Darrel Hall v. State ( 2006 )

Opinion issued June 15, 2006

  In The  

Court of Appeals

For The  

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-05-00919-CR  

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DARRELL HALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 248th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1021456

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MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found appellant, Darrell Hall, guilty of aggravated robbery. The jury assessed appellant’s punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions, at 40 years’ confinement. In two points of error, appellant challenges (1) the legal sufficiency of the evidence and (2) an evidentiary ruling of the trial court.

          We affirm.

Background

          On March 15, 2005, appellant robbed the complainant, Julian Landaverde, at gunpoint. Appellant took Landaverde’s mobile telephone and wallet containing $200. Appellant fled the scene as a passenger in a black car. Before the car drove off, Landaverde wrote down the license plate number. Landaverde contacted the police to report the incident and gave the responding police officer the license plate number.

          Ten days later, Houston police officer W. Lyons was dispatched to an apartment complex. When he arrived, Officer Lyons saw appellant get out of the passenger side of a black car. Appellant ran up to Officer Lyons and said, “He’s back there.” Appellant then ran in the direction he had indicated to Officer Lyons.

          Officer Lyons checked the license plate number of the black car and discovered that it was connected with the March 15 robbery of Landaverde. Although the black car was identified as having been involved in the robbery, no suspect had been named.

          Officer Lyons then approached a woman sitting in the black car. The woman directed Officer Lyons to the apartment where appellant lived. The apartment identified by the woman belonged to Alvin Stewart. Appellant had been living with Stewart in the apartment. Officer Lyons spoke with Stewart who provided the officer with appellant’s name.

          Based on this information, Houston police detective P. Reese compiled a photospread that included appellant’s photograph. Detective Reese showed the photospread to Landaverde, who immediately identified appellant as the person who had robbed him.

Moot Issue

          In his first point of error, appellant contended that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because volume two of the reporter’s record had not been filed with the district clerk’s office. The State contends that this point of error was rendered moot by the subsequent filing of volume two. We agree.

          Volume two contained a transcript of pretrial matters heard by the trial court. After appellant’s brief was filed, volume two was filed with the district clerk. Appellant then filed a supplemental brief in this Court. Appellant acknowledged that volume two had been filed and that it “does not include any testimony, evidence or hearings regarding the legal issues regarding [appellant’s] case.” The “prayer for relief” in appellant’s supplemental brief only requests this Court to consider his second point of error and to remand the case for a new trial.

          Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first point of error as moot.

Evidentiary Challenge

          In his second point of error, appellant complains of the trial court’s admission of Officer Lyons’s testimony that Stewart had provided the officer with appellant’s name. Appellant contends that such testimony was hearsay and violated his right to confrontation as provided in the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 10.

          Appellant did not preserve error as to his confrontation complaint. At trial, appellant objected to the complained-of testimony only on the ground that it was hearsay. Although admission of hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant implicates the right of confrontation, hearsay objections and objections to violations of the constitutional right to confront witnesses are neither synonymous nor necessarily coextensive. Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Paredes v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an objection made solely on the basis of hearsay did not preserve error on federal confrontation clause grounds. 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Because he did not object to Officer Lyons’s testimony on the basis of his right to confront witnesses under the Texas Constitution, we hold that appellant waived review of this claim on appeal. Id.; see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

          Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant’s hearsay objection to Officer Lyons’s testimony that Stewart had provided him with appellant’s name. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to evidentiary rulings). Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Conversely, a statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

          Texas courts have held that a statement is not hearsay when it is admitted, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish the course of events and circumstances showing how a defendant became a suspect or depicting events leading to his arrest. See id. at 347–48 (holding that appointment book and patient application form containing defendant’s name were not inadmissible hearsay because they were admitted to explain how defendant became suspect); Thornton v. State, 994 S.W.2d 845, 854 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding that police officer’s testimony was not hearsay when admitted to establish course of events and circumstances leading to defendant’s arrest).

          In this case, Officer Lyons’s testimony that Stewart provided him with appellant’s name served to inform the jury how appellant became a suspect and established the course of events leading to appellant’s arrest. For that reason, the trial court would have been justified in concluding that Officer Lyons’s testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of testimony.

          We overrule appellant’s second point of error.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                   Laura Carter Higley

                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Hanks, and Higley.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).