in the Interest of T.D., a Child ( 2022 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-22-00215-CV
    ___________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF T.D., A CHILD
    On Appeal from the 231st District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 231-691096-20
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Appellants M.C. (Mother) and T.D. (Father) appeal the trial court’s order
    terminating their parental rights to T.D. (Tess).1 In four issues, Mother complains
    that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the termination of her
    parental rights under Family Code Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and
    that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-
    interest finding. In two issues, Father complains that the evidence is legally and
    factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and that the trial
    court abused its discretion by admitting certain hearsay evidence over his objections.
    We will affirm.
    II. BACKGROUND
    A. The Events Leading Up to Tess’s Removal
    Mother and Father are Tess’s parents. For the first three-and-a-half years of
    her life, Tess lived with Mother, Father, T.D. (Paternal Grandfather), and T.D.
    (Paternal Grandmother).2
    1
    We use aliases to refer to the child, her family members, and others connected
    to this case. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002
    (d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
    Father testified that they lived in a duplex-style house, with Mother, Father,
    2
    and Tess living on one side of the house and his parents living on the other side of
    the house.
    2
    1. The September 2020 Incident
    Paige Martin, an investigator with the Department of Family and Protective
    Services (the Department), received a referral relating to Tess in September 2020 due
    to an allegation of domestic violence that had occurred the previous day between
    Mother and Father where Tess was present and Mother was intoxicated. Martin
    spoke to Mother on the phone regarding the incident the same day that she received
    the intake. Mother indicated to Martin that she had taken Tess for a walk, that she
    had returned home after the walk and “dr[u]nk a couple of shots of moonshine,” that
    she had then lain down on a bed next to Father feeling “really, really drunk,” and that
    she did not remember anything after that occurred. Mother relayed to Martin that she
    had been naked in the street at some point during the event and that she had
    sustained injuries, although Mother did not know how she received the injuries.
    Mother told Martin that she and Father had had “several different instances of
    domestic violence” in the past, describing how Father “had recently split her head
    open for smoking a cigarette[.]” Mother also indicated that she wanted to go to a
    shelter because “she didn’t want [Tess] to grow up the way that she had grown up
    watching her mom get beat up by her boyfriends.” When Martin told Mother that
    Father might need to participate in a Batterer’s Intervention and Prevention Program
    (BIPP), Mother told Martin that Father was “gonna be so mad at [Mother].”
    3
    Three days after their phone call, Martin met Mother in person and observed
    that Mother’s lip had been stitched up, and Mother “had somewhat of a black eye.”3
    Martin inquired about Mother’s substance abuse, and Mother indicated that she had
    smoked marijuana the previous week and that she had gotten “blacked-out drunk”
    three times in the prior year. Mother also admitted to “heavy drinking” while caring
    for Tess, but she denied methamphetamine use. Mother indicated that she “was done
    with [Father]” and that “she did not want to be with him anymore.”
    Martin later met with Father to discuss the September 2020 incident.
    According to Father, Mother had been drinking moonshine and had told him that she
    had drunk only two shots. Father recounted that Mother then took Tess for a walk
    “that would help with her buzz” and that after the walk, Mother took a shower.
    While Mother was in the shower, Father checked the moonshine to see how much
    Mother had drunk. Noticing that the moonshine only had “approximately two inches
    left in the quart jar,” Father became disappointed in Mother because he believed she
    had lied about how much moonshine she had drunk. According to Father, he then
    poured the remaining moonshine into the shower while Mother was still in it. A few
    3
    At trial, photos depicting Mother’s injured lip and marks on her neck were
    admitted into evidence. Father admitted to causing the marks on Mother’s neck but
    stated that he did not know when Mother’s lip had been injured. Father
    acknowledged that Mother received medical care stemming from the September 2020
    incident.
    4
    minutes later, Father heard “a loud thump” coming from the bathroom, and he went
    to check on Mother.4
    According to Father, Mother then attempted to run out the front door while
    naked, and he grabbed her by the waist and pulled her back inside the house. Father
    recounted that the dispute spilled over to the bedroom, where Mother grabbed his lip,
    “so he smacked her on the top of the head.” Father admitted that his hand was on
    Mother’s neck at some point during the incident. Father also said that at some point
    during the dispute he was on top of Mother on a bed and that she grabbed his groin
    and got away. She then ran out the front door, slammed it so hard that glass broke,
    fell down the front steps, and then took off running.
    Father acknowledged that Tess was present during some of the incident,
    including when he poured the moonshine into the shower and when he grabbed
    Mother around the waist and pulled her back inside the house. Father averred,
    however, that Tess was not present when he hit Mother on top of her head in the
    bedroom, noting that Paternal Grandfather came into the house during the dispute
    and took Tess outside to Paternal Grandfather’s truck.5
    4
    Father surmised that the noise he heard was caused by Mother slipping on the
    bathroom floor when getting out of the shower and hitting her head on a broken
    toilet that had been laying on its side on the bathroom floor, noting that the bathroom
    floor had gotten wet when he opened the shower curtain to dump out the moonshine.
    5
    Father testified that Paternal Grandfather took Tess out of the house around
    the time that Father grabbed Mother by the waist while Mother was attempting to
    leave.
    5
    Father was later arrested and charged for assault to a family member or
    member of his household by impeding breath and circulation relating to the
    September 2020 incident.6 See 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01
    (b)(2)(B). Father bonded
    out of jail that same month, and he was required to wear an ankle monitor and to stay
    away from Mother.
    Martin established safety plans for Mother and Father following the
    September 2020 incident that required, among other things, that they submit to drug
    testing. Around that time, Mother was tested for drugs, and her hair tested positive
    for methamphetamine. While Father told Martin that he was willing to submit to
    drug testing, he never submitted to the testing she requested.
    2. The October 2020 Incident
    Martin received a new intake in early November 2020 regarding a domestic-
    violence incident between Mother and Father that occurred in late October 2020.7
    Martin spoke to Mother on the phone regarding that event, and Mother told Martin
    6
    The indictment relating to that charge—which was admitted into evidence at
    the termination trial—also referred to a November 2019 domestic-violence event
    between Father and Mother where Father was alleged to “intentionally or knowingly
    cause bodily injury to [Mother] . . . by striking her with [Father’s] hand[.]” At trial,
    Father said he did not know what that November 2019 incident referred to. The
    indictment also contained a repeat offender notice, reflecting that Father had been
    convicted in 2012 for the “felony offense of illegal barter/expenditure invest in
    drugs[.]” At trial, Father acknowledged that he had been convicted of that offense.
    7
    While Mother had been staying in a shelter after the September 2020 incident,
    she was kicked out of the shelter because she had missed curfew. Father testified that
    he and Mother got back together after he was bonded out of jail in September 2020.
    6
    that it occurred after she had gone to Father’s attorney’s office to drop charges against
    him. Father had bought Mother a bottle of vodka, which she drank, and then she and
    Father got into a physical altercation at a home in White Settlement.8 Mother then
    ran from that home to a gas station and called the police. Father denied that the
    October 2020 incident occurred. Tess was removed from Mother’s and Father’s care
    in November 2020.
    B. The Events After Tess’s Removal
    1. Mother’s Continued Drug and Alcohol Use Following Removal
    Kierra Diaz, a permanency specialist employed by Our Community Our Kids
    (OCOK),9 an agency contracted by the Department, testified regarding Mother’s
    continued drug and alcohol problems following removal. Diaz stated that Mother
    had completed several services initially requested of her by the Department—
    including FOCUS Motherhood classes, domestic-violence education classes, and
    counseling—but that Diaz had asked Mother to reengage in counseling and drug
    treatment because of a July 2021 relapse where Mother’s hair tested positive for
    8
    Mother told Martin that Tess was with Mother’s mother during the October
    2020 incident. Martin testified that that information was inconsistent with the police
    report regarding the incident.
    9
    OCOK is a private provider of community-based care that contracts with the
    Department to provide foster care case management, kinship, and family reunification
    services in parts of the state, including Tarrant County. In re M.M., No. 02-21-00153-
    CV, 
    2021 WL 4898665
    , at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, pets. denied)
    (mem. op.).
    7
    methamphetamine.10 Mother also failed to take an October 2021 drug test requested
    by Diaz. During an October 2021 phone call between Mother and Diaz, Mother
    admitted that she was still using marijuana and that she had been kicked out of a
    shelter where she was staying because of a failed drug test. At that time, Mother told
    Diaz that she was pregnant. Diaz discussed the importance of not using marijuana
    while pregnant, and Mother told Diaz that using marijuana helped with her nausea
    and helped her to not use methamphetamine.
    Diaz met with Mother in late December 2021, and Mother told Diaz that she
    was still using methamphetamine and marijuana, having used both that month.
    Mother informed Diaz that she desired to go to an inpatient drug treatment program,
    and in January 2022, Mother successfully completed a month-long inpatient drug
    treatment program. The following month—February 2022—Mother gave birth to a
    son, Travis, who is Tess’s half-brother.11 Diaz testified that Travis’s meconium tested
    positive for methamphetamine and marijuana.
    10
    Diaz testified that Mother initially denied methamphetamine use when
    confronted with the July 2021 test results but that Mother eventually admitted to
    using methamphetamine. At trial, Diaz indicated that while Mother started a drug-
    treatment program after her relapse, Mother’s attendance “taper[ed] off,” and she did
    not complete the program. Mother had reengaged in counseling by the time of trial.
    Diaz also testified that Mother had not provided the Department proof that she had
    attended Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings.
    11
    Travis is not Father’s child. We will refer to Travis’s father as “Kevin Carter.”
    We will refer to Travis’s paternal grandparents as “Mr. Carter” and “Ms. Carter.”
    8
    Samples of Mother’s hair and nails were tested for drugs in February 2022.
    The sample from Mother’s hair tested positive for marijuana, and the sample from
    Mother’s nails tested positive for ecstasy, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Diaz
    testified that Mother refused to attend requested drug testing in March and
    April 2022.
    After Travis’s birth in February 2022, Mother and Travis moved into the home
    of Travis’s paternal grandparents, the Carters.12       Two months later—on Easter
    weekend 2022—Mother was kicked out of the Carters’ home after becoming
    intoxicated.13 Diaz spoke to Mother about that incident, and Mother stated that she
    “didn’t remember the full events that had taken place,” admitting that “she did drink
    to the point of intoxication and black[ed] out.” Mother acknowledged that Travis was
    in her care at the time of that incident, and she admitted to becoming intoxicated on
    other occasions while caring for Travis, mentioning that it had also happened
    “approximately three or four weeks prior” to the Easter weekend.
    As told by Mr. Carter, on the day of the occurrence, Mother “had gotten ahold
    of some alcohol and [became] very violent.” Mother kept screaming, “I want to leave.
    I want to leave.” Mother then ran out the door of the Carters’ home wearing “just a
    12
    The record reflects that Mother had been living in the Carters’ home for
    several months prior to Travis’s birth. Travis’s father, Kevin, also lived at the Carters’
    home during this time.
    After being kicked out of the Carters’ home, Mother moved in with her
    13
    mother and stepfather, while Travis remained at the Carters’ home.
    9
    shirt and a thong.” Mr. Carter was able to get Mother back into the house to put
    more clothes on, and then Mother left—after slamming the door and “thr[owing]
    some stuff around . . . just trying to make a big mess.”14
    2. Father’s Repeated Incarceration and Continued Drug Use
    As mentioned above, Father had been arrested and charged with assault
    stemming from the September 2020 incident, and he had been released from custody
    on bond pending his trial. Father was sent back to jail in December 2020 because he
    had violated his bond conditions, and he remained in jail until April 2021.15 Father
    was sent back to jail in July 2021 because he again violated his bond conditions, this
    time by testing positive for alcohol. In September 2021, Father pled guilty to his
    assault offense stemming from the September 2020 incident, and he was sentenced to
    two years’ confinement. In February 2022, Father was released from his confinement
    and placed on parole for the remainder of his sentence.16
    14
    Ms. Carter testified that this was not the first incident involving Mother and
    alcohol at the Carters’ home.
    15
    Father testified that he had violated his bond conditions by going to an
    exclusionary zone prohibited by his ankle monitor. Father explained that the
    exclusionary zone was an apartment where Mother was staying.
    16
    As to services requested by the Department, Father testified that he was not
    offered any services while he was incarcerated. While on parole, Father had engaged
    in BIPP classes and had been attending drug-counseling sessions, although he had not
    completed those services. Earlier in the case, Father completed FOCUS for Fathers
    classes.
    10
    At trial, Father testified that he had been a daily user of methamphetamine up
    until the September 2020 incident. He said that he had used methamphetamine “[a]
    few times” after the September 2020 incident, and he stated that he did not know
    whether he was using methamphetamine during the October 2020 domestic-violence
    event but that it was “possible.”          Father testified that he was not using
    methamphetamine at the time of trial and that if he were required to take a drug test,
    it would be negative; Father clarified, however, that if he were required to take a drug
    test that used his hair as a sample, the results might be positive because he had
    “slipped up when [he] first got out of prison” when he “tried some meth.” Diaz
    testified that she asked Father to submit to drug testing in March and April 2022, but
    Father did not comply. Diaz also stated that Father never completed a drug and
    alcohol assessment that she requested.
    3. Tess’s Placement with the Foster Family
    Following removal, Tess was placed with a foster family consisting of a foster
    mother (Foster Mother), foster father (Foster Father), and two foster siblings (Foster
    Siblings) (collectively the Foster Family).17 Foster Mother testified that Tess had a lot
    of tantrums when she first came into care, describing how Tess would kick, scream,
    and self-harm by pinching her arm or hitting herself in the face during those tantrums.
    Foster Mother said that Tess has been learning different strategies to help with her
    17
    Tess was three when she was placed with the Foster Family. At the time of
    trial, she was almost five.
    11
    tantrums and that she had noticed an improvement in Tess. When Tess first came
    into care, she would kick and punch Foster Family’s dog, but Tess was close to Foster
    Family’s dog at the time of trial. Foster Mother testified that she and Foster Father
    had bonded with Tess and that Tess had bonded with them. She stated that Tess calls
    her “Mom” and calls Foster Father “Daddy.”18 She also said that Tess had bonded
    with Foster Siblings. Foster Mother and Foster Father were willing to adopt Tess.
    Cori Uran, a counselor who provided play therapy to Tess, testified that the
    Foster Family was meeting Tess’s needs, stating that they were able to offer her
    stability, consistency, and love.   Uran also testified that Tess had told her that
    “[Father] beat up [Mother],” that “[Father] hurts [Mother],” and that Tess does not
    like living with Father and Mother “because they fight.”
    C. Procedural Background
    In its petition, the Department sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s
    respective parental rights based on, among other things, the predicate termination
    grounds set forth in Subsections (D), (E), and (O) of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the
    Family Code.19 See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D), (E), (O).
    18
    Foster Mother acknowledged that Tess was also “very close” to Mother.
    19
    The record reflects that Father, Mother, and an attorney ad litem also filed
    certain petitions in the suit seeking various forms of relief.
    12
    Following a three-day bench trial,20 the trial court issued a ruling finding that
    Mother and Father had engaged in conduct under Subsections (D), (E), and (O) of
    Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) and finding that termination of their respective
    parental rights was in Tess’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal from that
    termination order.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A. Father’s Evidentiary Complaint
    In his second21 issue, Father complains about two instances where the trial
    court admitted testimony over his hearsay objections.
    1. The Two Instances Comprising Father’s Evidentiary Complaint
    In the first instance, Martin, the Department investigator, was asked what Tess
    had told her when she spoke to Tess after the September 2020 incident. Father’s
    counsel objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court overruled the objection.
    Martin then stated that Tess “ma[d]e an outcry,” and Father’s counsel immediately
    objected again on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled the objection, stating,
    “Well, she said the child made an outcry. I’m going to overrule the objection.”
    Martin then testified that “[Tess] said that she had heard or that her daddy had killed
    20
    The trial took place over three days on April 25, May 17, and May 19, 2022.
    21
    We will address Father’s first issue later in the opinion.
    13
    her mommy, and her mommy was in the hospital[.]” Father’s counsel then renewed
    his hearsay objection, and the trial court again overruled the objection.
    In the second instance, Martin was asked whether Mother had told her about
    any statements made by Tess regarding domestic violence. Father’s counsel objected
    on hearsay grounds, and the Department responded that it was an admission by a
    party opponent. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the testimony.
    Martin then testified that “[Mother] told [her] that [Tess] told [Mother] that [Father]
    was so mad at [Mother] that he beat [Mother].” Father’s counsel then renewed his
    hearsay objection, and the trial court again overruled the objection. Martin then
    testified that “[Tess] told [Mother] that [Mother] was in the shower, and [Father] was
    so mad that he beat [Mother].”
    2. Standard of Review
    To obtain reversal of a judgment based on an error in the trial court, the
    appellant must show that the error occurred and that it probably caused rendition of
    an improper judgment or probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting
    the case to this court. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc.,
    
    166 S.W.3d 212
    , 225 (Tex. 2005). We will not reverse a trial court’s judgment because
    of an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the ruling probably, though not necessarily,
    caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Gunn v. McCoy, 
    554 S.W.3d 645
    , 668
    (Tex. 2018); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 
    380 S.W.3d 118
    , 136 (Tex. 2012). The
    complaining party must usually show that the whole case turned on the evidence at
    14
    issue. Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 
    66 S.W.3d 213
    , 220 (Tex. 2001) (op. on
    reh’g); City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 
    897 S.W.2d 750
    , 753–54 (Tex. 1995). Error in
    admitting evidence is generally harmless if the objecting party fails to again object
    when the same or similar evidence is later introduced. Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v.
    McShane, 
    239 S.W.3d 231
    , 235 (Tex. 2007); Richardson v. Green, 
    677 S.W.2d 497
    , 501
    (Tex. 1984). Error admitting evidence is also generally harmless if the contested
    evidence is merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence and does not control a
    material and dispositive issue. Interstate Northborough P’ship, 66 S.W.3d at 220.
    3. Analysis
    As to the first instance of Father’s complaint—Martin’s testimony that Tess
    said that Father had killed Mother and that Mother was in the hospital—the
    testimony relating to Father having killed Mother was not offered for the truth of the
    matter asserted. Therefore, it was not hearsay. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d); Ash v. Hack
    Branch Distrib. Co., 
    54 S.W.3d 401
    , 412 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pets. denied)
    (“Because the remainder of Smith’s objected-to testimony does not appear to have
    been offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, we conclude that it is
    not hearsay.”). Even if we assumed that that the trial court erred by overruling
    Father’s hearsay objection to the first instance of Father’s complaint, Father has not
    demonstrated harm. Diaz, the OCOK permanency specialist, testified that “[Tess]
    was worried at one point that [Father] had killed [Mother].” Father did not object to
    that testimony. Father also acknowledged at trial that Mother had received medical
    15
    treatment stemming from the September 2020 incident. Because Father failed to
    object when similar evidence was introduced at trial, any error in admitting evidence
    as to the first instance of Father’s complaint was harmless. See Bay Area Healthcare
    Grp., 239 S.W.3d at 235; Richardson, 677 S.W.2d at 501.
    As to the second instance of Father’s complaint—Martin’s testimony that Tess
    told Mother that Father was so mad at Mother that he beat Mother—even assuming
    that the trial court erred by overruling Father’s hearsay objection, Father has once
    again not demonstrated harm. Father asserts that this testimony was harmful because
    it “permitted the trial court to consider the statements of [Tess] in resolving the
    breadth and severity of the alleged domestic violence between [Father] and [Mother].”
    But more damning evidence of the breadth and severity of Father’s domestic violence
    against Mother was admitted at trial. Martin testified that Mother had mentioned
    “several different instances of domestic violence” between Father and Mother in the
    past and that Mother described how Father had once “split her head open for
    smoking a cigarette[.]” Martin also observed that Mother had an injured lip and a
    black eye following the September 2020 incident, and the record contains photos
    depicting Mother’s injuries following that occurrence. Perhaps most importantly,
    Father pled guilty to assault stemming from the September 2020 incident. Moreover,
    Uran, the counselor who provided play therapy to Tess, testified that Tess told her
    that “[Father] beat up [Mother],” that “[Father] hurts [Mother],” and that Tess does
    not like living with Father and Mother “because they fight.” Because other evidence
    16
    was properly admitted demonstrating the breadth and severity of Father’s domestic
    violence against Mother, any error in admitting the second instance that Father
    complains of was harmless. See Interstate Northborough P’ship, 66 S.W.3d at 220; see also
    Mayes v. State, 
    816 S.W.2d 79
    , 88 (Tex. 1991) (“[W]e conclude that the admission of
    Johnson’s testimony without objection rendered the admission of Bitenc’s testimony
    harmless because it established substantially the same evidence of appellant’s character
    as did the admission of Bitenc’s testimony.”).
    We overrule Father’s second issue.
    B. Conduct Grounds
    In her first three issues, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually
    insufficient to support termination under Family Code Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D),
    (E), and (O).22
    1. Standard of Review
    For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking
    termination must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the
    parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and
    (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b);
    In re E.N.C., 
    384 S.W.3d 796
    , 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L., 
    163 S.W.3d 79
    , 84 (Tex.
    In contrast to Mother, Father does not challenge the trial court’s conduct-
    22
    ground findings.
    17
    2005). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of
    fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
    established.” 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007
    ; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.
    To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination
    cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged findings
    to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction
    that the finding is true. In re J.P.B., 
    180 S.W.3d 570
    , 573 (Tex. 2005). We assume that
    the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
    factfinder could have done so. 
    Id.
     We disregard all evidence that a reasonable
    factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is
    contrary to the finding. 
    Id.
     That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a
    reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable
    factfinder could not. See 
    id.
     The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’
    credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 
    283 S.W.3d 336
    , 346 (Tex. 2009).
    We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the
    factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child
    relationship. In re A.B., 
    437 S.W.3d 498
    , 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due
    deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them with our own. In re
    H.R.M., 
    209 S.W.3d 105
    , 108 (Tex. 2006). Here, we review the whole record to
    decide whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
    18
    Department proved the conduct grounds.                  See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D), (E), (O); In re C.H., 
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder
    reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually
    sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.
    2. Applicable Law
    Subsections (D) and (E) provide that the trial court may order the termination
    of a parent’s rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has
    (D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
    conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
    emotional well-being of the child; [or]
    (E)    engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
    who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
    emotional well-being of the child[.]
    
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D), (E).
    “Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of
    Human Servs. v. Boyd, 
    727 S.W.2d 531
    , 533 (Tex. 1987); In re J.T.G., 
    121 S.W.3d 117
    ,
    125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Under Subsection (D), it is necessary to
    examine the evidence related to the environment of the child to determine if the
    environment was the source of the endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional
    well-being. J.T.G., 
    121 S.W.3d at 125
    . The conduct of a parent in the home can
    create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a
    child. 
    Id.
     For example, “abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of a
    child’s home may produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional
    19
    well-being of a child.” 
    Id.
     Illegal drug use by the parent and drug-related criminal
    activity by the parent “likewise support[] the conclusion that the child[]’s surroundings
    endanger [her] physical or emotional well-being.” 
    Id.
    Under Subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the
    endangerment of the child’s physical well-being was the direct result of the parent’s
    conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. See id.; see also 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(E). Termination under Subsection (E) must be based on more
    than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct
    by the parent is required. J.T.G., 
    121 S.W.3d at 125
    . It is not necessary, however, that
    the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury.
    Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; J.T.G., 
    121 S.W.3d at 125
    . The specific danger to a child’s
    well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone. In re R.W.,
    
    129 S.W.3d 732
    , 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). “As a general rule,
    conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
    physical and emotional well-being of a child.” 
    Id.
     Illegal drug use and its effect on the
    parent’s life and alcohol abuse may establish an endangering course of conduct. Id.; In
    re A.M.M., No. 04-20-00511-CV, 
    2021 WL 1394308
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    Apr. 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). We may consider conduct that occurred outside
    the child’s presence in our review. Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,
    
    312 S.W.3d 608
    , 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
    20
    3. Analysis
    Because the evidence pertaining to Subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, we
    conduct a consolidated review of those Subsections. See In re S.H., No. 02-17-00188-
    CV, 
    2017 WL 4542859
    , at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
    op.); In re T.N.S., 
    230 S.W.3d 434
    , 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
    Here, the record reflects that illegal drugs and alcohol abuse have been
    persistent problems in Mother’s life. The September 2020 incident occurred at a time
    when Mother was intoxicated to the point where she could not remember it. Tess
    was also in the home at the time. When Martin investigated this event, Mother
    admitted to “heavy drinking” while caring for Tess and to marijuana use. Mother
    tested positive for methamphetamine around the time of that occurrence. Alcohol
    also contributed to the October 2020 incident, with Mother describing it as occurring
    after she drank vodka and got into a physical altercation with Father.
    Mother’s problems with drugs and alcohol continued after Tess’s
    November 2020 removal. As to Mother’s drug use following removal, Mother tested
    positive for methamphetamine in July 2021.               Mother admitted to using
    methamphetamine and marijuana in December 2021, at a time when she was pregnant
    with Travis. Mother’s hair tested positive for marijuana in February 2022, and that
    same month, Mother’s nails tested positive for ecstasy, methamphetamine, and
    marijuana. While Mother completed an inpatient drug treatment program in January
    2022, she did not submit to requested drug testing in March and April 2022. See
    21
    J.T.G., 
    121 S.W.3d at 131
     (holding that factfinder “could have reasonably inferred that
    [father’s] failure to complete the scheduled drug screens indicated he was avoiding
    testing because he was using drugs”).      As to Mother’s alcohol abuse following
    removal, Mother was kicked out of the Carters’ home during Easter weekend 2022
    after she became intoxicated. Once again, Mother could not recall what had occurred
    during that incident, admitting that “she did drink to the point of intoxication and
    black[ed] out.” Travis was in Mother’s care at that time, and Mother admitted to
    being intoxicated on other occasions while caring for Travis.
    Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
    judgment and recognizing that the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’
    credibility and demeanor, we hold that there is some evidence of an endangering
    environment on which a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or
    conviction that Mother had knowingly placed or had knowingly allowed Tess to
    remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her emotional or physical well-
    being. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1)(D). Likewise, we hold that there is
    some evidence of endangering conduct on which a reasonable factfinder could have
    formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother had engaged in conduct that
    endangered Tess’s physical or emotional well-being. See 
    id.
     § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
    Giving due deference to the factfinder’s endangering-environment and
    endangering-conduct findings, without supplanting the factfinder’s judgment with our
    own, and after reviewing the entire record, we hold that a factfinder could reasonably
    22
    form a firm conviction or belief that Mother had knowingly placed or had knowingly
    allowed Tess to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her emotional
    or physical well-being and that Mother had engaged in conduct that endangered her
    physical or emotional well-being. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). We thus overrule
    Mother’s first and second issues.23
    Because we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
    the endangerment findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and because only
    one finding is necessary to sustain a parental-rights termination, we need not address
    Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(O). See
    
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(1); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; J.L., 163 S.W.3d
    at 84; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We therefore do not address Mother’s third issue.
    C. Best Interest
    In her fourth issue and in his first issue, Mother and Father each argue that the
    evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s respective best-
    interest findings.
    23
    In her brief, Mother portrays herself as a “victim” and states that “[o]nce [she]
    was able to break free of the cycle of Father’s abuse, she demonstrated the capability
    to be protective of [Tess].” While we acknowledge that Mother was a victim of
    domestic violence, we disagree with her characterization that she has demonstrated
    the capability to be protective of Tess. As detailed above, Mother’s problems with
    illegal drugs and alcohol abuse continued long after she broke free of Father’s abuse.
    23
    1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    We review the parties’ respective challenges to the sufficiency of the trial
    court’s best-interest findings under the same review standards stated above regarding
    the conduct grounds. Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a
    parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 
    209 S.W.3d 112
    , 116 (Tex. 2006), the
    best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and
    development, In re A.C., 
    560 S.W.3d 624
    , 631 (Tex. 2018). Evidence that is probative
    of the predicate grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1) may also be probative of best
    interest under Section 161.001(b)(2). In re E.C.R., 
    402 S.W.3d 239
    , 249 (Tex. 2013);
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. We also consider the evidence in light of the following
    nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining the child’s best
    interest:
    • the child’s desires;
    • the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future;
    • the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
    • the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
    • the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the child’s best
    interest;
    • the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
    • the stability of the home or proposed placement;
    • the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate that the existing parent–child
    relationship is not a proper one; and
    24
    • the parent’s excuse, if any, for the acts or omissions.
    Holley v. Adams, 
    544 S.W.2d 367
    , 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249;
    E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807. These factors do not form an exhaustive list, and some
    factors may not apply to some cases.            C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.   Furthermore,
    undisputed evidence of just one factor may suffice in a particular case to support a
    finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. On the other hand, the
    presence of paltry evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding.
    Id.; In re C.G., No. 02-20-00087-CV, 
    2020 WL 4518590
    , at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth Aug. 6, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re J.B., No. 02-18-00034-CV,
    
    2018 WL 3289612
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    2. Analysis as to Mother
    As to Tess’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future and the
    emotional and physical danger to her now and in the future, the record reflects that
    Mother had a history of illegal drug use and alcohol abuse. As detailed above, Tess
    was removed from Mother’s care after two domestic-violence incidents in 2020, both
    of which occurred while Mother was intoxicated and at least one of which occurred
    while Tess was present. Mother admitted to “heavy drinking” while caring for Tess,
    and the record reflects that Mother had been using marijuana and methamphetamine
    prior to Tess’s removal.
    25
    Tess’s removal did not serve as a wake-up call to Mother. Mother tested
    positive for methamphetamine in July 2021; she admitted to using methamphetamine
    and marijuana in December 2021; she tested positive for ecstasy, methamphetamine,
    and marijuana in February 2022; and she refused drug testing in March and
    April 2022. Mother also acknowledged that she had been intoxicated while caring for
    Travis on several occasions, describing being intoxicated to the point that she
    “black[ed] out.” The trial court was entitled to find that these factors weighed in
    favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights to Tess.
    As to the plans for Tess, Mother did not articulate any plan for Tess at trial.24
    In contrast, the Department put on testimony that Foster Mother and Foster Father
    desired to adopt Tess. The record reflects that Tess had bonded with the Foster
    Family and that the Foster Family was meeting Tess’s needs and providing her
    stability, consistency, and love. The trial court was entitled to find that this factor
    weighed in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights to Tess.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best-
    interest finding, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm
    conviction or belief that termination of the parent–child relationship between Mother
    and Tess was in Tess’s best interest, and we therefore hold that the evidence is legally
    sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 24
    Mother did not testify at trial.
    26
    161.001(b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Based on our exacting review of the entire
    record and giving due deference to the factfinder’s findings, we likewise conclude that
    the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s fourth issue.
    3. Analysis as to Father
    As to Tess’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future and the
    emotional and physical danger to her now and in the future, the record reflects that
    Father was violent toward Mother in the family home in September 2020 and that
    Tess was present during part of that violent encounter. That violent encounter was
    not an isolated incident. Mother referenced “several different instances of domestic
    violence” with Father in the past to a Department investigator, describing one
    occasion where he “split her head open[.]” Father ultimately pled guilty to assault
    stemming from the September 2020 incident and was sent to prison.
    Father also demonstrated a propensity for criminal activity. Apart from his
    conviction for assault stemming from the September 2020 incident, Father
    acknowledged that he had also been convicted of a felony offense in 2012 relating to
    drugs. Moreover, Father admitted that he had been jailed on two occasions stemming
    from violations of his bond conditions while he was awaiting trial for his assault case,
    one of which was caused by entering the exclusionary zone prohibited by his ankle
    monitor and the other caused by his drinking alcohol.
    27
    Father also had persistent problems with illegal drugs. The record reflects that
    Father refused to submit to drug testing requested by the Department around the
    time of Tess’s removal, and he also refused to submit to drug testing in the two
    months before trial. Father testified that he had used methamphetamine daily up until
    the September 2020 incident. He admitted to using methamphetamine “[a] few
    times” after the September 2020 incident, acknowledging that he had used
    methamphetamine after his February 2022 release from prison.            Father candidly
    acknowledged that he might fail a drug test if he were required to take one at trial due
    to his relapse after his release from prison. The trial court was entitled to find that
    these factors weighed in favor of terminating Father’s parental rights to Tess.
    As to the plans for Tess, Father stated at trial that he believed that his parents,
    his grandparents, and the Carters were all acceptable placements for Tess. As to
    Paternal Grandfather and Paternal Grandmother, the record reflects that Paternal
    Grandfather had been in prison in the past for assault and that there were concerns
    that he had downplayed the September 2020 domestic-violence incident between
    Mother and Father. The record also demonstrates that Tess did not feel safe around
    Paternal Grandmother, that Tess told a counselor that Paternal Grandmother “beats
    [her] ass,” and that Paternal Grandmother had a history of marijuana use.25 It also
    shows that Paternal Grandfather “had a history of violence against [the] police” and
    25
    At trial, Paternal Grandmother denied spanking Tess and testified that she
    had not used marijuana for “[a]lmost a year.”
    28
    that Paternal Grandfather and Paternal Grandmother “were very noncompliant with
    authority and [the] police.” As to Father’s grandparents, the record reflects that they
    had allowed Father unapproved access to Tess and had told Tess to keep it a secret.
    Diaz also testified that she had concerns for their physical ability to care for Tess due
    to their advanced age. As to the Carters, the record reflects that they remodeled their
    home to add a bedroom for Tess, that Travis was currently living in their home, and
    that they desired for Tess to live with them. The record also reflects, however, that
    the Carters were aware that Mother was alone with Travis while Mother was
    intoxicated. Moreover, Diaz expressed a concern that there was a lack of a bond
    between the Carters and Tess, stating that they did not have a biological relationship
    or an ongoing relationship.
    In contrast to some of the concerns regarding Father’s suggested placement for
    Tess, the record reflects that Tess had been living with the Foster Family since
    removal, that she had bonded with them, and that the Foster Mother and Foster
    Father desired to adopt her. There was also evidence that the Foster Family was
    meeting Tess’s needs and providing her stability, consistency, and love. The trial
    court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of terminating Father’s
    parental rights to Tess.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best-
    interest finding, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm
    conviction or belief that termination of the parent–child relationship between Father
    29
    and Tess was in Tess’s best interest, and we therefore hold that the evidence is legally
    sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001
    (b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Based on our exacting review of the entire
    record and giving due deference to the factfinder’s findings, we likewise conclude that
    the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. Accordingly, we overrule Father’s first issue.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Mother’s dispositive issues and Father’s two issues, we affirm
    the trial court’s termination order.
    /s/ Dana Womack
    Dana Womack
    Justice
    Delivered: October 20, 2022
    30