in the Interest of S.D.S.-C., a Child ( 2009 )


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  • i          i        i                                                                 i      i      i
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-08-00593-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF S.D.S.-C., a Child
    From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2003-PA-01005
    Honorable Peter Sakai, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Sitting:          Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
    Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: March 18, 2009
    AFFIRMED
    This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Shirlinda Casey’s petition to declare an
    adoption order void. Casey contends the trial court erred in denying her petition because the parties
    involved in the adoption lacked standing to file a petition for adoption and the trial court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction to hear the adoption because the father’s rights were not terminated. We
    affirm the trial court’s order.
    BACKGROUND
    On June 5, 2003, Casey and her partner, Sonya Sanders, filed a petition for a same sex
    adoption of Sanders’s biological child, S.D.S. On December 5, 2003, the trial court signed an order
    of adoption. On January 16, 2008, Casey filed a petition seeking to declare the December 5, 2003
    04-08-00593-CV
    adoption order void. The trial court denied Casey’s petition on the basis that Casey lacked standing
    under section 162.012(a) of the Texas Family Code.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Standing is a question of law, and we review standing issues de novo. See In re C.R.P., 
    192 S.W.3d 823
    , 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Standing focuses on who may bring an
    action, and “[i]n conducting our review, we take the factual allegations in the petition as true and
    construe them in favor of the pleader.”                   Hobbs v. Van Stavern, 
    249 S.W.3d 1
    , 3 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
    DISCUSSION
    Casey contends the trial court erred in denying her petition to declare the adoption of S.D.S.
    void. According to Casey, Sanders and she lacked standing to file the petition for adoption, and the
    trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the adoption, because the father’s rights were
    not terminated; therefore, the adoption order is void. As a result, Casey argues the trial court erred
    in denying her petition to vacate the adoption.
    Here, Casey did not attack the validity of the adoption order until approximately four years
    after the order was signed. Under the Texas Family Code, the validity of an adoption order is not
    subject to attack after six months following the date the adoption order was signed. TEX . FAM . CODE
    ANN . § 162.012(a) (Vernon 2009);1 see also Goodson v. Castellanos, 
    214 S.W.3d 741
    , 748-49 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied); 
    Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 4
    ; In re 
    C.R.P., 192 S.W.3d at 826
    . Casey’s
    attack on the adoption order was well beyond the statutory six month time limit. Under the plain and
    1
    Section 162.012(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “(a) Notwithstanding Rule 329, Texas Rule of Civil
    Procedure, the validity of an adoption order is not subject to attack after six months after the date the order was signed.”
    T EX . F AM . C O D E A N N . § 162.012(a) (Vernon 2009).
    -2-
    04-08-00593-CV
    unambiguous language of section 162.012(a), “adoptions cannot be attacked more than six months
    after the issuance of the adoption on any basis.” 
    Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 749
    ; see also 
    Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 4
    (noting no exceptions were made to the six month limitation—“not for challenges to
    purportedly void adoption orders, not for good cause, and not for public policy reasons”).
    Casey relies heavily on Goodson v. Castellanos as authority for her proposition that section
    162.012(a) does not preclude her petition to declare the adoption order void. See 
    Goodson, 214 S.W.3d at 750
    . Casey points to the language in Goodson stating that section 162.012(a) “does
    not prohibit all attacks on an adoption decree.” See 
    id. Notwithstanding this
    language, however, the
    court in Goodson stated that judges must follow the clear principles and directives of the legislature
    by following the plain language of the law in order “to make decisions that are in the best interests
    of the children involved.” 
    Id. After reviewing
    the legislative intent as well as public policy
    arguments, the court went on to clearly hold that an adoption order cannot be attacked more than six
    months after the issuance of the adoption on any basis, including a purportedly void adoption order.
    
    Id. at 749.
    We conclude that section 162.012(a) of the Texas Family Code precludes Casey’s attack on
    the validity of the adoption order. TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . § 162.012(a) (Vernon 2009); see also
    
    Hobbs, 249 S.W.3d at 4
    ; In re 
    C.R.P., 192 S.W.3d at 826
    . Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
    order denying Casey’s petition to declare the adoption void.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s order.
    Marialyn Barnard, Justice
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-08-00593-CV

Filed Date: 3/18/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2015