Alice Labra v. Carlos Labra ( 2014 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00285-CV
Alice LABRA,
Appellant
v.
Carlos
Carlos LABRA,
Appellee
From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-CI-10580
Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 23, 2014
AFFIRMED
This case stems from the trial court’s denial of Appellant Alice Labra’s Petition for Bill of
Review filed as a result of a default divorce decree where Appellee Carlos Labra was appointed
sole managing conservator of the parties’ minor children. Because Alice failed to meet her burden
on the bill of review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Alice filed her petition for divorce from Carlos on December 17, 2007, in cause number
2007-CI-18666. On November 13, 2008, the trial court entered temporary orders wherein the
04-13-00285-CV
parties were named joint managing conservators and Alice was granted the exclusive right to
designate the primary residence of the children.
Alice contends that in early 2010, Carlos discontinued all communication with her and did
not exercise his visitation rights. On September 9, 2010, the trial court signed Alice’s order, filed
by her attorney, setting the matter for trial on November 22, 2010.
Alice’s counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw indicating her inability “to
effectively communicate with Alice Labra in a manner consistent with good attorney-client
relations.” The motion to withdraw was granted by the trial court on November 22, 2010 and the
matter was reset. The order granting the motion to withdraw provided Alice’s last known address
as 10010 Sugarloaf Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78248, and further ordered that all notices be either
hand-delivered to Alice or mailed to the Sugarloaf address.
In January of 2011, Alice moved from the Sugarloaf address. Alice contends that prior to
moving, she contacted the Bexar County District Clerk on three separate occasions to inquire
whether there were any pending hearings or court dates that she was required to attend. On January
11, 2011, Carlos filed a motion to set the divorce case for trial and the matter was set for January
28, 2011. Once again, the trial setting was dropped and the matter was not heard on January 28,
2011.
Three months later, on April 13, 2011, Carlos filed an Original Counter-Petition for
Divorce and a new motion to set for trial. The case was set for trial on May 11, 2011. Notice was
sent to 10010 Sugarloaf Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78248. The notice was returned to sender by
the U.S. Post Office as “moved left no address . . . unable to forward . . . return to sender.” Alice
contends that she was never served with notice of the May 11, 2011 hearing and that Carlos knew
she was no longer residing at the Sugarloaf address. Additionally, Alice contends Carlos had her
-2-
04-13-00285-CV
telephone number, e-mail address, and was able to communicate with her through Facebook and
MySpace.
On May 11, 2011, Carlos obtained a Final Decree of Divorce. Alice asserts that she did
not know of the final decree until August of 2011, after all post-judgment filing deadlines had
expired. Between August of 2011 and December of 2011, Carlos had no contact with Alice and
no visitation with the children. Alice contends she relocated to California in December of 2011 to
be closer to her family and for financial support.
On February 17, 2012, Carlos obtained a Final Decree of Divorce-Nunc Pro Tunc,
correcting language in the May 11, 2011 decree to reflect Alice was not present at the final hearing.
Alice asserts the first notice she received of any action taken on the Texas divorce case was an
order to appear before the California Superior Court on April 10, 2012, for enforcement of the
Texas divorce decree.
On June 28, 2012, Alice filed an Original Petition for Bill of Review. After a December
6, 2012 hearing, the trial court concluded Alice failed to meet her burden on the bill of review and
denied the petition. Alice timely filed her notice of appeal.
BILL OF REVIEW
A bill of review is an equitable action brought by a party to a prior action who seeks to set
aside a judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial. Mabon Ltd. v.
Afri-Carib Enters., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam); see also TEX. R. CIV. P.
329b(f) (“[O]n expiration of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment
cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient cause. . . .”). The
fundamental policy that finality must be accorded to judgments makes the grounds upon which a
bill of review will be granted narrow and restricted. See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d
-3-
04-13-00285-CV
742, 751 (Tex. 2003); Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet).
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a bill of review for an abuse of discretion. See
Interaction, Inc. v. State, 17 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, or whether it acted
without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985); Garza v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 166 S.W.3d 799, 810–11 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it makes
its decision on conflicting evidence” and some evidence supports its judgment. Garcia–Udall v.
Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (citing Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d
859, 862 (Tex. 1978)); accord Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009);
Burns v. Burns, 116 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). Where, as here, the trial
court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment will be sustained on any
legal theory supported by the evidence. Nguyen, 93 S.W.3d at 293–94.
B. Argument of Parties
Alice argues her petition for bill of review should have been granted because she was not
personally served with citation and, therefore, did not have notice of the final hearing. Alice
contends she need not prove the traditional bill of review elements and the court should have
granted her bill of review because the lack of notice was for a dispositive trial setting.
Carlos contends that he took all necessary steps to provide the required notice to Alice. He
mailed the notice of setting and counter-petition to the last known address in compliance with Rule
21a. TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a. As such, Carlos contends there was no due process violation and Alice
failed to meet her burden on the bill of review.
-4-
04-13-00285-CV
C. Requirements to Set Aside a Judgment by Bill of Review
In order to set aside a judgment by bill of review, a claimant is normally required to prove
the following three elements: “‘(1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2)
which the plaintiff[ ] [was] prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of the
opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on [its] own part.’”
Mabon Ltd., 369 S.W.3d at 812 (alterations in original) (quoting Caldwell v. Barnes (Caldwell II),
154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)). A bill of review petitioner who alleges she had no
notice of a dispositive setting is excused from proving the first two elements, but she “must still
prove the third and final element required in a bill of review proceeding that the judgment was
rendered unmixed with any fault or negligence of [her] own.” Caldwell II, 154 S.W.3d at 97.
“A party’s failure to make reasonable inquiries regarding . . . pending litigation is [a] failure
to exercise diligence, and without the showing of such diligence, a bill of review will fail” based
on the inability of the party seeking relief to prove lack of negligence in allowing the judgment to
become final. In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied). A
person must exercise due diligence, and if legal remedies were available but ignored, relief by
equitable bill of review is unavailable. See Caldwell v. Barnes (Caldwell I), 975 S.W.2d 535, 537
(Tex. 1998); see also Min v. Avila, 991 S.W.2d 495, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
no pet.) (reiterating that in a petition for bill of review claiming lack of service, petitioner must
establish “lack of proper service and his own diligence in setting the default judgment aside”).
D. Alleged Fault or Negligence by Alice
1. Notice under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a
“When a party asserts a counterclaim or a cross-claim against another party who has
entered an appearance, the claim may be served in any manner prescribed for service of citation
or as provided in Rule 21a.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 124; Min, 991 S.W.2d at 500. Rule 21a “specifies
-5-
04-13-00285-CV
that notices be sent to the party’s last known address, thus imposing a responsibility on the person
to be notified to keep the court and parties apprised of their correct and current address.” Withrow
v. Schou, 13 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
In Mathews v. Harris Methodist, 834 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ
denied), the plaintiffs filed a bill of review seeking to have their case reinstated after it was
dismissed for want of prosecution. The court heard testimony that the plaintiffs’ lawyer did not
receive notice of the dismissal until after the case had been dismissed. Id. at 584. The evidence
also showed the attorney failed to notify the court of his address change after filing the original
lawsuit. Id. The Fort Worth court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the absence of notice prior
to the dismissal deprived the plaintiffs of due process, explaining “it is much more easily
understood how [a party who had no service of process] was deprived of his right to due process
as opposed to appellants who filed suit themselves, invoked the jurisdiction of the court and then
failed to give that court notice of where they could be reached.” Id. at 584–85. The court
concluded, “it cannot be said that appellants’ attorney was without fault because he knew that he
had a case pending yet failed to give the district court notice of his new address.” Id. at 585. We
see no procedural difference in the present case.
2. Testimony at Trial
During the hearing on the bill of review, Alice testified that she believed she was not
required to notify either the clerk or Carlos of any change of address because their attorneys agreed
that she would not disclose her address in exchange for holding a protective order in abeyance.
She further testified that she notified Carlos she was moving and that they had contact through
MySpace in January of 2011. The next time she had contact with Carlos was in July of 2011.
Alice contends Carlos had her telephone number, her e-mail address, and was able to contact her
through MySpace and Facebook.
-6-
04-13-00285-CV
When Alice’s attorney withdrew, the attorney provided the court with Alice’s address on
Sugarloaf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 10 (requiring, when another attorney is not to be substituted,
withdrawing attorney’s motion to state, among other things, the party’s last known address); see
also Harrison v. Harrison, 363 S.W.3d 859, 864 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
Alice conceded that prior to her attorney withdrawing from the case, Alice had instructed her to
move forward with the case. Alice also conceded that she knew the court had granted her
attorney’s motion to withdraw and the only address the clerk of the court had was the Sugarloaf
address and Alice did not provide her attorney or Carlos’s attorney with any change of address.
David Mallonee, a specialist with Child Protective Services, was also called to testify at
the bill of review hearing. Mallonee testified that an investigator from his office was assigned to
locate Alice based on the District Attorney’s “call in referral based on their inability to locate”
Alice or her children to testify in a child injury case involving Alice’s boyfriend, Ernest Kyle.
Kyle was charged with assault of Alice and two of the children. Mallonee further explained it was
his understanding the case was dismissed based on Alice’s and her son’s failure to testify.
Mallonee also testified that between May of 2010 and April of 2012, Carlos did not know where
Alice and the children were and that Carlos had contacted him seeking help in locating Alice and
the children. According to Mallonee, Alice expressed frustration in her family’s desire to have the
Department place the children with Carlos over her.
3. Application
The supreme court’s analysis in Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. 2005) is
particularly instructive in this case. The court noted that a litigant has a “duty ‘to keep the court
and parties apprised of their correct and current address’” in connection with Rule 21a. The court
explained, assuming such duty exists, that “unless noncompliance was intentional rather than a
mistake, due process requires some lesser sanction than trial without notice or an opportunity to
-7-
04-13-00285-CV
be heard.” Id. (citing Peralta, 485 U.S. at 85–86 and Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 779); see also Harrison,
363 S.W.3d at 865 (stating that absent intentional noncompliance, “[l]oss of the opportunity to
contest a termination of parental rights is simply too steep a penalty for failing to keep a current
address on file with a court in perpetuity”). This is precisely the issue in this case. Alice testified
that she intentionally did not provide Carlos’s attorney or the district clerk with her contact
information. Although she argues Carlos could reach her through e-mail and social media
websites, Alice provides no authority that such information complies with Rule 21a’s requirement.
The testimony supports not only that Alice failed to apprise any of the relevant parties of
her location, but that she took steps to preclude discovery of her address. Although the parties
agreed that Alice’s address could remain unknown while she was represented by counsel, we
cannot conclude that such agreement extended beyond Alice’s attorney’s representation of Alice
in the divorce proceedings. Cf. Campus Invs., Inc. v. Cullever, 144 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. 2004)
(per curiam) (concluding failure to update addresses as required by statute is negligence barring
relief by bill of review); Mathews, 834 S.W.2d at 584–85 (same). This is further evidenced by
Alice’s attorney filing Alice’s last known address within her motion to withdraw. Based on
Carlos’s testimony, and that of Mallonnee, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably
concluded Alice was actively preventing Carlos, or his attorney, from making contact with her,
including providing notice of a court setting.
Based on the record, we cannot say the trial court acted either arbitrarily or unreasonably
in determining that Alice failed to meet her burden to prevail on the bill of review. See Downer,
701 S.W.2d at 241–42; Interaction, Inc., 17 S.W.3d at 778.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court could have reasonably determined that Alice’s failure to provide a
correct mailing address at which she could receive notices constituted negligence on her part, we
-8-
04-13-00285-CV
cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the bill of review. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
-9-