in the Interest of A.F., a Child ( 2019 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
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No. 02-19-00196-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF A.F., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 323-107548-18
Before Bassel, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Gabriel, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant A.F. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his
daughter Anna.1 After a bench trial, during which evidence was presented that Father
had used drugs and had exposed Anna to drugs, that Father had continued to test
positive for drugs while the case was pending, and that Father did not complete the
tasks on his service plan, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that
Father’s actions (and inaction) satisfied the grounds listed in Texas Family Code
section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and that termination of Father’s parental rights
was in Anna’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O),
(2). See generally In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (recognizing appellate
court need not detail the evidence if affirming termination judgment). We affirm.
Father’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
and a brief in support of that motion in which he asserts that Father’s appeal is
frivolous. Although given the opportunity to file a pro se response to the Anders
brief, Father did not file a response. The Department of Family and Protective
Services filed a letter agreeing that the appeal is frivolous and stating that it would not
file a response to the motion to withdraw.
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (requiring court to use aliases to refer to minors in
an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights). All children are referred to
using aliases.
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reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might arguably support
the appeal. See 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98
S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding Anders procedures
apply in parental–rights termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 02-01-00349-CV, 2003
WL 2006583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).
In reviewing an Anders brief, this court is not required to review the merits of
each claim raised in the brief or in a pro se response. Cf. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d
824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Rather, this court’s duty is to determine whether
there are any arguable grounds for reversal and, if there are, to remand the case to the
trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues. Id. Thus, we
conduct an independent evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is
correct in determining that the appeal is frivolous. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,
511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also K.M., 2003 WL 2006583, at *2.
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief. Finding
no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe,
178 S.W.3d at 827; In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.
denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental
rights to Anna.
Because counsel’s motion to withdraw does not show good cause for the
withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, we
deny the motion. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J.,
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501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Accordingly,
counsel remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the supreme court
unless otherwise relieved from her duties for good cause in accordance with family
code section 107.016(3)(C). See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.
Per Curiam
Delivered: October 3, 2019
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