Jacke Rahmad Eaglin v. State ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-13-00527-CR
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JACKE RAHMAD EAGLIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12-15270
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jacke Rahmad Eaglin appeals from the trial court’s decision to revoke its
order placing Eaglin on community supervision. In three issues, Eaglin contends
that the evidence introduced during the revocation hearing is legally insufficient to
support the trial court’s decision to revoke its community-supervision order, that
the sentence the trial court assessed is constitutionally disproportionate and
unreasonable, and that the trial court erred by failing to consider several factors it
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should have considered in determining his sentence. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Background
In carrying out a plea bargain agreement, Eaglin pled guilty to the lesser
included offense of using a motor vehicle without having the authority to do so, a
state jail felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.07 (West 2011). Under the terms
of Eaglin’s plea bargain agreement, the trial court deferred its decision to
adjudicate Eaglin’s guilt and placed him on community supervision for five years.
The trial court also fined Eaglin seven hundred and fifty dollars.
Approximately six months later, the State filed a motion asking that the trial
court revoke its community supervision order and find Eaglin guilty of using a
motor vehicle without having been authorized to do so. During the revocation
hearing, Eaglin pled “not true” to the State’s allegations that he had violated the
community-supervision order by committing any one of the three crimes the
State’s motion alleged he had committed after being placed on community
supervision.
After hearing evidence, the trial court found that Eaglin violated the terms of
the trial court’s deferred adjudication order and found Eaglin guilty of using a
motor vehicle without having the authority to do so. At the conclusion of the
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hearing, the trial court pronounced Eaglin’s sentence of two years, to be served in a
state jail. Eaglin lodged no objections to his sentence at the hearing, nor did he file
a motion for new trial complaining about the length of his sentence.
Analysis
In issues one and two, Eaglin argues that his sentence is constitutionally
disproportionate and unreasonable under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. To preserve a complaint that a
sentence is disproportionate for the crime or circumstances particular to the
defendant’s case, the defendant must make a timely, specific objection in the trial
court asserting such a claim, or he must raise the issue in a motion for new trial.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (holding that defendant waived any claim that article I, section 13 of
the Texas Constitution was violated because the defendant failed to raise his
objection in the trial court); Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (holding that the defendant failed to preserve his argument
that his sentence was disproportionate by failing to raise an objection asserting that
claim in the trial court).
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The record reflects that when the trial court pronounced Eaglin’s sentence,
Eaglin did not object that he had been given a disproportionate sentence in
violation of the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution. We conclude
that Eaglin failed to preserve his claim about receiving a disproportionate sentence
for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
However, even had Eaglin preserved his complaint that his sentence is
disproportionate and unreasonable, his argument that his sentence is excessive is
without merit. Eaglin’s sentence of two years is within the statutory range
authorized for the crime of using a motor vehicle without authority. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.35(a) (West Supp. 2014) (providing that a state jail felony shall be
punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or
less than 180 days), § 31.07(b) (providing that the offense of using a motor vehicle
without authority is a state jail felony). When the defendant is sentenced to a
punishment within the range available for the crime for which the defendant is
convicted, a court will generally not disturb the trial court’s sentence by declaring
the sentence to be excessive. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984). Nor is a sentence that is within the range authorized for the
offense generally considered to be constitutionally cruel or unusual. See
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State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d); see also Jackson
v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
While Eaglin argues the trial court failed to consider factors mitigating
against his being given the maximum term for the crime that he committed, the
record does not show that the trial court refused to consider the mitigating factors
outlined in article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3 (West Supp. 2014).1 Eaglin failed to introduce
evidence at the hearing reflecting that lesser sentences are imposed by trial courts
for similar offenses on criminals who have committed similar crimes in Texas or in
other jurisdictions, so we are unable to compare the sentence Eaglin received with
any other cases to evaluate the arguments he makes in his appeal. 2 See Jackson,
989 S.W.2d at 846.
We hold that Eaglin failed to preserve the complaints that he makes about
his sentence for our review on appeal. Issues one and two are overruled.
1
We cite to the current version of the statute because the subsequent
amendment does not affect the outcome of this appeal.
2
Eaglin suggests that if more information is needed, this Court should abate
the appeal for a hearing to allow him to gather information regarding sentences
imposed for similar offenses. Eaglin cites no authority to support his request that
we should allow him additional hearings for this purpose, and we decline his
request to remand the case for further proceedings. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
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In issue three, Eaglin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support
the trial court’s order, which revoked an earlier order placing Eaglin on community
supervision. We review a trial court’s order revoking a community-supervision
order for abuse of discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). The State’s burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is by a
preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993) (citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984)). The State satisfies its burden when the greater weight of credible evidence
before the trial court creates a reasonable belief demonstrating it is more probable
than not that the defendant violated a condition of the trial court’s community-
supervision order. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64; Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627,
640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In a revocation proceeding,
the trial judge is the sole trier of facts, and in that role, it assesses the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the testimony. Mattias v. State, 731 S.W.2d 936, 940
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
The State’s motion asked the trial court to revoke the community-
supervision order on several grounds, including that Eaglin had violated the trial
court’s order by committing other offenses; aggravated assault on a public servant,
evading arrest or detention, and resisting arrest, search, or transportation. Eaglin
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pled “not true” to the State’s allegations that he had committed the additional
offenses. During Eaglin’s revocation hearing, Officer Brian Barbour testified that
he responded to a disturbance call in October 2013, which arose from an alleged
assault at a convenience store. Upon arriving at the convenience store, Officer
Barbour was advised by people in the store that Eaglin was the person who had
caused the disturbance. According to Officer Barbour, Eaglin came after him and
they scuffled. In an effort to detain Eaglin, Officer Barbour used his taser five to
six times, but Eaglin would not stay on the ground. During the scuffle, Eaglin
grabbed Officer Barbour’s groin and bit him twice, injuries that Officer Barbour
described as painful. With assistance, Officer Barbour eventually handcuffed and
detained Eaglin.
Eaglin also testified during his revocation hearing. Eaglin admitted that he
had scuffled with someone at the convenience store, but stated that he did not
know the person in the scuffle was an officer. According to Eaglin, another
customer in the store sprayed him with mace before Officer Barbour arrived.
Eaglin claimed that he believed that the customer was still attacking him when
Officer Barbour got involved.
The trial court found that Eaglin had violated the trial court’s community
supervision order by committing an aggravated assault on a public servant and by
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resisting arrest, search, or transportation. Having reviewed the record, we conclude
that it contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings and
conclusion that Eaglin had violated the community-supervision order by
committing additional offenses. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764; Cardona, 665
S.W.2d at 493. We overrule issue three.
Having overruled all of Eaglin’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on September 19, 2014
Opinion Delivered December 10, 2014
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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