Brian Christopher Dawson v. State ( 2019 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-18-00046-CR
BRIAN CHRISTOPHER DAWSON,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 21st District Court
Burleson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 15349
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Christopher Dawson was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm and
sentenced to 99 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a) (West 2011).
Because the trial court did not err in denying Dawson’s motion to suppress and because
the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first issue,1 Dawson contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Dawson’s motion to suppress because the vehicle in which Dawson was a passenger was
searched without a warrant and no valid exception to the warrant requirement was
established.
We review a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard. State v.
Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When the trial judge makes explicit
findings of fact, we afford those findings almost total deference as long as the record
supports them, regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied.
State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Guzman v. State, 955
S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo, however, a trial judge's
application of the law of search and seizure to the facts. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661,
667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Dawson was identified as confronting and chasing a person in an apartment
complex because the person owed money to Dawson’s friend. An eyewitness to the
incident called 911 and told the operator that Dawson had a 9-millimeter handgun
sticking out of his pants pocket and gave the operator the license plate number and a
description of the vehicle in which Dawson left the scene. Dispatch broadcast the vehicle
1
Dawson’s actual first issue was a complaint about the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law. We abated the appeal so that the trial court could remedy this failure. It did. We now,
on our own, label Dawson’s second issue as his first and his third issue as his second.
Dawson v. State Page 2
description, license plate number, and that Dawson had a gun. Deputy Stephens of the
Burleson County Sheriff’s Department saw a vehicle matching the description given; and
when he turned around to follow the vehicle, he saw that the license plate number
matched as well. The vehicle pulled over and stopped before Stephens activated his
lights or siren. Stephens pulled in behind it. Once backup arrived and Stephens
confirmed with a deputy at the scene of the incident that the eyewitness said Dawson
had a gun and also confirmed with an assistant district attorney that Stephens had
probable cause to search, Stephens searched the vehicle. A .380 caliber handgun, similar
in size and color to the description of the gun given by the eyewitness, was located in the
vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see
Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because in this case it is
undisputed that a search and seizure occurred without a warrant, the burden was on the
State to prove that the search or seizure was nevertheless reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A
warrantless search is unreasonable per se unless it fits into one of a "few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113
S. Ct. 2130, 2135, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-
20, 105 S. Ct. 409, 410, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1984)); see also State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 10
Dawson v. State Page 3
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement may
search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to
believe contraband or evidence is contained. Cal. v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct.
1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991); Yoon Chung v. State, 475 S.W.3d 378, 387 (Tex. App.—Waco
2014, pet. ref’d). Probable cause exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer on the scene would lead the
officer to reasonably believe that evidence of a crime will be found. Turrubiate v. State,
399 S.W.3d 147, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Reviewing the evidence de novo, we conclude that a police officer could
reasonably believe that the gun the eyewitness had seen was in the vehicle. Thus,
Stephens had probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, and the trial court did not err in denying Dawson’s motion to
suppress.2 Dawson’s first issue is overruled.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his second issue, Dawson contends the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the State failed to prove intentional or knowing possession of a
firearm.
2
We need not discuss the remainder of Dawson’s issue, that is, whether the search was valid as a search
incident to arrest or inventory search.
Dawson v. State Page 4
The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a
sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State,
514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the
appellate court to defer "to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that
of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
"divide and conquer" strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all
the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate
about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any
reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported
by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder
resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict,
and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the
testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so
long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to "the elements of the offense as
defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case." Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
correct jury charge is one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof
Dawson v. State Page 5
or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The "law
as authorized by the indictment" includes the statutory elements of the
offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
We analyze the sufficiency of the evidence of possession of a firearm by a felon
under the standards adopted for establishing the sufficiency of the evidence in cases of
possession of a controlled substance. Majors v. State, 554 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2018, no pet.); Corpus v. State, 30 S.W.3d 35, 37-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. ref'd). Thus, the State must establish the defendant knew of the weapon's
existence and exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over it. Id. The
State may prove possession through direct or circumstantial evidence, although the
evidence must establish that the accused's connection with the weapon was more than
fortuitous. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The eyewitness told Deputy Frank Benavides, also with the Burleson County
Sheriff’s Department, at the scene of the incident that Dawson had a black handgun. She
told Benavides that she saw it in Dawson’s waistband when he lifted up his shirt. The
eyewitness backtracked some in her testimony at trial, however, stating that she saw what
she “believed to be a gun” in Dawson’s front pocket. In addition to the eyewitness’s
testimony, a gun fitting the general description given by the eyewitness was found within
Dawson’s reach in the vehicle in which Dawson left the apartment complex. Under either
Dawson v. State Page 6
theory of possession, what the eyewitness saw in Dawson’s pocket or what Deputy
Stephens found in the car, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence is sufficient to establish that Dawson knew of the gun's existence and
exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over it. Thus, the evidence is
sufficient to establish Dawson’s intentional or knowing possession of a firearm.
Dawson’s second issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed April 24, 2019
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