Dione Diane Blades v. State ( 2019 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-18-00029-CR
DIONE DIANE BLADES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Childress County, Texas
Trial Court No. 6015, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding
April 5, 2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before CAMPBELL and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, Dione Diane Blades, appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating her
guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance,1 and sentencing her to ten
years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, a $3,000 fine, and $180 in restitution. We affirm.
1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (West 2017).
Factual and Procedural Background
On February 2, 2017, appellant pled guilty to a third-degree felony offense of
possession of a controlled substance. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court deferred
adjudication of appellant’s guilt, placed her on three years’ community supervision, and
assessed a $3,000 fine and $180 in restitution.
In May of 2017, appellant’s conditions of community supervision were amended to
give her the opportunity to go to drug treatment at the Concho Valley Community
Corrections Facility Substance Abuse Treatment Facility. Appellant was required to serve
ten days in the Childress County Jail before being sent to treatment.
On October 26, 2017, the State filed a motion to adjudicate the guilt of appellant.
It filed its first amended motion to adjudicate on November 8. In its amended motion, the
State alleged that appellant violated the terms and conditions of her community
supervision by consuming marijuana, consuming methamphetamine, consuming Tylenol
4, failing to obey the rules of the Concho Valley program, voluntarily terminating her
participation in the Concho Valley program, and failing to successfully complete the
Concho Valley program.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s amended motion on January 24,
2018. During the trial, appellant’s probation officer at the Concho Valley facility, Melissa
Migel, testified that appellant told Migel that she had used marijuana on June 23, 2017;
methamphetamine on July 2, while in county jail awaiting transfer to the Concho Valley
program; and Tylenol 4 on July 5, while being transported to the Concho Valley facility.
Migel also testified that appellant decided she wanted to leave the Concho Valley program
2
and that she was discharged without having successfully completed the program.
Appellant testified and admitted that she voluntarily left the Concho Valley program
without successfully completing it. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated
that it found that appellant had violated the terms of her community supervision by using
marijuana, methamphetamine, and Tylenol 4. The trial court also stated that it found that
appellant had voluntarily left the Concho Valley program and, as a result, had not
successfully completed that program. As such, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty
of the offense of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced her to ten years’
incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, a
$3,000 fine, and $180 in restitution. Appellant timely appealed the resulting judgment.
By her appeal, appellant presents five issues. Her first three issues challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that she used
marijuana, methamphetamine, and Tylenol 4 in violation of the terms and conditions of
her community supervision. Appellant’s fourth and fifth issues contend that the evidence
was insufficient to support the trial court’s determination that she failed to successfully
complete and voluntarily terminated her participation in the Concho Valley treatment
program.
Law and Analysis
A trial court’s order revoking community supervision is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Cardona
v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc)). In a revocation hearing,
the State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
3
defendant violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision. Id. at 763-64;
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). The State satisfies
this burden when the greater weight of credible evidence presented to the trial court
creates a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the defendant has
violated a condition of her community supervision. Rickels, 202 S.W.2d at 763-64. An
appellate court reviews the evidence presented in a revocation proceeding in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981).
The trial court is the sole trier of fact and determines issues of credibility and the
weight to be given to testimony at a revocation hearing. Mattias v. State, 731 S.W.2d
936, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc). The trial court can accept or reject any or all
of the testimony presented by the State or the defendant. Id.
Proof of any one violation of the terms and conditions of community supervision is
sufficient to support a revocation. McDonald v. State, 608 S.W.2d 192, 200 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (op. on reh’g); Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
A probationer’s oral admission of a violation of a term or condition of community
supervision made to a probation officer is, by itself, sufficient to support a revocation of
community supervision. Hampton v. State, No. 07-00-00078-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS
4721, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 18, 2000, no pet.) (citing Cunningham v. State,
488 S.W.2d 117, 119-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)); Anthony v. State, 962 S.W.2d 242, 246
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (same); Barajas v. State, 682 S.W.2d 588, 589
(Tex. App.—Waco 1984, no pet.) (same).
4
In the present case, one of the terms and conditions of appellant’s community
supervision required her to totally abstain from purchasing, using, possessing or
consuming marijuana, pills, narcotics, controlled substances, harmful drugs, or any
chemical which might cause intoxication unless prescribed by a physician. When
appellant arrived at the Concho Valley Treatment Facility, she was drug tested. When
Migel, appellant’s probation officer at Concho Valley, confronted appellant with test
results that were positive for methamphetamine and opiates, appellant admitted to Migel
that appellant had used marijuana on June 23, 2017, methamphetamine on July 2, and
Tylenol 4 on July 5. Each of these instances of drug use occurred during appellant’s
period of community supervision and each constitutes a violation of the terms and
conditions of appellant’s community supervision. Because an oral admission of a
violation of a term or condition of community supervision made to a probationer’s
probation officer is, by itself, sufficient evidence to support a revocation of community
supervision, see Hampton, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4721, at *4-5; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at
246; Barajas, 682 S.W.2d at 589, we must conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
support the trial court’s determination that appellant violated the terms and conditions of
her community supervision. Because proof of only one violation is necessary to support
a revocation, see McDonald, 608 S.W.2d at 200; Taylor, 604 S.W.2d at 180, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating appellant guilty of the offense
of possession of a controlled substance.
We acknowledge that appellant testified that she did not use methamphetamine
on July 2 and did not tell Migel that she had. Additionally, appellant testified that she had
been prescribed the Tylenol 4. However, we note that nothing in appellant’s testimony
5
addressed her admission of marijuana use on June 23. As previously indicated, proof of
only one violation is necessary to support a revocation. See McDonald, 608 S.W.2d at
200; Taylor, 604 S.W.2d at 180. Additionally, the trial court heard the conflicting testimony
of Migel and appellant and resolved the inconsistency in favor of Migel. Mattias, 731
S.W.2d at 940.
Because the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that
appellant violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision by using
controlled substances and this evidence is also sufficient to support the trial court’s
adjudication of appellant’s guilt, we need not address appellant’s fourth and fifth issues
relating to whether she violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision
by failing to successfully complete the Concho Valley drug treatment program. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s adjudication of
appellant as guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(a).
Judy C. Parker
Justice
Do not publish.
6