in Re J. Michael Moore ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-19-00551-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN RE J. MICHAEL MOORE
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Prohibition, and Injunction.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides1
Relator J. Michael Moore filed a petition for writ of mandamus, prohibition, and
injunction in the above cause on October 24, 2019. Through this original proceeding,
relator seeks (1) a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, the Honorable Judge
Fernando Mancias, to vacate his October 18, 2019 order striking relator’s plea in
intervention, (2) a writ of prohibition ordering and prohibiting the respondent from
interfering with the jurisdiction of the assigned senior justice of the 93rd Judicial District
1
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in
any other case,” but when “denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do
so.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
Court, and (3) a writ of injunction prohibiting and enjoining real parties in interest Marco
A. Cantu a/k/a Mark Cantu and Roxanne Cantu a/k/a Roxana Cantu “or any other parties
in active concert with them” from filing any further lawsuits or otherwise initiating pleadings
in any other court “concerning or related to the subject of these proceedings below for the
purpose of forum shopping, or to avoid this Court’s jurisdiction over any appeal in the
proceedings below.” We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and deny
the petitions for writs of prohibition and injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
In their briefing, the parties have extensively discussed the lengthy history and
convoluted facts that provide the backdrop to this original proceeding.2 Here, we confine
our recitation of the facts to those that are relevant and necessary to resolution of the
issues presented.
The underlying proceedings arise from trial court cause number C-4003-19-B in
the 93rd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. In the underlying proceedings, Cantu
seeks the Rule 202 deposition of Ricardo Rodriguez. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202 (governing
depositions taken before an anticipated suit or to investigate a potential claim or suit). On
October 8, 2019, relator filed a “Plea in Intervention and Motion to Transfer from Improper
Court Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7 Hidalgo County Local Rules and Art. 52.01.” Relator
asserted that he was an interested party with a justiciable interest in the subject matter of
the allegations in the suit because “he is one of the subjects of [Cantu’s] request to initiate
a criminal prosecution.” Relator alleged, in relevant part, that Cantu had engaged in forum
2
See, e.g., Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Cantu, No. 18-0879, 2019 WL 5482830, at *1–6, __
S.W.3d __, __ (Tex. Oct. 25, 2019) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. Cantu, 581 S.W.3d 859, 861–70 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2019, no pet.); Cantu v. Guerra & Moore, LLP, 549 S.W.3d 664, 666–72 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied).
2
shopping and requested transfer of the case from the 93rd District Court to the 92nd
District Court. That same day, relator filed a separate “Motion to Transfer from Improper
Court Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7 Hidalgo County Local Rules.” This motion sought transfer
of the case from the 93rd District Court “back to the first filed court,” the 92nd District
Court, because the case “was improperly transferred” to the 93rd District Court in violation
of Rule 1.1 of the Hidalgo County Local Rules. Relator argued that the Local Rules
provided that: “[o]n being filed, a case shall be assigned randomly to the docket of one of
the District Courts with civil jurisdiction,” and “[o]nce assigned to a court, a case will
remain on the docket of that court for all purposes unless transferred as provided by these
rules.” Relator contended that Cantu’s “unlawful forum shopping” had resulted in the
case’s transfer to the 93rd District Court.
On October 9, 2019, the Honorable Mario Ramirez Jr., the Local Administrative
Presiding Judge, signed an “Order of Referral and Recusal on Judge’s Own Motion.” The
order stated that, after having “reviewed the Plea in Intervention and Motion to Transfer
From Improper Court Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7 Hidalgo County Local Rules and Art. 52.0
and the Motion to Transfer From Improper Court Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7. Hidalgo County
Local Rules,” Judge Ramirez found it “necessary” to recuse himself. This order recused
Judge Ramirez and “referred this cause” to the Presiding Judge of the Fifth Administrative
Judicial Region “for assignment of a judge to preside in this cause.”
On October 9, 2019, the Honorable Missy Medary, Presiding Judge of the Fifth
Administrative Judicial Region, signed an “Order of Assignment.” The order assigns J.
Manuel Bañales, Senior Judge, to the 93rd District Court pursuant to section 74.056 of
the government code. The order specifically provides that:
3
The judge is assigned to preside in Cause Number C-4003-19-B styled
Marco Cantu, (Petitioner), J. Michael Moore, (Intervenor) vs. Hidalgo
County District Attorney Ricardo Rodriguez (Respondent) for the limited
purpose of determining the Motion to Transfer From Improper Court
Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7 Hidalgo County Local Rules, Plea in Intervention and
Motion to Strike Plea in Intervention and Motion for Sanctions and
Response to Motion to Transfer.
On October 10, 2019, Cantu filed “Plaintiff’s Objection to Appointment of Visiting
Presiding Judge.” On October 11, 2019, Judge Bañales signed an order setting a hearing
on Cantu’s objection to be held on October 24, 2019, “at the same date and time as the
other motions.”
On October 15, 2019, however, the Honorable Fernando Mancias, Presiding
Judge of the 93rd District Court, signed an “Order Setting Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike Plea [in] Intervention and Motion for Sanctions.” This hearing was set for October
18, 2019, at 3:00 p.m.
On October 17, 2019, Cantu filed “Plaintiff’s Supplemental Objection to
Appointment of Visiting Presiding Judge.”
On Friday, October 18, 2019, at 10:09 a.m., relator filed a letter directed to Judge
Mancias. The letter enclosed the Order of Assignment signed by Judge Medary assigning
Judge Bañales to the case and quoted portions of the letter of assignment, including the
specific matters for which Judge Bañales had been assigned. The letter informed Judge
Mancias that Judge Bañales had set all pending motions, including Cantu’s objection to
his assignment, for hearing on October 24, 2019. The letter further stated:
On Tuesday, October 15, 2019, Marco A. Cantu obtained a setting on the
same motions as that previously set by Presiding Judge Jose Manuel
Bañales of the 93rd District Court in this case which are subject to this
assignment, set by you for today at 3 p.m. The Order of Assignment by the
Presiding Judge of the Fifth Administrative Region, Judge Missy Medary,
4
commits exclusive jurisdiction of this case over Mr. Marco A. Cantu’s
motions until further order of the Administrative Presiding Judge.
Therefore, it is with all due respect that the undersigned Intervenor requests
that this Court remove the hearing set in this matter at 3:00 o’clock p.m.
today, October 18, 2019, as any order or action taken by the Court would
be a nullity, since the Order of Assignment controls the hearing on the
subject motions set for today.
By copy of this letter via e-file service, all parties are being notified of this
action as indicated below.
On October 18, 2019, Judge Mancias proceeded with the scheduled hearing.
Cantu appeared, but relator did not. Cantu noted that relator had filed “some kind of
pleading saying that Judge Bañales had been ordered to do something, but . . . this is on
my motion to strike their intervention and the Court set it and he had notice of it.” Judge
Mancias stated that he had received “an order from Judge Bañales where he sustained
an objection to him being assigned to whatever case he was assigned to.”3 Judge
Mancias instructed the bailiff to call for relator, who did so “three times; no response.”4
3
The record does not appear to contain this order.
4
As per the affidavit of relator:
On October 18, 2019, at 10:09 a.m., I e-served correspondence to Judge Fernando
Mancias of the 93rd Court of Hidalgo County, objecting to a hearing scheduled to be heard
on that date at 3:00 p.m. by Judge Mancias. As I was unable to reach the court by phone,
I sent Mr. Erasmo Escamilla, an employee of Moore Law Firm, to go hand deliver a
courtesy copy of the correspondence to Judge Mancias at his office.
Mr. Escamilla, while at the Courthouse, found that the courtroom was locked including
Judge Mancias’ office. While attempting to ascertain if the court personnel would be there
for that afternoon hearing at 3:00 p.m., Mr. Escamilla was approached by personnel from
County Court # 5, who informed him that the 93rd Court was closed for the day. They
further explained that the Court personnel would not return until Monday, October 21, 2019.
Mr. Escamilla left the courthouse and returned to the office. As a result of the information
given to Mr. Escamilla, I did not appear at that afternoon’s hearing even though at the
appointed time, another phone call was placed to the 93rd Court to make certain that the
Court was closed. My phone calls went unanswered. Thereafter, on October 21, 2019, I
received a signed order striking my Plea of Intervention in Cause No. C-4003-19-B. The
order was signed by Judge Mancias.
5
After further discussions, both on and off the record, Judge Mancias verbally granted
Cantu’s motion to strike relator’s intervention. That same day, Judge Mancias signed an
order striking relator’s plea in intervention.
On October 21, 2019, Judge Medary assigned the Honorable Rogelio Valdez to
the case. The language of the order assigning Judge Valdez mirrors that of the
assignment to Judge Bañales. It specifically provides that Judge Valdez is assigned to
provide in the case for “the limited purpose” of determining the “Motion to Transfer From
Improper Court Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7 Hidalgo County Local Rules, Plea in Intervention
and Motion to Strike Plea in Intervention and Motion for Sanctions and Response to
Motion to Transfer.”
This original proceeding ensued. Relator asserts that the trial court erred by
entering an order striking relator’s plea in intervention “after having been removed as the
Presiding Judge of the 93rd Judicial District Court from this case by Judge Medary” and
relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to address this error. The Court requested
that the real parties in interest—Marco A. Cantu a/k/a Mark Cantu and Roxanne Cantu
a/k/a Roxana Cantu; Ricardo Rodriguez, the Hidalgo County District Attorney; and Juan
L. Villescas, Assistant District Attorney; or any others whose interest would be directly
affected by the relief sought, file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8.
Judge Mancias signed and entered an Order Striking my Plea in Intervention at a time
when the Presiding Judge of the Fifth Administrative Judicial Region, the Honorable Missy
Medary, had previously assigned to a Senior Judge to the 93rd District Court, to determine
that issue and the transfer of the case back to the first filed court, the 92nd Judicial District
Court.
Relator also filed the affidavit of Escamilla detailing his actions as described by relator.
6
After requesting and receiving an extension of time, Cantu filed a “Reply to Petition
for Writ of Mandamus.” In his response, Cantu raises two arguments in opposition to
relator’s request for extraordinary relief. Cantu first asserts that “the relator merely
tendered exhibits, without a brief,” and further asserts that relator “did not comply with
Section 3, Rule 52. 3 (d) (1) (3) (f) (g) (h) (i).” See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3. Cantu’s arguments
concern the form and contents of a petition, including the appellate requirements
pertaining to the statement of the case, issues presented, statement of facts, argument,
and prayer. See id. Cantu’s arguments are not supported by the record. Relator’s
petition, which is available for review on our website, contains argument and authority,
and includes a statement of the case, the issues presented, a statement of facts, and a
prayer for relief. While the petition does not include a separate section entitled “issues,”
the issues are nevertheless expressly stated in the table of contents and reiterated in the
body of the petition. We conclude that the petition meets the requirements of the
appellate rules. See id.
Cantu further asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the
intervention “when the intervenor fail[ed] to appear at the hearing and fail[ed] to establish
a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Cantu’s arguments address the substantive
merits of the Judge Mancias’s ruling on the intervention rather than Judge Mancias’s
ability to rule on it.
Relator filed a reply in support of his petition arguing that Cantu’s response did not
address the issues presented in this original proceeding.
Cantu thereafter filed a response to relator’s reply. He continues to assert that
“[t]here is no argument and authorities ever presented [by relator] in this case.” He
7
asserts that he never received a petition “outlining any alleged error” committed by the
trial court and that he has “also checked on this Court’s web site, and only found a copy
of the exhibits.” Cantu asserts that all issues presented here are moot because the
intervention was struck, and issues made “for the first time” in relator’s “response”
concerning lack of jurisdiction are not before this Court and should be summarily
overruled. Cantu further makes arguments pertaining to the alleged merits of his
underlying claims and his pending appeal regarding disbarment. He insists that the trial
court’s ruling was correct and the “other issues presented” by relator “are all rabbit trails
designed to keep this court from focusing on whether there was an abuse of discretion
on behalf of [the trial court] in striking the [i]ntervention.”
Subsequently, relator filed a motion for emergency stay on grounds that Judge
Mancias had issued further orders in the matter below, including appointing an attorney
pro tem and authorizing the empaneling of a grand jury. This Court granted temporary
relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Relator seeks extraordinary relief by original appellate proceeding through the
issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1.
The issuance of an extraordinary writ is not authorized when the relator has an adequate
remedy by appeal. Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989)
(orig. proceeding).
A. Mandamus
Mandamus is appropriate when the relator demonstrates that the trial court clearly
abused its discretion and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Reece,
8
341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator has the burden of
establishing both prerequisites to mandamus relief, and this burden is a heavy one. In re
CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly
abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision that is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it
amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to analyze the law
correctly or apply the law correctly to the facts. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164
S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). The adequacy of an
appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the benefits of mandamus review
against the detriments. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding). We evaluate the benefits and detriments of mandamus review and consider
whether mandamus will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from
impairment or loss. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.
B. Prohibition
A writ of prohibition is a “creature of limited purpose.” In re Lewis, 223 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding); see In re State ex rel. Munk,
448 S.W.3d 687, 694 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, orig. proceeding); In re Miller, 433
S.W.3d 82, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding). A writ of
prohibition issues only to prevent the threatened commission of a future act. See Tilton
v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 676 n.4 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). The writ is designed
to operate like an injunction issued by a superior court to control, limit, or prevent action
in a court of inferior jurisdiction. Holloway, 767 S.W.2d at 682–83; In re Tex. Dep’t of
Transp., 583 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, orig. proceeding); In re Cap
9
Rock Energy Corp., 225 S.W.3d 160, 160 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding).
The purpose of the writ is to protect the subject matter of an appeal or to prohibit unlawful
interference with enforcement of an appellate court’s judgment. See Holloway, 767
S.W.2d at 683; In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 583 S.W.3d at 796; In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d
at 84; Sivley v. Sivley, 972 S.W.2d 850, 862–63 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, orig.
proceeding). Thus, a writ of prohibition has three functions: (1) preventing interference
with higher courts in deciding a pending appeal; (2) preventing inferior courts from
entertaining suits which will relitigate controversies which have already been settled by
issuing courts; and (3) prohibiting a trial court’s action when it affirmatively appears that
the court lacks jurisdiction. In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 583 S.W.3d at 796; In re Lewis,
223 S.W.3d at 761; In re Johnson, 961 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 1997, orig. proceeding). An appellate court does not have jurisdiction, absent
actual jurisdiction of a pending proceeding, to issue a writ of prohibition requiring that a
trial court refrain from performing a future act. In re State ex rel. Munk, 494 S.W.3d 370,
376–77 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, orig. proceeding); In re Nguyen, 155 S.W.3d 191,
194 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, orig. proceeding); Lesikar v. Anthony, 750 S.W.2d 338, 339
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding). The writ will not issue to protect
an appellate court’s jurisdiction from the “mere possibility” of interference by a trial court;
rather, the threat of jurisdictional interference must be “imminent.” In re Miller, 433 S.W.3d
at 84; see In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2006, orig. proceeding).
The essential difference between the writ of prohibition and the writ of mandamus
is that the former issues to prevent the commission of a future act whereas the latter
10
operates to undo or nullify an act already performed; the former will not be granted when
the act sought to be prevented is already done, but will lie when such act is not a full,
complete, and accomplished judicial act. In re State ex rel. Escamilla, 561 S.W.3d 711
(Tex. App.—Austin 2018, orig. proceeding).
C. Injunction
Like the writ of prohibition, the purpose of a writ of injunction is to enforce or protect
the appellate court’s jurisdiction. Holloway, 767 S.W.2d at 683; In re Murphy, 484 S.W.3d
655, 656 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Olson, 252 S.W.3d
747, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re
Sheshtawy, 161 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding).
The writ of injunction is issued by a superior court to control, limit, or prevent action in a
court of inferior jurisdiction. In re Olson, 252 S.W.3d at 747; In re State, 180 S.W.3d 423,
425 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, orig. proceeding). The use of a writ of injunction is limited
to cases in which we have actual jurisdiction over a pending proceeding. In re Murphy,
484 S.W.3d at 656; In re Olson, 252 S.W.3d at 747; In re Wyatt, 110 S.W.3d 511, 511
(Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding).
Like the writ of prohibition and in contrast to a writ of mandamus, a writ of injunction
is preventative in nature. Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 153–54 (Tex. 2016).
However, a writ of injunction operates on individuals whereas a writ of prohibition is
directed against a court. Haskett v. Harris, 567 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1978, no writ); Cattlemens Trust Co. of Ft. Worth v. Willis, 179 S.W.
1115, 1118 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1915, no writ); see also Amsav Grp. v. American
11
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Brazoria Cty., No. C14-89-00006-CV, 1989 WL 3387, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
More than one judge may exercise authority over a single case. Hull v. S. Coast
Catamarans, L.P., 365 S.W.3d 35, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied);
Davis v. Crist Indus., Inc., 98 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied);
see also TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 (district judges may exchange districts or hold court for
each other when they deem it expedient); TEX. R. CIV. P. 330(g) (stating that in counties
with two or more district courts having civil jurisdiction, “any judge may hear any part of
any case or proceeding pending in any said courts and determine the same, or may hear
and determine any question in any case, and any other judge may complete the hearing
and render judgment in the case”). These provisions for transfer between courts in the
same county “were clearly intended as a convenience for the courts and the parties”
based on the “underlying assumption that the courts, if not the parties, would
communicate and cooperate with one another in a collegial fashion.” Republic Royalty
Co. v. Evins, 931 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1996, orig.
proceeding). The statutes and rules rely on judicial restraint and collegiality to prevent
district and county courts within the same county from fighting one another for jurisdiction
over a particular case. Id.
Further, the presiding judge of an administrative judicial region is authorized to
assign judges in the region to “try cases and dispose of accumulated business.” TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.056(a), (b). A judge sitting by order of assignment has “all the
powers of the judge of the court to which he is assigned.” See id. § 74.059(a). Generally,
12
visiting judges are assigned either to a particular case or for a specific period of time.
Hull, 365 S.W.3d at 41; In re Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding). The terms of the assignment order control
the extent of the assigned judge’s authority and when that authority terminates. See Ex
parte Eastland, 811 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); In re Amos, 397 S.W.3d
309, 314 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, orig. proceeding); Hull, 365 S.W.3d at 41; In re B.F.B.,
241 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Davis, 98 S.W.3d at 341.
Section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code governs objections to the
assignment of trial judges. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053. If a properly filed
objection under this statute is timely, “the assigned judge’s disqualification is automatic.”
In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); see id. § 74.053(b)
(stating that “the judge shall not hear the case”); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501
(Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“When a party files a timely objection to an
assigned judge under section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code, the assigned
judge’s disqualification is mandatory.”); see also In re Honea, 415 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding).
This original proceeding attacks the respondent’s ruling striking relator’s plea in
intervention, and the resolution of the matter before us requires us to determine who had
the authority to rule on relator’s plea in intervention. As stated previously, relator’s plea
in intervention and motion to transfer were originally submitted to Judge Ramirez;
however, Judge Ramirez recused himself and referred the matter to the regional presiding
judge in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(f). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f).
Under Rule 18a(f), the regional presiding judge had the authority to assign a judge to rule.
13
See id. R. 18a(g). Rule 18a offers no third option whereby a judge other than the regional
presiding judge can handle matters following recusal. See generally id. R. 18a. Stated
otherwise, Rule 18a “expressly confers the authority to reassign a case following a
recusal to the regional presiding judge of the administrative judicial district.” In re Alpert,
276 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]) (concluding that the regional presiding judge, rather than the presiding judge of
the statutory probate courts, possessed the authority to reassign cases after a motion to
recuse had been filed in a probate matter). We note that the language of Rule 18a is
“mandatory.” In re State ex rel. Durden, No. 04-19-00215-CR, 2019 WL 3642650, at *2,
__ S.W.3d __, __, (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 7, 2019, orig. proceeding); In re
Marshall, 515 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding);
Culver v. Culver, 360 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
After the recusal, Judge Medary, acting in accordance with Rule 18a as the
regional presiding judge, assigned two different judges to rule on the referred matters.
See id. We examine the terms of the orders of assignment to determine the extent of the
assigned judges’ authority and when that authority terminated. See Ex parte Eastland,
811 S.W.2d at 572; In re Amos, 397 S.W.3d at 314; Hull, 365 S.W.3d at 41. Here, both
the original assignment order to Judge Bañales on October 9, 2019, and the subsequent
assignment order to Judge Valdez on October 21, 2019, contain language specifically
assigning them to “preside in Cause Number C-4003-19-B styled Marco Cantu,
(Petitioner), J. Michael Moore, (Intervenor) vs. Hidalgo County District Attorney Ricardo
Rodriguez (Respondent) for the limited purpose of determining the Motion to Transfer
From Improper Court Pursuant to Rule 1.2.7 Hidalgo County Local Rules, Plea in
14
Intervention and Motion to Strike Plea in Intervention and Motion for Sanctions and
Response to Motion to Transfer.” As stated previously, the record indicates that Cantu
objected to Judge Bañales’s assignment, and thus his disqualification was automatic, and
Judge Medary then assigned those same specified matters to Judge Valdez. Although
more than one judge may exercise authority over the case, the terms of the assignment
orders here precluded Judge Mancias from determining the merits of the plea in
intervention or the motion to transfer because Judge Medary’s orders gave the assigned
judges the exclusive authority over those matters specified in the terms of the orders of
assignment. See Davis, 98 S.W.3d at 341. Accordingly, Judge Mancias lacked authority
to entertain and rule on Cantu’s motion to strike relator’s plea in intervention and motion
to transfer. See id. He abused his discretion in concluding otherwise. See id.
Under the circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that relator lacks an
adequate remedy by appeal to address this error. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d at 136. It is well-established that the requirement that the relator lack an
adequate remedy at law is relaxed when the writ is sought against a trial judge who is
acting without authority. See In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998)
(orig. proceeding); In re Richardson, 252 S.W.3d 822, 826 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008,
orig. proceeding). After carefully balancing the benefits and detriments of review by
extraordinary writ, any alleged remedy by appeal would not suffice to spare relator from
further proceedings conducted by a trial judge who lacks authority to rule. See In re Team
Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d at 262; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.
We turn our attention to relator’s request for relief by mandamus, prohibition, and
injunction. Relator requests (1) a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Mancias to vacate
15
his order of October 18, 2019; (2) a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Mancias from
interfering with the assigned judge in this case “or any other assigned judges or any court
in which the matter might be transferred pursuant to a valid transfer order”; and (3) a writ
of injunction prohibiting and enjoining the real parties in interest, “or any other parties in
active concert with them” from “filing any further lawsuits or other initiating pleading in any
other court concerning or related to the subject of these proceedings below for the
purpose of forum shopping, or to avoid this Court’s jurisdiction over any appeal in the
proceedings below.” We conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate and required
under the circumstances of this case. Judge Mancias lacked authority to rule on the plea
in intervention and motion to transfer, see Davis, 98 S.W.3d at 341, and relator lacks a
remedy by appeal to address this error. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
at 136; In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d at 428; In re Richardson, 252 S.W.3d at
826. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct Judge Mancias to
vacate his order. In contrast, we deny relator’s request for relief by writs of injunction and
prohibition. There is no pending proceeding to which these matters pertain and
fundamentally relator has failed to show that the issuance of these writs is necessary to
enforce the jurisdiction of this Court. See In re Yates, 193 S.W.3d 151, 152 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition, the response, the
applicable law, and the additional briefing provided by the parties, is of the opinion that
relator has shown himself entitled to relief by mandamus, but not by prohibition or
injunction. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP.
16
P. 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective
until the case is finally decided.”). We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus
and direct Judge Mancias to vacate his order of October 18, 2019, striking relator’s
petition for intervention and any and all other orders that he has issued in this case. Our
writ will issue only if he fails to promptly comply with our directive. We deny the petition
for writ of prohibition and writ of injunction.
GINA M. BENAVIDES.
Justice
Delivered and filed the
19th day of December, 2019.
17