00921-CR
    NO. 01-17-00922-CR
    ———————————
    JAMES DOYLE COLLINS, JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 300th District Court
    Brazoria County, Texas
    Trial Court Case Nos. 76666-CR, 76667-CR, 76668-CR
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A jury found appellant, James Doyle Collins, Jr., guilty of three separate
    offenses of possession of child pornography1 and assessed his punishment at
    confinement for five years and a fine of $10,000, confinement for five years and a
    fine of $10,000, and confinement for ten years and a fine of $10,000, to run
    concurrently. It then recommended that his ten-year prison sentence be suspended
    and he be placed on community supervision. The trial court, in accordance with the
    jury’s recommendation, suspended appellant’s ten-year prison sentence and placed
    him on community supervision for a period of ten years. In two issues, appellant
    contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions and the
    trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement.
    We affirm.
    Background
    Pearland Police Department (“PPD”) Detective C. Arnold, a certified
    cyber-crimes investigator with the Houston Metro Internet Crimes Against Children
    Task Force (“ICACTF”), testified that he, through the use of computers in his office,
    monitors certain file-sharing networks that “exist on the internet” in order to
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(a) (Vernon 2016); appellate cause no.
    01-17-00920-CR; trial court cause no. 76666-CR (Offense I); appellate cause no.
    01-17-00921-CR; trial court cause no. 76667-CR (Offense II); appellate cause no.
    01-17-00922-CR; trial court cause no. 76668-CR (Offense III).
    2
    investigate the “distribution and receipt of child pornography.”2 Arnold receives “a
    notification when someone [using a file-sharing network] uploads or downloads a
    [known] child pornograph[y]” image or video, and upon receiving a notification, he
    views the image or video to determine whether it constitutes child pornography.3
    Arnold then obtains the location of the person using the file-sharing network based
    on the IP address assigned to that person.
    2
    Peer-to-peer file sharing is a popular means of obtaining and sharing
    files free of charge directly from other computer users who are
    connected to the [i]nternet and who are also using peer-to-peer
    file[-]sharing software. . . . Once peer-to-peer file[-]sharing software
    has been downloaded and installed [on a computer] by the user, the
    user may interface directly with other computers using the same
    filing[-]sharing software and browse and obtain files that have been
    made available for sharing. . . . File sharing occurs when one
    computer, identified by an Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, initiates a
    search for a responsive file by indicating the term or terms that it seeks
    to find in the file’s name. This is called a ‘query’ and consists of key
    words       such      as     ‘child,’    ‘pornography,’     or      ‘child
    pornography.’ . . . Other computers that are using the same
    file[-]sharing software and connected to the [i]nternet at the time will
    respond to the query with a ‘query hit message.’ A query hit message
    identifies the file or files available for sharing which have a word in
    the file name that matches the search word in the query. . . . After a
    query hit message is received, the computer user requesting the file
    must affirmatively select it for download, generally by double
    clicking on the file’s name.
    U.S. v. Thomas, Nos. 5:12-cr-37, 5:12-cr-44, 5:12-cr-97, 
    2013 WL 6000484
    , at *2–
    3 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2013) (order).
    Detective Arnold explained that twenty-six file-sharing networks exist, including
    “ARES, Limewire, [and] BearWare.”
    3
    The “alert” that Detective Arnold receives essentially tells him that in the
    “geographic area that [he is] monitoring,” a particular IP address has “downloaded
    or uploaded [a certain child-pornography] video[] and picture[].”
    3
    In regard to appellant, Detective Arnold testified that on March 6, 2015, his
    computer “made a direct connection and download [of a known child-pornography
    video] from an IP address in Pearland, [Texas].” When Arnold viewed the video,
    he determined that it constituted child pornography. At the time, Arnold did not
    know the identity of appellant, but based on the IP address associated with the
    downloaded-child-pornography video, he obtained appellant’s physical address.
    Arnold drove to appellant’s residence in Pearland, Brazoria County, Texas, and
    determined that he had a secure internet connection.4 Arnold then obtained a search
    warrant for appellant’s residence.5
    On May 12, 2015, Detective Arnold, along with Homeland Security Special
    Agents D. Lewis and L. Erickson, PPD Detectives D. Vlasek and J. Cox, and two
    uniformed PPD patrol officers, served a search warrant on appellant at his residence.
    Upon arriving at appellant’s home, Arnold, along with the other law enforcement
    officers, “clear[ed] the house” and identified the individuals that were present.
    4
    Detective Arnold explained that with an “open internet connection . . . someone can
    [park] in front of your house” and “us[e] your [W]ifi signal [to] access the internet.”
    However, with a secure internet connection, “no one can . . . use your internet
    connection without [knowing] your password.” This is important because if another
    person can “log into your wireless [internet] signal,” then “it would show your IP
    address and what they[, and not you, were] doing” on their computer.
    5
    The trial court admitted into evidence Detective Arnold’s affidavit and the search
    warrant.
    4
    Arnold and Lewis then interviewed appellant, while Vlasek and Cox “examine[d]
    and process[ed] all of the electronic[] [devices]” found in appellant’s home.6
    Detective Arnold noted that when he and Agent Lewis spoke to appellant, he
    was not in custody, was free to leave, and was not placed in handcuffs or in any type
    of restraints. Despite the fact that appellant was not in custody, Arnold informed
    him of his legal rights, and appellant waived them, agreeing to speak. Arnold did
    not coerce appellant, threaten him, or make any promises to him. And he recorded
    the interview with appellant.7
    During his interview, which lasted approximately forty-five minutes,
    appellant stated that he was the only person living in his home and he had
    downloaded and used, on his electronic devices, certain file-sharing networks,8
    6
    Detective Arnold explained that Detectives Vlasek and Cox used a “forensic
    recovery program” to “look[] for obvious signs of child pornography” on appellant’s
    electronic devices. The other law enforcement officers present at appellant’s home
    “split up doing searches in each of the rooms [in the house], looking for items that
    [might have] contain[ed]” child pornography.
    7
    The trial court admitted into evidence State’s Exhibit 2, appellant’s audio-recorded
    interview with Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis.
    8
    Detective Arnold explained that a file-sharing network “doesn’t do anything on its
    own.” A person “ha[s] to tell it what [to] look[] for,” “ha[s] to tell it to download
    files,” and “ha[s] to manually open files and view them.” And a file-sharing network
    does not appear on a person’s computer unless he specifically “download[s] it.”
    5
    including “ARES,”9 “BearShare and Bear,”10 and “Limewire.”11 When Arnold
    questioned appellant about certain terms that appellant may have used while
    searching the file-sharing networks, including the search terms “Vicky”12 and
    “PTHC,”13 appellant admitted that he had in fact viewed child pornography “out of
    9
    See Ferguson v. State, Nos. 09-15-00342-CR to 09-15-00345-CR, 
    2016 WL 4247956
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 10, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (defendant used “ARES file[-]sharing network” to
    download child pornography). Appellant admitted to using the “ARES” file-sharing
    network in 2015.
    10
    See Wiand v. United States, Nos. 3:10-CV-1420-M, 3:07-CR-352-M, 
    2012 WL 1033623
    , at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012) (defendant “admitted he acquired . . . child
    pornography using a file-sharing program called Bearshare”).
    11
    See Lubojasky v. State, No. 03-10-00780-CR, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14 (Tex.
    App.—Austin Oct. 19, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (“LimeWire is peer-to-peer file[-]sharing software that . . . is often used to
    download images and videos of child pornography.”).
    12
    Detective Arnold explained that “Vicky is a common series in child pornography
    that a lot of people that are seeking child pornography want to get. It [is] a video
    series . . . [of] a[] 4-year old child[,] whose name is Vicky[,] up to about the age of
    11. There are many, many videos over that time period that were made by her
    stepfather as he was sexually abusing her.” See Gasper v. State, Nos.
    01-16-00930-CR, 01-16-00931-CR, 01-16-00932-CR, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *4
    n.17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (“‘Vicki’ is ‘a series of a child’ and a ‘common search
    term[]’ for child pornography[.]”); Hicks v. State, Nos. 07-12-00256-CR to
    07-12-00276-CR, 
    2013 WL 4711223
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 28, 2013,
    no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting “the ‘Vicky’ series . . . [is
    a] series [that is] readily recognized by those who investigate child[-]pornography
    cases”).
    13
    Detective Arnold noted that “PTHC is an acronym [that] stands for Pre[-]Teen Hard
    Core. It’s another common search term that people will use on a file[-]sharing
    network when looking for child pornography.” See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at
    *3 n.8 (“‘PTHC’ is a ‘common search term[]’ for child pornography and stands for
    ‘preteen hard core[.]’”).
    6
    curiosity” and he had searched for “Vicky,” “PTHC,” and “Baby J”14 when looking
    for pornography on file-sharing networks. (Internal quotations omitted.) When
    appellant had searched for “Vicky” on a file-sharing network, “[a] whole bunch of
    porn showed up.” (Internal quotations omitted.) And when Arnold asked appellant
    if he had ever searched for a particular age while looking for pornography, appellant
    stated that he had searched for “12.” (Internal quotations omitted). According to
    Arnold, appellant had downloaded twenty-five child-pornography images and
    videos over a four-month period from December 2014 until March 2015. Appellant
    stated that he would download a child-pornography image or video “to see if the
    children were real” and this would then “lead [him] to the next one.” (Internal
    quotations omitted.) In other words, appellant admitted that he had downloaded,
    viewed, and continued to search for child pornography.
    Appellant also stated in his interview that he had deleted the child
    pornography that he had found. And he had looked for “adult porn” or pornography
    involving “adult women.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Further, when he had
    14
    Detective Arnold explained that “Baby J” is a “child porn[ography] series video
    [involving] a toddler or an infant child, probably 2 to 3 years of age.” (Internal
    quotations omitted.) Detective Cox testified that “Baby J is a common series of
    child pornography.” (Internal quotations omitted). See Assousa v. State, No.
    05-08-00007-CR, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 21, 2009, pet.
    ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Baby J series” constituted
    “known child-porn series[,] involving an infant child.” (internal quotations
    omitted)).
    7
    “tr[ied] to download movies,” appellant stated that “suddenly porn would [just]
    come up.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Appellant also stated that he had not
    realized that child pornography had actually been downloaded onto his computer.
    However, appellant admitted to looking at child pornography from 2011–2014. And
    at the end of his interview, he affirmed that he had “looked at child porn[ography],”
    explaining that he was “done looking at it” because he was “no longer curious.”
    (Internal quotations omitted.)
    Detective Arnold further testified that law enforcement officers found child
    pornography on more than one electronic device in appellant’s home. In fact, they
    found over 900 child-pornography images and videos on appellant’s electronic
    devices and discovered that appellant had been viewing and downloading child
    pornography over “a four-year period.” Arnold opined that the large volume of child
    pornography found on appellant’s electronic devices indicated that he had not been
    accidentally downloading child pornography. One electronic device contained 727
    child-pornography images, a second device contained sixteen child-pornography
    images, and a third device contained 168 child-pornography images.
    Detective Arnold explained that appellant had also been “distribut[ing] child
    pornography,” noting that he had shared a child-pornography video with Arnold’s
    computer. Specifically, on March 6, 2015, appellant had a child-pornography video
    in his “unique share folder” on the “ARES” file-sharing network, Arnold’s computer
    8
    “connected to [appellant’s] share folder[,]” and Arnold “got the video from
    [appellant].” Arnold did concede that he did not know who specifically was using
    appellant’s computer at the time that the child-pornography video was shared.
    However, appellant had told Arnold that he lived by himself and “[h]e was the one
    searching and . . . looking at the[] [child-pornography] videos.”
    Detective Cox, a computer forensic analyst with the ICACTF, testified that on
    May 12, 2015, he, along with other law enforcement officers, served a search warrant
    on appellant at his residence. Cox, as a computer forensic analyst, was responsible,
    along with Detective Vlasek, for “preview[ing]” or “[t]riag[ing]” any electronic
    devices found in appellant’s home, including “hard drives, laptops, flash drives,
    [and] camera cards,” to determine whether they contained “any evidence of child
    pornography.”     “[E]vidence of child pornography” could include file-sharing
    networks, “child[-]pornography files themselves,” and “link files which would show
    any . . . files that [had been recently] opened on” a particular electronic device.
    In regard to the electronic devices found in appellant’s home, Detective Cox
    noted that, while “preview[ing]” or “[t]riag[ing],” he did not find any actual
    child-pornography files on appellant’s devices, but he found “link files” with “titles
    that were consistent with child[-]pornography files.”15 And Cox found file-sharing
    15
    See U.S. v. Brown, No. 10-20233, 
    2012 WL 5948085
    , at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28,
    2012) (order) (in regard to offense of possession of child pornography, noting “the
    Government presented evidence that someone viewed child pornography on the
    9
    networks on multiple electronic devices in appellant’s home. Although Cox did not
    find actual child-pornography files while “[t]riag[ing]” appellant’s electronic
    devices, he “found evidence that child porn[ography] had been on some of the
    devices that [he was] look[ing] at.” Cox noted that law enforcement officers seized
    several electronic devices from appellant’s home so that “full forensic[] [analysis
    could be] done . . . at a later date by a forensic officer.”
    Detective Vlasek, a former computer forensic analyst with the ICACTF,
    testified that on May 12, 2015, he, along with other law enforcement officers, served
    a search warrant on appellant at his residence. Vlasek and Detective Cox were
    responsible for “preview[ing]” or “triag[ing]” the contents of the electronic devices
    found in appellant’s home. And while “preview[ing]” or “triag[ing]” the devices,
    he found “link files” and “quite a few” of “peer-to-peer [file-sharing] programs.”
    Vlasek explained that “link files” and “linked to” “[a]nything that [a] user [of an
    electronic device] has viewed, opened, [or] executed,” and based on the titles of the
    “link files” found on appellant’s electronic devices, Vlasek determined that they
    related to child pornography. Vlasek opined that the file-sharing networks and “link
    files” “indicat[ed] that child pornography exist[ed]” on appellant’s electronic
    desktop computer by way of a link file found on the . . . computer hard drive”);
    United States v. Koch, No. 3:08-cr-0105-JAJ, 
    2009 WL 10697501
    , at *2–5 (S.D.
    Iowa July 6, 2009) (order) (considering presence of “[l]ink files relating to child
    pornography” in determining defendant’s guilt).
    10
    devices. And law enforcement officers seized electronic devices from appellant’s
    home that day.
    Following the seizure of appellant’s electronic devices, Detective Vlasek
    completed a forensic analysis and found downloaded child pornography on three
    electronic devices: (1) a “gray desktop computer,” (2) a “Dell desktop” computer,
    and (3) a “PNY flash drive.” In total, he found “[r]oughly 900” child-pornography
    images and videos on appellant’s electronic devices.
    In regard to the “gray desktop computer,” Detective Vlasek testified that it
    contained   168    downloaded      child-pornography      images     and    twenty-five
    child-pornography videos.16 Vlasek viewed the child-pornography images and
    videos and confirmed that they did indeed constitute child pornography. The
    majority of the images and videos found on the “gray desktop computer” were “in
    the thumbnail database,” which indicated that they had been viewed.
    Detective Vlasek further noted that he had discovered, on the “gray desktop
    computer,” the “ARES” file-sharing network. And he determined that the majority
    of the child-pornography images and videos found on the “gray desktop computer”
    16
    The trial court admitted into evidence State’s Exhibit 4, a list of 366
    child-pornography images and videos found on the “gray desktop computer.”
    Detective Vlasek explained that some of the child-pornography images and videos
    appear several times on the list because they had been downloaded several times.
    State’s Exhibit 4 reveals that the child-pornography images and videos found on the
    “gray desktop computer” had been downloaded in 2008, 2010, and 2011.
    11
    had been downloaded using that program. According to Vlasek, although the
    child-pornography images and videos that he recovered from the “gray desktop
    computer” had been deleted, the “ARES” file-sharing network had not.
    Detective Vlasek further explained that he was able to recover the titles of the
    child-pornography images and videos that had been downloaded on the “gray
    desktop computer,” which included the following: “Six-year-old Larissa Fucked
    124s 1,” “Ten-year-old LS Magazine Issue LSM,”17 “PTHV, Lolifuck, 10-year-old
    Handjob,” “W18 Lolitas, Folladas”18 “Eight-year-old Real Child Porn Pre[-]Teen
    Pedo PTHD kiddy incest anal cum,” and “Kid Sex, . . . PTHC, King Pass, hussyfan,
    Baby J, Jenny, Baby shiv 2.”19 (Internal quotations omitted.) Vlasek also recovered
    the “search terms” that had been “inputted” into the “ARES” file-sharing network
    17
    Detective Arnold testified that “LSM” was “an infamous photography studio in
    Europe that specialized in child pornography.” The studio “would take series of
    pictures of kids, usually between the ages of 4 years old up to about 15 [years old]
    in various states of undress.” Arnold opined that “if you’re actually . . . searching
    for the letters ‘LSM,’ you’re looking for this European company that filmed children
    involved in sexual conduct.” Detective Cox further explained that “LSM” is “a
    series of child pornography. See U.S. v. Laub, No. 12-40103-01-JAR, 
    2014 WL 1400669
    , at *1 & n.2 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2014) (“[L]sm” constitutes “a common label
    or term present in files or documents containing images of child pornography”
    (internal quotations omitted)).
    18
    See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *3 n.9 (“‘Lolita’ and ‘Loli’ are ‘common search
    terms’ for child pornography.”).
    19
    See Solon v. United States, Nos. 2:11-CV-303-CAB, 07-CR-032-CAB, 
    2013 WL 12321956
    , at *14 n.10 (D. Wyo. May 24, 2013) (order) (video title containing
    “Babyshivid,” among other terms, “le[ft] little doubt [that] the content relate[d] to
    child pornography”).
    12
    on the “gray desktop computer,” which included the following: “Baby J,” “LSM,”
    “Kiddie,”20 “Pedo,”21 “Kinderfuck,” “Kiddie Pedo,” “King Pass,”22 “Kiddie Porn,”
    “Kids,” “[9]YO,”23 and “TPSF.”24 (Internal quotations omitted.) When asked
    whether he found “those search terms . . . [on] computers seized out of [appellant’s]
    home,” Vlasek responded, “Yes.”
    Further, during Detective Vlasek’s testimony, the trial court admitted into
    evidence State’s Exhibits 6 and 7, certain child-pornography images and videos that
    were found on the “gray desktop computer” seized from appellant’s home.25 Vlasek
    noted that these images and videos were indicative of the other child-pornography
    images that he found on the other electronic devices seized from appellant’s home.
    20
    See Lubojasky, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14 (“[K]iddie” constitutes “[a] known
    child pornography search term[]” (internal quotations omitted)).
    21
    See 
    id. (“PEDO” constitutes
    “[a] known child pornography search term[]” (internal
    quotations omitted)); Brackens v. State, 
    312 S.W.3d 831
    , 834 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (“‘Pedo’ . . . short for pedophile or pedophilia.”).
    22
    Detective Cox testified that “King Pass” is “a term that [he] find[s] on many
    child[-]pornography files,” and Detective Arnold explained that “King Pass” is a
    “term that . . . [is] attached in commonly looked-for child[-]pornography videos.”
    (Internal quotations omitted.)
    23
    See Laub, 
    2014 WL 1400669
    , at *1 (filename containing “9 yo” referenced age of
    child and indicative of child pornography (internal quotations omitted)); Solon,
    
    2013 WL 12321956
    , at *14 n.10 (video title containing “10yo and 9yo lolitas,”
    among other terms, “le[ft] little doubt [that] the content relate[d] to child
    pornography” (internal quotations omitted)).
    24
    The trial court admitted into evidence State’s Exhibit 5, a list of the search terms
    inputted into the “ARES” file-sharing network on the “gray desktop computer.”
    25
    Detective Vlasek testified that State’s Exhibit 7 depicted “[a] little girl,” named
    “Vicky.”
    13
    In regard to the “Dell desktop” computer, Detective Vlasek testified that it
    contained sixteen “complete[ly] download[ed]” child-pornography images and the
    “ARES” file-sharing network, all of which had been deleted. Vlasek recovered the
    titles of certain images that had been downloaded to the “Dell desktop,” which
    included the following: “King Pass,” “Old Cousin Fucks Little Cousin, Rare, New
    divx 2,” “PTHC, valya 10-year, 2 Sound,” “Babyshivid, Five-year old,” “Webcam,
    14-year Boy,” and “Way Fuck, PTHC, 3-year mom, dad Fuck.”26                        (Internal
    quotations omitted.)
    In regard to the “PNY flash drive,” Detective Vlasek explained that it
    contained 727 downloaded child-pornography images, which had been deleted, and
    three file-sharing networks, i.e., “ARES,” “Limewire,” and “Vuze.”27                 Vlasek
    viewed the 727 child-pornography images to confirm that they indeed constituted
    child pornography. The only items on the flash drive were child-pornography
    images.
    26
    The trial court also admitted into evidence State’s Exhibit 3, a list of nine titles of
    child-pornography images found on the “Dell computer.” State’s Exhibit 3 states
    that these images were downloaded on July 25, 2014.
    27
    See United States v. Walley, Nos. 8:13-cr-304-T-23AEP, 8:15-cv-344-T-23AEP,
    
    2018 WL 1519047
    , at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2010) (order) (defendant admitted to
    downloading “a couple hundred child[-]pornograph[y] images and a few
    videos . . . through Vuze, a peer-to-peer [file-sharing] network” (internal quotations
    omitted)).
    14
    Detective Vlasek conceded that he did not know who had specifically
    downloaded the child-pornography images and videos that he found on the
    electronic devices seized from appellant’s home. Nor could he testify as to who
    specifically entered in the “search terms” into the file-sharing networks. Further,
    every child-pornography image or video that he found on appellant’s electronic
    devices had been “deleted” at some point.
    However, Detective Vlasek also explained that there were no other persons in
    appellant’s home when the search warrant was served, he was not aware that anyone
    else lived in the home with appellant, and appellant was “in possession of” the “gray
    desktop computer,” the “Dell computer,” and the “PNY flash drive” when the search
    warrant was served. Further, Vlasek noted that appellant would have seen the title
    of any file before he “click[ed] the button to download it.” And he opined, based on
    the filenames, that it would not be surprising that the files would contain child
    pornography. When Vlasek was asked whether he could “tell . . . that [appellant
    had] actually looked at any of th[e] child pornography,” Vlasek responded “Yes,
    actually, I can.”28
    In his audio-recorded interview with Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis,
    admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 2, appellant stated that he was the only
    28
    However, Detective Vlasek noted that he was unable to tell whether the
    child-pornography image or video had been viewed for “one minute, ten seconds,
    one second, or an hour.”
    15
    person living in his home29 and he owned several computers. Specifically, appellant
    noted that he had a “Dell desktop” computer in the game room/den of his house and
    a “homemade” desktop computer in his bedroom. He further admitted that he had
    used certain file-sharing networks, including “Limewire,” “ARES,” and
    “BearShare.” And he had primarily used the “ARES” file-sharing network on the
    “Dell desktop” computer. Appellant conceded that he had “come across” child
    pornography, while using the “ARES” file-sharing network, noting that “sometimes,
    a whole bunch of stuff [would] just pop[] up” when he would generally search for
    “porn.” Appellant admitted that he would actually see the titles of the files prior to
    downloading them from the file-sharing network, and he would have to “click” on a
    particular image or video in order to download it. Appellant stated that when he saw
    a child-pornography file on the “ARES” file-sharing network, he would delete it.30
    Further, during the interview, when Detective Arnold told appellant that he
    had a child-pornography video in his share folder on the “ARES” file-sharing
    network, appellant stated that it would have been “caught up in some other stuff”
    that he had downloaded. And although appellant stated that he would “delete” any
    child-pornography that appeared on the “ARES” file-sharing network, he also stated
    29
    Appellant noted that his two sons had previously lived with him, but they were now
    married and living elsewhere. One son lives in Florida.
    30
    Appellant stated that he used the “ARES” file-sharing network between December
    2014 and March 2015.
    16
    that he would delete it after he had “seen . . . what it was.” Further, appellant
    admitted to “looking” for child pornography because he was curious about it. And
    he confirmed that he had searched for “porn,” “PTHC,” “Vicky,” and the age of
    “12.” According to appellant, when he had searched for “Vicky,” “a whole bunch
    of” pornography involving “younger girls” appeared. And he searched for the age
    of “12” to see if there was pornography involving “underage girls.”
    Appellant also stated that “a lot” of the files that he saw said “young women,”
    which he thought meant women who were nineteen or twenty years old. But, he also
    recalled seeing child-pornography images or videos involving ten-year-old and
    twelve-year-old children, and he wondered if they were real. This curiosity led
    appellant to look at more child-pornography images and videos because he was
    “wonder[ing].” When Arnold asked appellant if he had a “curiosity” for child
    pornography in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, appellant responded, “I guess so, just
    every once in a while.” According to appellant, he would look at child pornography
    and then stop. Appellant stated that he had used several different computers at
    different times, and he did not know whether law enforcement officers would find
    evidence of child pornography before 2011.           According to appellant, he had
    “satisfied” his curiosity related to child pornography.31
    31
    At the end of the interview, Detective Arnold told appellant that he could go back
    inside of his house, sit downstairs, “relax,” and “hang out” while law enforcement
    officers finished looking at his electronic devices. Arnold also told appellant that
    17
    Sufficiency of Evidence
    In his second issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient
    to support his convictions because the State did not prove that he intentionally and
    knowingly possessed child pornography.
    We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any
    “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318–19, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2788–
    89 (1979); Williams v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    , 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role
    is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact’s
    finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    Moreno v. State, 
    755 S.W.2d 866
    , 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We give deference
    to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh
    evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. 
    Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750
    . However, our duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented actually
    supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense of which
    he is accused. 
    Id. officers would
    likely take some of his electronic devices “back [to] the station” so
    that appellant did not have to “spend the entire day” with officers in his home.
    Appellant was permitted to watch television while the officers were in his home.
    He was not arrested on May 12, 2015, and the officers left his home at the conclusion
    of their search.
    18
    We note that in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a court must
    consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable
    inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 772
    , 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Wise v. State, 
    364 S.W.3d 900
    , 903 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2012) (evidence-sufficiency standard of review same for both direct and
    circumstantial evidence). Circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct
    evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can
    be sufficient to establish guilt. 
    Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778
    ; Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). For evidence to be sufficient, the State need
    not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with a
    defendant’s guilt. See 
    Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903
    ; Cantu v. State, 
    395 S.W.3d 202
    ,
    207–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Rather, a court considers
    only whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon
    the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable
    to the jury’s verdict. 
    Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903
    ; 
    Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13
    .
    Appellant argues that the State did not prove that he intentionally and
    knowingly possessed child pornography because the “ARES peer-to-peer
    [file-sharing] network” that he used “automatically download[ed] files to a shared
    folder that other users of ARES could access” and “most users are not even aware
    that the files are being shared from their computers”; he did not “possess[] . . . any
    19
    specialized software to recover deleted files”; “it is . . . possible for a person who
    believes that he is viewing only adult pornography to inadvertently download child
    pornography” or to be “redirected to a child pornography site without his
    knowledge”; “there is no evidence . . . that . . . he was indeed the person who
    accessed the [i]nternet files, knew that the[] files were being automatically
    downloaded and saved to his hard drive”; the search of his home did not reveal any
    “sexually explicit materials . . . depicting children”; and there is no evidence that he
    “had [ever] corresponded or met with another person to share information and
    identities of their victims,” “maintained or ran his own photographic production and
    reproduction equipment,” rented or used a “safe deposit box[] or other storage
    facility[y],” “collected, read, copied or maintained . . . lists of persons [with] similar
    sexual interests,” “kept the names of any children he may have been involved with,”
    “maintained diaries of any sexual encounters with children,” “cut pictures of any
    children out of any . . . publications . . . [to] use as a means of fantasy relationships,”
    “collected . . . writings on the subject of sexual activities with any children” or “on
    the subject of sexual activity,” “used sexual aids . . . in the seduction of any victims,”
    “used any drugs or alcohol as a means of inducement to get any child to a particular
    location,” “maintained artifacts . . . which depicted any children . . . in nude poses
    or sexual acts,” “kept mementoes,” “maintained any World Wide Web site,” or
    “used many screen names.” Further, appellant asserts that “[t]he fact that every
    20
    single file depicting child pornography [that was found on appellant’s electronic
    devices] had been deleted . . . evidences a lack of intent.”
    A person commits the offense of possession of child pornography if he
    knowingly or intentionally possesses visual material that visually depicts a child,
    younger than eighteen years of age at the time the image of the child was made, who
    is engaging in sexual conduct, and the person knows that the material depicts the
    child in this manner. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(a) (Vernon 2016); 
    Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903
    ; Krause v. State, 
    243 S.W.3d 95
    , 110 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2007, pet. ref’d). A person acts “intentionally” or with intent “with respect to the
    nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective
    or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2011). A person acts “knowingly” or with knowledge of the
    nature of his conduct or circumstances “when he is aware of the nature of his conduct
    or that the circumstances exist.” 
    Id. § 6.03(b).
    “Possession” means “actual care, custody, control, or management.” 
    Id. § 1.07(a)(39)
    (Vernon Supp. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant
    commits a possession offense only if he voluntarily possesses the contraband. 
    Id. § 6.01(a)
    (Vernon 2011). Possession is voluntary “if the possessor knowingly
    obtains or receives the [contraband] possessed or is aware of his control of the
    [contraband] for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.” 
    Id. 21 §
    6.01(b); see also Williams v. State, 
    313 S.W.3d 393
    , 397 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). Proof of a culpable mental state almost invariably
    depends on circumstantial evidence, and a trier of fact can infer knowledge from all
    the circumstances, including the acts, conduct, and remarks of the accused. See
    Hernandez v. State, 
    819 S.W.2d 806
    , 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Dillon v. State,
    
    574 S.W.2d 92
    , 94–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
    If contraband is not found on a person or is not in a location that is under the
    exclusive control of a single person, mere presence at the location where the
    contraband is found is insufficient by itself to establish actual care, custody, or
    control of the contraband. See Evans v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 158
    , 162 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006). “However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence,
    either direct or circumstantial . . . , may well be sufficient to establish [possession]
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. Accordingly, a
    fact finder may infer that a
    defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed contraband not in his exclusive
    possession if there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such
    an inference. Tate v. State, 
    500 S.W.3d 410
    , 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In
    other words, evidence that links the defendant to the contraband suffices for proof
    that he possessed it knowingly. Brown v. State, 
    911 S.W.2d 744
    , 747 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1995); Wilson v. State, 
    419 S.W.3d 582
    , 587–88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2013, no pet.). It is not the number of links that is important, but rather the logical
    22
    force the links have in establishing the elements of the offense. 
    Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162
    .
    In Wise, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted the “peculiarities of
    determining knowing or intentional possession of computer pornography” and
    concluded that “each case must be analyzed on its own 
    facts.” 364 S.W.3d at 904
    –
    05. Thus, the court held that in computer-pornography cases, “like all criminal cases,
    a court must assess whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable
    based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence considered in the light most
    favorable to the verdict.” 
    Id. at 905.
    Sufficient evidence to support a jury’s determination that a defendant had
    knowledge of child pornography on his electronic devices may include evidence:
    (1) the child pornography was found in different computer files, showing that the
    images or videos had been copied or moved; (2) the child pornography was found
    on an external hard drive or a removable storage device, which would indicate that
    the images or videos were deliberately saved on the external device; (3) the
    child-pornography stored on the computer and the external hard drive were stored in
    similarly named folders; (4) the names of the folders containing child pornography
    necessarily were assigned by the person saving the files; or (5) numerous images or
    videos of child pornography were recovered from the defendant’s electronic devices.
    See Ballard v. State, 
    537 S.W.3d 517
    , 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017,
    23
    no pet.); 
    Krause, 243 S.W.3d at 111
    –12; see also Savage v. State, Nos.
    05-06-00174-CR, 05-06-00175-CR, 
    2008 WL 726229
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    Mar. 19, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
    Detective Arnold testified on March 6, 2015, his computer, which
    “monitor[ed] file[-]sharing networks for the transmission of child pornography,”
    “made a direct connection and download[ed]” a child-pornography video “from an
    IP address in Pearland, [Texas].” Based on the IP address, Arnold determined that
    the downloaded child-pornography video had originated from appellant’s residence,
    which had a secure internet connection.
    On May 12, 2015, Detective Arnold and other members of the ICACTF
    searched appellant’s home for evidence of child pornography.          There, law
    enforcement officers found child pornography on more than one electronic device.
    In fact, they found over 900 child-pornography images and videos on appellant’s
    electronic devices. And forensic analysis of the devices showed that appellant had
    been viewing and downloading child pornography over “a four-year period.”
    According to Arnold, one electronic device found in appellant’s home contained 727
    child-pornography images, a second electronic device contained sixteen
    child-pornography images, and a third electronic device contained 168
    child-pornography images. See 
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 523
    –24 (evidence sufficient
    where electronic devices seized from defendant’s residence contained “several
    24
    hundred [child-pornography] videos”); Savage, 
    2008 WL 726229
    , at *7 (evidence
    sufficient where “numerous images of child pornography were recovered from
    [defendant’s] computer”); 
    Krause, 243 S.W.3d at 111
    –12 (evidence sufficient where
    defendant owned “CD’s, computers, and hard drives that stored images of children
    engaged in sexual conduct”).      Arnold opined that the large volume of child
    pornography on appellant’s electronic devices indicated that he had not accidentally
    downloaded child pornography.       See Gasper v. State, Nos. 01-16-00930-CR,
    01-16-00931-CR, 01-16-00932-CR, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] Sept. 26, 2017 no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (evidence sufficient where law enforcement officer opined defendant had not
    accidentally downloaded child pornography).
    Detective Arnold explained that appellant had also been “distribut[ing] child
    pornography,” noting that he had actually shared a child-pornography video with
    Arnold’s computer.       Specifically, on March 6, 2015, appellant had a
    child-pornography video in his “unique share folder” on the “ARES” file-sharing
    network, Arnold’s computer “connected to [appellant’s] share folder[,]” and Arnold
    “got the video from [appellant].” Although Arnold did not know who specifically
    was using appellant’s computer at the time that the child-pornography video was
    shared with Arnold’s computer, appellant had told Arnold that he lived by himself
    and “[h]e was the one searching and . . . looking at the[] [child-pornography]
    25
    videos.” See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7 (evidence sufficient where electronic
    devices found in home owned by defendant and he owned and used devices);
    
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 523
    –24 (evidence sufficient where defendant “primary user”
    of computer).
    Further, during his interview Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis, appellant
    stated that he had downloaded and used certain file-sharing networks, including
    “ARES,”32 “BearShare and Bear,”33 and “Limewire,”34 on the electronic devices in
    his home.35 See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7 (evidence sufficient where
    defendant admitted to using peer-to-peer file-sharing network “that c[ould] be used
    to obtain child pornography”); Lubojasky v. State, No. 03-10-00780-CR, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 19, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (peer-to-peer file-sharing network “often used to
    download images and videos of child pornography”). And when Arnold questioned
    appellant about certain terms that he may have searched for on a file-sharing
    32
    See Ferguson, 
    2016 WL 4247956
    , at *1. Appellant admitted to using “ARES” in
    2015.
    33
    See Wiand, 
    2012 WL 1033623
    , at *1.
    34
    See Lubojasky 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14.
    35
    Detective Arnold explained that a file-sharing network “doesn’t do anything on its
    own.” A person “ha[s] to tell it what [to] look[] for,” “ha[s] to tell it to download
    files,” and “ha[s] to manually open files and view them.” And a file-sharing network
    does not appear on a person’s computer unless he specifically “download[s] it.”
    26
    network, including “Vicky”36 and “PTHC,”37 appellant admitted that he had in fact
    viewed child pornography “out of curiosity” and he had searched for “Vicky,”
    “PTHC,” and “Baby J.”38 See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11 (evidence
    sufficient where defendant “admitted to seeing certain child-pornography terms
    while searching for pornography, and he knew the meaning of the[] terms”); see also
    Wenger v. State, 
    292 S.W.3d 191
    , 200–01 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)
    (evidence sufficient to support defendant intentionally or knowingly disseminated
    child pornography where he admitted to searching by inputting search terms like
    “young” and “Lolita” (internal quotations omitted)).            According to appellant,
    searching for “Vicky” on a file-sharing network prompted “[a] whole bunch of porn
    [to] show[] up.” (Internal quotations omitted.) And when Arnold asked appellant
    36
    Detective Arnold explained that “Vicky is a common series in child pornography
    that a lot of people that are seeking child pornography want to get. It [is] a video
    series . . . [of] a[] 4-year old child[,] whose name is Vicky[,] up to about the age of
    11. There are many, many videos over that time period that were made by her
    stepfather as he was sexually abusing her.” See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *4
    n.17; Hicks, 
    2013 WL 4711223
    , at *2.
    37
    Detective Arnold noted that “PTHC is an acronym [that] stands for Pre[-]Teen Hard
    Core. It’s another common search term that people will use on a file[-]sharing
    network when looking for child pornography.” See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at
    *3 n.8.
    38
    Detective Arnold explained that “Baby J” is a “child porn[ography] series video
    [involving] a toddler or an infant child, probably 2 to 3 years of age.” (Internal
    quotations omitted.) Detective Cox testified that “Baby J is a common series of
    child pornography.” (Internal quotations omitted). See Assousa, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    , at *2.
    27
    whether he had ever searched for a particular age when looking for pornography,
    appellant stated that he had searched for “12.” (Internal quotations omitted).
    Further, appellant told Detective Arnold that he would download a
    child-pornography image or video “to see if the children were real” and this would
    then “lead [him] to the next one.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In other words,
    appellant admitted that he had downloaded, viewed, and continued to search for
    child pornography.     Appellant further admitted that he had looked at child
    pornography from 2011–2014. And at the end of his interview, appellant affirmed
    that he had “looked at child porn[ography],” explaining that he was “done looking
    at it” because he was “no longer curious.” (Internal quotations omitted.) See
    Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11 (evidence sufficient where defendant admitted
    to “‘open[ing]’ files containing child pornography and ‘look[ing] at’ them”
    (alterations in original)); 
    Wilson, 419 S.W.3d at 590
    (evidence sufficient where
    defendant, in his interview, stated he “inadvertently viewed [child-pornography]
    images and would quickly ‘back out,’” “just clicked on [certain] images to ‘verify’
    that they were of underage children,” “viewed images he knew were of underage
    children because he was ‘curious,’” and “looked at [child-pornography] images out
    of sympathy for the children”); Bethards v. State, No. 10-09-00016-CR, 
    2011 WL 2937875
    , at *6 (Tex. App.—Waco July 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
    for publication) (evidence sufficient where defendant admitted to “intentionally
    28
    search[ing] for child pornography . . . because he was curious and was looking for
    information on whether the websites were legal”).
    Detective Vlasek, a former computer forensic analyst with the ICACTF,
    testified that on May 12, 2015, he, while “preview[ing]” or “triag[ing]” the contents
    of the electronic devices found in appellant’s home, found “link files” and “quite a
    few” of “peer-to-peer [file-sharing] programs.” See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at
    *8–9 (evidence sufficient where forensic analysis of electronic devices revealed
    peer-to-peer file-sharing network and child-pornography images and videos);
    Lubojasky, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14 (peer-to-peer file-sharing network “often
    used to download images and videos of child pornography”). Vlasek explained that
    “link files” are “linked to” “[a]nything that the user [of the electronic device] has
    viewed, opened, [or] executed,” and based on the titles of the “link files,” Vlasek
    was able to determine that they related to child pornography. 39 Vlasek opined that
    the file-sharing networks and “link files” found on appellant’s electronic devices
    “indicat[ed] that child pornography exist[ed].”
    Detective Vlasek completed a full forensic analysis of the electronic devices
    seized from appellant’s home, and he found downloaded child pornography on three
    devices: (1) a “gray desktop computer,” (2) a “Dell desktop” computer, and (3) a
    “PNY flash drive.” In total, he found “[r]oughly 900” child-pornography images
    39
    See Brown, 
    2012 WL 5948085
    , at *2; Koch, 
    2009 WL 10697501
    , at *2–5.
    29
    and videos on appellant’s electronic devices. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *8–
    10 (evidence sufficient to establish defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed
    child pornography where full forensic analysis revealed large amount of child
    pornography on electronic devices seized from defendant’s home); 
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 523
    –24 (evidence sufficient where electronic devices seized from
    defendant’s residence contained “several hundred [child-pornography] videos”);
    
    Krause, 243 S.W.3d at 111
    –12 (evidence sufficient where defendant owned “CD’s,
    computers, and hard drives that stored images of children engaged in sexual
    conduct”); see also Bogany v. State, Nos. 14-10-00138-CR to 14-10-00146-CR,
    
    2011 WL 704359
    , at *4–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 1, 2011, pet.
    ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (size of child-pornography
    collection on defendant’s computer “large enough to be obvious to the owner of the
    computer”).
    In regard to the “gray desktop computer,” Detective Vlasek testified that it
    contained     168   downloaded      child-pornography       images     and     twenty-five
    child-pornography videos.40 See 
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 523
    –24 (“[T]he fact that
    40
    State’s Exhibit 4, admitted into evidence, constituted a list of 366 child-pornography
    images and videos found on the “gray desktop computer.” Detective Vlasek
    explained that some of the images and videos appear several times on the list
    because they had been downloaded several times. State’s Exhibit 4 reveals that the
    child-pornography images and videos found on the “gray desktop computer” had
    been downloaded in 2008, 2010, and 2011.
    30
    hundreds of files of child pornography were recovered from [defendant’s] computer
    is . . . circumstantial evidence that he knowingly possessed child pornography.”);
    Savage, 
    2008 WL 726229
    , at *7 (evidence sufficient where “numerous images of
    child pornography were recovered from [defendant’s] computer”); see also Bogany,
    
    2011 WL 704359
    , at *4–6 (size of child-pornography collection on defendant’s
    computer “large enough to be obvious to the owner of the computer”). Vlasek
    viewed the child-pornography images and videos found on the “gray desktop
    computer” and confirmed that they did indeed constituted child pornography. And
    he explained that the majority of the images and videos found on the “gray desktop
    computer” were “in the thumbnail database,” indicating that the image or video had
    been viewed.
    Detective Vlasek further noted that he had discovered, on the “gray desktop
    computer,” the “ARES” file-sharing network. And he determined that the majority
    of the child-pornography images and videos found on the “gray desktop computer”
    had been downloaded using that program.               See Zaratti v. State, No.
    01-04-01019-CR, 
    2006 WL 2506899
    , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug.
    31, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence sufficient
    where computer expert located several child-pornography files in peer-to-peer
    file-sharing database). According to Vlasek, the child-pornography images and
    videos that he recovered from the “gray desktop computer” had been deleted, but the
    31
    “ARES” file-sharing network had not. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7, *9–
    11 (evidence sufficient although defendant had deleted or attempted to delete
    child-pornography files); Assousa v. State, No. 05-08-00007-CR, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 21, 2009, pet. ref’d) (not designated for
    publication) (“Logically, one cannot destroy what one does not possess and control.
    Indeed, the ability to destroy is definitive evidence of control.” (internal quotations
    omitted)); Fridell v. State, Nos. 09-04-200 CR, 09-04-201 CR, 
    2004 WL 2955227
    ,
    at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 22, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
    for publication) (“[A]ttempts to erase [child-pornography] material from the
    computer . . . show[s] that [defendant’s] possession of child pornography was
    knowing or intentional.”).
    Detective Vlasek further explained that he was able to recover the titles of the
    child-pornography images and videos that had been downloaded on the “gray
    desktop computer,” which included the following: “Six-year-old Larissa Fucked
    124s 1,” “Ten-year-old LS Magazine Issue LSM,”41 “PTHV, Lolifuck, 10-year-old
    41
    Detective Arnold testified that “LSM” was “an infamous photography studio in
    Europe that specialized in child pornography.” The studio “would take series of
    pictures of kids, usually between the ages of 4 years old up to about 15 [years old]
    in various states of undress.” Arnold opined that “if you’re actually . . . searching
    for the letters ‘LSM,’ you’re looking for this European company that filmed children
    involved in sexual conduct.” Detective Cox further explained that “LSM” is “a
    series of child pornography. See Laub, 
    2014 WL 1400669
    , at *1 & n.2.
    32
    Handjob,” “W18 Lolitas, Folladas,”42 “Eight-year-old Real Child Porn Pre[-]Teen
    Pedo PTHD kiddy incest anal cum,” and “Kid Sex, . . . PTHC, King Pass, hussyfan,
    Baby J, Jenny, Baby shiv 2.”43 (Internal quotations omitted.) See 
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 523
    –24 (“explicit titles” of child-pornography files found on defendant’s
    computer suggested knowing possession of child pornography); 
    Wenger, 292 S.W.3d at 201
    (noting “explicitly descriptive names of the . . . files themselves” in
    determining sufficiency of evidence). Vlasek also recovered the “search terms” that
    had been “inputted” into the “ARES” file-sharing network on the “gray desktop
    computer,” which included the following: “Baby J,” “LSM,” “Kiddie,”44 “Pedo,”45
    “Kinderfuck,” “Kiddie Pedo,” “King Pass,”46 “Kiddie Porn,” “Kids,” “[9]YO,”47 and
    “TPSF.”48 (Internal quotations omitted.) When asked whether he found “those
    search terms . . . [on] computers seized out of [appellant’s] home,” Vlasek
    42
    See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *3 n.9.
    43
    See Solon, 
    2013 WL 12321956
    , at *14 n.10.
    44
    See Lubojasky, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14.
    45
    See id.; 
    Brackens, 312 S.W.3d at 834
    .
    46
    Detective Cox testified that “King Pass” is “a term that [he] find[s] on many
    child[-]pornography files,” and Detective Arnold explained that “King Pass” is a
    “term that . . . [is] attached in commonly looked-for child[-]pornography videos.”
    (Internal quotations omitted.)
    47
    See Laub, 
    2014 WL 1400669
    , at *1; Solon, 
    2013 WL 12321956
    , at *14 n.10.
    48
    State’s Exhibit 5, admitted into evidence, constituted a list of the search terms
    inputted into the “ARES” file-sharing network on the “gray desktop computer.”
    33
    responded, “Yes.” And he noted that appellant would have seen the title of any file
    before he would have “click[ed] the button to download it.”
    Further, during Detective Vlasek’s testimony, the trial court admitted into
    evidence State’s Exhibits 6 and 7, certain child-pornography images and videos that
    were found on the “gray desktop computer” seized from appellant’s home.49 Vlasek
    noted that these images and videos were indicative of the other child-pornography
    images that he found on the other electronic devices seized from appellant’s home.
    In regard to the “Dell desktop” computer, Detective Vlasek testified that it
    contained sixteen “complete[ly] download[ed]” child-pornography images and the
    “ARES” file-sharing network. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *8–9; Lubojasky,
    
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14; Savage, 
    2008 WL 726229
    , at *7; 
    Krause, 243 S.W.3d at 111
    –12.
    However, the sixteen child-pornography images and the file-sharing network
    recovered from the “Dell desktop” had been deleted. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7, *9–11; Assousa, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    , at *4; see also Fridell, 
    2004 WL 2955227
    , at *3. Vlasek explained that he was able to recover titles of certain
    images that had been downloaded to the “Dell desktop,” which included the
    following: “King Pass,” “Old Cousin Fucks Little Cousin, Rare, New divx 2,”
    49
    According to Detective Vlasek, State’s Exhibit 7 depicted “[a] little girl” named
    “Vicky.”
    34
    “PTHC, valya 10-year, 2 Sound,” “Babyshivid, Five-year old,” “Webcam, 14-year
    Boy,” and “Way Fuck, PTHC, 3-year mom, dad Fuck.”50 (Internal quotations
    omitted.) See 
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 523
    –24 (“explicit titles” of child-pornography
    files found on defendant’s computer suggested knowing possession of child
    pornography); 
    Wenger, 292 S.W.3d at 201
    (noting “explicitly descriptive names of
    the . . . files themselves” in determining sufficiency of evidence).
    In regard to the “PNY flash drive,” Detective Vlasek testified that it contained
    727 downloaded child-pornography images, which had been deleted, and three
    file-sharing networks, i.e., “ARES,” “Limewire,” and “Vuze.”51 See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7, *9–11; Assousa, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    , at *4; Fridell, 
    2004 WL 2955227
    , at *3; see also Lubojasky, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14. Vlasek viewed
    the 727 child-pornography images to confirm that they indeed constituted child
    pornography. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *8–9; Savage, 
    2008 WL 726229
    ,
    at *7; see also Bogany, 
    2011 WL 704359
    , at *4–6 (size of child-pornography
    collection on defendant’s computer “large enough to be obvious to the owner of the
    computer”). The only items on the flash drive were child-pornography images. See
    50
    State’s Exhibit 3, admitted into evidence, constituted a list of nine titles of
    child-pornography images found on the “Dell computer.” State’s Exhibit 3 states
    that these images were downloaded on July 25, 2014. Detective Vlasek noted that
    appellant would have seen the title of a file before “click[ing] the button to download
    it.”
    51
    See Walley, 
    2018 WL 1519047
    , at *1.
    35
    
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 524
    (“[E]vidence supports an inference that [defendant]
    possessed child pornography knowingly because it . . . [was] saved deliberately to
    the[] external devices.”); Savage, 
    2008 WL 726229
    , at *6 (child-pornography
    images found on “loose hard drive” and “zip disks,” indicating “deliberately saved
    on the external devices”); 
    Krause, 243 S.W.3d at 111
    –12 (child pornography found
    on external hard drive, indicating images “deliberately saved to the[] external
    device[]”).
    Although Detective Vlasek conceded that he did not know who had
    specifically downloaded the child-pornography images and videos that he found on
    the electronic devices seized from appellant’s home or who had entered in the
    “search terms” into the file-sharing networks, he explained that there were no other
    persons in appellant’s home when the search warrant was served, he was not aware
    that anyone else lived in the home with appellant, and appellant was “in possession
    of” the “gray desktop computer,” the “Dell computer,” and the “PNY flash drive”
    when the search warrant was served.
    In his audio-recorded interview with Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis,
    appellant stated that he was the only person living in his home and he had a “Dell
    desktop” computer in the game room/den of his house and a “homemade” desktop
    computer in his bedroom.      He admitted that he had used certain file-sharing
    networks, including “Limewire,” “ARES”, and “BearShare.” And he had primarily
    36
    used the “ARES” file-sharing network on the “Dell desktop” computer. See Gasper,
    
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7 (evidence sufficient where defendant admitted to using a
    peer-to-peer file-sharing network “that c[ould] be used to obtain child
    pornography”); Lubojasky, 
    2012 WL 5192919
    , at *16 n.14. Appellant stated that he
    had “come across” child pornography, while using the “ARES” file-sharing network,
    noting that “sometimes, a whole bunch of stuff [would] just pop[] up” when he
    would generally search for “porn.”52 See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11
    (evidence sufficient where defendant stated “it was ‘possible’ that by downloading
    pornography in ‘mega pack[s]’ or ‘movie pack[s],’ he had ‘picked up child
    pornography’” (alterations in original)); 
    Wilson, 419 S.W.3d at 590
    (evidence
    sufficient where defendant, in his interview, stated he “inadvertently viewed
    [child-pornography] images”); Zaratti, 
    2006 WL 2506899
    , at *5–6 (evidence
    sufficient even though defendant argued because “his computer contained
    considerably more files of legal adult pornography than unlawful child pornography,
    it was possible that he could have downloaded the child pornography
    unintentionally”). Appellant admitted that he would actually see the titles of the files
    prior to downloading them from the file-sharing network, and he would have to
    “click” on a particular image or video in order to download it. Appellant stated that
    52
    Appellant conceded that he had used the “ARES” file-sharing network between
    December 2014 and March 2015.
    37
    when he saw a child-pornography file on the “ARES” file-sharing network, he would
    delete it. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7, *9–11; Assousa, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    ,
    at *4; Fridell, 
    2004 WL 2955227
    , at *3.
    Further, during appellant’s interview, Detective Arnold told him that he had a
    child-pornography video in his share folder on the “ARES” file-sharing network,
    and appellant stated that it would have been “caught up in some other stuff” that he
    had downloaded. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11; 
    Wilson, 419 S.W.3d at 590
    ; Zaratti, 
    2006 WL 2506899
    , at *5–6. Although appellant stated that he would
    “delete” the child-pornography that appeared on the “ARES” file-sharing network,
    he also stated that he would delete it after he had “seen . . . what it was.” Further,
    appellant admitted to “looking” for child pornography because he was curious about
    it. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11 (evidence sufficient where defendant
    admitting to “‘open[ing]’ files containing child pornography and ‘look[ing] at’
    them” (alterations in original)); 
    Wilson, 419 S.W.3d at 590
    (evidence sufficient
    where defendant, in his interview, stated he “inadvertently viewed [child
    pornography] images and would quickly ‘back out,’” “just clicked on [certain]
    images to ‘verify’ that they were of underage children,” “viewed images he knew
    were of underage children because he was ‘curious,’” and “looked at [child
    pornography] images out of sympathy for the children”); Bethards, 
    2011 WL 2937875
    , at *6 (evidence sufficient where defendant admitted to “intentionally
    38
    search[ing] for child pornography . . . because he was curious and was looking for
    information on whether the websites were legal”). And he confirmed that he had
    searched for “porn,” “PTHC,” “Vicky,” and the age of “12.” According to appellant,
    when he searched for “Vicky,” “a whole bunch of” pornography involving “younger
    girls” appeared. And he searched for the age of “12” to see if there was pornography
    involving “underage girls.” See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11 (evidence
    sufficient where defendant “admitted to seeing certain child-pornography terms
    while searching for pornography, and he knew the meaning of the[] terms”); see also
    
    Wenger, 292 S.W.3d at 200
    –01 (evidence sufficient to support defendant
    intentionally or knowingly disseminated child pornography where he admitted to
    searching by inputting search terms like “young” and “Lolita” (internal quotations
    omitted)). Appellant also stated that “a lot” of the files that he saw said “young
    women,” which he thought meant women who were nineteen or twenty years old.
    But, he recalled seeing child-pornography images or videos involving ten-year-old
    and twelve-year-old children, and he wondered if they were real. This curiosity led
    appellant to look at more child-pornography images and videos because he was
    “wonder[ing].”
    Further, when Detective Arnold asked appellant if he had a “curiosity” for
    child pornography in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, appellant responded, “I guess so,
    just every once in a while.” Appellant explained that he would look at child
    39
    pornography and then stop, and he had used several different computers at different
    times. According to appellant, he had “satisfied” his curiosity related to child
    pornography.
    To the extent that appellant asserts that a person other than himself could have
    been responsible for downloading the child-pornography images and videos found
    on the electronic devices seized from his home, we note that the State need not
    disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with appellant’s
    guilt. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *11; 
    Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903
    ; 
    Ballard, 537 S.W.3d at 522
    , 524. Further, to the extent that appellant, at times, in his
    interview with Detective Arnold and Agent Erickson, may have denied downloading
    child pornography, it was for the jury to determine his credibility and the weight to
    be given such evidence. See Adames v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 854
    , 860 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2011); Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). And
    appellant’s assertion that “[t]he fact that every single file depicting child
    pornography [that was found on appellant’s electronic devices] had been
    deleted . . . evidences a lack of intent,” is simply incorrect. See Gasper, 
    2017 WL 4249558
    , at *7, *9–11; Assousa, 
    2009 WL 1416759
    , at *4; Fridell, 
    2004 WL 2955227
    , at *3.
    Viewing all of the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the
    jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient for a rational fact finder to
    40
    have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intentionally had
    care, custody, control, or management of the child pornography found on the
    electronic devices seized from his house. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is
    legally sufficient to support appellant’s convictions.
    We overrule appellant’s second issue.
    Suppression of Statement
    In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress State’s Exhibit 2, his audio-recorded interview with Detective
    Arnold and Agent Lewis, because “a reasonable and prudent person would [have]
    believe[d]” that he was “under arrest” at the time of his interview and his
    “[s]tatements [w]ere the [r]esult of [i]nterrogation.”
    We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a
    bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 
    399 S.W.3d 147
    , 150 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion
    and the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. 
    Id. The trial
    court
    is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility and may
    choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the witnesses’ testimony. Maxwell
    v. State, 
    73 S.W.3d 278
    , 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Ross, 
    32 S.W.3d 853
    ,
    855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If, as in this case, the trial court makes express findings
    of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling
    41
    and determine whether the evidence supports the fact findings. See Valtierra v.
    State, 
    310 S.W.3d 442
    , 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court’s findings on a
    motion to suppress may be written or oral. See State v. Cullen, 
    195 S.W.3d 696
    , 699
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); State v. Groves, 
    837 S.W.2d 103
    , 105 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1992). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
    facts, particularly when the trial court’s fact findings are based on an evaluation of
    credibility and demeanor. 
    Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447
    .
    We review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit findings that
    are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly,
    
    204 S.W.3d 808
    , 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will sustain the trial court’s ruling
    if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law
    applicable to the case. 
    Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447
    –48. In determining whether
    the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is supported by the record, we
    generally consider only the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion unless
    the suppression issues have been consensually relitigated by the parties during the
    trial on the merits. Rachal v. State, 
    917 S.W.2d 799
    , 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
    Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress “[a]ny statements . . . allegedly
    made by [him]” or “[a]ny video and/or audio recordings made of [him]” “[a]t the
    time of any conversations between [him] and law enforcement officers,” i.e.,
    appellant’s audio-recorded interview with Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis.
    42
    Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion,
    and, orally, on the record, issued the following findings of fact and conclusions of
    law53:
    Under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, I’ll find
    under Subsection 5 that the statement that has been provided was not a
    statement that was given or stems from custodial interrogation.
    I will find that [appellant] at that time who was not arrested was not
    physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; that
    he was not told he could not leave; and that although there were a
    number of officers there who were there as was presented by Detective
    Arnold for purposes of evaluating those items that would need to be
    seized and/or searched and the other officers that were there for officer
    safety, that presence did not create a situation that would lead a
    reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement had been
    significantly restricted. In fact, there was no indication that he was
    restricted from leaving at all.
    Further, I will find that if there is any indication, and there’s not, that
    there was a custodial interrogation, I will further find that the [legal]
    warnings were complied with as provided for in 38.22; that there was
    an electronic recording that was not visual but was audio only; that prior
    to any statements being provided that [appellant] was provided with his
    [legal] warnings as set out in 38.22, and as he just testified that he freely
    and voluntarily knowingly waived his rights and began to visit with
    Detective Arnold.
    53
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 2018) (“If [a]
    statement has been found to have been voluntarily made and held admissible as a
    matter of law and fact by the court in a hearing in the absence of the jury, the court
    must enter an order stating its conclusion as to whether or not the statement was
    voluntarily made, along with the specific finding of facts upon which the conclusion
    was based, which order shall be filed among the papers of the cause.”); Urias v.
    State, 
    155 S.W.3d 141
    , 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A trial court may dictate its
    findings and conclusions into a reporter’s record that is included in the appellate
    record. See Mbugua v. State, 
    312 S.W.3d 657
    , 668 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2009, pet. ref’d).
    43
    The recording is capable of making an accurate recording. The operator
    was competent and the recording hasn’t been altered in any respect. All
    of the voices on the recording are identified and that prior to 20 days of
    the date of these proceedings that audio was provided to counsel for
    review and listening.
    And as such, even if there had been custodial interrogation, it would
    be -- it would not be suppressed and would be permitted to be admitted.
    But as I indicated, I’m finding under Subsection 5 that this does not
    stem from custodial interrogation and, therefore, is admissible.
    Appellant first argues that he was “under arrest” at the time of his interview
    with Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis because “[a] large number of law
    enforcement officers entered [his] residence early in the morning and exercised
    physical control over [him]”; the officers “sought out [a]ppellant and escorted him
    outside [of] his home and into a police vehicle waiting in the street”; “he was
    accompanied by at least two detectives who interrogated him for nearly an hour”; he
    was “aware [that] he was the focal point of the investigation”; he testified that “he
    believed [that] he was in custody”; he was “denied access to food, drink, and a
    restroom break while in the police vehicle”; and “[a] reasonably prudent person
    would certainly believe [that he] w[as] about to be transported to jail” and “would
    not feel [that he] would be able to invoke [his] constitutional right to counsel, to
    remain silent, or [to] terminate the interrogation.”
    The United States Constitution prohibits the use of statements made by a
    criminal defendant against himself if they are obtained through custodial
    44
    interrogation without the necessary procedural safeguards to secure the Fifth
    Amendment right against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    ,
    444, 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 1612 (1966); Jones v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 766
    , 772 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2003). Similarly, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure precludes the State’s
    use of the statements of a criminal defendant against himself obtained through a
    custodial interrogation without compliance with procedural safeguards. TEX. CODE
    CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon Supp. 2018).             Notably, however, an
    individual’s Fifth Amendment rights do not come into play if the person is not in
    custody and any investigation is not yet custodial, and neither Miranda nor article
    38.22 warnings are required before questioning. Herrera v. State, 
    241 S.W.3d 520
    ,
    526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Melton v. State, 
    790 S.W.2d 322
    , 326 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1990); White v. State, 
    395 S.W.3d 828
    , 834 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).
    “Custody” for purposes of article 38.22 is consistent with the meaning of
    “custody” for purposes of Miranda. Gardner v. State, 
    433 S.W.3d 93
    , 98 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). The appropriate inquiry as to whether
    a person is in “custody,” for purposes of their right to receive legal warnings, is
    “whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
    associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 
    463 U.S. 1121
    , 1125, 103 S.
    Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 
    429 U.S. 492
    , 495, 
    97 S. Ct. 711
    , 714 (1977)); see also Gardner v. State, 
    306 S.W.3d 274
    , 293–94 (Tex. Crim.
    
    45 Ohio App. 2009
    ).      A “custodial interrogation” is “questioning initiated by law
    enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
    deprived of his freedom . . . in any significant way.” See 
    Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 525
    . The determination of custody is made on a case-by-case basis considering all
    the surrounding circumstances. Dowthitt v. State, 
    931 S.W.2d 244
    , 255 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1996). A person is in custody only if, under the circumstances, an objectively
    reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the
    degree associated with a formal arrest. 
    Id. at 254.
    Generally, a person’s detention may constitute custody for purposes of
    Miranda and article 38.22: (1) when an individual is physically deprived of his
    freedom of action in any significant way; (2) when a law enforcement officer tells
    the person that he is not free to leave; (3) when a law enforcement officer creates a
    situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of
    movement has been significantly restricted; and (4) there is probable cause to arrest
    the person and law enforcement officers do not tell the person that he is free to leave.
    
    Id. at 255.
    In the first three situations, the restriction upon freedom of movement
    must amount to the degree associated with an arrest rather than an investigative
    detention. 
    Id. Under the
    fourth situation, the existence of probable cause must be
    manifested to the person. 
    Id. Such a
    concession, however, does not automatically
    establish a custodial interrogation; rather, it is a factor to consider, together with
    46
    other circumstances, to determine whether a reasonable person would believe that
    he is under restraint to a degree associated with an arrest. 
    Id. Additional circumstances
    to consider in determining whether an interrogation
    is custodial include whether the criminal defendant arrived at the interrogation place
    voluntarily, the length of the interrogation, any request by the defendant to see
    relatives or friends, and the degree of control exercised over him. Gardner v. 
    State, 433 S.W.3d at 98
    ; Ervin v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 187
    , 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). We may also examine such things as “the location of the
    questioning, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of
    physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the [defendant] at the
    end of the questioning.” Howes v. Fields, 
    565 U.S. 499
    , 509, 
    132 S. Ct. 1181
    , 1189
    (2012) (internal citations omitted); see also Copeland v. State, No. 06-17-00193-CR,
    
    2018 WL 1801324
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.,
    not designated for publication).
    Simply because an interrogation begins as “noncustodial” does not preclude
    custody from arising later if the conduct of law enforcement officers causes “a
    consensual inquiry to escalate into [a] custodial interrogation.” 
    Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255
    . A defendant bears the burden at trial of proving that his statements
    were the product of a custodial interrogation. 
    Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526
    .
    47
    At the suppression hearing, Detective Arnold testified that on May 12, 2015,
    he and Agent Lewis interviewed appellant in a silver Dodge Durango sport utility
    vehicle (“SUV”) that was parked outside of appellant’s residence. In addition to
    Arnold and Lewis, Detectives Vlasek and Cox, Agent Erickson, and two uniformed
    PPD law enforcement officers were present at appellant’s home that day to aid in the
    serving of a search warrant on appellant. These additional individuals did not
    participate in appellant’s interview. Instead, they secured the scene and searched for
    electronic devices or “anything tending to show that child pornography was present”
    in appellant’s home.
    Before interviewing appellant, Detective Arnold identified himself, as did
    Agent Lewis, and Arnold told appellant that he was not under arrest. Although
    appellant was not “in custody,” Arnold “read him his [legal] rights,” including
    informing him that he had a “right to remain silent” and “anything [that] he said
    c[ould] and w[ould] be used against him in a [c]ourt of law.” Arnold did not tell
    appellant that he was recording their conversation. At the time of the interview,
    Arnold did not know whether appellant had child pornography on any electronic
    devices in his home; he only knew that “child pornography [had] c[o]me from an IP
    address that returned to [appellant’s] physical [home] address.” In other words, at
    the time of appellant’s interview, Arnold was “not a hundred precedent sure that
    48
    [appellant] even possessed child pornography.” During the course of the interview,
    appellant admitted to possessing child pornography.
    Following appellant’s interview, Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis walked
    appellant back inside his home. They, along with Detectives Vlasek and Cox, Agent
    Erickson, and the two uniformed PPD law enforcement officers, then remained at
    appellant’s home “[s]till searching, identifying . . . electronic evidence,” and
    “triaging th[at] evidence,” in order to “eliminate” those electronic devices in
    appellant’s home that did not contain child pornography. As the officers searched
    his home, appellant, following his interview, sat in “a common area” of the home
    with a uniformed PPD officer. According to Arnold, however, that officer was “not
    sitting on top of [appellant]”54 and he was free to leave the home. In fact, the law
    enforcement officer sat with appellant for safety purposes only, specifically to
    prevent appellant from “run[ning] around the house,” “access[ing] . . . weapons,” or
    “interfer[ing] with the piles of electronic evidence that [were] being processed by
    the forensic analysts.” After officers completed their search of appellant’s home and
    seized certain electronic devices, they left appellant at his home. Appellant was not
    54
    The other uniformed PPD officer stood at the front door of appellant’s home “to
    prevent people coming back into the house once they [had] le[ft].”
    49
    arrested that day, and at no point, during the entirety of the time that law enforcement
    officers were at his home, was appellant ever placed in handcuffs.55
    Appellant testified that on May 12, 2015, law enforcement officers arrived at
    his residence “early in the morning” to search his home pursuant to a search warrant.
    Appellant spoke with Detective Arnold that day, although he did not know, at the
    time, that Arnold was recording his interview.            Appellant’s interview lasted
    thirty-five to forty minutes, he was “read . . . [his] rights” prior to the interview, and
    he chose to speak to Arnold. Appellant was not threatened or coerced into speaking
    with Arnold, but he felt intimated. During the interview, appellant informed law
    enforcement officers that there were firearms in his home.
    After his interview, appellant did not feel that he could leave his home because
    a law enforcement officer sat next to him by the pool table in his house and he was
    told “to sit there . . . and not to move.” However, only one officer stayed with
    appellant, while the other officers searched the home. None of the law enforcement
    officers told appellant that he could leave, but appellant received water when
    55
    Appellant’s audio-recorded interview further reveals that at the end of the interview,
    Detective Arnold told appellant that he could go back inside of his house, sit
    downstairs, “relax,” and “hang out” while law enforcement officers finished looking
    at his electronic devices. Arnold also told appellant that officers would likely take
    some of his electronic devices “back [to] the station” so that he did not have to
    “spend the entire day” with officers in his home. Law enforcement officers
    permitted appellant to watch television, did not arrest him on May 12, 2015, and left
    his home at the conclusion of their search.
    50
    requested. And although he never asked to use the restroom, he knew that he could
    do so. Appellant believed that he was under arrest. However, he was not placed in
    handcuffs, and he was not told that he “under arrest” that day. (Internal quotations
    omitted.)
    The question we must determine in regard to custody is whether, under the
    circumstances, an objectively reasonable person would believe that his freedom of
    movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. 
    Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254
    ; Wilson v. State, 
    442 S.W.3d 779
    , 784 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2014, pet. ref’d). Initially, we note that appellant’s subjective belief that he was
    “under arrest” is irrelevant. See Bartlett v. State, 
    249 S.W.3d 658
    , 669 (Tex. App.—
    Austin 2008, pet. ref’d); Hernandez v. State, No. 01-13-00245-CR, 
    2014 WL 3607849
    , at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.,
    not designated for publication). Further, here, after law enforcement officers arrived
    at him home to execute a search warrant, appellant voluntarily agreed to speak with
    Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis.
    The interview, which lasted approximately thirty-four minutes, took place in
    a silver Dodge Durango SUV that was parked outside of appellant’s residence with
    only Detective Arnold and Agent Lewis present. Cf. 
    Ervin, 333 S.W.3d at 208
    (“[T]he four hour period of time at the police station does not constitute a length of
    time that would cause a reasonable person to believe she was in custody . . . .”); see
    51
    also Copeland, 
    2018 WL 1801324
    , at *6 (facts tending to show interrogation
    noncustodial included short length of interview). Appellant was never placed in
    handcuffs or restrained in any way before, after, or during his interview, and Arnold
    told appellant that he was not being arrested. See Taylor v. State, 
    509 S.W.3d 468
    ,
    481 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. ref’d) (defendant not in custody where he
    voluntarily agreed to interview and told not being arrested); 
    Ervin, 333 S.W.3d at 211
    (defendant not in custody where she voluntarily gave statements to law
    enforcement officers and remained unhandcuffed throughout statements); 
    Gardner, 433 S.W.3d at 99
    (defendant not in custody when he willingly accompanied law
    enforcement officers to patrol car and never handcuffed). The entire interview was
    conducted in a non-confrontational manner, and appellant was not pressured or
    coerced into speaking with Arnold and Lewis. See Copeland, 
    2018 WL 1801324
    , at
    *6 (facts tending to show interrogation noncustodial included “only one law
    enforcement officer present during the questioning,” interview conducted in
    “non-confrontational tone,” and officer “did not pressure or coerce confession” from
    defendant).
    Although appellant was not offered water or access to the restroom during the
    interview, he also did not request either. See 
    id. (facts tending
    to show interrogation
    noncustodial included defendant making no requests to leave room for any reason);
    State v. Perez, No. 14-16-00690-CR, 
    2017 WL 5505855
    , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston
    52
    14th Dist.] Nov. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (considering defendant “did not ask for food or drink”); 
    Gardner, 433 S.W.3d at 99
    (defendant did not ask to use telephone and officers did not refuse to allow defendant
    to use telephone). Upon reentering his home after his interview, appellant requested
    water, which he received. And appellant admitted that he knew that he would be
    permitted to use the restroom if he had needed to do so. See Colvin v. State, 
    467 S.W.3d 647
    , 658–59 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (defendant not denied
    food, water, or other facilities tended to show interrogation noncustodial); Johnson
    v. State, 
    299 S.W.3d 491
    , 495 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) (defendant’s
    “requests for water and breaks were heeded”).
    Further, prior to his interview, Detective Arnold was “not a hundred percent
    sure that [appellant] even possessed child pornography.” See Nickerson v. State, 
    478 S.W.3d 744
    , 754–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (defendant not
    in custody where he voluntarily agreed to give statement, treated fairly, and officers
    not certain he committed offense prior to interview). And although appellant
    admitted to possessing child pornography during the course of his interview, this is
    not dispositive of the custody determination. See Trejos v. State, 
    243 S.W.3d 30
    ,
    46–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (defendant not in custody
    although he “admitted . . . his role in [complainant’s] death,” officer considered him
    to be suspect, and his statements made during interview provided sufficient probable
    53
    cause to arrest him); Garcia v. State, 
    106 S.W.3d 854
    , 858–59 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (defendant not in custody, despite statements giving
    officers probable cause to arrest him).
    Following appellant’s interview, he was walked back inside his home. See
    
    Taylor, 509 S.W.3d at 481
    (defendant not in custody where not arrested and left at
    conclusion of interview); 
    Ervin, 333 S.W.3d at 211
    (defendant not in custody where
    she returned home after making statement). And Detective Arnold told appellant
    that he could sit downstairs, “relax,” and “hang out” while officers finished
    examining his electronic devices. Because, at the time, law enforcement officers
    were still searching the home and collecting evidence, appellant sat in “a common
    area” of the home with a uniformed PPD officer for safety purposes and to avoid any
    interference with the officers’ search. See 
    Gardner, 433 S.W.3d at 99
    (defendant
    not in custody although “officers escorted [him] to avoid any interference with the
    officers executing the search warrant”); cf. Turner v. State, 
    252 S.W.3d 571
    , 580
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (placing defendant in handcuffs
    for officer safety purposes did not mean in custody). Appellant had, after all,
    informed law enforcement officers that he had firearms in his home.
    According to Detective Arnold, appellant, at all times, was free to leave.
    Arnold informed appellant that law enforcement officers would likely seize some
    the electronic devices found in the home so that appellant did not have to “spend the
    54
    entire day” with officers. Officers permitted appellant to watch television while they
    searched the home, did not arrest appellant on May 12, 2015, and left appellant at
    his home at the conclusion of their search.         See 
    Gardner, 433 S.W.3d at 99
    (“[O]fficers left [defendant’s] home after executing the warrant and did not arrest
    [defendant] until several weeks later . . . . This fact weighs heavily in favor of
    finding that [defendant] was not in custody [at the time of his interview].”).
    Having examined the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there is
    nothing in the record to suggest a restraint of appellant’s freedom of movement of
    the degree associated with a formal arrest. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
    did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress his statement.
    We overrule appellant’s first issue.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Terry Jennings
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Massengale.
    Massengale, J., concurring solely in the judgment.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    55