Dwain A. Boehl v. Lisa Richardson ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-19-00021-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
DWAIN A. BOEHL, Appellant,
v.
LISA RICHARDSON, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Dwain A. Boehl (Dwain) appeals the trial court’s judgment entering a
forcible detainer in favor of appellee Lisa Richardson, who is a distant cousin to Dwain’s
father Leroy. By four issues, which we combine into three, Dwain argues that: (1) the
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the forcible detainer action; (2) the trial
court erroneously awarded attorney’s fees; and (3) the findings of fact and conclusions of
law are not supported by the evidence. We vacate the judgment and dismiss for want of
jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal concerns the right to possession of certain real property in Victoria,
Texas (the Property). Leroy and Margaret Boehl created a living trust in 1996. The
Property and the house on the Property were conveyed to the trust by special warranty
deed in August 1997. Margaret died in June 2009. Leroy moved to a retirement center
in Houston, Texas; he died in June 2018.
On July 26, 2018, Leroy’s daughter Susan Donnell, filed an application to probate
Leroy’s Last Will and Testament, originally executed in 2016. This 2016 will named
Donnell as the independent executor and successor trustee. The 2016 will directed that
all personal household effects were to be transferred to the trust, while the rest of the
estate was to be given to Donnell, as the trustee, to divide the property in accordance
with the trust. During this time, Dwain lived on the Property. On September 13, 2018,
Richardson filed an opposition to the probate of the 2016 will. Richardson alleged that
on May 22, 2018, when executing his fifth amendment to the trust, Leroy also executed
a new will, which replaced Richardson as trustee in place of Donnell.
Because Leroy resided in Houston at the time of his death, a court in Harris County
assumed jurisdiction over the will contest and the trust amendment contest, in case
number 472228.
Meanwhile, Richardson filed an eviction suit in a justice court in Victoria County,
claiming that Dwain had no right to possess the Property. During the proceedings, Dwain
testified that he currently resided at the Property and had done so since 2005. He stated
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that he was aware that his parents had placed the Property in their living trust. Dwain
also admitted that Leroy had told him to leave the Property shortly before Leroy died.
However, Dwain also claims that his father told him that he could move back in at some
point and that Dwain was never required to pay rent while he lived at the Property. After
Leroy died, Richardson sent Dwain a three-day eviction notice; however, Dwain remained
on the Property. He testified that based on the 2016 will, he had no reason to believe
that he could no longer reside at the Property. The court admitted Dwain’s expert
evidence, which indicated that in the handwriting expert’s opinions, Leroy did not sign the
second will. The justice court determined that Richardson was entitled to immediate
possession of the property. Dwain appealed to the county court.
The county court also found that Richardson was entitled to immediate possession
of the Property and awarded her $3,874.75 in attorney’s fees and costs. Dwain filed a
motion for new trial and a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The county
court entered the findings of fact and conclusions of law but denied the motion for new
trial. This appeal ensued.
II. JURISDICTION
In issues one and two, which we address together, Dwain asserts that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction over the forcible detainer suit.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review de novo whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a
case. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. See id.
To determine whether the plaintiff has affirmatively demonstrated the court’s jurisdiction
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to hear the case, we consider the facts alleged by the plaintiff and, “to the extent it is
relevant to the jurisdictional issue, the evidence submitted by the parties.” Tex. Nat. Res.
Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001). If a plaintiff pleads
facts that affirmatively demonstrate an absence of jurisdiction and such defect is
incurable, immediate dismissal of the case is proper. Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co., 779
S.W.2d 802, 804–05 (Tex. 1989).
Justice courts have original jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer
proceedings. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(2); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004;
Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). District
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over title disputes. See Merit Mgmt. Partners I, L.P. v.
Noelke, 266 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). Forcible detainer
actions in justice courts may be tried concurrently with title disputes in district court. See
Kassim v. Carlisle Interests, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.);
Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). “A forcible detainer action is a procedure to determine the right
to immediate possession of real property. It is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
inexpensive means to obtain possession without resort to an action on the title.”
Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557. Accordingly, in a forcible detainer suit, “the only issue shall
be as to the right to actual possession; and the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 746. However, if the question of title is so “intertwined” with the issue of
immediate possession, then possession may not be adjudicated until legal title has been
determined. Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557. Thus, “[i]f it becomes apparent that a genuine
fact issue regarding title exists in a forcible detainer suit, the court does not have
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jurisdiction over the matter. Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Waco
2002, no pet.).
B. Analysis
Dwain contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the forcible
detainer suit. First, Dwain contends a forcible detainer action requires proof of a landlord-
tenant relationship. See Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 733–35 (“One indication that a justice court
(and county court on appeal) is called on to adjudicate title to real estate in a forcible
detainer case—and, thus, exceed its jurisdiction—is when a landlord tenant relationship
is lacking.”). Secondly, he contends that “the question of title is so intertwined with the
issue of possession, th[at] possession may not be adjudicated without first determining
title.” Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We agree with Dwain that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Although a tenant-landlord relationship is not “a prerequisite to jurisdiction, the lack
of such a relationship indicates that the case may present a title issue.” Espinoza v.
Lopez, 468 S.W.3d 692, 695–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). We
reached a similar conclusion in Garza v. Estate of Olivarez, No. 13-17-00265-CV, 2018
WL 3768505, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.). In Garza, the estate admitted in its pleadings that there was no lease agreement
between Garza and the estate. We concluded: “[t]he undisputed fact that there was no
lease agreement, and therefore no landlord-tenant relationship, indicates that there is a
genuine issue of title that must be resolved.” Id. Similarly, in the present case,
Richardson pleaded “[Dwain] is not now and never has been a tenant of [the Property].”
Thus, this indicates there is a genuine issue of title that needs to be resolved first. Id.
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Richardson argues there was a tenant-landlord relationship because once she
gave Dwain notice to leave the Property, he became a tenant at sufferance. It is true that
several courts have held that the trial court had jurisdiction in a forcible detainer suit where
one of the parties was a tenant at sufferance. See Pinnacle, 447 S.W.3d at 564
(“[B]ecause the deed of trust contained a valid tenant-at-sufferance clause, appellees do
not allege a title dispute that is intertwined with the right of immediate possession.”); see
also Onabajo v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB, No. 03-17-00486-CV, 2018 WL
2728068, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding
there was an independent basis for the justice court and for the county court to determine
the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue of title to the property
because “foreclosure under [the] security instrument create[d] a landlord and tenant-at-
sufferance relationship”); Gardocki v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, No. 14-12-00921-CV, 2013
WL 6568765, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“[W]here a deed of trust provides that in the event of foreclosure, the previous owner will
become a tenant at sufferance if he does not surrender possession, the trial court can
resolve possession without resort to title.”). However, in the present case, there is no
such tenant at sufferance clause and there is no foreclosure.
Ultimately, Dwain contends he is entitled to remain on the Property because under
the 2016 will, Dwain’s sister Donnell was named as the successor trustee. Dwain testified
that he is working with his sisters to remodel the home by installing new floors and
applying fresh paint; furthermore, Dwain claims that Donnell did not give Dwain any
indication that he was going to be forced to vacate the Property. Under the 2016 will,
Richardson did not have any immediate right to possession of the Property or authority
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to force Dwain to leave. But under the 2018 will, Richardson is named as the successor
trustee, and as such, she had the right to immediate possession.
Thus, considering the pleadings and record evidence, we conclude that “the right
to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute.” Lopez, 76
S.W.3d at 605; see Yarto v. Gilliland, 287 S.W.3d 83, 90 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2009, no pet.) (concluding that the parties’ “competing assertions over the
nature of their relationship—with neither party’s assertion having the support of a
contractual document (i.e., a written lease or written contract for deed)—requires the
resolution of a title dispute before the right of immediate possession can be fully
ascertained”); see also Garza, 2018 WL 3768505, at *5. Therefore, the justice court, and
county court on appeal, lacked jurisdiction. See Lopez, 76 S.W.3d at 605. We sustain
Dwain’s first issue. Because we sustain Dwain’s first issue, we need not address his third
issue concerning the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 47.1.
III. ATTORNEY’S FEES
In his second issue, Dwain argues that the trial court erroneously awarded
attorney’s fees because Richardson did not meet the requirements that would permit
attorney’s fees in an eviction suit. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004. Richardson
concedes that attorney’s fees were not proper here. We sustain Dwain’s second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss Richardson’s forcible detainer
suit for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e); Goodman-Delaney v. Grantham,
484 S.W.3d 171, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“When a court’s
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void judgment is appealed, we have jurisdiction to declare the judgment void and render
judgment dismissing the case.”).
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
12th day of December, 2019.
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