Ashley Rene Kainer v. State ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-18-00203-CR
ASHLEY RENE KAINER, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2011-431,650-A, Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
December 12, 2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, Ashley Rene Kainer, appeals the trial court’s denial of her application
for writ of habeas corpus contending that she should have been released from community
supervision because the trial court violated her due process and due course of law rights
by extending the period of her community supervision for one year without a showing of
good cause. We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s application.
Background
On May 3, 2012, appellant pled guilty to the offense of intoxicated assault and was
sentenced to five years incarceration, but this sentence was suspended and appellant
was placed on community supervision for five years instead.
In October 2012 and April 2014, the State filed motions to modify the terms and
conditions of appellant’s community supervision. In each of these instances, appellant
waived a hearing. Based on the State’s motions and appellant’s waivers, the trial court
modified the terms and conditions of appellant’s community supervision.
On April 21, 2017, the trial court entered an order modifying the terms and
conditions of appellant’s community supervision. The order expressly provides that, “it
appearing that good cause has been shown and that the Community Supervision should
be modified . . .” before the order extends appellant’s period of community supervision for
one year. The order indicates that the one-year extension will “allow the defendant to pay
back his (sic) Court Costs, Community Supervision fees and Restitution, or complete
Court Ordered Programs.” It further identifies that appellant waived her right to an
attorney and a hearing and that appellant agreed to the modification. The order is signed
by appellant, a community supervision officer, a community supervision supervisor, and
the trial court.
On January 8, 2018, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community
supervision. In response, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the State’s motion to revoke
that contends that the trial court is without jurisdiction because its April 21, 2017
modification order is void and, consequently, the period of appellant’s community
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supervision expired on May 2, 2017. After a hearing was commenced, the State informed
the trial court that it desired to dismiss its motion to revoke appellant’s community
supervision. The trial court adjourned the hearing.
Immediately following the adjournment of the revocation hearing, appellant filed
her motion for release from community supervision, which reasserted her contention that
the trial court’s April 21, 2017 modification order was void and, therefore, her term of
community supervision expired on May 2, 2017. The trial court denied the motion without
a hearing on February 21, 2018.
Subsequently, on March 13, appellant filed her application for writ of habeas
corpus seeking an order releasing her from community supervision under article 11.072
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072
(West 2015). The trial court entered an order denying appellant’s application as well as
findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is from this order that appellant appeals.
The State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision on April 24,
2018, which remains pending at this time.
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s April 21, 2017 order
extending appellant’s community supervision was void and, therefore, appellant’s
community supervision term ended on May 2, 2017, rendering the trial court without
jurisdiction to rule on the State’s April 24, 2018 motion to revoke community supervision.
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Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a habeas corpus application for abuse of
discretion. Ex parte Reyna, No. 07-16-00177-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12193, at * 7
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 10, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(citing Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam),
overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 371 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)). As such, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. A trial court abuses
its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and made without reference to
any guiding rules or principles. Id. at *7-8. We afford almost total deference to the trial
court’s determinations of historical fact that are supported by the record, especially when
those findings are based on the judge’s evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.
However, we review de novo resolution of legal questions and application of legal
standards. Id.
Law and Analysis
A trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate period of community
supervision for an eligible defendant provided the period falls within the range permitted
by statute. In re Gandara, No. 08-17-00053-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6042, at *7 (Tex.
App.—El Paso June 30, 2017, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (citing
Mayes v. State, 353 S.W.3d 790, 795-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). However, to extend a
period of community supervision, there must be a showing of good cause made to the
trial court. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.753(a) (West 2018); In re Gandara, 2017
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Tex. App. LEXIS 6042, at *8. “Good cause” is not defined by the legislature in article
42A.753. This Court has defined the phrase “good cause” as connoting “something akin
to a legitimate or substantial reason, as opposed to mere arbitrariness.” Barton-Rye v.
State, No. 07-16-00096-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9899, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Sept. 1, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 822 (Revised 4th ed. 1968), and WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 978
(Unabridged 3rd ed. 1976)); see In re Gandara, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6042, at *8-9
(finding the Barton-Rye definition to be well-reasoned).
Trial courts have discretion to extend the period of community supervision with or
without a motion to revoke or a hearing. In re Gandara, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6042, at
*8 (citing Calderon v. State, 75 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet.
ref’d) (op. on reh’g), Prevato v. State, 77 S.W.3d 317, 319-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.), Warmoth v. State, 946 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1997, no pet.), and Ex parte Harrington, 883 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1994, pet. ref’d)). We know that proof of a violation of the terms and conditions of
community supervision constitutes good cause supporting an extension. In re Gandara,
2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6042, at *7 (“[G]ood cause will exist in every case where the court
finds that the probationer has violated a condition of community supervision.”). However,
less than a finding of a violation is required to support a modification. So long as we can
find some legitimate reason for the trial court’s decision to extend appellant’s period of
community supervision, we will affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s application.
See id. at *8.
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While the State did not file a motion for modification of the terms of appellant’s
community supervision nor did the trial court hold a hearing, we conclude that sufficient
good cause was shown to support the trial court’s extension of the period of appellant’s
community supervision. Initially, we note that appellant agreed in writing to the
modification of her probation by signing, along with her probation officer, the “Order
Amending Conditions of Community Supervision” that extended the term of her
community supervision for a year. In this same document, appellant waived her right to
an attorney and hearing. Further, this agreed order states that,
Defendant shall be extended for a period of 1 YEAR to expire on 05/02/18,
and during the extension period, the defendant WILL be responsible for
additional Community Supervision fees beginning on the original date of
expiration to allow the defendant to pay back [her] Court Costs, Community
Supervision Fees and Restitution, or complete Court Ordered Programs.
It is reasonable to conclude from this language that the trial court found good cause to
extend the period of appellant’s community supervision as a means to allow her to pay
back costs, fees, and restitution, and to complete court-ordered community supervision
programs.1 We find such a statement made on the face of the order analogous to what
this Court has accepted as good cause. See Barton-Rye, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9899,
at *3 (when court’s order justified extension of community supervision period by stating
that the extension was “as an alternative to incarceration,” good cause existed for the
1 On January 8, 2018, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision. In this
motion, the State alleged, inter alia, that appellant owed community supervision fees of $1,883. Appellant’s
terms and conditions of community supervision required her to pay a community supervision fee of $60 per
month. As such, the record reflects that appellant was necessarily in arrears on her required community
supervision fees at the time of the extension. In addition, the motion to revoke alleges that appellant had
failed to attend or complete drug and alcohol counseling that was assigned in April of 2017. Further, the
State’s motion to revoke also alleged that her March 9, 2017 urinalysis detected cocaine, her March 29,
2017 urinalysis detected alcohol, and that she signed an admission form on April 13, 2017, acknowledging
that she used cocaine on March 6, 2017. These allegations, to which appellant pleaded true, would each
constitute a showing of good cause for the trial court’s extension of appellant’s community supervision.
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extension). We deny appellant’s sole issue and conclude that the trial court’s April 21,
2017 order was supported by a showing of good cause.
Conclusion
Having found that the trial court had good cause to extend appellant’s community
supervision, we uphold its April 21, 2017 order amending conditions of community
supervision and, consequently, affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s
application for writ of habeas corpus.
Judy C. Parker
Justice
Do not publish.
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