in the Interest of C.L., a Child ( 2009 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-126-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.L., A CHILD
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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant James L. appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental
rights to C.L., his daughter. We affirm.
I. Background
C.L. is the daughter of appellant James L. and Mary M. C.L. was born
on October 24, 2000. She was eight years old at the time of trial. James and
Mary are married, but they have been separated since March 2003. C.L. had
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
been living with Mary since James began a five-year prison sentence in March
2003 for aggravated sexual assault of a child, who was his niece.
The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed
this suit seeking termination of Mary’s and James’s parental rights to C.L.
Before trial, Mary voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.
The Department introduced evidence of James’s knowledge that Mary
had been intoxicated while attempting to care for C.L. and that C.L. had lived
with a half-brother who was an alleged sex offender. James testified that, after
his release from prison in January 2008, he did not attempt reunification with
C.L. until after this suit was filed.
Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated James’s parental rights
under Texas Family Code section 161.001, based on the following findings:
• James had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed C.L. to remain
in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical or
emotional well-being;
• James had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed C.L. with
persons who engaged in conduct that endangered her physical or
emotional well-being; and
• termination was in C.L.’s best interest. 2
This appeal followed.
2
… See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D),(E), (2) (Vernon 2008).
2
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Termination of
James’s Parental Rights
James challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s findings that he had knowingly placed, or knowingly
allowed C.L. to remain, in conditions or surroundings that endangered her
physical or emotional well-being,3 and that he had engaged in conduct, or
knowingly placed C.L. with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered
her physical or emotional well-being.4
In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
Texas Family Code section 161.001, the petitioner must establish by clear and
convincing evidence one ground listed under section 161.001(1) and must
prove that termination is in the best interest of the child.5
A. Standards of Review
Because of the elevated status of parental rights, the quantum of proof
in a termination proceeding is elevated from the preponderance of the evidence
3
… See id. § 161.001(1)(D).
4
… See id. § 161.001(1)(E).
5
… Id. § 161.001; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). James
does not challenge the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights
is in C.L.’s best interest.
3
to clear and convincing evidence. 6 “Clear and convincing evidence” means the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.7 This higher burden of proof alters the appellate standard for both
legal and factual sufficiency reviews.8 In termination cases, therefore, both
standards must take into consideration whether the evidence is such that a
factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of
the matter on which the petitioner bears the burden of proof.9
In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination
cases, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding to determine whether a trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were established.10 This
means that we must assume that the factfinder resolved any disputed facts in
6
… Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–69, 102 S. Ct. 1388,
1397–1403 (1982); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001.
7
… Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (Vernon 2008).
8
… In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2002); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25 (Tex. 2002); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 124 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.).
9
… J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265–66; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25; J.T.G., 121
S.W.3d at 124.
10
… In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
4
favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so. 11 We must
also disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. 12
We must consider, however, undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the
finding.13 That is, we must consider evidence favorable to termination if a
reasonable factfinder could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not.14
In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we must give due
deference to the factfinder’s findings and not supplant the judgment with our
own.15 We must determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the grounds for termination
were established.16 If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that
a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so
significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient.17
11
… Id.
12
… Id.
13
… Id.
14
… Id.
15
… In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).
16
… C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.
17
… H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
5
B. Evidence Supporting Terminating James’s Parental Rights Based on
Family Code Section 161.001(1)(D)
Under subsection D of section 161.001(1), we examine the evidence to
determine whether the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child
to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” 18 Endangerment is defined as exposing to
loss or injury, or to jeopardize.19 Under subsection D, it is necessary to examine
evidence related to the environment of the child to determine if the environment
was the source of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional
well-being.20
To support a finding of endangerment, the parent’s conduct does not
necessarily have to be directed at the child, nor is the child required to suffer
injury.21 Rather, a child is endangered when the environment or the course of
conduct of one of the parents creates a potential for danger that the parent is
18
… Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D); see J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at
125; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet.
denied).
19
… J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.
20
… D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 632.
21
… Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.
1987).
6
aware of but disregards.22 Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by
persons who live in the child’s home or with whom the child is compelled to
associate on a regular basis in the home is a part of the “conditions or
surroundings” of the child’s home under section 161.001(1)(D).23 For example,
a parent’s drug use may support an endangerment finding.24 Additionally, a
parent need not know for certain that the child is in an endangering
environment; awareness of such a potential is sufficient.25
The record shows that various evidence was presented on the issue of
whether James knowingly placed or allowed C.L. to remain in conditions or
surroundings that endangered her physical or emotional well-being. James
testified at trial that, after C.L. was born, he and Mary each often drank alcohol
to the point of intoxication, including drinking in their home while caring for C.L.
James conceded that these episodes of parental intoxication endangered C.L.’s
22
… In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.); see In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1995, no writ).
23
… In re J.L.W., No. 02-08-00179-CV, 2008 WL 4937970, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re W.S., 899
S.W.2d at 776 (stating that “environment” refers not only to the acceptability
of living conditions, but also to the parent’s conduct in the home).
24
… J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.
25
… See S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d at 477.
7
well-being, and he admitted that his personal decision to become intoxicated
while C.L. was in his care was a “bad choice.”
In 1995, James was placed on seven years’ deferred adjudication
probation for aggravated sexual assault of a child. The victim was his then
twelve-year-old niece. While on probation, James attended but failed to
complete a sex offender treatment course. Because he failed to comply with
the terms of his probation, in March 2003, the trial court adjudicated his guilt,
revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to five years’
imprisonment.
When James was released from prison in January 2008, C.L. was in
Mary’s care. C.L. also lived with a half-brother whom James knew to be an
alleged sex offender. James also testified that he knew that Mary had a history
of drinking alcohol while C.L. was in her care, to the point where James
conceded that Mary’s actions “placed [C.L.’s] emotional or physical well-being
in danger,” and that he knew that Mary allegedly had been driving while
intoxicated with her children in the vehicle. James also testified that he did not
seek reunification with C.L. until after being served with the original petition for
termination in this lawsuit.
In June 2008, the Department initiated an investigation when Mary
indicated that she did not wish to have C.L.’s older brother released from
8
juvenile detention. One week before this case was filed, Mary attended a
supervised visit of her grandchild. During the visit, the individual with whom
the grandchild was placed, Bobbie Jones, witnessed Mary drinking two cans of
beer while holding the grandchild. One week later, but still before this case
was filed, Jones and two others reported that Mary arrived at another visitation
of the same grandchild while intoxicated. When Mary left the visitation, and
despite pleas not to drink and drive, Jones and two other individuals witnessed
Mary driving herself and her children, including C.L., home while intoxicated.
During the pendency of this litigation, James did not complete the service
plan the Department prepared for his reunification with C.L. The service plan
required James to complete a psychological evaluation, parenting classes, sex
offender group therapy, and individual counseling. James completed only the
psychological counseling and parenting classes at the time of trial. In fact,
James testified at trial that, since 1995, he has not completed any sex offender
therapy courses ordered during his probation, offered in prison, or
recommended during the pendency of this litigation. James testified that he did
not have enough money to pay for the sex offender group therapy program that
was required under his service plan and that the cost for the program was at
least $700.00. The record includes evidence, however, that James purchased
9
approximately $750.00 worth of presents for C.L. after he was released from
prison.
Because of his imprisonment, his failure to seek reunification with C.L.
after his release from prison in January 2008, and his failure to complete his
reunification service plan following initiation of this lawsuit, James has not been
actively involved with C.L. since at least the beginning of his prison sentence
on March 11, 2003.
Mary testified at trial that she had never left C.L. unsupervised with
James during the two years of C.L.’s life before he was imprisoned. Mary
stated that she did not trust James alone with C.L. in light of his criminal
record: “I don’t trust him with any female child, to tell you the truth . . . . I’m
not going to put my child in any risk of that happening to her.”
Mary’s pattern of alcohol abuse and its effect on her life and ability to
parent established an endangering course of conduct.26 James testified that he
knew of Mary’s alcohol abuse and knew that Mary had a history of attempting
to care for C.L. while intoxicated. James knew that Mary’s behavior presented
more than a theoretical harm to C.L.’s well-being; he testified that he knew that
Mary’s consumption of alcohol while caring for C.L. placed C.L.’s emotional or
26
… See In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
10
physical well-being in danger. James also knew that C.L.’s conditions or
surroundings included living in a home with a half-brother who was an alleged
juvenile sex offender.
Upon his release from prison, James knew of C.L.’s endangerment, but
he made no attempt to reunify with C.L. or remove her from her endangering
conditions and surroundings for approximately five months, and even then his
attempts to reunify coincided with the filing of this lawsuit.
Having carefully considered the evidence, we hold that the evidence is
legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding
under subsection D of family code section 161.001(1).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 27
PER CURIAM
PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; MCCOY and MEIER, JJ.
DELIVERED: September 24, 2009
27
… See S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d at 477; W.S., 899 S.W.2d at 776. Because
the finding under section 161.001(1)(D) is sufficient to support a judgment of
termination, we need not address James’s issues regarding the trial court’s
findings under section 161.001(1)(E). See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; In re K.A.S.,
131 S.W.3d 215, 225 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
11