Steven Harold Bettes v. State ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-18-00459-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
STEVEN HAROLD BETTES, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras
Appellant Steven Bettes appeals his conviction for a third-degree felony offense of
evading arrest with a vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). The
punishment range for the offense was enhanced due to appellant’s three prior felony
convictions. See id. § 12.42(d) (increasing punishment range to “any term of not more
than 99 years or less than 25 years”). By one issue, Bettes argues there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that he knowingly evaded law enforcement. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Bettes was indicted for one count of felony driving while intoxicated (Count 1) and
one count of evading arrest or detention in a motor vehicle (Count 2). See id.
§§ 38.04(b)(2)(A), 49.04(a). The State included enhancement allegations that Bettes had
previously been convicted of three felonies.1 Prior to trial, the State abandoned Count 1.
Bettes pleaded not guilty to Count 2 and proceeded to trial.
The evidence at trial showed that on December 2, 2016, Deputy Blake Mosziek of
the Victoria County Sheriff’s Office responded to a 911 call regarding a reckless driver.
The caller, later called as a witness at trial, testified that Bettes was driving in an erratic
manner, sideswiped a Ford truck, and was driving individuals off of the road. Deputy
Mosziek pursued Bettes in a marked patrol unit with his lights and sirens both activated,
generally maintaining a distance of approximately four car lengths behind Bettes. There
were no vehicles between Bettes and Mosziek’s patrol unit. Bettes continued to drive at
about sixty-five miles per hour, swerving in and out of the oncoming lane for traffic and
forcing an oncoming vehicle off of the road. After over a minute and a half of the patrol
unit pursuing Bettes with its lights and sirens activated, Bettes crashed on the side of the
road. Deputy Mosziek approached the vehicle and arrested Bettes. Deputy Mosziek then
1 The State alleged that Bettes, prior to the commission of the primary offense, was finally convicted
of: (1) burglary of a motor vehicle, (2) burglary of a building, and (3) robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 29.02, 30.02, 30.04; see also Samora v. State, No. 07-16-00206-CR, 2017 WL 3611700, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Aug. 14, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that burglary of
a motor vehicle was a third-degree felony under previous version of Texas Penal Code).
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secured a warrant and obtained a blood specimen from Bettes. The toxicology report
showed that Bettes had cocaine in his system.
The jury returned a guilty verdict, Bettes pleaded true to the enhancement
allegations, and the jury assessed punishment at sixty years’ imprisonment in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The jury
is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Thus,
when the record indicates conflicting inferences, this court must presume that those
inferences were resolved in favor of the State. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903. This standard
is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9,
13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense
as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Coleman v. State, 131 S.W.3d 303,
307 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A hypothetically correct jury charge lists all
elements of the offense, is consistent with the indictment, and does not unnecessarily
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increase the prosecution’s burden of proof. Villareal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009).
B. Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention “if he intentionally
flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting to lawfully arrest or detain
him.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a). The offense includes two conduct elements: the
element of intentionally fleeing and the element of knowledge that a police officer is
attempting lawfully to arrest or detain the person. Riggs v. State, 482 S.W.3d 270, 275
(Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. ref’d). A person acts intentionally with respect to the result
of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). “A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.” Id. § 6.03(b).
A party’s knowledge is a fact question for the jury and may be proven through
circumstantial evidence. See Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);
Clay v. State, 389 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d). The jury
may “use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience
gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the evidence.” Acosta v. State,
429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Evidence demonstrating that an officer in
a vehicle is attempting to arrest or detain a person “generally consists of the officer
displaying authority by the use of overhead/emergency lights and siren.” Duvall v. State,
367 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d). The offense of evading
arrest supports the policy of encouraging suspects to yield to a show of authority by law
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enforcement. Redwine v. State, 305 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, pet. ref’d).
C. Analysis
By his single issue on appeal, Bettes contends that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not show that he knew he was
being chased by a police officer attempting to arrest or detain him.
Deputy Mosziek testified that even after he had activated his overhead lights and
sirens on his marked patrol vehicle, Bettes continued to maintain his speed for “about
three miles,” until crashing on the side of the road. The video evidence introduced into
the record reveals Deputy Mosziek at times pursued Bettes at a distance of approximately
four car lengths, and that he had activated his sirens for over a minute and a half before
Bettes crashed. The jury also had reason to believe that Bettes had a motive to evade
arrest, as witness testimony showed that he had just sideswiped a Ford truck, and a
toxicology report indicated that Bettes had cocaine in his system.
Bettes cites Redwine and Griego v. State as support for the argument that
activating sirens and chasing a vehicle for some time does not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person pursued knew he was being chased by a police officer attempting
to arrest or detain him. See id. at 368; Griego v. State, 345 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2011, no pet.). However, Redwine does not stand for such a conclusion. In
Redwine, the evidence demonstrated that two officers, in their patrol car, pursued
Redwine for driving too near the center of the undivided road. Redwine, 305 S.W.3d at
361. Although one of the officers initially testified that they had activated their emergency
lights and sirens, that testimony was undermined by the other officer, who testified that
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the deputies chose not to activate their lights and sirens so as to remain undetected. Id.
at 361, 364–65. Moreover, the absence of any dash cam footage also indicated that they
had not activated their overhead lights. Id. at 361. When the officers arrived at Redwine’s
parked truck, Redwine had run into the woods. Id. at 362. The court noted that the
officer’s testimony, in which he claimed he had activated his lights and siren, was
admittedly uncertain; the court noted that “in the absence of other evidence, the jury could
not translate [the officer’s] uncertainty into belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 368.
Here, there is no such uncertainty. The testimony and dash cam footage in the record
clearly show that Deputy Mosziek had both his overhead lights and siren activated for
over a minute and a half while in close pursuit of Bettes, until Bettes crashed.
In Griego, two patrol cars with their lights flashing passed the defendant while
going the opposite direction. 345 S.W.3d at 747. By the time the two patrol cars
performed a U-turn and caught up with the defendant he had turned onto a side street.
Id. at 747. The patrol cars followed him onto that street where he immediately took
another turn, and then turned into his driveway. Id. The court noted that “the officers
would have been visible in appellant’s rearview mirror for approximately eight seconds,”
and thus a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was aware of the officers pursuing him. Id. at 752. Here, Deputy Mosziek
followed directly behind Bettes for over one and a half minutes, and during all of this time
Bettes could have learned of the officer pursuing him. The patrol car’s lights and siren
were both activated and there were not cars in between Deputy Mosziek and Bettes. The
amount of pursuit time here is also materially longer than that in Griego. Moreover, the
pursuit in this case occurred on a highway, and at no point during the pursuit did Bettes
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turn or distance himself so far from the patrol car that his ability to become aware of the
patrol car would have been interrupted, as was the situation in Griego.
This case is more appropriately in line with Lopez v. State. See 415 S.W.3d 495,
497 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). In Lopez, law enforcement officers activated
their patrol car’s lights and siren while behind and in pursuit of the defendant’s vehicle.
Id. at 497. The defendant continued traveling through a residential area for
“approximately one and one-half minutes,” making several turns before pulling into his
driveway. Id. At trial, the defendant testified that he did not see the lights or hear the
siren. Id. In that case, our sister court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to find
that the defendant was aware law enforcement officers were attempting to arrest or detain
him, even though the defendant personally denied such knowledge. Id. Here, Deputy
Mosziek closely pursued Bettes on a highway in his marked patrol car. Both his siren
and overhead lights were activated for one and one-half minutes. This was evidence of
Deputy Mosziek’s attempt to stop appellant’s vehicle and an exertion of authority by law
enforcement to which appellant did not yield. See Duvall, 367 S.W.3d at 513. Moreover,
there was no testimony by Bettes at trial that he did not hear the siren or see the lights.
Also, no turns were made throughout the entire period, and Bettes could have seen and
heard Deputy Mosziek’s marked patrol vehicle behind him throughout the pursuit.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a
rational juror, applying common knowledge and experience, could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Bettes had knowledge that the patrol unit behind him was
attempting to perform a traffic stop. See Acosta, 429 S.W.3d at 624; Wise, 364 S.W.3d
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at 903; Lopez, 415 S.W.3d at 497; Duvall, 367 S.W.3d at 513. We overrule appellant’s
sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
27th day of June, 2019.
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