Elias Esequiel Vasquez v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                              Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-13-00338-CR
    No. 04-13-00339-CR
    Elias Esequiel VASQUEZ,
    Appellant
    v.
    The
    The STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 229th Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. 11-CRS-270 & 11-CRS-272
    Honorable Ana Lisa Garza, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:      Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Sitting:         Karen Angelini, Justice
    Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2014
    AFFIRMED
    At around 11:00 p.m., on February 27, 2011, appellant was involved in an automobile
    accident that resulted in the death of Guillermo Olivares III and bodily injury to Yadira Pena.
    Appellant pled guilty to intoxication manslaughter in the death of Olivares and guilty to
    intoxication assault for the injuries sustained by Pena. A jury assessed punishment. In both
    appeals, appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the
    trial court’s judgment in both cases.
    04-13-00338-CR & 04-13-00339-CR
    BACKGROUND
    At the time of the accident, appellant was driving a maroon 2005 GMC Canyon owned by
    his mother, who had consented to his using the vehicle. After the accident, the vehicle was towed
    to a salvage yard. The complainants’ vehicle, a 2008 Silverado, also was towed to the same salvage
    yard. Approximately eleven months after the accident, an investigator with the Starr County
    District Attorney’s Office went to the salvage yard to obtain the electronic data recorder (“the
    EDR”) from one of the vehicles. Joel Diaz, who managed the salvage yard, testified he was
    approached by the investigator who gave him a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for the Silverado.
    Diaz gave the investigator the EDR from the Silverado. About one week later, an investigator
    from the District Attorney’s Office returned to the salvage yard, and told Diaz he had taken the
    EDR from the wrong vehicle, and he needed the EDR from the GMC Canyon. Diaz said the
    investigator had no paperwork with him; nevertheless, Diaz gave the investigator the EDR from
    the GMC Canyon. Appellant later filed a motion to suppress the EDR on the grounds it was
    illegally obtained. The trial court denied his motion, and these appeals ensued.
    STANDING
    In these appeals, we must decide whether appellant had standing to challenge the State’s
    obtaining the EDR from the GMC Canyon. “The rights protected by the Fourth Amendment to
    the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution are personal.” Matthews
    v. State, 
    431 S.W.3d 596
    , 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “As such, [a defendant] must show that
    the search violated his, rather than a third party’s, legitimate expectation of privacy.” 
    Id. (emphasis in
    original). A defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment must, therefore, show (1) that he exhibited an actual “subjective expectation of
    privacy in the place invaded,” and (2) that “society is prepared to recognize that expectation of
    privacy as objectively reasonable.” State v. Betts, 
    397 S.W.3d 198
    , 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    -2-
    04-13-00338-CR & 04-13-00339-CR
    Only after a defendant has established his standing to complain may a court consider whether he
    has suffered a substantive Fourth Amendment violation. Kothe v. State, 
    152 S.W.3d 54
    , 59 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004). Standing is reviewed de novo because it is a question of law. 
    Id. In a
    motion
    to suppress, the movant has the burden to establish standing. State v. Klima, 
    934 S.W.2d 109
    , 110
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
    A person has an expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he does not own if he has gained
    possession of the car from the owner with the owner’s consent or from someone authorized to give
    permission to drive it. See 
    Matthews, 431 S.W.3d at 607-08
    . In this case, appellant’s mother
    testified she gave appellant permission to drive her GMC Canyon. Therefore, at the time of the
    accident, appellant had both a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy in his mother’s
    GMC Canyon. See 
    id. at 610.
    However, a party lacks standing to object to the reasonableness of a search of abandoned
    property. McDuff v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 607
    , 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Abandonment of
    property occurs when the defendant intends to abandon the property and his decision to abandon
    it is not due to police misconduct. 
    Id. “When police
    take possession of abandoned property
    independent of police misconduct[,] there is no seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” 
    Id. Abandonment is
    primarily a question of intent that can be inferred from the words and actions of
    the parties and other circumstances surrounding the alleged abandonment. 
    Id. The dispositive
    issue is whether the defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his
    interest in property so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with
    regard to it at the time of the search. 
    Id. Shortly after
    the accident, the GMC Canyon was towed to the salvage yard. Nothing in the
    record indicates either appellant or his mother attempted to regain possession of the vehicle in the
    almost eleven months following the February 27, 2011, accident. The investigator obtained the
    -3-
    04-13-00338-CR & 04-13-00339-CR
    GMC Canyon’s EDR from Diaz on January 3, 2012. Diaz testified he has a Texas Nonrepairable
    Vehicle title to the GMC Canyon, and the State introduced a document showing the current owner
    of the vehicle to be State Farm County Mutual. This document also stated: “Registration invalid.
    . . . Nonrepairable Vehicle Title Issued. Tx Title Surrendered on 2011/05/13. . . . Salvaged on
    2012/07/18. Evidence Surrendered: Tx Nonrepair Cert of Title . . . .” On this record, we conclude
    appellant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in his mother’s vehicle. Therefore, he
    lost standing to challenge the State’s obtaining the EDR from the vehicle.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
    Therefore, we overrule appellant’s issue in both appeals, and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Do not publish
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-13-00338-CR

Filed Date: 12/10/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/10/2014