Chandler Kyle Ventress v. State ( 2019 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-17-00384-CR
__________________
CHANDLER KYLE VENTRESS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 15-22600
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chandler Kyle Ventress, Appellant, appeals his conviction for capital murder.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 2019). 1 The indictment by a grand jury
alleged that
1
We cite current versions of statutes because amendments after Ventress’s
offense do not affect our disposition.
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Chandler Kyle Ventress, hereinafter styled the Defendant, on or
about the 29th day of April, [2015,] . . . did then and there intentionally
cause the death of . . . Mettha Chandrasire Kuruppu, by shooting [him]
with a firearm, and the Defendant was then and there in the course of
committing and attempting to commit the offense of Aggravated
Robbery[.]
The State filed a notice waiving the death penalty, and the case was tried to a
jury. The jury found Ventress guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment.
The trial court assessed punishment and sentenced Ventress to life without parole in
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.2 The trial
court certified that Ventress had the right to appeal, and he timely filed a notice of
appeal.
Issues
Ventress raises four issues on appeal. In his first issue he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and argues that the State failed
to prove he intentionally shot the victim. In his second, third, and fourth issues, he
2
Section 12.31(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides the punishment for an
individual found guilty of a capital felony. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a) (West
2019). In a case in which the State seeks the death penalty, the punishment will be
either life without parole or death. Id. If the State does not seek the death penalty
and the defendant is found guilty, the punishment shall be imprisonment in the TDCJ
for “(1) life, if the individual committed the offense when younger than 18 years of
age; or (2) life without parole, if the individual committed the offense when 18 years
of age or older.” Id. The record reflects that Ventress was almost nineteen years old
at the time of the offense.
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alleges the trial court erred in allowing a witness to speculate about the reaction of
Ventress’s two family members and girlfriend when the investigators showed them
still photographs of the alleged suspects taken from surveillance video.
Evidence Presented at Trial
Testimony of Charles Young
Beaumont Police Officer Charles Young testified that shortly after midnight
on April 29, 2015, he was on patrol when he received a call from his dispatch about
a panic alarm call from a convenience store located at 870 South Major Drive.
Officer Young testified that calls from a panic alarm go through an alarm company,
and the alarm company calls the police department and then the police are
dispatched, and the whole procedure can take a couple of minutes.
According to Officer Young, he and Officers Hubbard and Smith arrived at
the convenience store at about twenty minutes after midnight. At that time, the lights
were still on in the store, the security gates on the store were still open, and he could
not see anyone inside the store. Upon arriving, the officers saw a crowbar on the
ground near the door of the store, and the door was ajar. Officer Young and two
other officers entered the store and split up. At first Officer Young did not see anyone
behind the counter, but as he made his way around the counter, he saw the victim
on the floor in a pool of blood. According to Officer Young, the victim appeared to
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be deceased. Officer Young testified he followed protocol and called for EMS and
called his supervisor.
At some point, the other officers ran out of the store to investigate a vehicle
that left quickly from the area while Officer Young stayed at the scene. Officer
Young testified that he could not recall if the officers located the vehicle or
apprehended a suspect from the vehicle, and he did not see anything in the store that
night that led him to believe that Ventress was involved. Officer Young testified that
detectives and crime scene technicians were dispatched to the crime scene, and he
stayed at the scene until he was released. Officer Young testified he later authored a
report.
Testimony of Deron Simpson
Beaumont Police Officer Deron Simpson testified that on the evening in
question he was part of the team of officers dispatched to the scene. Using some
photographs that had been admitted into evidence, Officer Simpson testified about
the crime scene and what he observed when he arrived. Upon arrival at the scene, he
noticed a “crowbar in between the door.” Other officers arrived at the scene at
different times. He observed the victim, whom Simpson could tell was deceased, and
the store was in disarray. EMS and fire personnel were already at the scene when
Officer Simpson arrived.
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Officer Simpson along with Sergeant Dischler watched “some in store
security footage[,]” taken from a security camera located behind what appeared to
be a false wall. Officer Simpson testified that he watched the video footage on the
store computer, and he could see two men that “had masks on[]” enter the store, one
of them used a crowbar to keep the door open, and one of the men had a firearm.
According to Officer Simpson, he could see that the clerk was scared, and the clerk
“swiped at the gun at first[]” and retrieved a BB gun that resembled a real firearm.
Officer Simpson testified the video footage then shows the armed gunman fire his
weapon and then he “took off outside the store.” According to Simpson, video
footage revealed that after the two men ran out of the store, the store clerk placed
the BB gun back in a box, took his slippers off, and then collapsed. Officer Simpson
observed the store clerk being shot on the videos. According to Officer Simpson,
cameras are sometimes motion activated so time lapses can be explained by a lack
of motion. The video footage, photographs of the scene, and the BB gun were
admitted into evidence and published to the jury.
Officer Simpson agreed that, based on his training and experience as a police
officer, a firearm is a deadly weapon and capable of causing serious bodily injury or
death in the manner or means that it is used. He also testified that if someone
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exhibited a firearm at an individual it would cause the individual to be in fear of their
life and shooting someone with a firearm could cause serious bodily injury.
Testimony of Ronald Dischler
Beaumont Police Detective Sergeant Ronald Charles Dischler, Sr., testified
that he was called to the scene after he received word from another sergeant that
there was a major crime at that location. According to Sergeant Dischler, when he
first arrived at the scene, patrol units had stopped a vehicle that had been seen leaving
the area at a high rate of speed.
Sergeant Dischler described the surveillance video as showing two men enter
through the door, the confrontation with Kuruppu, a slight altercation, two gunshots,
two men run out after the shooting, the actions of Kuruppu after he is shot, and then
Kuruppu “bleed[ing] out.” Sergeant Dischler agreed that based on the surveillance
video, it appeared that Kuruppu was the victim of an aggravated robbery. According
to Dischler, the men that came into the store were trying to commit a theft with a
gun and the men pointed the gun directly at Kuruppu. The Sergeant agreed that a
gun can cause serious bodily injury or death, that based on the physical reaction of
Kuruppu depicted in the video he was in fear, and that the video shows that the shot
fired from the revolver at Kuruppu by one of the men led to Kuruppu’s death.
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Sergeant Dischler explained that several officers and crime scene technicians
were dispatched to the scene, and a video and photographs were made of the scene
before removing any of the evidence. Sergeant Dischler testified about the scene and
explained what was depicted in the crime scene photographs and video. Dischler
testified that the day after the incident he returned to the scene to try to find
additional evidence and located two projectiles involved in the shooting: one was
lying on the ground and the other was embedded in the wall directly behind the cash
register.
Sergeant Dischler testified that his investigation led him to Ventress.
According to Sergeant Dischler, he and Captain Holmes showed still photographs
from the security video to Ventress’s girlfriend and aunt. The still photographs they
used were marked as Exhibits 51 and 52 and depict the shooter with a bandana over
a portion of his face and pointing the gun at the store clerk. According to Sergeant
Dischler, Ventress’s girlfriend and aunt had distinct visible reactions to the
photographs and became upset, and Dischler described their reactions as
“[i]mmediate recognition.” Sergeant Dischler testified that he and Captain Holmes
also showed the photographs to Ventress’s mother, who had the “[s]ame reaction,
immediate recognition[]” of Ventress.
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The Sergeant testified that Ventress came to the police station with members
of his family and gave a voluntary statement, and a video recording of that statement
was introduced and published to the jury. The video-recorded interview shows
Ventress initially denied involvement in the matter, but later in the interview
Ventress breaks down and admits to Detective Crystal Holmes and Investigator
Marcelo Molfino that he shot at Kuruppu and left the store.
Testimony of Pathologist
Forensic pathologist John Wayne testified about the autopsy he performed on
Kuruppu. The pathologist confirmed that the cause of death was a gunshot wound
through the torso.
Testimony of Crystal Holmes
Crystal Holmes is a Captain with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, and
she participated in the investigation and interviewed Ventress. Captain Holmes
testified that law enforcement released information to the public on Crime Stoppers
and began getting names and leads, and then they investigated the leads. One of the
names they obtained was Chandler Kyle Ventress. Captain Holmes identified
Ventress as the defendant seated in the courtroom. After Sergeant Dischler retrieved
the video surveillance from the store, some still photographs were developed from
the videos to show to people to see if they could identify the suspects in the photos.
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The photos Captain Holmes used as part of her investigation were admitted into
evidence and published to the jury. Captain Holmes testified that she showed one of
the photographs to Ventress’s girlfriend, and she told the girlfriend the police were
specifically looking at Ventress as a suspect in the murder. According to Captain
Holmes, when she showed the photo to the girlfriend, the girlfriend “had a visible
reaction[,]” put her hands up to her face and covered her mouth and her eyes, and
she was “very upset.” Captain Holmes testified that from Ventress’s girlfriend’s
reaction Holmes believed Ventress’s girlfriend knew the individual in the photo.
Captain Holmes testified that when she showed Ventress’s aunt one of the still
photographs, the aunt “placed it on the table in front of her and she put her hands up
over her face and she began to cry[.]” Captain Holmes testified that she formed the
conclusion from the aunt’s reaction that the aunt knew the individual in the
photograph to be her nephew, Chandler Ventress. Captain Holmes testified that
when she showed the still photograph to Ventress’s mother that his mother’s
physical reaction was dramatic and expressive and matched the reactions of
Ventress’s girlfriend and aunt.
Captain Holmes also testified that Ventress voluntarily came to the police
station with his mother and his pastor and was interviewed. Captain Holmes
summarized the interview and indicated that after giving Ventress his Miranda
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warnings, she and Investigator Molfino questioned him and Ventress initially denied
any involvement. Later during the interview, Ventress admitted that he was the
person holding the gun in the photo marked as Exhibit 51 and who shot Kuruppu.
Captain Holmes described the interview process to the jury and explained how
Ventress at first was rigid in the interview and then relaxed, and she agreed that at
some point he broke down and admitted he is the person in Exhibit 51 who shot
Kuruppu. Ventress also voluntarily agreed to provide a written statement, which
Captain Holmes then wrote for him based on the statement he gave in the video
interview and Ventress read the written statement, made a couple of changes, and
then he signed the written statement.
Captain Holmes read the written statement to the jury. According to the
statement, Ventress, and a friend named Sean, were riding around in Sean’s SUV,
Sean told Ventress that he wanted to “hit the store at 105[,]” and Ventress told Sean,
“Let’s do whatever.” They pulled up to the street behind the store and put on clothes
that Sean had put into the SUV, and Ventress then put on his “black overshirt with
the gray band on the sleeves[]” and “put the yellow bandana over the lower portion
of” his face. Sean handed Ventress a gun, and Sean had something wrapped in a
towel that Ventress thought was a BB gun. According to his written statement,
Ventress entered the store first with the gun in his hand, he pointed the gun at the
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clerk and told the clerk to give him the money, the clerk slapped at the gun and
ducked behind the counter, Ventress saw him go down and fumble under the counter,
and Ventress “turned [his] head towards the door and fired a shot as [he] took off
running.” According to the written statement he and Sean then ran back to the SUV,
then went to Sean’s house where he left the clothes and gun, and he did not know
where the gun was at the time of the statement. Ventress also stated in his written
statement
I have been living with the weight on my heart since this happened. I
did not mean to shoot that man. It was an accident. We just intended
to go in and rob the store. I wish I could take it all back. I am so sorry.
I wish I could make it up to the family and bring him back, serve them
for the rest of my life, whatever it takes. This doesn’t seem real.
Testimony of Investigator Marcelo Molfino
Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office Investigator Marcelo Molfino
testified about the interview of Appellant and provided his opinion that Ventress did
not appear to be intoxicated at the time of his statement. The investigator described
the procedure followed during the interview and explained how Ventress’s
demeanor and body language changed during the interview. The video of the
interview was played for the jury. Investigator Molfino testified that he and the
detectives tried to establish a rapport with Ventress during the interview, and on
cross-examination Molfino acknowledged that he heard the detectives during the
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interview refer to the shooting as an “accident” when interviewing Ventress. Molfino
testified that he thought Ventress and Sean “planned a robbery and it didn’t go as
planned and what happened, happened.”
The defendant did not testify or call any witnesses.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and then determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Acosta v. State, 429
S.W.3d 621, 624-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 318-19 (1979)). The jury is the ultimate authority on the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894,
901-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). We give deference to the jury’s responsibility to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2019).
“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect . . . to a result of his conduct
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when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.” Id. § 6.03(a) (West 2011).
The jury may infer the intent to kill from the defendant’s acts, words, or
conduct. Hall v. State, 418 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (quoting
Kincaid v. State, 198 S.W.2d 899, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946)), see also Guevara
v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating intent may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and conduct of accused); Brown
v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (concluding a jury may infer
intent from any facts in evidence it believes prove the existence of that intent, such
as the use of a deadly weapon). If the record supports conflicting inferences, we must
presume that the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and
defer to that determination. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. “Circumstantial evidence
is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13.
The specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon,
unless the manner of its use makes it reasonably apparent that death or serious bodily
injury could not have resulted. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996); Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on
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reh’g); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 2018) (“deadly
weapon” means “a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for
the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury”). “Naturally, the most
obvious cases and the easiest ones in which to prove a specific intent to kill, are those
cases in which a firearm was used and was fired or attempted to have been fired at a
person.” Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). If a deadly
weapon, such as a pistol, is used in a deadly manner, an intent to kill is presumed.
Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Livingston v.
State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). A jury may infer that a
defendant intended the natural consequences of his actions. Herrera v. State, 526
S.W.3d 800, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Ruffin v.
State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A jury may also infer a
defendant’s knowledge or intent from any facts tending to prove its existence,
including the method of committing the crime, the nature of the wounds inflicted on
the victim, and the accused’s acts, words, and conduct. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61,
64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Ventress admitted that he went into the store with a gun and that he intended
to rob the convenience store. He stated that he remembered pointing the gun at the
clerk and telling the clerk to give him the money, that the clerk slapped the gun in
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Ventress’s hand and fumbled under the counter, and that Ventress then fired a shot
toward the victim before running out of the store. Ventress stated in his confession
that he “did not mean to shoot [Kuruppu].” The jury viewed the video footage from
several angles showing the shooter enter the store and point a gun at the victim. The
video footage also shows the shooter pointing the gun at the victim and shooting the
victim in the chest. The jury heard the testimony of the pathologist who determined
that Kuruppu’s cause of death was a gunshot wound through the torso.
The jury could have inferred from the evidence, including the events depicted
on the video footage, as well as the testimony from the investigating officers and the
statement made by the defendant, that Ventress acted with the required mental state
at the time of the shooting. After considering the evidence under the appropriate
standard, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ventress intentionally caused Kuruppu’s death as alleged in
the indictment. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Complaints About Admission of Testimony
Ventress argues the trial court committed reversible error in allowing
Detective Holmes to speculate about and interpret the reactions of Ventress’s
girlfriend, aunt, and mother to the photographs Holmes showed them during her
investigation. Holmes testified that each of the three witnesses’ reactions indicated
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to her that the witnesses recognized the individual in the photograph. When Holmes
testified that she believed each of the three witnesses’ recognized Ventress as the
person depicted in the photograph, Ventress objected to the testimony as
“speculation[]” about the witnesses state of mind or what they were thinking. The
trial court overruled the objections. On appeal, Ventress contends that the “State’s
investigator Crystal Holmes was improperly allowed to testify and speculate about
the reactions of appellant’s family members when confronted with photographs.”
Ventress points out that not one of the family members who were interviewed
testified, and “the admission of the rank speculation by the office[r] was reversible
error[,]” and that “[t]he obvious implication of the officer’s speculation was that
each person recognized the perpetrator in the photograph to be appellant.”
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without
reference to any guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372,
380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). When considering a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence, we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless it falls outside the “zone
of reasonable disagreement.” Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 370 (citing Martinez v. State,
327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). We will uphold a trial court’s
16
evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling.
Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
“[A]lthough police officers have training and experience, they are not
precluded from offering lay testimony regarding events which they have personally
observed.” Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Ventress
did not object to Sergeant Dischler’s testimony in which he concluded that
Ventress’s girlfriend, aunt, and mother had “[i]mmediate recognition” of Ventress
in the still photograph from the murder scene, without objection. “[I]t is well settled
that an error in [admitting] evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in
elsewhere without objection[.]” Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); see also Cordero v. State, 444 S.W.3d 812, 820 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2014, pet. ref’d). Because Ventress failed to object to the same or similar testimony
by Sergeant Dischler, Ventress cannot now successfully complain that the trial court
erred by admitting the same evidence through Holmes’s testimony. See Ethington,
819 S.W.2d at 858.
Additionally, the admission of evidence in violation of an evidentiary rule is
non-constitutional error. See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). An appellate court must disregard non-constitutional error that does not affect
a defendant’s “substantial rights[.]” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is
17
affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the
jury’s verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence if the
appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355.
After examining the entire record, we conclude the error, if any, was harmless.
Considering the evidence presented to the jury, the Appellant’s written and video-
recorded confession, and the video footage of the crime being committed, we have
fair assurance that the complained-of error, if any, did not influence the jury or had
but a slight effect. Id. Accordingly, we overrule issues two, three, and four.
Having overruled all issues raised by Ventress, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on June 10, 2019
Opinion Delivered August 21, 2019
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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