Julie McCurley and Randy McCurley, Individually and as Parents, Next Friends and Guardians of Stephen McCurley v. Texas Motor Speedway, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •                         In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-19-00108-CV
    ___________________________
    JULIE MCCURLEY AND RANDY MCCURLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
    PARENTS, NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS OF STEPHEN MCCURLEY,
    Appellants
    V.
    TEXAS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the 393rd District Court
    Denton County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 17-3572-393
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellants Julie McCurley and Randy McCurley, individually and as parents,
    next friends, and guardians of their son Stephen McCurley, sued Appellee Texas
    Motor Speedway, Inc. for injuries Stephen sustained when, while attending a
    NASCAR race, his wheelchair hit an uneven, elevated spot on a ramp in the
    Speedway’s stands. The McCurleys alleged that because the ramp was “missing
    necessary bolts or rivets to secure [it] to the base,” Stephen was flung from his
    wheelchair and that the dangerous condition could have been prevented if the
    Speedway had conducted a reasonable, proper, and complete inspection of the
    premises prior to the race.
    The Speedway filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion for
    summary judgment in which it set forth the following grounds: (1) there is no
    evidence that a condition on the premises posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (2)
    there is no evidence that the Speedway knew or should have known of any danger
    posed by missing rivets on the ramp in question; (3) there is no evidence that the
    Speedway breached a duty of ordinary care by failing to adequately warn the
    McCurleys of the condition or by failing to make it reasonably safe; (4) there is no
    evidence that any act or omission on the Speedway’s part was a proximate cause of
    Stephen’s fall; and (5) the competent, uncontroverted evidence presented by the
    Speedway conclusively shows that it did not know and reasonably should not have
    known of the alleged danger before Stephen’s fall and did not breach its duty of
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    ordinary care by failing to adequately warn him of the condition or by failing to make
    the condition reasonably safe. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
    Speedway.
    On appeal, the McCurleys raise four issues: (1) whether issues of material fact
    existed because of the Speedway’s creation of the dangerous condition and its
    constructive knowledge of the condition; (2) whether Paragraphs 16 and 20 of the
    affidavit of Kerry Lee, the McCurleys’ expert witness, were conclusory and were
    properly stricken by the trial court; (3) whether the Speedway’s “lack of inspection of
    the premises and lack of documentation creating the dangerous condition of the ramp
    provide issues of fact on liability”; and (4) whether a question of fact exists on the
    Speedway’s constructive knowledge of the unreasonable risk of harm. Within their
    brief, they focus almost exclusively on the Speedway’s constructive knowledge,
    arguing that the case was “decided summarily” on that issue and that the Speedway’s
    motion “did not challenge the other elements of the cause of action.” However, as
    set out above, the Speedway raised four no-evidence grounds and one traditional
    ground, and the trial court’s judgment does not reflect the ground upon which it
    granted the motion.
    “When an argument is not made challenging every ground on which the
    summary judgment could be based, we are required to affirm the summary judgment,
    regardless of the merits of the unchallenged ground.” Rollins v. Denton Cty., No. 02-14-
    00312-CV, 
    2015 WL 7817357
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.)
    3
    (mem. op.); see generally Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 
    461 S.W.2d 119
    , 120–21 (Tex. 1970)
    (affirming summary judgment based on unchallenged ground of affirmative defense
    of limitations but expressing “no opinion as to whether a grant of summary judgment
    would be proper or erroneous” on that ground); Ramirez v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 
    458 S.W.3d 568
    , 572 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment
    based on grounds not challenged in brief on appeal without referencing merits of
    those grounds). “We can affirm the trial court’s judgment on the basis of even one
    unchallenged ground.” Mann v. Denton Cty., No. 02-16-00030-CV, 
    2017 WL 526309
    ,
    at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
    The McCurleys challenge the constructive knowledge summary judgment
    grounds in two of their issues, arguing that “an inference of constructive knowledge
    inherently presents a fact question,” and they allude to the “creation of the dangerous
    condition,” but they do not challenge the Speedway’s remaining summary judgment
    grounds. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on the unchallenged
    grounds without reaching the merits and overrule the McCurleys’ issues as moot.
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    Bonnie Sudderth
    Chief Justice
    Delivered: December 5, 2019
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-19-00108-CV

Filed Date: 12/5/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/7/2019