Ex Parte Armando Ramos ( 2022 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
DISSENTING OPINION
No. 04-21-00203-CR
EX PARTE Armando RAMOS
From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018CR6442-W1
Honorable Velia J. Meza, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Dissenting Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: November 30, 2022
Appellant Armando Ramos appeals the trial court’s denial of his application for a post-
conviction writ of habeas corpus, arguing his misdemeanor conviction subjected him to double
jeopardy. The majority opinion affirms the trial court’s denial of Ramos’s habeas application.
Because I believe the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the habeas application, I
respectfully dissent.
THE 11.09 HABEAS APPLICATION
“A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor offense may attack the validity of his conviction
by way of habeas corpus if he is either (1) confined or restrained as a result of a misdemeanor
charge or conviction, or (2) is no longer confined, but is subject to collateral legal consequences
resulting from the conviction.” Ex parte Rucker, No. 05-21-00364-CR, 2022 WL 714744, at *3
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 10, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Dissenting Opinion 04-21-00203-CR
State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 125–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)). See
generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 11.09, 11.21, 11.22; Ex parte Schmidt, 109 S.W.3d 480,
482–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “To prevail upon a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus,
[appellant] bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts that would
entitle him to relief.” Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Collazo,
264 S.W.3d at 126. The habeas applicant must therefore prove he is confined, restrained, or subject
to collateral legal consequences resulting from his misdemeanor conviction. See Collazo, 264
S.W.3d at 126; see also Schmidt, 109 S.W.3d at 481–84; Rucker, 2022 WL 714744, at *3. These
requirements are jurisdictional. See Ex parte Cathcart, 13 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(“Because we find that appellant was neither held to bail nor legally restrained in her liberty on
the charge of intoxication assault, we must also find that the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
district court was not properly invoked.”); Collazo, 264 S.W.3d at 125–26 (concluding habeas
applicant properly invoked trial court’s jurisdiction by demonstrating he was subject to collateral
consequences because he was denied opportunity to obtain Texas peace officer license); Le v.
State, 300 S.W.3d 324, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (concluding habeas
applicant properly invoked trial court’s jurisdiction by demonstrating he was subject to collateral
consequences because then-present ICE detention and potential deportation based solely on
misdemeanor convictions).
The habeas applicant must also establish the confinement or restraint is a result of the
conviction that he challenges in his habeas application. See Le, 300 S.W.3d at 326 (habeas
applicant must establish collateral legal consequences resulted from her Texas misdemeanor
convictions); Collazo, 264 S.W.3d at 125–26 (defendant may attack misdemeanor conviction
provided he is confined, restrained, or subject to collateral legal consequences resulting from
conviction); see also Cathcart, 13 S.W.3d at 417; In re Crocker, No. 05-21-00692-CV, 2021 WL
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Dissenting Opinion 04-21-00203-CR
4621765, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 7, 2021) (orig. proceeding) (“Without proof that relator
is being restrained or confined as a result of the DWI arrest, relator is not entitled to seek habeas
relief.”).
Ramos alleged in his habeas application he was offered “time served” for a guilty plea on
his misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated, and he accepted that deal. This is consistent
with the record, which shows Ramos was sentenced to time served, and the trial court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law, which provide “[Ramos’s] sentence was satisfied as time served.”
Although Ramos remains confined, the record shows he is not confined or restrained as a result of
a misdemeanor charge or conviction. Instead, his confinement results from the revocation of his
parole with respect to his conviction for felony aggravated sexual assault of a child, which occurred
two years before his guilty plea on his misdemeanor DWI conviction. Ramos does not identify any
other proof he is confined, restrained, or subject to collateral legal consequences because of his
misdemeanor DWI conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 11.21 & 11.22; Tatum, 846
S.W.2d at 327; Collazo, 264 S.W.3d at 126; Brumley, 2018 WL 2054625, at *1.
Because Ramos has failed to carry his burden of showing how he is confined, restrained,
or subject to collateral legal consequences, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider his
habeas application. See Cathcart, 13 S.W.3d at 417; Ex parte Huerta, 582 S.W.3d 407, 413 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d) (vacating trial court’s order and dismissing appeal for want of
jurisdiction where release from Lubbock County confinement rendered appeal of trial court’s order
moot); Ex Parte Galvan-Herrera, No. 13-11-00380-CR, 2012 WL 1484097, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi-Edinburg Apr. 26, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(vacating and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction). Without jurisdiction, the trial court improperly
considered Ramos’s habeas application and denied it. The majority opinion, however, implicitly
finds the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Ramos’s application and ignores the burden Ramos
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Dissenting Opinion 04-21-00203-CR
must carry to show he is confined, restrained, or subject to collateral legal consequences as a result
of his misdemeanor DWI conviction. To the extent the majority reasons the State has not raised
these jurisdictional concerns, we are “obligated to review issues affecting jurisdiction.” See
Collazo, 264 S.W.3d at 126, n.2.
CONCLUSION
Because Ramos failed to meet his burden and show how he is confined, restrained, or
otherwise subject to collateral legal consequences, he failed to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction
to consider his 11.09 habeas application. I would therefore vacate the trial court’s April 9, 2021
order denying habeas relief and dismiss Ramos’s misdemeanor habeas application for lack of
jurisdiction.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Do Not Publish
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