Patrick Lee Wallace v. State ( 2017 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-16-00214-CR
PATRICK LEE WALLACE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 8th District Court
Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1323172
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Patrick Lee Wallace pled guilty to his third offense of driving while intoxicated. Pursuant
to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court suspended Wallace’s sentence of three
years’ imprisonment, placed him on community supervision for a period of three years, and
ordered him to pay a $1,500.00 fine and $524.00 in court costs. Based on its findings that Wallace
had failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his community supervision, the trial court
revoked his community supervision, sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, and ordered him
to pay a $1,500.00 fine, $524.00 in court costs, and $500.00 in attorney fees for counsel appointed
to Wallace during the revocation proceedings.
On appeal, Wallace argues that because he was indigent, the trial court erred in ordering
him to pay attorney fees for counsel appointed during the revocation proceedings. Wallace also
argues that the State failed to meet its burden to establish that he violated three terms and
conditions of his community supervision involving the payment of fines and fees, even though he
fails to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that he
violated five other terms and conditions of his community supervision.1
Because Wallace’s testimony during the revocation proceedings supported the trial court’s
ruling that he had the ability to pay attorney fees, we overrule Wallace’s first point of error.
Additionally, because Wallace has failed to attack all grounds supporting the revocation of his
community supervision, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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The State has not filed a brief in this case.
2
I. The Trial Court’s Conclusion that Wallace had the Ability to Pay Attorney Fees is
Supported by the Record
Under Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the
authority to order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney fees only if “the judge determines
that a defendant has financial resources that enable the defendant to offset in part or in whole the
costs of the legal services provided . . . including any expenses and costs.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2016). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay
are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering
reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services provided. Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759,
765–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010)).
The trial court found that Wallace was indigent.2 He was presumed to remain indigent
absent record proof of a material change in his circumstances. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2016); Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010); Watkins v. State, 333 S.W.3d 771, 781–82 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref’d).
On October 26, 2016, two months before the revocation hearing, Wallace filled out a form
demonstrating that for the past three years, he had been employed by “Trademanagement Serv.,”
was making $20.00 per hour, and was working forty hours per week. Wallace informed the court
that his net take home pay per month was $2,480.00. He stated that his monthly expenses were
$2,450.00, which included $200.00 per month for entertainment. Based on these representations,
2
The trial court also appointed Wallace counsel on appeal.
3
the trial court found Wallace indigent and appointed him counsel for the revocation proceedings.
However, Wallace testified at the revocation hearing that he could pay “$1,200.00 today” and that
he could pay any other amounts required under the terms and conditions of his community
supervision “in a timely manner.”
In light of Wallace’s testimony, the trial court expressly found that Wallace had the ability
to pay $500.00 in attorney fees. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding, we overrule
Wallace’s first point of error.
II. Unchallenged Grounds Support the Trial Court’s Decision to Revoke Wallace’s
Community Supervision
Wallace raises a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting three of the
eight grounds contained in the State’s motion to revoke. Five grounds remain unchallenged.
One sufficient ground for revocation supports a trial court’s order revoking community
supervision. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Thus, when an
appellant does not challenge every ground found true by the trial court during revocation
proceedings, “nothing is presented for review.” Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
Accordingly, after reviewing the record of the revocation proceedings, we hold that
Wallace has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community
supervision based on the unchallenged grounds. See id. Because we need not further address his
second point of error, we overrule it. See id.
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III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
Date Submitted: March 28, 2017
Date Decided: April 21, 2017
Do Not Publish
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